CHAPTER I
1. The Brahman who is without beginning or end,
whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of
the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects,
from whom the creation of the world proceeds,
It 1 is solemnly declared here that Brahman is beyond all
representation ; 2 it is endowed with all powers which are
neither identical with it nor different from it; it has two
aspects, that of unity ( vidya ) and that of diversity ( avidyd );
(even in its aspect of avidyd ), it is really free from all diver¬
sity; it is, in all states, unaffected by beginning and end, even
though the manifestations appear in wordly transactions 3 in
a temporal and spatial sequence. The Brahman is both effect
and cause, it is many and one and in all the different systems,
the manifestations are not conceived as having nothing before
them and nothing after them. Nor is any limit admitted, above
below, or sideways, to its spatial differentiation. All its mani¬
festations, though they appear to be distinct from one another,
are in the nature of the word ( sabda ), because in all of
them, the original material persists. Because, in our cog¬
nitions, we identify objects with their words (sabdopagrdhi)
and our cognitions are intertwined with the words (sabdo-
pagrdhya), they are essentially of the nature of the word . 4
All divisions such as the beginning, the sustenance and the
end of things can be determined only through words. The
Brahman is called phoneme ( aksara ) because it is the cause
of the phonemes . 5 The manifestation of the word which is
in everybody as one with the spirit is for the purpose of
communicating what is within. It has been said: —
“Some declare that the Word which is really subtle
identical with the meanning, One and identical with the
Self when not manifest, appears as something else and diffe¬
rentiated.”
2 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
What is meant by ‘it appears as the objects’ is this—what
is called appearance (vivarta) is the assumption by the One,
without losing its one-ness, through apparent diversity, of
the unreal forms of others.6 It is like the appearances in a
dream. It has been said—“The spatial and temporal mani¬
festations are no more than the functioning of the powers of
Nescience they are neither identical nor different from the
one which is the Truth. The fact of being Nescience consists
just in that What is meant by “from whom the creation of
the world proceeds” is this:—The transformations, that is, the
Universe proceeds out of Brahman which is the Word, devoid
of all inner sequence; from that involution (smnvarta) in
which all diversity has merged and is undifferentiated and is
inexpressible, all transformations being in a latent stage. 7
/ a \8 The Self which, though all representations are of it, does not
come within their range and which, on the basis of guess, authority
and inference, appears in different ways.
(bl The all-embracing, beyond all differentiation and unification,
existence and non-existence, sequence and absence of it, truth and
falsehood, shines as distinct from everything.
He the inner Controller of Beings, is seen near and far.
He i uSly f-e and is sought by those who desire liberation.
(d) He is the creator of those objects which are looked upon as
ultimate causes, just as the lustre of the seasons is the creator of the
masses of clouds at the end of summer.
(el That one spirit is differentiated in many ways, like the waters
of the ocean, which are impregnated with heat at the time of dissolution.
(f) From that spirit which is like a universal and liable to be
differentiated, legions of particulars are produced, like ram-laden clouds
from special winds.
(g) That supreme light appears first as the three Vedas and is
the cause of different views among the followers of different systems.
(h) That aspect of it which is really the truth, full of peace, is,
however, always accompanied by Nescience, which is indefinable.9
(i) There is no limit to the number of transformations of it (Nes¬
cience). When the soul has realised it, it does not exist for him any
more.
(j) Just as one having a defect in the eye sees the clear sky as
being clouded with many forms, in the same way, the immortal
1 i. 3
Brahman, free from all change, is soiled by Nescience and appears to
have many forms.
(k) This Brahman creates everything as having the nature of the
word; it is the source of the illumination power of the word. This
universe emerges out of the word aspect of Brahman and merges, into
it.
[1. Sometimes, where the text consists of a long sentence, the
translation is in the form of short phrases. It is hoped that it will be
clear to the reader of which part of the long sentence each short
phrase is a translation.
2. The word so translated is parikalpa. An attempt will be made
to use the same English word for translating a Sanskrit word occurring
in different contexts; but in some cases, other more suitable English
words will be found to have been used.
3. Vyavahdra. This word occurs frequently. Here it has been trans¬
lated as ‘worldly transactions’. Often it means the use of words to
communicate one’s thoughts, verbal usage, or exchange of ideas. As
Helaraja puts it— pratipadyapratipddakayor hi parasparabhiprayasah-
krdxitir vyavaharah (He. on Vak. III. Sain. 32) . On another occasion,
he says— Jhanasyaiva parcisparasahkrdntir vyavaharah (He. on Vak. III.
Sain. 2), prakhyopdkliyatmakatvacca vyavaharasya. . . (He. on Vak. III.
Dra. 14) .
4. vikdrarvarri prakrtyanvayitvac cliabdopagrahyataya sabdopagrdhi-
taya ca sabdatattvam. This is one of the important arguments in the
chain of reasoning meant to prove sabdadvaita, the doctrine that the
ultimate reality from which everything comes is in the nature *of word.
The argument is used in the different systems of philosophy also.
5. aksara ordinarily means ‘imperishable’, but the Vrtti gives a
special meaning to the word.
6. The Vrtti gives here a defination of the important word vivarta ,
in connection with the explanation of the word vivartate. According
to the Vrtti, the word, though a verb, also conveys the same idea.
7. purvam vikaragranthirupatvenavyapadesyat (Vr). Even with the
help of the Paddhati, the meaning is not clear. The word granthi occurs
several times in the text, both in the Karika and in the Vrtti:—Vak. I.
115; Vrtti on Vak. I, 4, 5, 142; 145. Usually it has the meaning of trans¬
formation ( vikara ) but here it comes in the same compound with the
word vikara and so it must have a different meaning. As Vrsabha puts
it _ granthisabdo’ nyatra yadyapi vikaravacanah tathapi vikdrasabdena
salia pryujyamdno’ peksitapravrttinimitto drastavyah (Vr. on Vak. I. 1.
(p. 10, 1. 14). Here the whole expression in question qualifies brah-
manah. The translation is very tentative.
8. This and the following verses are called agama by Vrsabha and,
according to him, they elaborate the idea of the Karika which is being
4
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
explained. As he puts it —iddnim sarvasyaiva kdrikarthasyagamendnuga -
mam darsayati. (Vr. on Vak. 1.1. (p. 10, 1. 17).
9. santavidyatmakam etc. The construction of this verse is defec¬
tive. In view of amsah, one would expect dtmakah and grastah , but all
the mss of the Vrtti and the Paddhati have the neuter form).
2. Who has been taught as the One appearing as
many due to the multiplicity of his powers, who, though,
not different from his powers, seems to be so, 1
It has been revealed that the diversity of the transfor¬
mations and the unity of what is transformed do not go be¬
yond the unity of the Ultimate (prakrtyekatva) , 2 As has
been said—‘It is like Water, the Seer, One without a second *
Similarly: ‘O gentle One!, in the beginning, Being alone was
One without a second’ * Then again— ‘The one Pranava was
divided into three’. Similarly, ‘In the beginning, there was
non-being. What was that non-being? It is the Rsis who were
non-being at the beginning, the Rsis who were' the prcinas ”5
What is meant by ‘due to the multiplicity of his powers’ is—
Appearing as many, the powers which are mutually opposed
and are identical with Brahman accumulate in it which is
essentially the Word. In a cognition in which many objects
figure, the different objects which figure such as earth, people,
etc., do not affect the unity of the cognition. There is no con¬
tradiction between the multiplicity of the things like trees
which are cognised and the unity of the cognition. The form
of the cognition does not really differ from that of the object
because different forms of the objects are not beyond the
unity of the cognitions. Similarly, the powers which appear
to be different from one another are not really so. The text
‘though not different from his powers’ means: the powers are
not different from Brahman as the universal and the particu¬
lar are from each other. But it appears to be different when
it assumes the form of the different objects which figure in it. 6
[1. Bhinnam saktivyapasrayat’ would perhaps be a better read
ing but all the mss and the Paddhati have the text as printed.
2. prakrtyekatvanatikramena. By ‘oneness’ of Brahman only ab
sence of all differentiation-is meant and not association with the number
I. 3. 5
one. As Vrsabha says— na tvekatvasayikhyayogena. ‘Oneness’ due to
association with the number one belongs to manifestations and not to
the ultimate. There are two kinds of oneness, says Vrsabha: dvidham
ekatvam prdkrtam vaikrtam ca (Vr on Vak. I. 1. (p. 15, 1 . 2).
3. Cf. Br. Up. 4.3.32 where the text is— salila, eko drasta? dvuito
bliavati.
4. Ch. Up. 6.2.1.
5. 6. Br. 6.1.1.1.
6. The word sakti is used twice in this verse. Vrsabha explains it—
ghatddayali paddrthah yogyatdva, (Vak. I. 2. (p. 14, 1. 20). in other
words, both the power to bring about appearances and the appearances
themselves can be called sakti].
3. Depending on whose Time-power to which
(though one) differentiation is attributed, the six trans¬
formations, birth etc. become the cause of all variety in
Being.
All powers 1 depending on their causes and having a
starting point are governed by the creative power ( svdtan-
trya.) called Time; they follow the modes of this Time-power.
Because of the regulation of the immense diversity of each
object by means of prevention and permission, its appearances
seem to have a sequence. Time, by allowing them to come to
be, is the secondary cause of all transformations which de¬
pend on their own other causes also and whose production
had been delayed. 2 Its causal power being thus differentiated
by the manifestations which have a sequence, the differentia¬
tion which exists in the manifestations is attributed to it. It
is like attributing to the balance the divisions marked by lines
on it at the time of the balancing of the weight of the mate¬
rial which is in contact with it. 3 Thus when sequence is
attributed to something which is neither prior nor posterior
in the form ‘it was’ or ‘it was not,’ the six transformations
birth etc., become the source of the modifications, the
changes in Being. Transformation of action will be dealt
with in detail in the section devoted to ‘Being’ under the
subject of universal.
6
VAKYAPADIYAM of BHARTRHARI
[1. Vrsabha explains saktayali as padarthah by identifying cause and
effect.
2. pratibaddhajanmandm. Though all the mss of the Vrtti have
pratibandha° the text adopted is probably the genuine one. The ex¬
planation of Vrsabha— yesdmevdTiena pvathdTiidta utpattau pvatibandhuli
krtah te pratibaddhajanmdnah’ also supports the emendation.
3. While explaining the analogy of the balance, Vrsabha uses the
terms tuldsutTd, tulddanda, tulupdtdla and ddiulalekhd, The rod type of
balance seems to be referred to. The thing to be weighed is placed
on a pan (tuldpatald) which hangs from one end of the rod (tuld-
danda) which is held by a string ( tuUsutra ) at one of the points
marked by a line on the rod ( ddiiddlekha ) according to the weight of
the thing weighed].
4. Of which one that is the seed of all, there is
this state of multiplicity, that of the enjoyer, the enjoyed
and enjoyment. 1 . . ,
The One Brahman is the substratum of powers which
cannot be defined as identical or different from it, as exis¬
tent or non-existent and are not opposed to one another; 2 it
is differentiated into unreal forms which, like the beings
appearing in a dream, have no external reality, are different
from one another and are knots of the nature of enjoyer,
enjoyed and enjoyment. When the predispositions towards
differentiation mature, this worldly arrangement with its
multiplicity comes into being. 3
[1. The main purpose of this verse is to point out that nothing is
different from Brahman and that, yet, all appearance of differentiation
is due to it.
2. Even though the powers produce opposite effects and are, in
that sense, opposed to one another, yet they are said to be not so,
because they all exist in the same substratum at the same time.
(ekasminn adhdne yaugapadyena vrtteli —Vr.).
3. tasya granthyantarasamatikramena vivrttagranthiparicchedasya.
This is rather obscure. The word granthi comes twice. See note, 7 on
verse 1. The commentary ‘Ambakartrl’ explains granthi as vasand, the
predispositions leading to differentiation, whereas Vrsabha takes it to
mean the differentiated objects themselves. Something which appears as
a differentiation within something which has no differentiation is a
I. 5.
7
grantlii. As Vr. puts it, ata eva pavanuitinano vihtircitvHd granthaydh. I
have used the word ‘knot’ suggesting a distortion of reality. The trans¬
lation is very tentative].
5. A means of attainment and a symbol of that
One is the Veda, which though one, has been handed
down as though in many recensions by the sages.
The attainment of Brahman is nothing more than going
beyond the knot 1 of the ego-sense in the form of ‘I’ and ‘Mine’.
Others say that it is the resolution of the effects into the
original cause, 2 the cessation of the activity of the senses, 3
satisfaction without the aid of external means, one’s own self, 4
the yearning for the supreme Self, the absence of craving for
any adventitious object, the fact of possessing complete
power, 5 escape from the influence of the functions of Time,®
the complete cessation of the self. 7 Such are the alternative
ways of conceiving the attainment of Brahman. The means of
attainment is the collection of the Vedas. Just as making
gifts, pel-forming austerities and practising continence are
means of attaining heaven. It has been said: When, by prac¬
tising the Vedas, the vast darkness is removed, that supreme,
bright, imperishable light comes into being in this very
birth. By the word symbol (anuhara) the idea contained in
the following ancient saying (purdkalpa) is meant: The Rsis
the seers of the mantras, those who have realised the truth
(dharma) see that subtle, inaudible Word and, wishing to
communicate it to those who have not realised the truth,
teach the symbol of it which is like a dream 8 in their desire
to tell what they have seen, heard and experienced. It has,
indeed, been said: — The Rsis realised that truth (dharma );
they taught the mantras to those who had not realised the
truth- these others, also anxious to teach, proclaimed the
Vedas and the Vedangas, in order that the symbol of Brah¬
man may be understood (bilmagrahandya ). Bilma is bhilma
which means something which illuminates (bhdsanam) . 9 By
the words ‘The Veda, though One, has been handed down in
many ways by the Rsis,’ what is meant is this; The object
8
vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
called Veda, as seen by the Rsis in their vision, is One. As
the One cannot be communicated through the many, the
Rsis first transferred it to the Word to which diversity is attri¬
buted because of the diversity of the manifesting agents (i.e.,
the dhvanis). The Word, then, without giving up its unity,
assumes different forms such as Samhitd , Pada, Krama etc.
It is handed down by the Rsis in different branches, establish¬
ed for the sake of convenience of study. Another view is:
The Word varies in the different regions and has, therefore,
many forms; but it does not deviate from its purpose of con¬
veying the same thing everywhere. In its different forms, it
becomes the cause of regional and other diversity. In the
same way, the words of the Vedas, though handed down in
different branches, do not deviate from the fact that every¬
where they convey the same thing. The diversity in the
branches is based on the diversity of forms. Others are of
this view: In the old days, the Ayurveda, with its eight
sections, 10 was one. In the Kali era, due to the reduced
capacity of men, it has been divided into sections. In the
same way, the Veda, the collection of Brahman, includes an
infinite number of ways and powers.
[1. Granthi. See n. 7 on verse 1 and n. 3 on verse 4.
2. Ambakartri understands this as the Sankhya view.
3. Ambakartri sees here the yoga view. The word vikaranablidva
occurs in Yog. Dar. 3.48 in connection with the attainment of super¬
natural powers.
4. dtmatattva. While explaining this, Vr. gives reference to Br.
Up. 4.3.21. where the text, in a slightly modified form, is as follows:
tad yatlvd priyaya striya samparisvakto na baliyam kincana veda. The
idea is that when Brahman is attained one is aware of nothing else.
5. paripurnasaktitvam. Vr. explains sakti in the sense of the eight
supernatural powers attained through yoga. They are: anima, mahima,
garimd, laghima , prdpti , prdkamya, isitvam, vasitvam. See Y. Dar. 3.45.
6. Kalavrtti. The two functions of time, prevention (pratibandha)
and permission ( abhyanujna ) by virtue of which only certain effects
appear at certain times and not others.
7. sarvatmana nairdtmyam. Vr. understands this as referring to
the extreme indefinability of Brahman: nailisvabhavyam, brahmasva-
bhavasya nirupayitum vaktum cdsakyatvat. Some scholars, however,
take it as referring to the Bauddha view.
9
I. 6.
8. Svapnavrttam iva. Just as one’s experience in a dream is a kind
of reflection of our experience in the wakeful state, in the same way,
the Vedas are a kind of reflection of what the R$is saw in their vision.
9. Ni. 1.20.2.
10. The eight sections of Ayurveda, as given by Vr. are: salyacikitsa,
salakyam, kayacikitsa 3 bhutacikitsa , kaumarabhrtyam, agadatantmm,
vajzkaranatantram, rasayanatantram ].
6. Its divisions follow many recensions, but they
are all subsidiary to the same action. Also a certain
fixity in the power of words is seen in these different
branches.
Once the Veda has been divided into four, there are
the one hundred branches of the adhvaryus ( Yajurveda ),
the thousand paths of the Samaveda, the twenty-one kinds of
Rg-Veda or fifteen as some say and the nine kinds of Athar-
vana veda. Thus every Veda has many paths. What is meant
by ‘subsidiary to the same action’ is: All branches lead to the
same ritual. It is like this: all the branches of the physicians
ultimately practice one treatment. What is meant by ‘fixity
in the power of words’ is: Words, as, taught for a particular
branch, convey their meaning in that branch and also lead
to merit. What is meant by ‘it is seen in the different bran¬
ches of Veda’ is seen in the following examples “Long d
is substituted for the final of deva and sumna when the
suffix kyac follows in the Kathaka branch of the Yajurveda.”
(P. 7, 4, 38.) and ‘the final of the word sima bears the acute
(udatta) accent in the Atharvana Veda’ (Phitsutra 79.) All
this is according to the view of those who hold that the divi¬
sion of the Veda into branches takes place again and again
and that, before the division, the word invariably exists in
an undifferentiated state. 1
[1. Vr. points out that what has been said in the verses 5 and 6
is based on the view that the Veda manifests itself as one from Brahman.
Later, due to the reduced capacity of men, it is divided into branches.
At the time of dissolution ( pralaya ) it again becomes one. When crea-
K. S. 2
10
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
tion begins again, it manifests itself as one but it is again divided into
branches when the capacity of man diminishes.
The other view is that the Veda manifests itself from the very
beginning with divisions. According to this, there is no undifferentiated
word. As Vr. puts it: tesam upasamhrtakramd vdg durlabha. (Vak.
1.6. (p. 27, 1. 24).]
7. The various Smrtis, some having visible utility
and others invisible utility, have been propounded by
the sages, well-versed in the Veda on the basis of this
very Veda, with the help of indications.
Some traditions have a written basis while others have
no written basis, but are known from the conduct of the
cultured. Traditions relating to medical treatment etc., have
a visible purpose to serve. Traditions relating to what can
be eaten and what not, which woman one can marry, or
otherwise, what can be said and what not have an invisible
purpose. Where two traditions relating to the same subject
go against each other, there is option, provided that there is
no visible purpose to be served. 1 Where two traditions rela¬
ting to the same subject go against each other and there is
a visible purpose and disapproval by the cultured, there, the
traditions having visible purpose have no authority. 2 Where
two traditions relating to the same subject differ from each
other and there is visible purpose, but no disapproval by the
cultured, there there is option. For example, in the matter
of the penance to be observed for killing a frog. 3 What is
meant by ‘on the basis of this very Veda, with the help of
indications/ is that the indications found in the Scripture
make us know that the actions taught in the Scripture and
the written Tradition have the same agent. Those persons
who are entitled to perform the action taught by Scripture,
having a visible or invisible purpose, are made known by
the Scripture itself as being entitled to perform the actions
taught by the written Tradition. For example, the injunc¬
tion: ‘the sacrificer should cook for a guest who has arrived
a big bull or a big ram.’ 4 Sometimes (i.e., when no indic$-
i. s. ii
tion is found in the Scripture in a particular case) the indi¬
cations found elsewhere are enough on the analogy of the
rice in the cooking pot, 5 to establish the authority of the
traditions which do not go against Scripture.
[1. G.Dh.S. 22, 3 and Manu. 11. 73 prescribe two different penan¬
ces for one who is guilty of having killed a Brahmana. As the purpose
of the penance is invisible and as both texts are authority, there is
option. Another example is G.Dh.S. 23, 8-10 where two penances are
taught for one who is guilty of having committed sacrilege with the
wife of the Guru.
2. Even where a tradition has a visible purpose to fulfil, if it is
disapproved by the cultured, it should not be followed. Drinking of
liquor as a medicine has a visible purpose, namely, the curing of the
disease and it is, therefore, prescribed by Ayurveda. But drinking
liquor is prohibited in the Dharmasastra i.e., by the cultured. This
prohibition has greater authority than the prescription of Ayurveda. That
is why one has to do penance after drinking liquor as a medicine.
3. Ya. Smr. 3. 270.
4. &. B. 3. 4. 1. 2.
5. See Jacob. A Iiandjul of Popular Maxims, I, p. 52].
8. Based on the explanatory comments and simi¬
lar passages, conflicting views have been set forth by
the exponents of Monism and Dualism according to
their own taste.
It is generally seen that human speculations are based
upon explanatory comments and similar Vedic sentences. 1
Because of the diversity of the human intellect, diversity
of speculation takes place. For example, there is the expla¬
natory comment ( arthavMa ): “In the beginning, all this
was nothing,” meant to praise the place where the fire is to
be kindled. 2 On the basis of an imaginary interpretation of
it, the following Absolutism is constructed: ‘The non-exis¬
tent is born of the non-existent, the action-less from the
action-less, the non-substratum from the non-substratum, the
inexpressible from the inexpressible, the essenceless from
the essenceless.’
VAKyApADIYAM OP BHARTRHABi
i2
“The One Self is differentiated by means of existence
and non-existence, neither of which is prior or posterior.
How can the undifferentiated One be both expressible and
inexpressible ?”
Similarly
“There was no non-existent nor was there the existent.” 3
“In the beginning, all this was only darkness.” 4
“This (the world) is like foam, it is nothing, it is like
bubble, it is nothing. It is mere illusion, not easily set aside.
So do the learned see it.”
“The blind one saw the jewel, the finger-less one thread¬
ed it, the neck-less one wore it and the tongue-less one
praised it.” 5
The sentence
“In the beginning, all this, was water”. 6
is an explanatory comment relating to the new and full
moon sacrifice. From that arises the following speculation: —
“Of these waters, there is the effect (paka) in the form
of consciousness and there is the effect in the form of matter.
And life (pinna) is the essence of the waters and that comes
back and also does not come back.” 7
Really speaking, it is the one having the form of all
knowledge and appears in all this diversity. Dualists also
have their views: —
“There are the eternal things and the non-eternal things,
the causes of all objects, things which have a form and
things which have no form, subtle and .gross, in which the
Similarly
“Two birds, companions, united together, occupy the
same tree. Of the two, one eats the tasty fig fruit, the other
one does not eat, but shines.” 8
i3
i. fi.
“By ‘two birds’, the senses and the inner Controller, the
intelligence and the soul are meant.” Others, 9 on the other
hand, say: —
“The differentiated and the undifferentiated conscious¬
ness, full of seeds, are meant.”
“It moves, it does not move, it is far, ‘it is near, it is
within everything and so is it without.” 10
[1. The Vrtti explains artliavadarupani in the verse as arthavaddn
arthavddaprakdi'dni. Thus the word rupdni is explained as arthavada -
prakdrani . For Vr., the word artliavadarupani in the verse is an ekasesa;
artliavddan artliavadarupani cety artliavadarupani on the analogy of the
ekasesa in P. 7. 4. 82. guno yaiilukoh which means: yani yaiiluki ceti
yahlukoli.
2. Vr. quotes the following prescription —
Sa vai saptapuruso va
He adds: catvara atnvdnali, trayali paksapucchdmti. te ca purusd pranaU
vena stuyante. Cf. 6. Br. 6. 1. 1. 6.
3. RV. 10. 129. 1. Vr. calls this passage also an arthavada . The
idea is that by giving the place of kindling the fire the same attributes
as Brahman, one is praising it.
4. Cf. Mai. Up. 5. 2. where the text is: Tamo vd idam agra dsid
ekam.
5. Tai. Ar. 1. 11. 5. runs as follows —
Sa tam manim avindat,
So’ nangulir dvayat;
So 3 grivali pratyamuncat
So’ jihvo asascata.
6. &. B. 14.8.6.1. See also Jai. Up. 1.56.1.
7. Vr explains avartti and andvartti as ‘coming back’ in the case
of those who have not yet attained ‘ moksa 3 and ‘not coming back’ in
the case of those who have attained it.
8. Cf. RV. 1. 164. 20 and Sve. Up. 4.6. where the text is:
Dvd suparua sayuja sakhaya samanam
vrk?apri parisasvajdte .
tayor anyah pippalam svadvatti
anasnann any o’ bhicakasiti.
9. According to Vr, these are again the Monists who hold this
view.
10. SYV. 40. 5.]
14
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
Since there are these different speculations in regard to
the one Brahman beyond all differentiation on account of its
being endowed with all powers, therefore it is that
9. The true and pure essence has also been taught
there, the knowledge capable of being grasped through
one word, having the form of Pranava, and in no way
contradicting the different views.
No representation in regard to the one all-embracing
Brahman is different from the other representations consider¬
ed to be opposed to it. 1 Knowers of Brahman have declared: —
“Even a particular manifestation of Brahman, is not be¬
yond its all-comprehensiveness nor is it different from
another.” 2
Again
“All vision is complete and is really not different (from
the others) but the experiencer looks upon it as different.” 3
The mystic syllable ( Pranava ) allows for all points of view,
it is the source of all Scripture, 4 it is the common factor of
all original causes, it is the cause of the rise and fall of doc¬
trines, it accepts within itself all mutually contradictory ideas
of Brahman or disallows all of them. The object of this allow¬
ance and disallowance does not, therefore, vary.
It has been said: —
“It is one and it is not one; it is both and it is not both.
Those who are for action speak of diversity ( visama ) and
those who are for knowledge see unity ( sama ).”
[1. According to Vr. as all representations are about the same
subject, so they are not opposed to one another: sarv&sam visaya-
matrandm satyatvad brahmaiva visaya iti visayablied-dt parikalpantarcini
na bhidyante.
2. This is given as a statement of Brahmavidah but it is not found
in the old Upanisads.
I. 10.
15
3. Vr explains nnyunam as follows — Darsandntardnmkrtaih
paddrthair darscnvantaram api yuktam, sarvesdyi sarvarupatvdt The id '
seems to be that, as all systems are speculations in regard to Brahman
which includes everything, they include one another.
4. Sarva&rutirupali. Pranava is the source of all Scripture (sruti)
as the Vedas are manifestations of it. Yatah pranavo Vedarupena
vivrttah. (Vr.). It is also the source of all words (sruti): sarvasruti-
rupali sarvasabdasvabhavah sarvasabdarupena tasya vivrtteh (Vr) ]
10. All the different sciences which impart know¬
ledge and bring culture to man proceed from the major
and minor limbs of that Veda, the creator and organiser
of the worlds.
The Veda, as the source and teacher of the world, is
the creator in regard to the appearances and organiser in re¬
gard to the organisations. Some say that Pranava is the Veda.
It is the source of all words and all things. According to this
view, the different sciences, being essentially elaborations of
the Pranava, do not go beyond the Veda.
It has been said: —
“All the words are included in the Veda.
One who does not know the Veda cannot understand
Brahman at all.”
It has also been said:
“The injunctions, what is enjoined and the reasoning
constitute the Veda.” 1
From the major ( anga ) and the minor (upaniga) limbs of the
Pranava, from the Scripture, written Tradition and the final
portion of the three-fold Veda are derived the different scien¬
ces which are the cause of right knowledge and the culture
of man. 2 Or they may be looked upon as the cause of the
culture of man because man consists essentially of knowledge
(jnana) , 3 From the major auxiliary sciences like astrono¬
my-astrology etc., of the well-known Brahman called Veda
come the science of omens etc., and from the minor auxiliary
sciences of the same Veda proceed dream-lore etc,
16
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[1. To the question: What is the Veda?, two answers are recorded
in the Vrtti: (1) Pranava eva veda ityeke, (2) Vidhir vidheyas tar -
kasca vedah.
2. Pranava } anga and updnga. The Vrtti understands these terms
as standing for sruti, smrti and trayyanta, i.e. the explanatory com¬
ments ( arthavada ), the auxiliary sciences, Grammar etc., and the
Upanisads. According to another view, sruti is pranava, smrti, is either
anga like Grammar or updnga like Ayurveda and trayyanta is the
Upanisads. Usually, the word anga stands for the six auxiliary scien¬
ces of the Veda: Jyotisa, giksa, Kalpa, Vydkarana, Nirukta and
Chandas. From them, the science of omens ( sakunajnana ) etc are
derived. The word updnga stands for smrtis, purana, etc., from which
are derived dreamlore, etc.
3. Jndnasamskdrahetavah in the verse is explained in two wa
in the Vrtti: (1) samyagjndnahetavali purusasamskarahetavasca'
(2) jnandtmakatvad vd purusasyaiva samskdrahetavali. This is not the
only place where the Vrtti contains alternative explanations of the text
of the verse. The questions which this raises will be discussed
elsewhere.]
11. The best of all the austerities, the one that i s
nearest to that Brahman is the discipline called
‘Grammar’, the first among the auxiliary sciences of the
Vedas, so have the sages declared.
That auxiliary science through which the form of the
Word—Brahman 1 is determined in order that correctness may
be understood is the nearest (to the Vedas) because it helps
directly. Proximity is known to depend upon special service
rendered. There is also the Scripture to be restored. 2 Once
it has been settled by the reasoning (of the Mimamsa) what is
to be restored and what not, the science of Grammar is the
basis for the correct modification of gender, number etc It
is said to be near because it is through it that the other scrip¬
ture (which is not available) is understood. What is meant
by ‘the best of all austerities’ is this: Compared to what are
considered to be austerities in the world like continence, sleep¬
ing on the ground, standing in water and progressive reduc¬
tion and increase of nourishment according to the course of
the moon 3 and compared to what are considered to be thp
I. 12.
17
holiest forms of study, the study of the science of Grammar is
the best form of austerity, because it leads to special results,
visible and invisible. Concerning which the tradition has
declared that a mere knowledge of whose enumeration of
phonemes ( aksarasamdmndya ) leads to the same holy fruit
as the knowledge of the whole of the Veda,4 that, indeed, is
the first auxiliary science of the Vedas, because it is the most
important one. It has been said: —
“Of the six auxiliary sciences, the most important one
is the Science of Grammar. Effort made in regard to the
most important one surely yields fruit.” 5
[!• 17? explains cnicili as: sabdctTupBiici vivTttdsyn
bralimanah.
2. Uliyam camn&yantaram asti. See Mi. Su. 2.1.34.
3. Cf. Brahmacaryam satyavacanam savanesiidakopasparsana-
mardravastrata-dhalis&yitanasaka iti tapamsi, G.Dh.S. 3.1.15,
4. M.Bha. I. p. 36.
5. M.Bha. I. p. 1.]
12. This discipline is the shortest route to the
attainment of that supreme essence of the Word which
has assumed differentiation, of the holiest of all lights.
What is meant by ‘Of the word which has assumed diffe¬
rentiation’ is: Of the word which has been differentiated into
phoneme, word and sentence on the basis of the place of
articulation etc., from the undifferentiated sequenceless inner
word-essence. Or ‘of the word which has assumed different
forms like cow etc., as meanings on the basis of the eternal
relation between word and meaning. Or it might be said
that the divisions of the word assume the form of cow etc.
Or rather, cow etc., apparent external divisions, are trans¬
formed into words. Some hold that only causality is the re¬
lation between word and meaning. 1 It has been said:_
“It is the name which appeared as the form and it is the
form which appeared as the name. According to some, they
ICS. 3
18
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
were one at first and were differentiated later. According to
others, the differentiation was already theie before.
What is meant by ‘the supreme essence of the word’ is: the
collection of words, the correctness of which has been estab¬
lished, both because of its expressiveness and its capacity to
bring about happiness, is spoken of. It has been said: “words
devoid of correctness are just the sediment.” What is meant
by ‘the holiest of all lights’ is: In this world, there are three
lights, three lamps which illuminate themselves and others.
They are as follows: —
“What is called jatavedcLJi (i.e., fire) the light which is
within man, and the light called the Word which illuminates
both the sentient and the insentient. In the last one is the
whole of this world established, both that which moves and
that which does not move.”
What is meant by ‘the shortest route’ is: The Science of
Grammar (laksana ), consisting of general and special rules , 2
is the means of learning the whole of the word—Brahman in
an easy manner, by means of the main rules and their elabo¬
rations. It is the means of inferring that those who, with¬
out being taught, are well acquainted with the true word
endowed with correctness and free from corruption, are the
cultured people . 3 Once it has been inferred who the cultured
persons are, the Science of Grammar is the agent for declar¬
ing the correctness of words like prsodara on the ground that
they are used by the cultured . 4 It has been said.
“He who does not know the Science of Grammar does
not know the word, the meaning, their mutual relation and
the occasion for use nor what is correct and what is not, even
when the meaning is the same nor who is cultured, inferred
from their use of the correct forms of the words. ’
[1. It is the Word which appears as the objects. The objects are
merged in the word, exist in the form of the word. Thus, there is
the relation of cause and effect between words and things. The things
existing within in the form of the word are the cause and the externa¬
lised word is the effect. Or, the inner word is the cause and the
externalised objects are the effects. The same idea is set forth in
the following verse,
19
*
1. 13.
2. Sdmunyavisesavaddhi laksanam . Vrsabha explains this as fol¬
lows — Utsargdpavdda - vidhipratisedlia - niptatanatidesasthanyddesa -
linganiyamaih saptabhih sdrnanya-visesapralcdraili. As ten things are
mentioned in the long compound word, but only seven things are
meant to be conveyed, one can, according to the Ambakartri, under¬
stand the following: utsargdpavdda, vidhipratisedlia, vidliinipatana,
vidhyatidesa , sthdnyadesa, linge samdnyavisesarupa and vidhiniyama .
3. See M.Bha. on P. 6. 3. 109. where a description of Si§tah, cul¬
tured people, is given.
4. P. 6. 3. 109.]
13. The expression of what one wants to say (the
principle of the use of things) depends upon words and
the truth concerning words cannot be understood ex¬
cept through Grammar.
(a) The basis for the expression of a meaning is that
the speaker wants to communicate it, not whether it has an
external existence as an object or not. Desire to communi¬
cate depends upon the existence of a suitable word. The
speaker uses a separate suitable word for every meaning
which his desire to communicate brings to the mind. It is
like a person applying the right sense when he wants to cog¬
nise anything directly.
(b) Another explains differently. What is meant by the
truth ( tattva ) in the use ( pravrtti ) of an object ( artha ) is
the ground for the application of a word to that object. When,
due to the presence of that ground in an object, a cognition
of that object corresponding to that ground arises, then one
can bring that object into verbal usage. In the absence of
that ground inhering in the object, there cannot be any verbal
usage in regard to the bare object. As words acquire their
form in relation to the universal (jdti) it is the universal
(samdnya) which is the basis of words.
(c) Or one can say that interconnection ( samsarga ) is
the basis ( tcittvci ) of verbal usage. As the meanings of words
20
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARi
are closely connected with one another, even though they
appear to be unconnected, verbal usage depends upon the
sentence. When the cognition of interconnection ceases, no
verbal usage in regard to the word-meaning is possible.
(d) Another meaning is this: A bare object comes only
within the range of tyad (that) etc., which just point to
things. The basis of its verbal usage is interconnection. That
which is connected enters into relation with action in a pri¬
mary or secondary capacity.
(e) Or activity ( pravrtti ) means an action like ‘being
born’ conveyed by the verb. The essence (tattva) of this
thing which is called activity is the fact of being something
to be accomplished, its requirement of means, its assuming
the form of sequence, its being the cause of suggesting time.
The other object is a mere thing which remains the same
in all the three times. It is conveyed by the noun and is
free from all inner sequence.
(f) Or again, what is the basis ( tattva ) of the verbal
usage (pravrtti) of an object (artlia) ? The cognition, having
the form of an object, which is projected as an external
object. And that depends upon the word.
What is meant by ‘the truth concerning words’ is its
completeness (avaikalya) its correct form in which its purity
has not gone. That is its complete form. The others, the cor¬
rupt forms, used by those who really intended to use the
correct ones, are its incomplete forms.
[The main word in this verse is arthapravrttitattvanam . This com¬
pound word is analysed in six ways in the Vrtti.: a. b, c, d; e; f. In
a, it is analysed thus: arthasya pravrttitattvam ; in b, thus: arthasya
pravrttau tattvam nimittam; in c, in the same way as in b; in d, thus:
arthasya pravrttitattvam; in e, thus: arthasya pravrttesca tattvam; in f,
thus: arthasya pravrttitattvam . In all the explanations except e, pravrtti
means vyavahara = verbal usage. In e, it means action.
The fact that as many as six alternative explanations have been
given raises some questions which are discussed in the Introduction.]
21
i. i4.
14. It (Grammar) is the door to salvation, the re¬
medy for all the impurities of speech, the purifier of all
the sciences and shines in every branch of knowledge.
1 0ne, who, with a previous knowledge of the correct
forms of words, realises the unity of the real word, goes be¬
yond sequence and attains union with it. By acquiring special
merit through the use of the correct word, he is united with
the great Word and attains freedom from the senses. 2 After
having reached the undifferentiated state of the word, he
comes to the source of all differentiation: Intuition (pratibha ).
From that Intuition in which all Being is latent and which,
due to the repetition of the union (mentioned above) tends
to produce its result, he reaches the Supreme Source in
which all differentiation in completely lost. What is meant
by ‘the remedy for all impurities of speech’ is that it is like
the science of Medicine (Ayurveda) in regard to the defects
of the body. One who knows grammar does not use the
corrupt forms which are the cause of sin. It has been said
that.
“Knowledge (of the correct forms) is his refuge”
(M. Bh)a. I, p. 2, 1. 28.).
What is meant by ‘purifier of all the sciences’ is that cor¬
rectness ( samskdra ) is known through it. In all the sciences,
it is ths (correct) words which convey the meaning. It has
been said: —
“Whatever is learnt and not understood but is merely
uttered as it is, is like dry fuel without fire; it will never
burn.” 3
There is also the following verse cited by those who
have not gone astray: —
“On the earth, water is the purest of things; of the
(purified) waters, it is the sacred hymns ( mantras ) which
are the purifying agents and the sages have declared that it
is the science of Grammar which reveals the purity of the
sacred hymns, Saman, Rk and Yajus.”
22 vAkyAfadiyam of bhartrhari
What is meant by ‘shines in every branch of knowledge*
is that everybody follows the science of grammar even for
composing a work on his own special subject and is very
careful to avoid the use of corrupt forms.
[1. This verse is understood in the Vrtti as describing the stages
through which the grammarian goes in attaining moksa. Vr. says:
etasyd eva brahmaprapteh kramam iddnlm varnayann aha avyavaklr -
nam iti. Some, however, think that different forms of liberation are
set forth here.
One thing to be noted is that Bhartrhari, in the Vrtti, speaks
about going from pratibha which is understood by Vr. as Pasyantl, to
Para Prakrti. In other words, there is a stage beyond Pasyantl called
Para Prakrtih . Pasyantl itself is called sarvavikdrdnam prakrtih. Thus
Pasyantl is prakrti and after that comes para prakrtih.
2. Vaikaranyam = apagatendriyatdm (Vr.). The same word is used
in the Vrtti on verse 5 to describe one of the alternative conception of
moksa.
3. Ni. 1. 18.]
15. Just as all the universals of things depend
upon the form of their words for their communication,
so is this science the basis of all the other sciences.
[Sabdakrtinbandhandh. By akrti , it is the jati which is meant here.
In other words, the universals of words convey the universals of
meanings. (See Vak. III. Ja. 6).
16. This is the first step in the ladder leading to
liberation, this is the straight royal road for all those
who desire salvation.
17. Here the Self, being free from errrors and thus
fit to study the Vedas, sees the very basis of the Vedas;
their pure form.
[ Chandasyah . This word can be explained according to P. 4. 4. 98:
Tatra sadhuh 9 . It would then mean 'fit in regard to the Chandas, i.e.
I. 18-22.
23
fit to study it or protect it. Vr, however, explains it thus: Chandasyah
iti. Chandasam samuhah , samuharthe aupasayikhyanikali taddhitali. He
has probably in mind P. 4. 2. 42 according to which the suffix yan is
added to words in the sense of collection.]
18-22 4 That which 2 is the highest form of undiffer¬
entiated speech, the pure Light which appears differ¬
entiated only in the midst of all this darkness.
The Light which those worship who have passed
beyond the manifested state consisting of the cognition
of things and actions and beyond light and darkness. 3
That in which the manifestors of speech, like the
signs of the alphabet appear, through Yoga preceded
by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of words,
like reflections in a mirror.
That of which the different phonemes 4 of the
Atharvans, the Samans, the Rks and the Yajus are the
symbols.
That which, though one, is variously interpreted in
the different traditions, that supreme Brahman is
attained by a knowledge of Grammar.
[1. No Vrtti is available on verses 15-22. This naturally raises the
problem whether they are integral parts of the Vakyapadiyam or quota¬
tions in the Vrtti on verse 14. Usually, quotations are immediately
preceded by some word like tad yatha or evam hyaha which indicates
that what follows is a quotation. There is no such word here. The
fact that Vr. comments on them settles nothing as he comments on all
obvious quotations also. There is, however, one indication that they
are integral parts of the work: The word tatra occurring in verse 23
refers to the science of Grammar mentioned in verse 22 which shows
that the former is a continuation of the latter. As verses 18-22 form
a group and constitute one sentence, verse 23 is a continuation, not
only of verse 22, but of all of them.
2. Some form of the relative pronoun yad occurs in all the verses
from 18-22 and it is to be correlated \vith the word tad occurring in
24
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
verse 22. What do these words refer to? to Brahman or to Vyakarana?
Some of the points mentioned in the description seem to be equally
applicable to both, i think, however, that they refer to Brahman. Vr.
also makes it clear when he says in his commentary on verse 18.
Brahma adhigamyate iti vaksyati. Tat sarvesiittaraslokesu sambandha-
nlyam.
3. Vaikrtam murtivyaparadarsanavi samatikrdntah . Vr. explains:
Yogina ityarthah.
4. Pn'thaksthitiparigrahdli: Etad aha. ndndjdtiyavarnapratitibimba -
parigrahena sthitah iti. (Vr.).]
23. There, the great sages who are the authors of
the sutras, varttikas and the Bhasya have declared
words, meanings and their relation to one another to
be eternal.
The very basis of the science of Grammar is that the
word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal.
In it, by ‘word’ is meant the universal (dkrti) of the word
It has been said: —
“As the universal is eternal, so is the word eternal.” 1
This science proceeds on the basis of the universal. In fact,
it has been said: —
That is already established, because it is the universal
which is taught.” 2
This universal is different from the particular universal call¬
ed wordness. Wordness is a universal which coexists in
t e same thing with other (lesser) universals which cannot
co-exist in the same thing. Universals of words, like the
universal of the word tree, when there is vagueness, are
mixed up with the causes of the manifestation of the indivi¬
dual word and when manifested by the individual word, are
called words. 3 Just as, in a pot, the facts of being substance,
earth and pot can co-inhere, in the same way, in the word
tree, universals like those of being an attribute, a word
and the word tree can co-inhere without mutual opposition,
I. 23.
25
(Objection) In the case of objects like the pot, the parts
of which exist at the same time, one can see that the whole
( avayavi ) is the cause of the manifestation of the particular
universal (pot-ness). But the parts of a particular word
cannot co-exist, they are not produced at the same time, they
do not exist at the same time, they are unnameable ( avya -
padesya) and so they cannot produce the whole word, the
many material parts of which do not co-exist and where the
universal can inhere. The universal word-ness exists in
each part. If, similarly, it is maintained that the universal
of the particular word tree also exists in each part, then the
cognition having the form of the word tree would occur
even after the first part is uttered, i.e., when parts like ‘v*
are uttered in isolation (and that does not happen).
This is not a valid objection. It is as in the case of
actions like lifting, revolving, pouring etc., which are produ¬
ced and perish and whose parts do not produce another action
corresponding to the whole (avayavi ). Nor is the inherence,
m the parts, of universal like the fact of being lifting etc.,
distinct from the fact of being action, not accepted. 4 Nor do
cognitions having the form of particular actions like lifting
arise when only a part is seen. These parts of actions are
due to special efforts and each of them is the substratum of
universals like the fact of being lifting etc., but as this parti¬
cularity is difficult to grasp, they do not produce a cognition
having a particular universal as its object. All the manifest¬
ing factors of that particular cognition have not yet come into
being. Therefore, there cannot be any verbal usage based
on it. But when these actions, involving contacts and separa¬
tions, determined by a particular direction, are perceived in
succession, then verbal usage, characterised by a particular
universal, becomes possible. In the same way, in the case of
words like ‘vrksa’, distinct parts like V are produced by
special effort, but their distinction is difficult to grasp and
even though they, at the time of the utterance of each part,
suggest the universals of particular words, one cannot perform
any verbal usage with them, because universals do not, at
that time, have many elements to suggest them. But when a
K. S. 4
26
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARI
succession of the parts is gradually perceived, verbal usage
based on particular universals becomes possible.
Grammarians do not necessarily accept the view current
in other sastras regarding the mode of suggestion of the uni¬
versals . 5 Suggestors do not necessarily suggest what inheres
in them. Even though the universal of a word may not inhere
in the word, when the mind is prepared by the successive
impressions left by the cognition of the previous phonemes of
a word, the universal of the word, previously not cognised or
indistinctly cognised, is perceived through the cognition of
the last phoneme . 6 One infers the existence of the universal
of a particular word from the recognition which one makes in
the form ‘This is the same as that’ when words like c vrksa 9
are uttered by parrots, sankas, men etc.
Even those who do not accept the existence of such a
universal declare that there is one eternal word which is
suggested by the many sounds of a word . 7 Others still accept
divisions in the form of phonemes within the word . 8 Some •
others hold that the word is one, whether it be a phoneme,
a word or a sentence, but appears to have parts produced in a
sequence. Others still hold that, due to the continuity of tra¬
dition, there is constant usage and the speakers are not aware
of the beginning of words which are eternal because of un¬
interrupted usage . 9
The eternality of meanings is also accepted by some on
the basis of the eternality of universals. It has been asked: —
“According to what conception of word-meaning would
the analysis “siddhe sabde arthe sambandhe” be proper?
And the answer is: —
“That it is the universal .’’ 10
In this Bhasya passage, the eternity of meanings has been
variously explained, according to all the views. It has to be
understood according to the Bhasya.
The relation is also eternal. What is meant in this: where
there is the idea of mutual appurtenance, the relation between
word and meaning in the form ‘It is this’ is. since meaning
21
i. 25.
cannot be assigned (by grammar) n , eternal, self-existing and
not something not known before and made for the first time
by some speaker for the benefit of some listener. Therefore
the relation between word and meaning is beginningless and
unbroken. Or, it may be stated that the relation between
word and meaning is that of the illuminator and the
illuminated (prakasyaprakasakabhava ), based upon con¬
vention ( samayopadhih ) a kind of fitness, like that
between the senses and their objects. Or it may be
said that the relation between word and meaning is
causality based on unbroken tradition, considering that the
cognition (arising from words) having the form of external
objects, thought of as external and accepted as having a men¬
tal as well as an external object, just as the letters of the
script are thought of as the phonemess of the alphabet, be¬
cause they bring the latter to the minds. It has been said
(in order to show that the meaning is essentially mental): —
“They, while explaining their deeds from birth to death,
* make them present to the mind, objects of the mind.” 12
What is meant by ‘taught there by the great sages’, is:
by the authors of the sutras etc. Those who have composed
the sutras etc. of the science of Grammar are referred to. The
very fact that the sutras have been composed shows that
they considered the words to be eternal. There would be
no purpose in composing the science of Grammar if the words
were not eternal. Because they would be a matter of mere
usage and great cultured persons would not take the trouble
of expounding them. Therefore, the science of Grammar pro¬
ceeds only when the correct forms of words are well estab¬
lished. Others bring forward sutras like
Tadasisyam samj iiapramanatvcit .
“This, (the concord of gender and number taught in
P. 1, 2, 51.) need not be taught because names are to be
accepted as they are (praiivana) .” 13
as proof that the words are eternal. In the varttikas also,
there are the following statements which show the eternality
of the word.
28
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
“On the basis that the word, the meaning and their rela¬
tion are eternal.” 14
“That is already proved because the word is eternal.” 15
“It is sphota which is the word, the sound is only the pro¬
duct of effort” 16 ( vyciycima ).
“The whole word takes the place of the whole word.” 17
In the Bhasya also, it has, indeed, been said: —
“This matter has been specifically considered in the
Sangraha, namely whether the word is eternal.” 18
It has also been said in a Bhasya passage.
“Word being eternal, the phonemes also should be eternal
and changeless.” 19
Even if eternality is taken as something merely practical
(the teaching of augments and substitutes does not violate it).
As has been said: —
“(As) both Khadira and Barbura have fine leaves and
yellow stalks, (when one says) ‘the Khadira has thorns’,
(what happens is not that the statement adds thorns which
were not there, but that the idea of Khadira which might
have extended to both is now restricted to Khadira only.) 20
Similarly, when one, after having said: —
“To the east of the village are the mango-trees” (one
adds), “the banyan trees have milk, downward growths and
wide leaves”.
(all that happens is that the idea of mango-trees which
might have been wrongly extended to the banyan trees
also now disappears and, in its place, the idea of banyan
tree comes).
Or (it might be said) those very sages who have realised
the truth and have, in the course of their different teachings,
composed Sutras, Anutantra (varttikas) and Bhasya, have,
in the science of Grammar also, declared that the word,
the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. And their
authority in the world is established.
[1. Though the idea is found expressed in the M.Bha, the actual
words are not traceable.
29
I. 23.
2. M. Bha I, p. 13.
3. gabdakrtivisesa hi etc. This sentence is somewhat obscure.
The previous sentences told us that the word stands for the universal
and that the universal of a word can co-inhere in it with other lesser
universals. If the word stands for the universal, why do we say ‘word’
instead of saying ‘wordness’? This sentence is apparently an answer
to that question. The main part of the sentence is vrksasabdatvadayah
sabdd ityapadisyante = The universals of words like Vrksasabdatva are
merely referred to as the words. That is because they are identified
(sarupatam apanndh ) with the cause of their manifestation ( nimitta),
namely, the individual words. This manifestation is necessary. Other¬
wise there would be extreme vagueness (sati vastusampramohe) and
there would be no verbal usage at all.
4. Karmatvasamanyadanye utksepaiuitvddayaste§u karmaksane§u
samaveta abhyupagamyanta eva vaisesikaili —Vr.
5. Na cavasyayi sastrantare parifosta jatyabhivyaktiprakriya vaiya-
karanaih parigrhyate. The usual view connected particularly with
the Vaisesikas, is that the universal (jati) inheres in the particular
which, therefore, reveals it. Though the universal is eternal according
to them, it exists in the particular and it can be perceived only as
existing in the particular. The latter, therefore, is said to reveal it
(abhivyahjaka ). When such a process is described, universals like
ghatatva , existing in ghata, are kept in mind. The universal vrksa -
sabdatva does not exist in the word vrksa exactly as ghatatva exists in
the ghata and its perception is also a different process which is des¬
cribed in greater detail in the course of the work. For the present,
it may be noted that when light and the senses reveal objects, they
reveal things which do not inhere in them, but are external to them.
6. There are two views on this question: (1) cognition of the
last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions left by the cognitions
of the previous phonemes, cause the cognition of the universal, (2) the
cognition of the last phoneme, together with those of the previous
phonemes, leave impressions which cause the cognition of the universal.
r
7. Yair apyakrtivyavaharo nabhyupagamyate etc. The same word,
uttered by different persons, at different times or even by parrots etc,
is recognised as the same word. But this recognition of identity
must not be confused with the universal. If it were the universal it
should rest on a particular word as ghatatva rests on. a particular
ghata. But it seems to be somewhat independent of it. So it is con¬
ceived by some as an eternal independent entity and not as a universal.
The fact that it is suggested by the impressions left by the different
phonemes of a word also points to the same conclusion.
8. Vr. remarks: parasparavyavrtta vary&statreti bhdgav ant am
sphotam manyante .
30
VAKYAPADIYAM OP BHARTRHARI
9. Vyavaharaniiyatayd nitytih sabdd Hi. Vyavaharanityata, vyavas-
thdnityatd, prava.hanitya.td, all mean continuity as distinguished from
K-utasthanityatd, absolute etemaliity or changelessness.
10. M.Bha. I, p. 7, 1. 8.
11. Arthanadesanat. tacca laghvartham. ko hi samartho dhdtupmti-
padikapratyayanipdtdndm arthan ddestum. (M.Bha. I, p. 363).
12. M.Bha. on P. 3.1.26.
13. P. 1.2.53.
14. M.Bha. 1.1.
15. Not traceable.
16. Not found in the Varttikas nor in the M.Bha.
17. M.Bha on P. 1.1.20 (I, p. 75).
18. M.Bha. I. p. 6, 1. 12.
19. M.Bha. I. p. 18. 1. 14-15.
20. M.Bha. I. p. 113. 1. 12.]
24.-26. The meanings which have been obtained
by abstraction, those which are of a fixed character, the
forms which have to be grammatically analysed and
those which are used as means for this purpose, the
relations consisting in causality and fitness which lead
to merit and understanding of meaning in the case of
correct forms and to the understanding of meaning only
in the case of incorrect ones, these have been described
in this sastra through indications and direct statements.
These are only some which have been dealt with here
according to tradition, in order that they may be fixed
in memory.
These three verses give the whole of the subject-matter
to be dealt with. The abstracted word-meaning is tha't which
was closely connected, but being freed from that connection
by an inferred postulated form, it is now abstracted. The
form of that separated thing is beyond the range of usage.
It is generally established on the basis of postulation, by
I. 24-26.
31
following tradition, ' according to one’s understanding and
through repeated practice. Similarly, the essence of the word
being indivisible, in order that the work of Grammar may
proceed, by adopting the method of positive and negative
reasoning and postulating their recurrence, the words are
separated from the whole and the separated word-meaning
is looked upon as what is expressed by them. This sepa¬
rated word-meaning serves the usage of the science of Gram¬
mar and also worldly usage based on difference and is simi¬
lar to usage in Grammar. When this separated meaning rests
on one single word, it cannot be determined as true or false.
When the mere word tree ( vrksa ) or fig-tree ( plaksa ) is
uttered and it is not completed by the addition of a verb,
the meanings conveyed by the words cannot be clearly de¬
fined. As long as specific actions which keep out others do
not set aside the act of mere existence which is the cause
of the very use of a word, 1 the verb ‘it is’ ( asti ), in the third
person, denoting existence, though not used, is brought to
the mind by the words tree etc., and is understood. These
words, looking like single words, when completed by some
word or other, are called sentences. Similarly, such divisions
as the meaning of the first word (of a compound) the mean¬
ing of the second word, the meaning of an outside word, the
meaning of the stem, the meaning of the root, the meaning
of the suffix etc., are abstracted somehow in many ways from
a single word by some scholars without any clear line of
demarcation. 2 The meaning with a fixed character is that
which is conveyed by the sentence, it has fictitious divisions^
it is specific, one, of the nature of action. It is conveyed by
means of the cognitions of the separated word-meanings.
Even though the separated elements are cognised, the mean¬
ings understood from namasyati , (he pays homage) scingra-
mayate (he offers battle) mundayati (he shaves the head)
kuttayati (he powders) carvayati (he masticates) etc., at
the time of the comprehension of the whole, is not complex. 3
That is why it has been said: —
“Or it is not necessary, because it is the (complete) word
which is used to convey the meaning.” 4
32
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
Word’ here stands for that in which an action is merged.
Or one might say that it is only the apparent persistence of
the cognition ( samjpratyaya ) (of the separated elements)
which is referred to here. Accepting the use of the indivisi¬
ble) word to convey the (indivisible meaning, the Bhasya-
kara) again says: —
“It is the word which ends in a primary or secondary
suffix which has a meaning and not the bare primary and
secondary suffixes.” 5
What is meant by ‘forms to be grammatically analysed’ is
this: According to some, it is the individual word which is the
limit of grammatical analysis, while according to others, it is
the sentence which is the limit. 6 According to the view that it
is the word which is so, when, because of the identity of
sounds, the same form of the word is taken, words which
have acquired their correct form on the basis of the univer¬
sal, even when the particulars come on the scene because
of connection with other words, would continue to have the
form based on the universal, which is an inner factor. The
result would be that a word like isuklci (white), in the sin¬
gular number and neuter gender, would be connected with
other words expressive of the substratum, having some other
gender and number. In order that this may not happen, the
rule,
“Of the adjectives also, except the universal”. 7
lays down that when words expressive of the substrata
which are external factors are to follow, words expressive of
quality, should take the gender and number of the words
expressive of the substrata. According to the view that gram¬
matical analysis has the sentence as the limit, considering that
a quality always exists in something, it is not possible to sepa¬
rate it from its substratum and so, being fully determined,
it does not denote the general idea at all. On this point, it
has been said: —
“That is natural.” 8
I. 24-26.
33
Similarly, it is according to the view that each word in a
‘dvandva’ compound gets its correct form separately that the
varttika
“In a dvandva compound, the gotra suffix must be elided
even in the numbers other than plural?” 9
has been taught. On the view that it is the whole which
gets the correct form, it has been said: —
“Or it may not be taught, as, in a dvandva compound,
every word is in the plural number.” 10
Similarly, all the sutras beginning with
“A qualifying word ending in a case-affix, is variously
combined with a qualified word ending in a case-affix” 11 and
“Words expressive of the standard of comparison and
ending in a case-suffix are combined with words expressive
of the common property ending in a case-affix,” 12
are to be understood as having been composed on the view
that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis. It is after
accepting that it is the word which has to be grammatically
analysed that such divisions as bhu ti y bhu ati , leading to the
understanding of groups of other words (than the sentence)
have been postulated and accepted as means ( pratipadaka ).
What is meant by ‘causality’ is this: when the cognition
which has parts of the appearances of the object and is super¬
imposed on the object is taken as the object, then, of that
object, the word is the cause. Since the relation of identity
between the word and the meaning in the form ‘It is this’ is
established, that cognition of the meaning is the cause of the
application of the word which is within and which is mani¬
fested by the sounds. Because of the relation of illuminator
and illuminated between particular words and particular
meanings, as in the case of the senses and their objects, there
is an eternal fitness, not created by anybody, of the express¬
ive words possessing unvarying and well-established correct¬
ness in regard to the meanings expressed by them. 13 In
the case of words whose relation with their meanings is not
established at the time of their first application, the fitness
depends upon convention.
K. S.5
34
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
The relation of the correct word with its meaning be¬
comes auxiliary to the understanding of the meaning and
when it is used with a knowledge of Grammar, 14 it becomes
auxiliary to the manifestation of merit. In the production of
special knowledge of the meaning, it brings about a condition
similar to perception. Corrupt forms, on the other hand, be¬
come, like winking etc., auxiliary to the production of special
knowledge in the manner of inference, by their connection
with what is connected with the meaning.
What is meant by “These have been described through
indications” is this:—When, in order to carry on the work
of Grammar, the analysis of some unified meaning is made,
there can be difference of opinion among men regarding the
different limits of the (analysed) meanings. How is it to be
known whether the suffix ‘nic’ is to be added to the root
when the causative is to be expressed or whether it is to be
added to the root of which it is the meaning? 15 Similarly,
in regard to the sutra
“When the idea of the feminine is to be expressed” 16
the doubt arises whether the suffixes ‘tap’ etc., are to be
added to a nominal stem when the idea of the feminine
gender is to be expressed or to a stem which includes the
feminine gender in its own meaning. Similarly, the doubt
arises: the meaning of which element is important in a com¬
pound-word formed according to the rule.
“The negative particle c na’ may be compounded with a
word connected with it in meaning and the resulting com¬
pound word is to be called tatpurusa.” 17
These options do not exist in the world, because the
worldly meaning is the whole and in regard to that, there is
no deviation. The alternatives adopted by men being thus
indefinite, that option is accepted by which the decisions of
the Science of Grammar are not affected. Similarly, that
the meanings of the inflectional suffixes are the numbers
one etc., or the accessories to the actions like the object, that
the meaning of a nominal stem is the group of five or of
four or of three, such alternative views are due to the varia¬
tions in human intelligence. 18 Action, accessary to action
i. 24-26. 3S
and time are also analysed as the expressed meanings in
different ways by different people. It has been said:
“The root stands for the accessories, action and time,
person and number, that is the verb; gender and number,
accessories to action, this is what the nominal stem stands
for.” 19
That the tatmanepada suffix comes after a root which
expresses mere action or the object of action, that the paras-
maipada suffix is added to a root which expresses the agent
has been said on the basis of an imaginary separation. The
statement
“After conveying its own meaning (the universal) which
inheres (in its substratum) the word, (though) free from any
further requirement, denotes the substance”
is nothing more than the following of the order in which
the understanding takes place. 20 A word does not convey its
own meaning and others by pausing again and again, because
it is uttered only once. Nor is it ever separated from its mean¬
ing. Nor is there any fixed sequence in the understanding of
the meaning by the hearer or the speaker. 21 The object,
qualified by all the attributes, a bundle of all the parts . which
are closely linked, comes at one and the same time- within
the range of a single cognition and later, one deliberately
analyses it into different cognitions. But, since an intuition
leading to purposeful activity cannot take place without the
reunification of what has,, been divided, one again under¬
stands the connected form. The sequence of the cognitions
of the speaker or the hearer who understands the parts sepa¬
rately, through considerations of proximity, width of scope,
abundance of the causes of manifestation, the desire to know
and the tendency to awaken the seed of another cognition 22
is not fixed in regard to the parts which are to be understood.
For it has been said: —
“The one object is divided in many ways on the basis
of difference of powers, by following the different forms of
cognition, by those who know the nature of knowledge.”
36
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTHHARX
The meaning with a fixed character in the Science of
Grammar is either the word-meaning or the sentence-mean¬
ing. For it has been said: —
‘Or no, for it is the word which is used to convey the
meaning.” 23 and
“What is extra, that is the meaning of the sentence.” 24
In the Sangraha also, it has been said: —
“What is called the word is not fixed in its form. The
form and the meaning of a word are born from the mean¬
ing of a sentence.”
Even though the form of the word to be explained is
determined, according to the view that the sentence is the
limit of analysis, there is no fixity in the form to be accepted
when it comes to division into stem and suffix, of words like
viarutta , indrarii, aikagarika, girisa 3 srotriya , ksattriya etc. 25
It has been said: —
The word with its meaning comes from the meaning
(of the sentence). It is through the word that the meaning
of a sentence is determined. The sentence is born of a collce-
tion of words and the word is born of a collection of pho¬
nemes.”
At the time of derivation, it is stated that the word
exists in the sentence and that the word is born of a collec¬
tion of phonemes.
The relation has also been shown as that of cause and
effect. For example: —
‘They, describing their fortunes from birth to death,
reveal them as existing, as figuring in the mind.” 26
Here and there, the relation has also been described as
fitness. For example: —
Expression, on the other hand, is natural.” 27 While the
colour remains the same, the words sona, karka and hema
are applied to a horse and not to a cow and others. 28
Similarly, it has been said: —
t 24-26.
37
“Among those who work and study equally, some are
rewarded with understanding while others are not” 29
and so on.
“Such roots having the circumflex accent and n as indi¬
catory letter have been taught by the Teacher which are
both, i.e., the fruit of whose action is meant for the agent
and not meant for the agent.” 30
The author of the Sangraha says: —
When the word and the meaning are separated, there
is division in usage. Because (really speaking) the unity of
the word and the meaning is established.”
Again he says: —
Neither in the world nor in the Veda is there any per¬
son who creates the relation. How can the relation of words
(with meanings) be created through words?”
[1. Yeyam aupacariki satta sa sarvasabdapravrttikdranam (Vr.).
2. It is not merely the indivisible meaning of the sentence which
is artificially divided but the meaning of a single word can also be
so divided. The addition of the verb asti to the single word vfksa
s ows that even sentences consisting of single words are artificially
divided.
3. Namasyati etc. Even though namasyati is explained as namah
karoti, ‘he pays homage’ as involving an agent’ an object and an
action, what is understood from it in the end does not involve such
fferentiation, but is a unified whole. The separation of the elements
at the time of the explanation is artificial. When grammar speaks about
primary and secondary suffixes and their meanings, it is all artificial.
It is the whole word ending in one of these suffixes which has a
meaning. See P. 3.1.17, 19, 21; 25.
4. Va. 19 on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bha. I. p. 237).
5. M.Bha. I. p. 319, 1. 6.
6. Padavadhikam anvakliydnam. The word sukla ordinarily de¬
notes the quality white. When one wants the word to denote, not
the quality, but the thing which has that quality, the suffix matup
has to be added to the word according to P. 5.2.94. But the elision
of this suffix after words expressive of quality has also been taught.
, Us the word means ‘a white thing’ the form would still be
sukla. Thus the word sukla denotes two different things: the quality
white and the thing having that quality. The fact of being white
VAKYAPAblYAM OP BHARTRHARi
Sg
(suklatva ) exists in both and, on that basis, the word gets its form;
namely, its singular number and neuter gender: suklam. Even when a
word expressive of the thing or things in which the quality resides
is used like patdh , the word suklam which has already acquired its lorm
according to the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis,
would retain it and we would get the expression: suklam patdh. But as
the expression is wrong, Panini, in order to prevent its occurrence; says:
Visesananam cajateh (P. 1.2.52). According to this rule, adjectives take
the gender and number of the words which they qualify. The very fact
that he makes such a sutra shows that he considers the word to be the
limit of grammatical analysis.
Vdkyavadhikam anvakhydnam. According to this view, a quality
always resides in its substratum. It cannot be thought of in isolation.
The gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum would
inevitably belong to the word expressive of the quality. Therefore
words like sukla never express the quality white, in isolation. So it
would never have the singular number and neuter gender in isolation.
It would have the gender and number of the word expressive of the
substratum where it resides. Therefore, no special sutra is neces¬
sary to bring it about. That is why it has been declared unneces¬
sary in the sutra Tad asisyam sampwipramdnatvdt (P. 1.2.53).
7. P. 1.2.52.
8. M.Bha. I. p. 430, 1. 11.
9. Va. 5. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bha. I. p. 490).
10. Va. 8. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bha. I. p. 491).
11. P. 2.1.57.
12. P. 2.1.55.
13. See the Vrtti on Ka 23.
14. Sabdapurvake va prayoge. See Va. 9, Paspasahnika and the
M. Bha thereon. But sabdapurvaka prayoga which leads to dharma and
abhyudaya must be distinguished from sabdapurva yoga which is men¬
tioned in several places in the Vrtti. See the Vrtti on Ka 14, 131, 142.
It must also be distinguished from Vdgyoga which is already mentioned
in the M. Bha, Paspasahnika and here in the Vrtti on I. 130.
15. P. 3. 1. 26.
16. P. 4.1.3.
17. P. 2.2.6.
18. There are different views current among grammarians as to
the number of meanings which a bare stem ( pratipadika ) can convey.
Some hold that it can denote five things ( pncaka ): svartha (the uni¬
versal), dravya (the particular) linga (gender), samkhyd (number) and
accesory to action ( kdraka ). For example, in the sentence dadhy
dnaya, the word dadhi denotes all the five things, even though, in form,
I. 24-26.
39
it is no more than the bare stem. Others think that the accessory to
action is conveyed by the suffix and so attribute only four ( catuska )
to the bare stem. Others think that number also is the meaning of
the suffix, in which case only three ( trika ) remain for the bare stem.
If the feminine gender is considered to be the meaning of the feminine
suffix, the bare stem would convey only two ideas ( dvika ).
19. According to Vrsabha, this is a sutra belonging to the Kasakrtsna
school. He is also our sole authority for the meanings of the technical
words used in the sutra. From his explanation it follows that, ac¬
cording to Kasakrtsna, the suffixes do not express any meaning apart
from what the root or the nominal stem expresses. As Vr. puts it:
pratyaydndmavyatiriktdrthdbhidhdndt. It is also to be noted that, in
the supposed sutra of Kasakrtsna, which verbal element expresses
which meaning is directly stated, so that one does not have to depend
on indications.
20. Pratipattikramaniyaindnugamamdtram—Na sabdagato’ abliidhd-
nakramo’ pi tu pratipattyapratipattikramah (Vr.).
21. Pratipattikramo liy ayam srotur abhidhdtur vd na vyavastliitah.
The idea is that there is no sequence at all. The following sentence
makes it clear.
22. In understanding the parts abstracted from the unified whole,
the speaker or the hearer is guided by the following factors, as explain¬
ed by Vrsabha:—1. Pratyasatti= proximity. It is the universal which
exists in a particular that helps one to distinguish the latter from other
kinds of particulars. So that universal is proximate to the particular
and, therefore, it is understood first. But the universal cannot be
understood except through the particular in which it inheres nor can
gender be understood except through the particular in which it resides.
So, through the desire to cognise the universal and proximity to gender,
the particular is grasped. Gender is understood before number and
accessory because it does not depend upon any other particular for its
comprehension and it also helps to distinguish the particular in which
it exists from other particulars; 2. Width of scope (mahavisayatva)
can be seen in the universal which inheres in all the particulars.
Compared to gender, the particular has a wider scope, because all the
genders can exist in the particular. One gender excludes the others
and so it has a narrower scope. Gender is wider in scope than number,
because the same gender can cover all numbers, whereas one number
excludes the other numbers. As all the particulars can manifest the
universal, the latter has abundant causes of manifestation; 3. (ablii-
vyaktinimittopavyanjanaprakarsa) . The universal has more mani¬
festos compared to the particular which i s manifested by its
own parts only; 4. The desire to know ( upalipsa ) is also a
factor: what is desired to be known first is known first. Finally,
all cognitions have inner dispositions ( blja ) among their causes. They
are awakened ( vrttildbha ) before the cognitions take place. The cog-
40
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
nition of the universal tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise
the particular while that of the latter tends to awaken the predisposition
to cognise gender etc. This is what is called; 5. bljavrttildbhdnugunyam .
23. Va. 19, on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bha. I. p. 237).
24. M.Bha on Va. 2. on P. 2.3.49. (M.Bha. I. p. 462).
25. These words can be analysed in different ways —
Marutta: Marut + tap (Va. 10 on P. 5.2.122) or Marut + dd -|- kta,
in the sense of marudbhir dattah, the root dd being elided.
Indrdnl: Indra + dnuk -J- nls or Indra + an (causative of an) +
an -f- nip.
Aikdgarika: Ekagdra -f thant or Ekagara + than.
Girisa: Giri + si -f- da ( aunddika ) or Giri -f- sa (matvarthiya).
Srotriya : nipata according to P. 5.2.84. or Chandas srotra +
ghan (adhlte ityarthe).
Ksatriya: Ksatra -f- glia or Ksatra + iya.
26. M. Bha on Va. 15 on P. 3.1.26.
27. Va. 15 on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 433).
28. Cf. M.Bha. Vol. I. p. 433. It is there pointed out that the words
sona, hema and karka which mean red. black and white respectively,
can be applied only to a horse of that colour and not to other animals
of the same colour.
29. M.Bha. on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 430, 1. 12).
30. M.Bha. on P. 1.3.72. (Vol. I. p. 292, 1. 22).
27. The correct words, acquired from the cultur¬
ed through tradition, are the means of obtaining merit.
The incorrect words, while not differing from them as
far as conveying of the meaning is concerned, are of an
opposite character.
Just as other means of attaining merit, received through
uninterrupted tradition consisting of successive teaching of
the cultured, or just as prohibited things like injury to others,
telling lies, stealing etc., or things neither allowed nor pro¬
hibited like hicup, breathing, scratching etc., are well estab¬
lished and are not to be doubted, in the same way, the dis¬
tinction between what is correct and what is not is based on
unbroken tradition and is not to be doubted, but is to be
accepted according to tradition.
I. 28.
41
28. Whether words be eternal or otherwise, their
beginning is not known. As in the case of living be¬
ings, there is what is called continuity ( vyavastha-
nityata).
1 Whether one accepts the view that the words are eter¬
nal and manifested or the view that they exist beforehand
and undergo modifications like birth etc., or the view that
they do not exist beforehand but are made audible and be¬
come inaudible again (sopakhyanirupdkhyatvani ), in any
case, there was no first stage in which verbal usage did
not exist nor will there be a future stage when it will not
exist. For those who declare that God, Time, the Purusas, 2
knowledge, the individual soul ( ksetrajna ) to be different
(from the effects and their causes), for those who declare
this (universe) to be without God, Time, the Purusas, know¬
ledge or the individual soul but entirely based on nescience,
for those who maintain that the universe, without a before
and after and without going beyond the unity of the ultimate,
consists of the manifestation of the different forms due to the
combined, mutually opposed and indefinable powers, for all
of them, there was no first period of time when there was
no activity of the living. This is what is called continuity,
without a beginning and without an end. It has been said—
“That is also eternal, in which the identity is not des¬
troyed.” 3
[1. According to Vrsabha, two views are here expressed in regard
to words: (1) that they are eternal and, therefore, already existent °and
manifested at the time of use, (2) that they are produced at the
time of use and disappear again. The first view is associated with the
Sarikhyas, especially Varsaganya. The second view seems to be that
of the Naiyayikas. In regard to the universe, the view that it is with¬
out God etc., but based entirely on nescience is attributed by Vr to
Brahmavadinah. Some, however, attribute it to the Buddhists and the
view expressed in the latter part of the sentence to the Advaitins.
2. Purusa — Purusa iti kecit prthivyadisamghatam ahull (Vr.).
3. M.Bha. I. p. 7, 1. 22.]
K.S.6
42
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
29. Nobody would establish this system of rules
without a purpose. Therefore, this tradition relating to
correctness is being composed by the cultured.
Which cultured person, even if he has a confused mind
( sambhinnabaddhih ) and no sympathy towards the world, 1
would undertake the regulation of the accent and othei
signs of correctness of the words of the Veda and of the
world which are so difficult to know and to learn and which
are the very purpose of Grammar? And such a legulation
would not be useless. (If it were) such a regulation made
by the cultured would be unacceptable to the others. And
it would not be authority in the world for scholars. There¬
fore, this tradition (relating to words) beginningless, hand¬
ed down from teacher to pupil, the means of inferring who
the cultured persons are, infallible, consisting of general lules
and their elaborations, is being composed in different ways,
through direct statements and by implication.
[1. Sambhinnabuddhir api lokam pratyaYiabhinivistali, The reason¬
ing behind this expression is not clear. The purpose of this verse is to
justify the composition of the science of grammar. Four reasons are put
forward justifying its composition: (1) that it is eternal, (2) that it
has been handed down from teacher to pupil, (3) that it helps us
to infer who is cultured and who is not, (4) that it gives an infallible
knowledge of correctness. Those who are confused as to what is right
and what is wrong ( sambhinnabuddhih ) and have no sympathy for the
world ( lokam pratyanabhinivistah ) would not be able to undertake
the composition of the science of grammar. Vr. seems to have had
the reading: lokam pratyabhinivistah which can mean, ^ according to
him, “ api namayam lokah kliedaydsabhyam yajyeta iti vyutthita -
buddhir abhinivistah = one who would like the world to be troubled
by pain and fatigue. But Vr. considers the former reading easier to
explain.]
30. Dharma cannot be determined by reasoning
alone, without the help of tradition. Even the know¬
ledge of the Seers is due to their previous observance
of the tradition.
43
I. 30-3i.
All thinkers, when they reach the extreme, have recourse
to the own nature of things. The determination of the own
nature of actions having invisible fruits can be made only
with the help of tradition. How can one trust human reason¬
ing in which the similarities and differences of things are
never certain and which is, therefore, always doubtful? Even
in the case of those individuals who have adopted a parti¬
cular mode of intellectual and spiritual life and are known
to have acquired qualities which reasoning cannot explain,
it is said that, because of their adherence to the injunctions
of the Agama (Tradition), their souls are purified and a
divine knowledge is manifested in them. 1 To assume that
such knowledge is natural to them would be to condemn all
special effort 2 as fruitless and obstacles to such knowledge
would also arise naturally.
[1. Sage Kapila is usually given as the example of one, who posse¬
ssed divine knowledge capable of seeing the past, the present and the
future, the subtle ( suksina ), the distant (viprakrsta) and the hidden
(vyavahita ).
2. The effort made by persons to acquire the kind of knowledge
that Kapila had is meant here. Vr. says: yatna ity abhyasadvkali.']
31. Nobody can violate, on the basis of reasoning,
those paths of Dharma which have come down without
a break, because they are accepted in the world.
In spite of many variations in the doctrines of the cul¬
tured, there are well-known beneficial modes of conduct,
common to all; to go against them would not be liked by the
people. They have never been refuted by mere reasoning.
It may be that some do, on the basis of some passage in the
tradition itself, 1 resort to a reprehensible mode of conduct,
opposed to what is accepted in the world.
[ 1 . Te’pi hi vedantadarsanam anyatha parikalpya pmvrttali—Vv. Ac¬
cording to this, it is some passage of the Vedanta, i.e., the Upanisads,
which is misunderstood by some people and made the basis of
reprehensible conduct. Could it be such a passage as na kahcana
pariharet (Cha. Up. 2.13.)]
44
vakyApadiyam of bhartrhari
32. It is extremely difficult to establish by reason¬
ing the nature of objects, because their properties differ
according to difference in circumstances, place and
time.
The inference, after seeing what is connected and consi¬
dered invariably concommittant or something similar to it,
of another thing which is not visible, does not lead to any
certainty in regard to that invisible thing. One sees that
the nature of things of proved strength and quality in cer¬
tain circumstances, varies, in other circumstances, visible or
invisible to ordinary persons. Even the properties of exter¬
nal things like seeds and plants are suspended in certain cir¬
cumstances. Similarly, properties of things change with
change of place. Waters of the Himalayas are very cold to
the touch. But similar waters found in clouds, a water-
boiler and the like are warm to the touch. The ordinary man
( arvagdarsana ), misled by external resemblance, is unable
to see the difference and can see it only with the help of
tradition. Similarly, properties of things change with time.
The temperature of the waters of a well and the like, is very
different in summer and winter. Which intelligent man
would ’ try to demonstrate, by mere reasoning, this subtle
difference in nature, imperceptible to the ordinary man, un-
ascertainable by inference and incomprehensible except
through knowledge derived from tradition?
33. The known power of an object to produce
different effects is inoperative when it comes into contact
with particular objects or factors.
The proved power of fire etc., to bring about destruc¬
tion in wood etc., is inoperative in regard to such things as
masses of clouds. Similarly, due to the action of magical
formulae, special herbs or chemical products, the power (of
fire) to burn even inflammable objects is suspended. Subs¬
tances whose powers are proved in some cases are of doubt¬
ful effectiveness in other cases.
45
1. 34.
34. Whatever is inferred with great effort by
clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer
ones. 1
Substance is different from quality because the latter
qualifies the former. It is like this. Even though there would
be the difference of qualifier and qualified in both cases, the
word ‘king’ can qualify the word ‘kingdom’ (as in the phrase
‘the king’s kingdom’ = rdjno rastram) but not the word
‘hermit’. The word sandal can qualify the word ‘smell’, but
not the word colour. Therefore, substance is different from
quality. Even though the separate identity of substance is
thus established, it has been said that the argument is not
sound. The fact is that words sometimes convey the general
and sometimes the particular. To qualify the word smell or
the like with the word sandal which stands for something
having a particular colour, shape etc., has a purpose. To qua¬
lify it with the mere word colour would be useless, because
colour is a general word and as much as it conveys was alrea¬
dy known. When the question ‘whose man is this’ is asked
the answer ‘the king’s’ is given in order to exclude other
possible masters. Nobody would answer ‘of some person’,
because that much was already known. Others give another
example: Even though a word and a stanza have this much
in common that both are parts of a hymn (which is a collec¬
tion of words), a stanza can qualify a word (as in the ex¬
pression ‘the word of a stanza’ = rcah padam) but not vice-
versa (one would not say: the stanza of the word). Another
argues differently: It is on the assumption of identity that
the word sandal qualifies the word smell and the word colour
does not. So the reason given: ‘because the latter qualifies
the former’ to prove difference (between substance and
quality) should prove the opposite. The problem arises be¬
cause of particular meanings which figure or do not figure
in the mind when words are uttered. Therefore, the infe¬
rence of something which is invisible from what is visible
is alright if it is not opposed to tradition. It is a fact that
minor acts, closely connected with particular major acts like
46
VAKVAPADIYAlvi OF BHARTKHARi
cooking and ordinarily leading to their inference, may be
performed by some for deceiving others. 2
[1. Cf. Tatha hi kaiscid abhiyuktair yatnenotpreksitastarka ablii -
yuktantarairanyairabhasyamand drsyante —Sank. Bha. on Br. Su II.
1 . 11 .
2. The purpose of this karika is to show that reasoning, unsupport¬
ed by tradition, is unreliable and that the reasoning of one may be
upset by another. The argument of the Naiyayika to prove tliat
substance is different from quality is taken as an example. His argu¬
ment, briefly, is: Substance is different from quality because the latter
can qualify the former. Against this, others point out that the argu¬
ment is weak because both what is different and what is not different
from another can qualify it in some cases and cannot qualify it in other
cases. A king and a kingdom are different from each other and we
can say: the king’s kingdom (rajho rastram). Here ‘king’ qualifies
‘kingdom’. But, on this analogy, we cannot say: the hermit’s kingdom,
even though the hermit and the kingdom are also different from each
other. Similarly, we can say ‘the smell of sandal’, but we cannot say
‘the smell of something having colour’, even though in both cases, there
is difference between the two things. To come to cases where there
is no difference, we can say: dmrdndm vanam = a grove of mango-
trees. Here mango-trees qualify grove, though the grove is not
different from the trees. That which qualifies must keep out something.
When we say, the smell of sandal, the word sandal keeps out other
things having smell like flowers. When we say, the king’s man, the
word ‘king’s’ keeps out other possible masters. It is not, therefore, the
fact of being different which enables qualifiers to qualify a substance.
Sometimes, the whole qualifies a part as in ‘rcah padam ’ = the word
of a stanza or grhasya dvarasald = the parlour of the house. Here
the house qualifies the parlour, because parlour is part of the house.
In other words, the relation of qualifier and qualified cannot prove
that two things are different from each other.]
35. The experts’ knowledge of the genuineness of
precious stones and coins, uncommunicable to others,
is born of practice and not of reasoning.
Expert examiners of coins, goldsmiths etc., even after
having found out the subtle reasons for deciding the genuine¬
ness of coins like a k5.rsa.pana, are not able to communicate
them to others, because these reasons have no words to ex¬
press them. Even experts, full of concentration, do not
understand, without long practice, the distinction between
I. 36-37.
47
sadja, rsabha , gandhara , dhaivata etc., even though, it comes
within the range of perception. 1
[1. The purpose of this verse seems to be to point ^out that, in
order to understand certain things, it is necessary, not only to make
use of perception, inference and tradition, but a fourth thing called,
abliyasa, practice. The knowledge which the expert acquires about the
genuineness of precious stones is something which he cannot communi¬
cate to others nor has it been communicated to him by others. That
Is why it is said to be different from tradition which can be communi¬
cated to others.]
36. The extraordinary powers of the Pitrs, the
demons and the goblins, going beyond perception and
inference, are the results of their previous deeds.
In all circles of thought, it is admitted that deaf people
and others hear sounds in their dreams and that some per¬
sons can see minute things inside houses through thick walls,
without breaking them. When the question arises as to the
means by which this is done, one cannot think of anything
else than the indefinable power of adrsta. the result of deeds
done in previous births. 1
[1. Vr. points out that those who become deaf after birth may
hear sounds in dreams because of the impressions of sounds heard
before becoming deaf. But those who are born deaf also hear sounds
in dreams. And then there are the manes, demons and goblins who
can see the past, the distant and the hidden. All this is due to the
effect of deeds done in previous birth. This faculty is called adrsta
which must be distinguished from perception, inference, tradition and
practice.]
37. The knowledge of the past and the future of
those whose insight has manifested itself and whose
mind is in no way tainted differs in no way from
perception.
According to the view that the effect is a totally new
product ( asatkaryavada ) it is, before its creation, without
48
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
a basis, without a form, without an essence, something
in regard to which the causal power of something can¬
not be determined nor specified. How then can it be under¬
stood? According to the other view ( satkciryavdda ) its speci¬
fic form (before creation) is not manifest, it is unknown for
the purpose of worldly transactions, it is as good as totally
non-existent. But cultured persons, whose impurities have
been burnt away by austerities, whose cognitions are free
from all limitations, see everything vividly reflected in their
cognitions. 1
[1. Vr. points out that the purpose of this Karika is to state that
in addition to ordinary perception, there exists another. Only those
whose impurities have been washed away have it. It is the result of
their good deeds in previous births. Through that, they can see the
past and the present.
While explaining the expression: adrstapratiniyatakdranasakti-
•parigraham, Vr. points out that the different kinds of inference: purva-
vat, sesavat and sdmtinyatorfrsta, cannot enable us to determine what
has causal power in regard to which effect, no matter what view of
causality we adopt, whether it be asatkdryavdda or satkdryavada .]
38. The words of those who, with their divine
vision, see things which are beyond the senses and un¬
knowable. cannot be set aside by reasoning.
The supreme inner Controller, the atoms which are the
abode of the initial cause of creation, the unmanifested Word
—Absolute which is the substratum of its powers, the gods, 1
the residual forces 2 generated by action, leading to particular
results and not to others, in their maturity, the divine other¬
worldly body, 3 and other such things known in all scholarly
circles, imperceptible to the senses like colour and beyond
the range of inner experience like happiness are undoubtedly
perceived by the sages with their extraordinary eye. The
words of these sages, dealing with matters beyond the range
of inference, cannot be upset by reasoning which is so liable
to err. 4 People born blind cognise colour and as they had
never seen colour before, it cannot be a case of inference.
[1. Those who have a visible or concrete form and those who have
not—Vr.
2. Aniibandlia-parhmma-saktivaikcilyani. The residual force of
action is anubandlia; when under favourable circumstances, the force
yields the result of the action in question, it is parinama; its inability to
yield any other result is sciktivaikalya.
3. Siiksinamativaliikam sariram. Vr. says that this refers to the
intermediary body which the dead person acquires before he gets his
next body. It is called intermediary, because it enables the person to
cross over.
4. Vyabhicaribhir cinumanaih —This is a reference to the point
already made in Ka. 32 and 34 that all reasoning is unreliable and
liable to be upset by other reasoning.]
39. How can one who does not question the
authority of such persons any more than his own ex¬
perience and has, therefore, taken his stand on direct
vision, be set aside by others (who follow reasoning) ?
There are in every branch (of the Veda) and for every¬
body, some trustworthy persons. Their words are not scru¬
tinised and are not to be doubted any more than one’s own
perception. Whose actions, like making stones float on water,
though not actually seen, can be believed on the authority
of trustworthy persons who follow them. It is like this. That
actions done in this world lead to desirable or undesirable
fruit after death is accepted in the world on the authority
of trustworthy persons and even without such teaching in
the Scripture, all persons usually accept it.
40. In order to decide what is good and what is
bad, all men, including the lowest, have very little use
for scripture; 1
Therefore, direct perception and extra-sensory cognition
(of the sages) set aside reasoning even when there is con¬
tradiction between the two.
50
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHABT
[1. This verse is found in the SI. Var. (verse 3, p. 209. (Chow-
khambha edition). It is there given as that of Parasarya, i.e., Vyasa.
Jayanta Bhatta, in his Nyayamanjarl, also gives it as a quotation from
Vyasa. Here, however, it is not given as a quotation, but as an integral
part of the Vakyapadiya itself.]
41. One who has recourse to Tradition which
shines uninterruptedly like the T consciousness cannot
be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning. 1
The spontaneous and eternal consciousness which is
attested by our sense of ‘I am’ and the like, is not set aside
even by the teaching of authoritative persons that there is
neither *1’ nor < mine’ even in the case of libeiated souls as
far as worldly life is concerned. Such is the case with Tra¬
dition in the form of Scripture and written tradition accept¬
ed by all cultured people. It is not violated in the matter of
what should be done and what should not be done, what can
be eaten and what cannot be eaten, which woman one can
marry and which woman one cannot many by the followers
of different doctrines. One who closely follows such a tradi¬
tion observed by the elders cannot deviate from the right
path by accepting the reasoning of logicians. Thus, he re¬
mains irreproachable in the eyes of the woild.
[1. Mere reasoning such as that the word, the meaning and their
mutual relation being eternal and known from the world, it is not
necessary to compose the science of Grammar.]
42. Fall is not unlikely in the case of one who
relies on reasoning, as in the case of a blind man who
walks along a difficult path by groping with the hands.
Just as one, who, after seeing a sample, accepts the rest
according to the maxim of the rice in the cooking pot (st/ia-
llpulcikanydya ) 1 is like a blind man who goes hurriedly on
a difficult hilly path without the help of one who can see,
t 43. 51
understands a part of the path by groping with his hands,
traverses it, and, on that basis, takes the rest of the path also
to be similar and comes to grief, in the same way, one who,
without the help of the eye of Tradition, relies on reasoning
and, after having attained confidence in some matters through
inference only, proceeds, without the help of tradition, to
perform acts having visible and invisible results, inevitably
incurs great sin.
[1. Sthdlipuldkanyaya. See Jacob — A Handful of Popular Maxims —1,
p. 53.]
43. Therefore, on the basis of eternal Scripture
and authoritative tradition, the cultured have composed
this science of the explanation of the words.
Therefore, teachers have composed this science of the
explanation of words (Grammar) after having taken as
authority the tradition which is not connected with any per¬
son, not to be doubted and calculated to teach man what is
good for him, after having accepted, as in the case of words
like prsoclara 1 the uninterrupted practice of their own schools,
acceptable to the cultured, in regard to the use of the cor¬
rect forms of words and after having taken as authority, the
works of earlier sages in which option is allowed where there
is contradiction between two teachings, in which there are
main rules and their exceptions and in which there is great
variation, according to time, in the manner of presentation
of the forms of words . 2
[1. Prsodara. See P. 6.3.109— Prsodarani yathopadistam.
2. Pratikalam drstasabdasvarupavyabhicdrani Vrsabha under¬
stands this in two ways: (1) during periods when men are intellectually
strong, everything is taught in great detail; at other times, briefly.
This is one variation according to time. (2) At one time, one form
of a word is taught as leading to happiness (merit) and another form
at another time. At one time, nydnkavam was correct but now ?iai-
yankavam is correct.]
52 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARl
V 44 . In the words which are expressive the learn¬
ed discern two elements: one is the cause of the real
word which, the other, is used to convey the meaning.
That is called the expressive word which takes over the
meaning, imposes it on its own form, makes it identical with
itself, as it were. It has been said in the Sangraha.
“According to the view that it is the undivided word
which conveys the meaning , 1 the expressive word has its
own form (which is the basis of its usage and grammatical
explanation). According to the view that the word can be
divided into meaningful parts , 2 the basis of the formation
of the word is the element delimited by meaning. Others are
of the view that the word which conveys the meaning (does
not express it but only) suggests it, because in that way,
the use of the relation of the identity of the word and the
meaning in the form ‘It is this’ would be possible. 3 ” Or the
word updddna may be taken to mean the whole which is to
be accepted (for the operation of the rule). It is like this:
where a word stands for its own form, its parts are not taken
into consideration and no division is, therefore, cognised . 4
What is meant by ‘one is the cause of the real word’ is: the
cause of that, standing on which or resting on which or based
on which the sounds convey the meaning. What is meant
by ‘the other is used to convey the meaning’ is—By the acti¬
vity of the articulatory organs, it attains modification, be¬
comes audible, depends, as the illuminator, always on the
illuminated 5 and is used to convey the meaning. According
to others, that in which there is no inner sequence is the
cause, that which has acquired sequence conveys the mean¬
ing. They proclaim that even that conveys the meaning
when it enters the mind of the listener with all sequence
suppressed. Another maintains that what has sequence is the
cause of what has none. In the sequenceless word are merg¬
ed both the expressive power ( srutisakti ) and the power of
being expressed ( arthasalcti ). It has been said—
53
t 45.
“From the differentiated, the undifferentiated word is
born and it expresses the meaning. The word assumes the
form of the meaning and enters into relation with it.”
[1. Avyutpattipaksa. When a word cannot be divided into meaning¬
ful parts, the whole of it is associated with a meaning which is not
related to the meanings of its parts, because there are no parts.
2. Vyutpattipaksci. Where a word can be divided into meaningful
parts, the meaning of the whole is sought to be connected with the
meaning of the parts.
3. Dyotaka. Those who hold that the word is suggestive (and not
expressive = vacaka ) seem to mean that the relation of expressive and
expressed presupposes difference between word and meaning. But
there is abheda between the two. Therefore, the word cannot be vacaka ,
it can only be dyotaka .
4. Sometimes, a word stands for its own form and not for a
meaning different from the form. That is mostly the case in gram¬
matical rules. P. 4.2.33 “agner dhak” says that the suffix dhak (= eya)
is to be added to agni. Here agni naturally stands for its own form
and not for what it means. Therefore, it cannot be divided into parts.
The suffix can be added only to the word as a whole and not to any
part of it. Agni is svarupapaddrthaka .
5. Pratydyyaparatantra . ‘Tadakdropagraheiiopasthandf —Vr. The
word as prakasaka, naturally depends upon the meaning which is
prakdsya or pratyayya . It is supposed always to carry the reflection
of the meaning.]
45. That there is an essential difference between
them is the view of some followers of tradition. Others,
on the other hand, think that they are one but appear
to be different owing to difference in the point of view.
When the word ‘essential difference’ is the object of the
verb bru (ahull), it takes the second case-affix (dviiiya) but
when the whole sentence as uttered by the followers of tra¬
dition is imitated, it takes the first case-affix (prathamd).
According to the view that the effect is different from the
cause, the difference between the two (kinds of words men¬
tioned in the previous verse) is clear. According to the
other view (that the effect is not different from the cause)
54
Vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
one and the same thing is thought of as two on the basis of
difference in point of view resulting from its two powers.
Or the difference of opinion among ancient thinkers may be
based on their difference of opinion regarding the identity
or difference of the universal and the particular of words . 1
This matter will be discussed in detail later.
[1. sabdakrtivyaktibhedabheda—“Tatra kesamcic chabdakrtir nimit -
tam sabdavyaktir vacika . Aparesdm etad eva viparltam. Tayos ca kecid
bhedam abhedam cdpare pratipannah. (Vr.)]
46. Just as the fire which is within the churn-
sticks is the cause of the other fire (which is kindled),
similarly, the word which is in the mind (of the
speaker) becomes the cause of the different expressive
words.
Just as one sees that, both according to the doctrine of
identity and that of difference , 1 the fire, at first in the form
of seed and unmanifested is later kindled into a flame and
its capacity to illuminate itself and others, previously imper¬
ceptible, becomes later perceptible, in the same way, the
word in the mind which has the seeds of differentiation in it,
comes near to manifestation when the seeds become mature
and is manifested by the movements of the articulatory
organs and due to differentiation in the manifesting sounds,
appears to have divisions and is perceived as having inner
sequence and illuminates its own form and others . 2 ^
[1. Ekatvapaksa and nanatvapaksa stand for satkarycivdda and
Qsatkaryavada respectively.
2. The word exists in the mind of the speaker as a unity. When
he utters it and produces the different soimds by the movements of
the articulatory organs, it appears to have differentiation. But the
listener ultimately perceives it as a unity and it is then that it conveys
the meaning. I n this verse, the word which exists in the speaker’s
mind as a unity is described as the nimitta . As Vr. puts it: Sa eva
vaktrbuddhistho’nabhivyaJcto nimittam.]
h
I. 47-48.
55
47. First conceived in the mind and applied to
some meaning or other, the word is suggested by the
sounds whch are produced by the articulatory organs.
When the relation of identity between the word and the
meaning in the form ‘It is this’ ( so’yam) is analysed, the
word which is sought to be superimposed on the meaning
and into which the meaning enters as a kind of reflection
(upayogenanupravesam labhate) is, before its utterance, visua¬
lised by the mind, applied to a meaning according to the inten¬
tion of the speaker, seems to change its form into that of
another and projects it (on the meaning). What is meant
by ‘produced by the articulatory organs’ is that the word
whose nature it is not to change, appears to change, follow¬
ing the manifesting sound whose nature it is to change.
The word which is entirely without change appears to change
in terms of the gross nada, perceptible like a mass of clouds,
brought into being when the subtle all-pervasive sounds
. (dlivani ) are amassed (praciyarrvane) by the movements of
the articulatory organs 1 .
[1. Three words are used in the Vrtti-sabda, dhvani and nada.
The first stands for the word which conveys the meaning. The
dlwanis are conceived of as something atomic, all-pervasive and imper¬
ceptible. When amassed by the movements of the articulatory organs,
they become gross and perceptible and are then called nada. It is
they which suggest the word. The word is first conceived as a
unity in the mind of the speaker. In order to utter it, he makes
movements of his articulatory organs which have the effect of progres¬
sively collecting the subtle, atomic, all-pervading dhvanis and bringing
into being the nadas which are gross and audible. These have divisions
and sequence and so the word, suggested by them, though changeless
and sequenceless, also seems to have them. The process of accumu¬
lation of the atomic dhvanis. resembling the accumulation of clouds
(abhrasahghdtavad ) is referred to in Verse 111—** abhramva praciyante
sabdakliyah paramanavah ”.]
48, Because the gross sound (nada) is produced
in a sequence, the word which is neither prior nor
posterior nor has any sequence, is manifested as having
sequence and parts.
56
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
The gross sound ( nada ) which is in the form of an accu¬
mulation on account of the sequential activity (of the articu¬
latory organs) suggests the word ( spliota ) by means of the
functions of prevention and permission . 1 Though the word
(spliota) is one, it appears to have different parts. It has
neither sequence nor simultaneity, both being opposed to its
one-ness and eternality. Therefore without giving up its one¬
ness, it appears to have differentiation which is a property
of the gross sound associated with it. Such is the nature of
what is associated with it. It is like the whole ( avayavi )
which is an absolute unity appearing to be differentiated be¬
cause of the differentiation of its parts.
[1. Sapratibandhdbhyanujhayd vrttyd. Pratibandha (prevention)
and abliyanujha (permission) are usually given as the two functions
of time, by virtue of which everything happens at its proper time,
neither before nor later. Growth, for instance, means that at any of
its stages, the later stages cannot appear. Similarly, when a word is
uttered, the manifesting sounds can only appear in a sequence. When
one appears, the later ones cannot. This is abhyanujna for what ap¬
pears and pratibandha for what does not.]
49. Just as a reflection, found elsewhere (as in
water) seems to have movement because of the move¬
ment of water, such is the relation between spliota and
nada.
According to the view that the reflection is identical
with what reflects it or according to the opposite view ( anya-
tvapalcse) , the reflection of an object like the moon appears
to be connected with and to have the properties of its sub¬
stratum, but it is not really so. Though it has no movements
of its own, it takes on the property called movement of water,
wave etc., and appears to have the various movements
of water etc. Similarly, the word ( spliota ) takes on the pro¬
perties of the primary sound (prdkrtadhvani) when it is look¬
ed upon as short, long, or protracted and those of the secon¬
dary sound (vaikrtadhvani ) when it is looked upon as having
quick, medium or slow speed . 1
I. 50.
57
[1. There are different views about the nature of a reflection:
(1) In the presence of the original, a luminous object like water is
affected and seems to reflect the original, but it is only a change in
the water.. There is no reflection apart from the water. (2) The re¬
flection exists in the water apart from it and has the original as its
material cause. (3) The rays of the eye, turned back by luminous
surfaces like those of a mirror, water etc., see the original and that
seeing is the reflection. According to the first view ( tattvapaksa ) the
xeflection appears to be in the water and to have its movements, but
it is only the water which one sees in that condition. In the second
and third views (anyatvapaksa ), the reflection is something different
ficm the water. There is no contact between the wind and the
reflection and so there cannot be any movement in the reflection itself.
Because the reflection is in contact with water and the latter with the
wind, the movement in the water appears to exist in the reflection.
According to all the three views, the reflection by itself is without
movement, but appears to have it because of the water. Similarly, the
word ( sphota ) appears to be short, long or protracted because' the
sounds which manifest it ( prakrtadhvani ) are either short, long or
protracted or it appears to be of quick, medium or slow speed, because
the secondary sounds ( vaikrtadhvani ) are such.]
50. Just as, in knowledge, its own form and that
of the known are cognised, in the same way, in verbal
cognition, the form of the object and that of the word
are cognised.
Knowledge is dependent on the object because it is there
to illuminate it. Though it is not meant to show its form also,
still it does show it separately as another knowledge would. 1
That is how a previous knowledge, not cognised by another
knowledge, becomes the object of remembrance. In the
same way, the word, in so far as it is secondary to
the meaning, is dependent upon it and assumes its form.
It also conveys its own form, as a primary thing. Though
it is present, it is not resorted to in the world, because
it cannot have any relation with actions like eating. In Gram¬
mar, on the other hand, the external object is opposed to
(grammatical) operations and the own form of the word
appears as the meaning of a word and, therefore, there is ncr
opposition between it and action,
K. S. 8
58
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHAR1
[1. Knowledge becomes known in two ways, according to the Vrtti.
It can become the object of another knowledge as in the anuvyavasdya
of the Naiyayikas which takes a form like: ghatam aham janami = I
have the knowledge of the pot. But even in ordinary forms of know¬
ledge, when an outside object is illuminated, the knowledge itself is
also revealed without its becoming the object of another knowledge.
That is why we can remember a previous knowledge. Only that
which had become the object of a previous knowledge can be
remembered.]
51. The energy ( Kratu ) called the word, existing
within, as the yolk in the pea-hen’s egg, has an action¬
like function and assumes the sequence of its parts.
The external (audible) word, employed in verbal usage,
is merged in the mind after suppressing all assumption of
differentiation, without, however, abandoning the residual
force of the differentiation, as in the case of the yo m the egg
of the pea-hen. 1 Just as one single word can merge, so can
passages consisting of as many as ten parts The word, thus
merged, with all differentiation suppressed again assumes
differentiation and sequence, when, through the speaker’s
desire to say something, the inner word is awakened and it
becomes the sentence or the word, each with its divisions. It
is this merging and emerging of the word which is looked
upon as its activity.
ri Mayvrandarasavat —a comparison usually brought in to explain
how what looks one and simple may actually contain all the potentia¬
lities of multiplicity and complexity. See K A. Subramama Iyer-Some
more Nyayas (JOR., Madras, Vol. 6, p. 342).
2 Dasataya. This word occurs in the Vrtti on verse 82 also. In
both the passages, Vr. says that it means Catulisastih. See He. s com¬
mentary on Vak. C. Ka, 66, where the word occurs: Dasa avayava
yesam te dasatayah samudayah rgdtmanah. Tesam samuhasya dasa-
tayasya catuhscLstytitTiidkasya, etc.]
52. Just as the unified image of an original figure
is drawn on cloth (in three stages), so does one see the
three stages in the case of the word also.
I. 53.
59
When a painter wishes to paint a figure having parts
like that of a man, he first sees it gradually in a sequence,
then as the object of a single cognition and then paints it
on cloth or on a wall in a sequence. In the same way, the
word in verbal usage is first perceived in a sequence, then
cognised as a unity with the sequence suppressed. This part¬
less and sequenceless mental form is superimposed, i.e., iden¬
tified with the previous appearance having sequence and
seeming to be separate. It again enters into verbal usage
by displaying the characteristic of the sounds, namely, diff¬
erentiation and sequence, produced by the movements of
the articulatory organs. In the same way, the word goes
again and again through three stages and does not fail to
become both the illuminator and the illuminated. 1
[1.. It has been said in verse 44 that there are two kinds of words,
of which one is the nimitta and the other, the expressive one. As to
which is the nimitta and which the expressive one, is a question of
point of view. Different points of view have been indicated in the
■Vrtti on verse 44. Of the two kinds of word, one is a unity, with no
differentiation and inner sequence and the other has differentiation
and sequence. Either of the two can be looked upon as the nimitta,
but only the word which is a unity and has no differentiation can be
expressive.
The three stages metioned in the verse and the Vrtti are described
as follows by Vrsabha Prathamatah sravane kramavan , tato’l'pabhutah
kramahy tatah parapratipadavdya kramavan itiJ]
53. Just as the mind of the speaker first turns
towards the words, in the same way, the attention of
the hearers also is first directed towards them.
Just as the speaker, wishing to make an effort to utter
a particular word, concentrates his mind on it, isolating it,
as it were, in each case, from all the other words around it, 1 in
e same way, the hearer also, knowing that the understanding
of the meaning depends upon a clear grasp of the form of
the word, ascertains it as associated with all its attributes. 2
This stage consisting in grasping the form of the word, is
60
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHAKTHHAHI
not thought of as a separate thing because of one’s habit of
concentrating on the understanding of the meaning. 3 There¬
fore, all words capable of conveying all meaning, first attain
supreme importance ( sesibhavakcLstliam ) and then become
secondary to the conveying of the meaning.
[1. Pratisabdam paritah paricchinndn sabddtmanah samsprsanniva —
When one wants to utter a particular word, one has to grasp its form
clearly, i.e., one has to separate it, as it were, from the other words
which are also lying dormant in one’s mind. But the other words can¬
not all come up in his mind at that time. His mind does not touch
them at that time ( samsprs ). That is why the word iva is used:
samsprsann iva. At the most, the speaker would think of the other
words in the sentence which he is about to utter, but not to the same
extent as the word which he is actually pronouncing. In either case,
the word iva is significant.
2. Tam sabdam sarvaih sambandhibhir visesanair dsritasamsargd-
nugraham. What the author means is: tarn sabdam asritasarvasam -
bandhivisesanasamsargdnugraham .
3. Arthapratipattibhavanabhydsat . According to Vr. this means:
on account of one’s habit of understanding the meaning and acting
accordingly. Bhavana kriyanusthdnam.']
54. Being meant for something else, the world
does not pay attention to the forms of the words which,
being primary in some cases only, are ordinarily
secondary to the meaning.
Just as, in an expression like ‘this is a white one (ayam
suklah) where something having a quality is understood,
connection of the quality with a particular action takes place
only sometimes as taught elsewhere, in the same way, when
the identification with the form of the word takes place as in
the expression: ‘this thing which is the word gauh’ and when
action is meant to be connected with it, its purpose is fulfilled
and when, therefore, it becomes secondary to the object,
people do not connect it with action as they do connect the
object with it. 1
[1. In order to show that the form of the word becomes connected
VyitJj action only sometimes, the analogy of action is ^iven. statements
6i
i. 55.
present a quality as connected with action only sometimes. There is
a difference between suklam gayi pasya and suklam gam bhojaya. The
former sentence presents the quality white also as connected with
the action of seeing, suklam is a visesana of gam. But in the latter
sentence, it is the object cow which is to be fed. It happens to be
white, so the white cow is fed. But the quality 'white’ is not
connected with the action of feeding. It is only upalaksana
\ and not visesana. Similarly, where actions are performed on objects con¬
veyed by words, as usually happens in the world, the form of the
word is not so connected. But a word conveys its form also and it must
also have its scope for being connected with action. It is in the
science of Grammar that the form of a word finds its full scope for
being connected with action. Where the form is secondary to the
object which it coveys, people do not connect it with action.]
55. Just as light has two powers, that of being
revealed and that of being the revealer, similarly, all
words have two distinct powers.
Pots and other such things are always the cognised and,
therefore, at the time of their cognition, they do not bestow
the slightest benefit, either on the sense or on the object, as
an aid to their cognition. 1 In the same way, all the senses
become the cause of the cognition of the object without them¬
selves being cognised. Light, on the other hand, being en¬
dowed with a form opposed to that of darkness, becomes the
cause of cognition, as a helper, when its own form is cog¬
nised. In the same way, the word, grasped in its form 2
which is distinct from that of other things and other words,
with its special form which is fully cognised, illuminates the
object to be cognised. These two powers of the words, that
of being the revealer and that of being the revealed, are
always identical (<a tmabliute ) but appear to be different.
[1. Grdhyatvenaiva—The object is always the thing to be cognised
(grahya ) in the process of its cognition and never the grdhaka. It
is always the karma } the object, in the process of cognition. Though in
Grammar, the karma is a Karaka, that does not make it a grdhaka ,
it is always grdliya. The object which is cognised does not bring about
the cognition. It does not cause the utpatti of the cognition, even
though it is the grahya.
62
VAKyApADIYAM OF BHARTHHARI
2. Svarupeimvadhriyarroanabhedah and parigrlutavisesasabdasva-
rupah mean the same thing. Vr. points out that the former expression
emphasises the distinction from other things and words while the latter
stresses its character as the conveyor of the meaning.]
That being so,
56. No meaning is conveyed by words which have
not themselves become the objects of knowledge. By
their mere existence, even though not understood, they
do not convey the meaning.
If words could, without becoming primary as the thing to
be conveyed, become secondary to the conveyance of the
meaning, then, they would, by the mere fact of their pre¬
sence, whether cognised or not, without becoming the object
of a cognition, convey their respective meanings. But they
do not do so. Therefore, in the process of the words becom¬
ing secondary to the meaning, their assuming the form of
the primary, is a necessary part.
57. Therefore, when the own form of the word
is not understood, one asks the speaker ‘what did you
say?’ When an object is to be revealed, the form of the
senses is not similarly perceived.
People in the world, knowing that the understanding of
the meaning is dependent upon the understanding of the
form of the word, ask: what did you say? in order to under¬
stand the form of the words when, after the words have been
uttered, their form is not grasped. The senses, on the other
hand, become secondary to the understanding of the mean¬
ing, without being connected, even slightly, with the state
of being primary, without their own form being cognised. 1
[1. Se^bhdvarrmtrdsamsparsendsamsrstdni. Here matra seems to
have the meaning of ‘slight’, little’. Ordinarily, in the Vrtti, it means
‘a part’. The word occurs frequently in the Vrtti and has several
shades of meaning.
I. 58-59.
63
Aparicclunnasvalaksaimni. Here svalaksana means the same thing
as svai'upa. Ordinarily, in the philosophical literature, svalaksaiia, the
particular, as used as opposed to samdnyalaksanci, the universal.]
58. These two abstracted powers of words, treat¬
ed as different, become, without opposition, the cause
of operations depending upon difference.
Just as, both in the world and in the Science of Gram¬
mar, we perform, in regard to things within which difference
has been artificially made by the mind on the basis of diffe¬
rence in point of view (nimitta) all the operations which
depend on real difference, in the same way, in regard to words
also, when one separates by abstraction ( apoddlvara ) their
powers of being revealer and revealed all the operations such
as the application of names like ‘designation’ (samjnd) and
‘designated’ ( samjnin ) have been taught in the science of
Grammar!
[1. In the world, when we say ‘a gold ring’, we are applying the
words ‘gold’ and ‘ring’ to the same thing. When we think of the
material with which it is made, we call it gold, when we think of its
shape, we call it ring. This is what is called vyapadesivadbhciva. On
account of this difference in point of view, we san say: suvarnasya
ahguliyakam, ie. we can use the sixth case-affix ( sastlu ) which we
ordinarily do only when there is real difference as in rdjnah purusah.
The sutra svam ritpam sabdasydsabdasamjna (P. 1.1.68) tells us that,
in the Science of Grammar, grammatical operations are ordinarily on
the basis of this difference by artificial abstraction.]
59. Just as words like Vrddhi, having conveyed
their own forms enter into relation with their named,
the phonemes conveyed by the contractions at, aic,
In rules like
“Yan comes in place of ik when a vowel follows” 1 where
the names are different (from the named) it is not the verbal
element ik which is the original nor the verbal element Yan
64
vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
the substitute. It is between the named having a. different
form conveyed by these verbal elements that the relations of
original and substitute is taught in the Science of Grammar. 2
Even where the named have the same form as the names, it
is clear that such a relationship is understood. Just as words
like Vrddhi , standing for their own form, meaningful with
their meanings, wanting to convey other sounds with their
form, enter into relation with d etc., varied by accent, nasa¬
lisation etc., conveyed by u t, aic etc., in the same way (the
name conveys the named) even when the difference bet¬
ween the two is not easily perceived.
[1. P. 6.1.77.
2. Rupantarayuktiindm samjndndm. If ik and yan are names
(samjrui) the sounds conveyed by them would be the named, samj-
nin. Therefore, one would expect in the text sainjninam and not
savijUandm.]
60. In the same way, the word agni (in the sutra
P. 4.2.33) having first conveyed its own form agni,
enters into the relation (of name and named) with the
word agni (used in speech) and conveyed by the word
agni (in the sutra).
In the sutra 1
“The own form of a word” etc. (svam rupam sabdasya ),
the name and the named are separately mentioned. There,
there are two words which are heard and which are
meant to convey another, and the words which are to
he conveyed are also two in number and they stand to
each other in the relation (of name and named) and are
(therefore) the object of grammatical teaching. Therefore,
(the sutra in question), makes that word agni which has as its
meaning the other word agni having the same form, the
name of the other word agni conveyed by it having the same
form. 2
[1. P. 1.1.68.
I. 61-62.
65
2. The construction of the last sentence in the vrtti is rather
awkward and contains repetitions. The sutra svam riipam sabdasya
etc. teaches the relation of samjiid and samjnin between a word men¬
tioned in a sutra of Panini and the same word, having the same form,
coming in actual usage. Though the samjiid, and the samjnin have the
same form, they are mentioned as different from each other. The
sutia in question refers to a word which may come in any sutra of
Panini as the savijUd and the same word, as it may come in actual
usage, as the samjnin. These two are called pratipddaka in the Vrtti.
The word which actually comes in a sutra (as agni in agner dhak) and
the same word when it comes in actual usage, are called pratiyamana.
The sutra in question tells us that the word which actually comes in a
sutia. is the name ( samjnd ) of the same word actually occurring in
usage.]
61. Whatever word is uttered does not neces¬
sarily become the object of grammatical operation. Its
power to bring another similar word to the mind is not
taken away.
The reason for the statement which has been made will
be given in the next verse. The word which conveys
(pvatydyaka ) is uttered for the sake of another and it con¬
nects that other word for which it is uttered with grammati¬
cal operations, causes them to be performed on it. When the
word which is conveyed ( pratydyya ) and exists in the
mind (of the hearer) is uttered for the sake of illustration,
its power to convey another similar word is not hampered.
This is the nature of all words that are uttered 1
[1. The point in this verse is that all words, when uttered, have
the power to bring another similar word to the mind and the gramma¬
tical operation in question is done to the one that comes to the mind.
That which is uttered is pratyayaka, something which conveys another
and that which is conveyed is pratydyya. The latter can also be utter¬
ed in its turn and it would then convey another similar word.]
62. When a word is uttered to convey a meaning,
it is secondary to the latter and, so, is not connected
with action. It is, with the meanings conveyed by the
words that actions are connected,
K.S. 9
66
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARI
Just as words like ‘bring the cow’ or ‘eat the curds’ are
secondary to the conveying of the meaning and do not become
auxiliaries of the action in question, so are words secondary
to other words, as there is no difference as far as dependence
is concerned. From this one understands that all things which
are conveyed by words, whether they are perceived by the
eyes or the ears, become auxiliaries to the action.
63. When, whatever is considered as the common
property between the standard and the object of com¬
parison, itself figures in acts of comparison, some other
common property, different from it, is adopted.
The standard of comparison, the object of comparison
and the common property, this triad is well-established. In
the sentence “the ksattriya studies like the brahmana”, the
common property is mentioned in regard to the standard of
comparison also. When the statement is ‘the study of the
ksattriya is similar to that of the brahmana, the two students
are mentioned as connected with the standard and objects
of comparison and then, excellence etc., are understood as
common properties of the two ways of studying, different
from each other, because they exist in different substrata.
Completion ( parinis'patti ) etc. would be understood as com¬
mon properties of excellence etc. connected with study. In
this way, there is no limit to the process of difference (by
abstraction) A
[1. There are different grades in the process of comparison, we
can say: (1) Bmhmanavad adlute ksattriyali (2) Brahinwrmdhyaya -
nena tulyam ksattriyadhyayanam (3) Brahmanddhyayanasausthavena
tulyam ksattriyadhyayanasausthavam.
In No. 1, the common point is that both the brahmana and the
ksattriya study; in No. 2, the common point is that their studies
have" excellence; in No. 3, the common point is that their studies lead
to completion. What was a common point in the previous comparison
becomes the standard and the object of comparison in the succee ‘ng
one. Study, excellence and completion are really one, but are looked
upon as different by abstraction.]
1 . 64 . 6 ?
64. When an attribute which is the cause of
degree is presented as an independent thing, degree in
it can be known only through another attribute present
in it.
Whatever is presented as the main thing in the form ‘this’
or ‘that’ is substance. There cannot be a greater or lesser
degree of it; therefore, when degree is sought to be expressed
in an object, it is done through attributes (nimitta) which
exist in it, differentiate it, are dependent upon it, are physi¬
cally attached to it and are active in bringing about degree.
In the sentence: This is an excellent white thing ( prakrstali
suklali ) even though the colour white distinguishes the thing,
it is also active in bringing about degree and, therefore, that
thing which has that quality and would otherwise have no
degree, now attains degree. In the sentence: ‘the colour of
this is white’ where colour is presented as a substance, degree
is brought about by an attribute ( nimitta ) present in the
colour. The universal ‘whiteness’ which inheres in white
is one and cannot be a cause of differentiation and so diff¬
erentiation in the one having shades of difference within
(avantarasya ) is brought about by an attribute present in
the colour. Or it can be put in this way: As there is no
word expressive of such attributes (in suklataram vupawn
asya ) and as they cannot be conveyed by the abstract suffix
(bhdvapratyaya ) they are understood from the word, like
whiteness itself, and are understood as the cause of degree.
As long as it is sought to bring about degree in anything
which is presented as the main thing, in the form ‘this’ or
‘that’, so long would there be no end to this process of
abstracting some attribute or other. 1
[1. Verse 61 makes the statement that a grammatical operation is
not done on a word which is actually mentioned in a sutra but on a
similar word occurring in worldly usage. The two words are different
but are looked upon as the same because of resemblance. Verse 62
gives the reason for the statement made in 61: what is mentioned
is subordinate to something else and so is not subject to grammatical
operations. Verses 63 and 64 give illustrations. The former tells us
that what was the common point in the previous comparison becomes
68
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one by
a process of abstraction while the latter tells us that by the same
process, what is presented as a guna in one statement can be presented
as a dravya in another.
When a quality which is the cause of degree in a substance is
presented independently, i.e., as a substance, it is only by another
quality present in it that degree can be understood. In f suklatarah
patah’j pa ta is the substance and degree in it is expressed by suklatara
which denotes the quality of being whiter. But in suklataram rupam
asya , colour itself is presented as a substance and not as a quality of
cloth. But it is presented as having degree and this degree comes
through some other quality like bhdsvaratva, brightness present in the
white. For grammarians, whatever a word presents as the main thing
to be qualified is substance ( dravya ). They do not follow the Vaisesika
definition of dravya (Vai. Su. 1.1.15.). Even what is called quality
can be so presented by words in which case it will have to be qualified
by some other quality. In order that a quality may bring about
degree in a substance it must be: (1) bhedahetu, (2) asrita , (3) sarrisrsta,
(4) prakarse savydpdra. Due to the absence of one or more of these
conditions in the sentence purusasya svdmi, purusa cannot bring abqut
degree in svami . For the same reason, jati or the universal, cannot
bring about degree.]
That being so, in an utterance.
65. When the word considered to be the meaning
is itself uttered, it assumes a form quite different from
the one (which it had as a meaning).
After having given a reason (verse 62) and examples
(verses 63, 64). For establishing difference, the considera¬
tion of the topic under discussion, i.e., the form of the word,
is now being concluded. Whenever the word which is the
meaning is uttered for the sake of illustration, on every
such occasion, another form of it, the cause or the basis of
it, would be distinguished, for such is the nature of anything
that is uttered. According to some, it is the same word which
is repeated as the conveyor—form ( abhidlvdna ) without its
losing its character as the form-conveyed (cibhidheyatva ).
It has been said in the Sangraha —
“The form of the word (as the conveyed) never comes
Under the organs of articulation ( karana ) anymore than
69
I. 66.
objects like a cow (which are also conveyed by words); it is
always the conveyed; when the conveyor-form comes under
the organs of articulation, the conveyed which has the same
form appears to be uttered, even though it does not come
under the organs of articulation. 1
[1. The point which is emphasised from verse 61 onwards is that
the same word can be looked upon both as pratydyaka and pratyayya.
The difference would then be due to an abstraction made by the mind.
Ordinarily, it is outside objects which are conveyed ( pratyayya ) by
a word. Sometimes, as in Grammar, the word itself is the pratyayya.
The word which is pratydyaka is uttered, but not the one which is
pratyayya. As soon as the latter is uttered for the sake of illustration,
it becomes pratydyaka in relation to another similar word which would
then become the pratyayya .]
66. Before the name becomes connected with the
named, the name is connected with its own form as the
meaning (the named). That is how it becomes the
occasion for the use of the genitive and the nominative
cases.
Even though a word may not have any other thing to
be conveyed, it is not without its own form (as the con¬
veyed). On the basis of its own form ( svarupadhistlvdnam )
and after making it secondary, the word conveys some other
meaning. As long as the name is not connected with the
named, the latter is not its meaning and if it has no other
meaning, it would not get the name of stem (pi-utipadika)
and so no case-affix could be added to it. As words are ex¬
pressive (vdcaka) because of their difference (in regard to
the expressed), in the present case, the meaning of the stem
would not be different from the stem itself. 1
[1. In the sutra Vrddhir ad aic (P. 1.1.1.) the word VYddJii is the
name and the vowels at and aic are the named. Even before a date
was written, the word Vrddhi had already got the first case-affix. It
must, therefore, have been a stem (.pratipadika ). But nothing can be
a stem if it has no meaning and Vrddhi gets its meaning only after it
is connected with ddoic. How then did it become pratipadika? The
70
VAKYAPADIYAM OP BHARTRHARi
answer is that its own form was already there as the meaning. So
it became pratipadika and the first case-affix was added to it.]
67. Because it has its own form as the meaning,
the nominative case comes after the name. When it
has an outside object as the meaning, difference comes
in and is conveyed by the genitive case in the form
‘asya’.
When the form of the word is sought to be imposed on
external objects, then they are meaningful with their own
form which is their basis ( adhistlidna ) and the first case-affix
is taught after them. When one says: “This is so and so”,
the relation (of the name) with the named is specified, its
expressive power is determined. As when one says: “This
VS-luka is a cow” or “This lad is a lion”. The cause of the
addition of the sixth case-affix to the named, namely, the
absence of the meaning of the stem, is brought about by the
connection of the name which stands for its form with the
words which are the named. It has been said—
“Since, whether in the form ‘that is so and so’ or in the
form ‘this is the name of so and so’, it is with a meaningful
name and not with a meaningless one that connection takes
place; therefore, the relation between word and meaning
is eternal.”
68-69. According to some, in the sutra—“ svam-
rupam” etc., the particular form of the word ( vydkti)
is taught as the name ( samjnd ) of the form in general
(jati). The general form as existing in a particular
one undergoes grammatical operations.
Others, on the other hand, look, upon the parti¬
cular form to be understood as the named in this sutra;
in particular places, the particular form conveyed by
I. 68-69.
71
the general form, comes up (for grammatical opera¬
tions) .
(While explaining the sutra svam rupam sabdasya etc.,
P. 1.1.68.) some commentators say:—“the own form of a
word is the expressor, the illuminator, the conveyor of the
word,” while others say—‘the own form of a word is the
expressed, the illuminated, the conveyed.’ These two views
have been set forth by these two verses. In regard to the
universal, there are two views current among thinkers. 1 Some
maintain that the individuals have their special forms. The
form of the individuals is not something unknowable, un-
nameable and non-existent. It is the individual cow which
is the cow and not cowness. It is the individual blue which
is the blue and not the universal blue. The universal is the
cause of the uniformity of cognition. It is the same thing
in regard to the different individuals in which there is no
inherence (of the universal). It is this (uniform cognition)
which is the cause of the inference of the existence of the
universal.
Others, however, are of the opinion: words attain their
form in regard to the universal as identical with the othei-
wise inexpressible individual. Everywhere, from a thing in
which the cause ( nimitta ) exists, a cognition corresponding
to that cause arises. In such cases, those causes which have
their own expressive words and those which have not, 2 bring
about the same cognition and the application of the same
word, on the basis of a partial or complete resemblance. That
being so, in the sutra in question, the words ‘own form
(svam rupam) stand, according to some, for the universal
(jati) and in the expression ‘of the word’ ( sabdasya ) ‘word
stands for the individual. According to others, it is just the
opposite. Either the individual is the name of the universal
or the universal is the name of the individual. This universal,
(of the word) uttered in the different contexts, conveys the
individual as connected with the relevant action (i.e. gram¬
matical operation). The universal is never uttered as un¬
connected with the individual. Nor is the individual ever
72
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
brought into use unconnected with the universal. The speak¬
ers’ intention differs according to his purpose. One of the
two is the main thing and the other comes inevitably with
it. That it is the universal on which- the action is to be
done according to the Science of Grammar or that it is the
individual that is so is only a difference in the statement (in
particular cases).
In regard to the sutra svam rupam sabdasya (P. 1.1.68.)
the tradition of the circles of Grammarians is very varied.
It may be stated as follows—The mere form which is a part
of that meaningful combination of form and meaning, posses¬
sed of the powers of the universal, particular etc. and referred
to as the word ( sabdasya ) is the name. Or the meaningful
combination including the form, characterised by the powers
inherent in it, is the name. The fact is that what is called
the word is a combination of parts. Form etc. are its parts.
One does speak of a whole and its parts as different from
each other as when we say ‘the branch of a tree’.
Another declares: Even though an object remains the
same, the meaning of the word (which refers to it) varies.
A word makes a choice between the different powers relating
to the same object. 3 For example, in the expression ‘this
stick the pronoun presents the object as something existing
before one’s eyes, not as something having the universal
stickness’ even though that is also perceived. The pronoun
cannot express the connection with the universal stickness.
The power of the word ‘stick’ which expresses a particular
universal is debarred, even though it is visible, from present¬
ing it as present before the eyes. In the same way, in the
expression ‘the own form’ (svam rupam ), the words ‘agni’
etc., even though they have the universal in them, are present¬
ed as the words agni etc, not as universals of the words. By
word in ‘of the word’, what is conveyed is the connection with
the universal (of the word agni) and not its aspect as being
the word agni. All this is just an illustration of the principle
that a word, in one of its aspects, considered as a name, can
convey the same word in another of its aspects as the named: 4
All the different views relating to the sutra svam rupam etc,
I. 68-69.
73
have not been set forth in order to avoid prolixity resulting
from one thing leading to another.
[1. So far, the sutra svam rupam was explained on the basis of
the view that the own form of a word that may occur in a sutra is
the name and the external object which it denotes is the named. The
present two verses set forth two other views in regard to the name
and the named. They are—(1) that the individual aspect of a word
is the name (samjhd) and its universal aspect, the named ( samjnin),
(2) that it is vice-versa. As this involves the concept of the universals,
the author refers to two views in regard to universals current among
thinkers of his day. The first view is that the existence of the
universal is inferred from our uniformity of cognition in regard to
the individuals. The individuals themselves can be perceived and
spoken about without the universal existing in them being directly
perceived. There are other distinguishing features in the individuals
which enable us to perceive them without the help of the universal.
That there is uniformity in our cognition of the individuals does not
mean that we cognise directly the universal existing in them. We
only infer its existence on the basis of the uniformity of cognition.
The second view is that words primarily convey the universal. They
convey the individual also as identical with the universal and, therefore,
nameable. The universal existing in the individual is what enables
us to cognise the individual as such: it is the ‘nimitta’ and our cogni¬
tion of the individual takes the form of this nimitta according to the
principle: sarvatraiva hi nimittannimittavatyartlie nimitta—svamipah
pratyaya utpadyate. It is this nimitta which causes uniformity of
cognition in regard to the individuals and the application of the same
word to them.
2. Drstabhidhanani adrstabliidhandni ca nimittani. Nimitta is of
two kinds: kdraka and jnapaka. It is the latter which is subdivided
into drstabhidlvana and adrstabhidhana. Gdtva is a jhapakanimitta
which exists in the cow. It is drstabhidlvana , because it has a recog¬
nised word to express it. When we see different individuals having
gotva in them, we see the same gotva (jati ) in all of them, our cognition
(pratyaya ) of all of them is uniform and we apply the same word to
all of them. As Vr. puts it, three things persist. Drstabhidhanesu tra-
yam anuvartate jdtih sabdali pratyaya iti. utpalagandlia is given as an
example of adrstabhidhana , because the word does not denote any
universal, but only two things connected by a relation. In this case,
therefore, only two things persist: the word and the cognition. As
though not satisfied with this example, Vr. gives that of rajapurusa.
3. Sabdo liyekavastuvisayandmapi saktirudm avaccliedenopagrahe
vartate. Any given thing has many aspects. Words have the power
K. S. 10
74, VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
, „„ _ given occasion, conveys one
to convey them. But a given woid, on g __ this stick, ay am
of them to the exclusion of others. In aya^d ^ eyes tQ the
conveys the aspect of the stick being pi stick,
exclusion of the universal which is also presen
4. Tatra sabdantararthah sabdantararthasya ^
samjnatvenopddtyanvanasya samjnibhavam pratipacya . c
is that sabdavyakti is samjna and sabdajdti is samjnm To«fa to
both of them as sabdantararthah is using rather peculiar- language, a
general characteristic of the Vrtti. It seems to be a bahuvrihi compound
the analysis of which would be: sabddntaram (vyakurupam) jatnuparr
va artho yasya sa sabdah sabdtintararthal}.]
70. Some consider the word to be one whether it
is accepted as transitory or eternal; others consider it
as many, whether it is accepted as transitory oi eternal.
According to those who believe that the word is one,
there cannot he this distinction between the universal and
the individuals (because that presupposes difference between
the individuals); that is why this new point (the unity or
the plurality of the word) has been taken up after expounding
the point about the universal. According to the view that
the word is eternal, its unity is the main doctrine. According
to the view that the word is an effect (and so not eternal),
the invariable cognition of sameness which arises when a
phoneme or a word, once uttered, is uttered again, leads to
the postulation that it is one. It is on the basis of the view
that it is one that it has been said m the Vartti a
“That is already settled, because the phoneme ‘a ’’is one”. 1
It is between the cognitions of the same phoneme t at there
is an interval of time or of other phonemes and not that the
phoneme itself is different. That one hears the same word
at different places is like the cognition of Being ( sattd ) oi
the universal at different places or the form (of moon etc.)
in water etc. Even according to the view that the word is
different and that it is an effect, one must necessarily accept
a kind of secondary one-ness when a word is uttered again
and again. Whether the word be eternal or an effect, those
75
i. 1L
who are for plurality believe that a word having many mean¬
ings and phonemes found in different words is not at all the
same unit. 2
[1. Va 5 on the sutra ‘a-i-im’ (M. Bha. I, p. 16).
2. In regard 1o the word, there are the three following pairs of al¬
ternative views held by different thinkers: (1) that it stands for the
universal or for the individual, (2) that it remains the same even when
it has another meaning or that it is a different word for every new
meaning (3) that it is eternal or that it is an effect. These pairs of
views are related to one another. The concept of the word as a uni¬
versal presupposes the existence of individual words in each of which
the universal inheres. So, according to the view that the word is
one under all circumstances, the concept of universal and particular
cannot arise. There is a very close connection between the view that
the word is eternal and that it is one. This is the primary concept
of unity. But some kind of unity has to be postulated even according
to the view that there are as many words as there are circumstances
of its use because, in all these circumstances, we do recognise the word
to be the same. This is the secondary kind of unity. Grammarians
accept eternality, unity and both the concepts of the universal and
the individual.
71. Even when the words where they occur are
different, the identity of the phonemes is not affected.
Similarly, a word occurring in different sentences is
one and the same.
In the different words asva, arka, artha, it is the same
phoneme a that is used in the world; it is perceived after
an interval of time or after the intervention of other phonemes 1
or not perceived at all when the causes of manifestation
( nimitta ) are absent; it appears to be different when the
different speakers are at different places and, hence, the mani¬
festing agents ( nimitta ) are different, just as the reflection
of the same thing in a shadow or mirror or water. Similarly,
a word abstracted from sentences and having different mean¬
ings like the word go or aksi is really the same word as long
as the form is the same. 2 Even though as expressive of two
different meanings, a word may be a noun or a verb, still
it is looked upon as the same word.
76
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[1. Va 11 and 12 on the sutra ‘a-i-un 3 (M. Bha., p. 18.)
2. Vr. points out that the word aksi, when taken as a verb can be
derived from the root aks or as or ad. He derives asva as a verb fiom
the root sin. Of course, ordinarily, these words are nouns.]
72. There is no word over and above the phonemes
nor is there any sentence over and above the phonemes
and words.
The phonemes which are produced in a sequence, which
pei'ish as soon as they are uttered, which do not exist at the
sametime and have themselves parts, cannot produce the word
as distinct (from themselves); therefore, the word is nothing
more than the phonemes. As the phonemes have parts and
as that process of division can be continued to the point of
impracticability (a vya^vahdrcLvicclieddt) there lesluts some¬
thing which is the fourth of the fourth, unnameable and
beyond practicability (vyavahdv&tita) but no phoneme oi
word. And if there is no phoneme or word, there cannot
be a sentence as distinct from them. That is why it has
been saidb
“All this would result in non-eternality,”. 1
As there cannot be a collection (of phonemes or of
words) there would be no unit associated with a definite mean¬
ing (uyagrhl>t&rthah) nor any form fully delimited, (upacp-
JUtah) . 2
[1. Cf. M. Bha. on Va. 12 on the sutra a-i-uiy (M. Bha. I., p. 18.)
2. It was said in the previous verse that a phoneme occurring
in different words is the same phoneme and that a word occurring
in different sentences is the same word. This means that there is
no sentence over and above the phonemes and words. The phonemes
cannot produce the word because they do not co-exist. Secondly?
they themselves can be thought of as having parts and if one goes
on dividing these parts, one comes to something which is infinitesimal
and unnameable, the fourth of a fourth ( turiyaturlya ) as it has been
called to show that it is something very minute. Such minute parts
cannot produce the phoneme and so the phonemes cannot produce the
word. If the phonemes and the words cannot be produced, the sen-
I. ?3-74.
77
tence, as something over and above them, does not exist, nor can it
be produced by them. It would be something eternal and indivisible.
It would also be impossible to conceive of words having fully delimited
forms or well-defined meanings.]
Another has said—
73. There are no phonemes in the word nor are
there parts in the phoneme. There is no absolute
difference of the words from the sentence.
As the effort relating to the whole as a collection of
phonemes is different and, therefore, the sounds uttered to
suggest the word are also different, there takes place, from
the different cognitions having the appearance of the cogni¬
tions of the real phonemes, a perception of the word caused
by means of the perception of parts in the form of phonemes.
But it is really without sequence, without before and after,
one, eternal, indivisible and it appears as a unit produced
by smaller elements, the phonemes. But the further divi¬
sions of the phonemes like a, indescribable, beyond usage,
considered different, are really fictitious. Therefore, their
clearly intelligible unity is well-known in the usage of the
Science of Grammar. As it is the sentence, whether con¬
sisting of one word or of many words, which is used to ex¬
press the meaning, there arises a perception of the word as
means to the perception of the sentence. In regard to the
sentence, there arise cognitions having sequence and having
the form of phonemes and words, but they are not identified
with the sentence. Therefore, phonemes and words have no
separate existence from the sentence so defined, unbreakable,
indivisible.
74. The practice (of the Grammarians) has been
based on these different views. What the main view is
to some is, to others, the reverse.
In regard to the supreme, sequenceless, inner principle
of the word, scholars, on the basis of different traditions re-
78
VakyApadiyAm bF bharurhAri
garding every topic ( pratyadhikaranam ) have resorted to diff¬
erent doctrines in following the usage of the Science of
Grammar. It is as follows—If the audible form is the same,
it is the same word, even when the meaning varies; if the
meaning varies, even when the audible form is the same,
it is a different word. For some, the difference is secondary
and one-ness is primary. For others, difference is primary
and one-ness is a matter of usage. It has been said—
“The same word has many meanings—For example,
aksdh 9 padah, m)dsdsh. >n
Similarly, after having said—
“The word ‘village’ (grama) has many meanings .” 2
he (the Bhasyakara) concludes specifically by saying—
“That word ‘village’ is taken which stands for the whole,
including forests, boundaries and pasture-land .” 3
[1. M. Bha on Va. 9 on P. 1.2.45. (M. Bha. I, p. 220).
.. Aksa means, among other things, (1) an axle, axis (2) a gambling
die (3) an organ of sense; jpada means (1) foot, (2) a quarter, (3) a
weight; masa means (1) black gram, (2) a weight, (3) a spot on the
skin.
2. M. Bha. I, p. 59, 1. 20.
3. M. Bha. I, p. 59, 1. 23.]
75. Of the sphota which has no temporal distinc¬
tion and which appears to follow the duration of the
sounds, distinctions in duration ( vrtti ) have been
declared on the basis of distinctions in the manifesting
sounds.
As the principle word-self is eternal, the function of the
measure called ‘time’ does not affect in the slightest degree
the duration of sphota. Inasmuch as the form of the sphota
is perceived as mixed up with the sounds, therefore, the
duration of the sounds appears to be that of the perception
of sphota. Through the limiting factor of such a perception
of sphota, involving difference in time, divisions in the form
of quick, medium and slow speeds, each faster than the fol-
I. 76.
79
lowing one by one third , 1 are associated with the sphota
(though they belong to the sounds).
[1. Triblvdgotkarsena. It is not clear whether this means ‘greater
by one third’ or ‘multiplied by three’.)
If that is so, in the case of the short, long and protracted
vowels also, it is the sound which would be the cause of the
difference in time. Therefore, just as the long and the pro¬
tracted vowels would be called by the same name, the sutra—
“A vowel followed by the symbolic letter t stands for one of
that duration only ” 1 would be applicable to them. Similarly,
in the case of the different speeds also, it would apply and
there would also be the objection contained in the following—
“If the symbolic letter t is added after the quick one,
it should be added after the medium and the slow ones also,
because of difference in time .” 2 To this, the following answer
is given—
76. According to the view that the word is
eternal, the short, the long and the protracted being
different in nature, distinctions in time belonging to the
primary sound are attributed to the sphota.
The sound is of two kinds: primary and secondary. The
primary one is that without which the form of the sphota,
being unmanifested, would remain unperceived. And the
secondary one is that by means of which the form of the
sphota is perceived again and again without interruption.
The author of the Sahgraha says, indeed, as follows—
“The primary sound is the cause of the perception of the
word ( sphota ); the secondary one becomes the cause of the
difference in the continuity of perception ( sthiiibheda ),”
In the same way, out of the sentences uttered by Garga and
others, of equal length because of equal number of parts some,
on account of their special arrangement ( sannivesavisesa ) are
perceived after a large number of repetitions while others
are grasped after a lesser number of repetitions. Similarly,
80
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the short vowel, by its special nature, is perceived by a sound
of lesser duration. With so much of manifesting cause, a
knowledge which grasps its form is engendered. The long
vowel, on the other hand, is manifested by a sound of longer
duration. The protracted vowel is perceived by a sound of
still longer duration. Because of the non-perception of diff¬
erence, the duration of the primary sound is attributed to the
sphota and is looked upon, by courtesy, as the duration of the
sphota in the Science of Grammar.
[1. P. 1.1.70.
2. Va 4 on P. 1.1.70.]
77. After the manifestation of the sphota, the
secondary sounds cause difference in speed of utterance
but the essence of the sphota is not affected by them.
Just as light, as soon as it appears, becomes the cause
of the perception of a jar etc. and if it continues, becomes the
cause of the continued perception of it, in the same way,
the sound which continues after the manifestation of the
word, causes the continuance of the cognition of the word
by adding strength to the manifestation. Therefore, though
associated with the secondary sound, the difference of which
is clearly perceived , 1 no identity is superimposed on the sphota
which, therefore, does not cause any usage of difference of
time in the Science of Grammar as in the case of short etc.
[1. upalaksitavyatirekena vaikrtena dhvanina. Vr points out that
the primary sound causes the manifestation of the sphota and so it
has to be produced before the manifestation whereas the secondary
sound is produced after the manifestation and so its difference from
the sphota is clearly perceived by the hearer. There does not, therefore,
take place the false attribution of its properties to the sphota. The
two are clearly distinguished. As the manifestation of the sphota itself
depends upon the primary sound which has to be produced before
its properties are falsely attributed to it.]
How does the sound become a factor in the cognition of
the word?
1. 78.
81
78. Those who hold that the word is manifested
by the sounds conceive of it in three ways—that a
certain fitness is brought about in the sense of hearing,
that a fitness is produced in the word itself or that a
fitness results in both.
In this verse, only the process of the manifestation of the
word is stated. Giving illustrations is the topic of the next
two verses.
In this matter, some think that the sound, when pro¬
duced, perfects the sense of hearing and the sense of hearing,
thus perfected, becomes the means of the perception of the
word. 1 Other upholders of manifestation are of the view that
the word, perfected by contact with the sound, becomes the
object of the sense of hearing. According to others, the
sound brings benefit both to the word and to the sense of
hearing. The sense and the object, favoured by a helping
factor, cause the perception of the word. Like the benefit
conferred by the light of the lamp in regard to things per¬
ceived by the sense of vision, (here also) the powers of the
causal factors, merely because they require a helping factor,
do not go beyond the totality of the causal factors. 2
[1. Vrsabha understands the perfection of the sense of hearing itself
in three ways: (1) the sounds impart to the sense of hearing the
power of grasping the word which was not there before. (2) the
sounds only awaken the power which was already there (3) what
is called perfection of the sense means the presence of the sounds in
the sense of hearing, favourable to its grasping the word.
2. What is meant here is that the function of the sounds, whether
it be the perfection of the sense of hearing or of the word, does not
go beyond the totality of the causal factors, but is part of them, just
as the light of the lamp is part of the causal factors in the perception
of visual objects.
The Vrtti here may be compared with the following passage: —
Sa ca nadah srotrasydnugrahe varttate. Tadanugrliitam srotram sab -
dopalabdhau samartham bliavati, yatha aksno ranjanam ityeke. Apare
sabdasyaiva, yatha proksanam prthivyd eva , na ghrdnasya. Ubhayor
ityapare, yatha vasyendriyasya prathamatascaksurasviln ghatam cdnu -
gyhnati .
K.S. 11
82
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRIIARI
(Bhartrhari’s commentary on the Mahabhasya, p. 20 (A.B.O.R.T,
XLIII).
79. By concentration and by the application of
ointment, it is only the visual sense which is perfected.
The perfection of the object is for the perception of the
smell in it.
Concentration, whether natural or extraordinary, does
not bring about any special feature in the essense of the ob¬
ject to be seen. Similarly, substances like ointment perfect
the sense of vision and not the external object. Even extra¬
ordinary concentration confers benefit on the sense of vision
only in the perception of things subtle, hidden and distant.
If it conferred a benefit on the object, others also would per¬
ceive it, as there would be no difference. Perfection of the
object, ie. of oil etc. 1 by sunshine and of the earth etc. by the
sprinkling of water, can be seen at the time of the cognition
of their smell, but not perception of the sense of smell. If it is
the sense of smell which is perfected, there would be no
difference as far as the cognition of the smell is concerned,
whether the objects be perfected or not, because there would
be no difference (in the objects).
[1. Tailddindm, Vr explains: Gandhatailadindm = of medicated
oil etc.]
80. According to the view that the visual sense
reaches out to the object, it is held that both the object
and the sense are perfected by light. Such is the process
in the case of the (manifesting) sounds.
One who is situated in the dark perceives an object like
the jar, illuminated by light. According to those who believe
that the sense of vision does not reach out to the object, it is
the object which is mostly perfected. If the sense of vision
reaches out, the rays of the eye are aided by light which is
of the same kind. 1
I. 81
83
[1. There were several views about the sense of vision. Some held
that it is nothing more than the physical eye-ball and, therefore, not
of the nature of light. Others held that it consists of the eye-ball
which, however, is of the nature of light. The Naiyayikas held that
it consists of visual light rays and, therefore, it is taijasa. Even here,
there were two views: Some held that it does not reach out to the
object before perceiving it, that it is aprapyakdri. Others, however,
held that it reaches out to the object ( pidpyakdri ) Vr describes the
process as follows:—The sense of vision which consists of light rays
goes out of the eye to the object and, on the way, mixes with the all-
pervasive light atoms and engenders a beam of light very wide at the
further end (prthvagram ). This beam, on reaching the lighted spot
where the object is, mixes with the external light, both being of the
same kind. This is what is meant by the perfection of the sense of
vision. The fact that the object is illuminated by the external light is
its perfection. Thus there takes place perfection of both, according to
this view.]
81. According to some, the sound is cognised as
identical with the word ( sphota ); others think that the
sound is not perceived at all, which others still think
that it is perceived as a separate entity.
Those who believe that the word is manifested hold three
different views on the subject. The sound which is closely
bound up with the word is perceived as one with it, as the
colour of the associated object is perceived as one with the
crystal. According to others, just as the senses, and their
qualities, being themselves unperceived, 1 become the cause
of the cognition of the object, in the same way, the sound,
its own form remaining unperceived, becomes the cause of
the cognition of the word. Others still say: from a distance,
even if the form of the word is not perceived, the bare sound
is perceived. Others explain that it (the perception of the
sound) is similar to that of the word. It is like this: it is
seen that in deserts, small things appear to be big. Moon
and other objects are perceived as small, trees etc. are vague¬
ly perceived but not that they have bark and holes on them
or that they belong to particular species like Dhava or Khq,-
dira.
84 vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
[1. The Saiikhyas consider the senses to be products of Ahahkara,
but the illustration here is based on the view that the senses are pro¬
ducts of the elements. Even if they are products of the combined ele¬
ments (pahdkrta ), one of the elements is predominant in the combi¬
nation. The predominant element with its special quality, is itself not
perceived when it becomes the cause of the perception of the same
quality in the external products. The sense of smell has smell as its
quality but that is not perceived when it helps us to perceive the smell
of other objects.]
82. Just as a Vedic passage ( anuvaka ) or a verse
is well-fixed in the mind 1 after the (last) repetition and
is not fully grasped in each repetition,
The sounds relating to the phonemes, words and sentence,
produced by special efforts, manifest the stfiota of the pho¬
nemes, words and sentence and superimpose them on the
cognitions. If the ultimate parts of the phonemes 2 are per¬
ceived gradually, could be no collection of them and the
final cognition would be devoid of an object. This point has
been discussed in many ways in the commentary 3 on the
Bhasya on the sutra which defines connected text ( samhita ).
Even when the form of the whole word is manifested, as long
as it has no definite form and special features, it is as good
as unperceived and no usage can be made of it.
[1. Sodhatvam. This is an unusual word. Vr. explains it as be¬
coming the objects of one act of remembrance: smrtibuddher ekasyd
visayabhdvam. It amounts to becoming well fixed in the mind.
2. Kramena tu vai-Tiaturiyagrahane. What is pointed out here is
that if it is held that the parts of a sphota are gradually manifested, it
cannot be manifested at all. Each sound manifests the whole of the
sphota. Thus it is manifested again and again.
3. Samhitdsutrabhasyavivarane. The sutra is P. 1.4.109. The
Vivarana is obviously a commentary on the Bhasya on this sutra,
written probably by Bhartrhari himself. See p. 9 of Pt. Charu Deva
Shastri’s Sanskrit Introduction to his edition of Vakyapadlya, Kanda I.]
83. In the same way, through the previous eogni-
tions ? unnameable, but favourable to the final cleay
cognition, the form of the word, manifested by the last
sound, is perceived.
The many cognitions, produced by the sounds in the course
of the manifestation of the word, being conducive to the clear
perception of the form of the word, inexpressible and in the
nature of means, become the cause of the perception of the
word.
The following is the process by which the form of the
word is clearly perceived:
84. The word is grasped in the (final) cognition
the seeds of which have been sown by the sounds in¬
cluding the final one and which has gradually attained
maturity. 1
The sounds, while they manifest the word, leave im¬
pression-seeds 2 progressively clearer and conducive to the
clear perception (of the word). Then, the final sound brings
to the mind which has now attained maturity or a certain
fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous
cognitions, the form of the word as coloured by itself. 3
[1. Verses 82, 83 and 84 are quoted in the Sphotasiddhi (p. 132),
(Madras University Sanskrit Series 6).
2. Vyaktapanccheddnugunasamskdrablidvandbljani. Samskdra, blva-
vand and bz ja denote the same thing. They stand, according to Vr.,
for three aspects of the same thing. The previous somewhat vague
cognitions of the sphotri leave their impressions in the mind. Vr. says
that they are called samskaras because, they, in a way, perfect the
mind; they are called bhavana because they give them the form of con¬
sciousness ( bhdvayanti ) and, finally, they are called seeds ( bljdni )
because they are the causes of the later clear cognition.
3. Upagrahena. Vr. explains this by ‘svikdrenci’. This is probably
a reference to the fact that the sound colours the sphotti with its
own form.]
86
VAkyApadiyam of bhartrhari
85. When one perceives those non-existing ele¬
ments in the middle as existing, it is due to the incapa¬
city of the perceiver, they are only a means to the
cognition of the real word.
When the indivisible, sequenceless and unbreakable
phoneme, word or sentence is manifested by the sounds,
cognitions appearing to perceive parts of the phoneme and
relating to its parts occur in regard to the phoneme; cogni¬
tions appearing to perceive phonemes as parts of the word
occur in regard to the word and cognitions appearing to per¬
ceive words as parts of sentences occur in regard to the
sentence. Due to these cognitions, hearers think that these
non-existing parts actually exist. It is only the incapacity of
the hearers who can only perceive the word as shown by
others. 1 Indeed their perception of the word can take place
only through such means, such sequence and such phonemes
(which appear as parts of something which is partless.
(Others, on the other hand) perceive and cause others to
perceive the sequenceless word, even a dasatwya, 2 through
other means. 3
[1. Parapradarsita. What is emphasised here is that ordinary per¬
sons can perceive the word (sphota) only through the sounds and as
possessing the attributes of sounds. The next sentence makes this
point clear.
2. Dasatayd. The word occurs also in the Vrtti on I. 51. There,
as here, Vrsabha explains it as catuhsastih — sixty-four.
3. Upayantarena Vrsabha explains it is arsena jnanena.']
86. The appearance of diversity in knowledge and
the Word is surely an illusion. The word is coloured by
sequence and knowledge is coloured by the known.
Even though knowledge is undifferentiated and formless,
it appears to be differentiated because it takes on the form
of all the things which are to be known, as when one says
five trees, twenty cows. The inner word in which..aU the
I. 87-88.
87
seeds are merged, appears, at the time of its manifestation,
to follow the differentiation and sequence of the manifesting
sounds. Therefore, the indivisible word-principle, called
Word-Mind, being affected by the appearance of difference
belonging to something else, is understood differently from
what it is. It has been said: —
“Knowledge, without the thing to be known, does not
enter into usage. And nothing can be expressed through the
word which has not assumed sequence.”
87. Just as the cognition of the earlier (lower)
numbers is the means for the understanding of the
number in question, though they are different from one
another, in the same way, the understanding of the
other verbal elements is the means for the understand¬
ing of the sentence. '
Just as one who wants to cognise the number hundred or
thousand which differentiate their substrata, understands as
means thereof the numbers one etc. having different effects
as parts of the numbers hundred etc. 1 in the same way, the
cognitions of the different words Devadatta etc. is the means
for the perception of the form of the sentence. Hence their
acceptance is inevitable.
[1. The illustration of the cognition of numbers is based on the
Vaisesika conception. The Vaisesikas believe that from duality on¬
wards up to the highest number p ardrdha, all numbers are produced
by apeksabuddhi, ie. the notion that relates to many unities before
the next number is produced. When two things are brought before us,
we cognise each one separately as ‘this is one and that is one’. This
is apeksabuddhi. Then arises the notion of two. This is true of all
the subsequent numbers. Thus the previous numbers become the
means for the production and cognition of the later numbers.]
88. Even though the sounds manifesting the
phonemes, words and sentences are entirely different
from one another, their powers appear confused.
-
88 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
Separate efforts are made in regard to the phoneme, word
and the sentence and the air set in motion by them strikes
against the places of articulation. Even though the sounds
thus perfected by contact with the different places of articu¬
lation are different from one another, the difference between
these manifesting agents is difficult to grasp as in the case of
the manifesting substratum of the universals of the cow and
the gayal or as in the case of the substratum of the actions
of turning and pouring. Even though the manifesting powers
have separate effects, their essence, possessing some com¬
mon features, is confused due to some special effect. Hence
there is the comprehension of parts in the partless phonemes,
of divisions in the form of phonemes in the word and of
divisions in the form of words in the sentence!
[1. The Vrtti explains why the partless phoneme, word and sen¬
tence appears to have parts. The sounds which manifest the^ phoneme
V are different from those which manifest the word gaulj, and the
latter are different from those which manifest the sentence gamabhyaja
But they are identified with one another because of their apparent re¬
semblance. They differ from one another in their cause as well as in
their effect. So their powers are different. They suggest such different
things as phoneme, word and sentence. This is difference in the effect.
They are produced by different efforts, such as the effort to manifest the
phoneme, the effort to manifest the word and the effort to manifest the
sentence. This is difference in the cause. Difference in the effoit causes
difference in the air which strikes at the different places of articulation.
Though these manifesting sounds are different from one another, the
difference is not noticed, because, on the basis of imagined resemblance,
they are identified with one another. The sounds manifesting g are
identified with those manifesting V i* 1 9 au h these latter with those
manifesting { g’ in the sentence c gamdbhyaja \ So the word which is indi¬
visible appears to have parts e g 3 etc. and the sentence which is partless
appears to have parts c gam’ etc. This is what is meant by sanklrna
iva saktayah the powers seem to be confused. The appearance of parts
in the partless is the result of this confusion. If, for the manifestation
of two indivisible words, one has to make similar movements of the
vocal organs, the phonemes produced by these movements, appear to
be parts of both of these indivisible words.]
89. Just as, from a distance or in the dark, after
having mistaken an object in the previous cognitions,
one sees it correctly,
I. 90-91.
89
It is in accordance with the properties of objects and the
senses that people of ordinary vision, perceiving from a dis¬
tance, only the general shape, mistake trees etc. for elephants
etc. Staying in the same place, by steady concentration, gra¬
dually, they perceive their special features. Entering sudden¬
ly dimly lighted rooms from a well-lighted place and after
having mistaken rope etc. for snake etc. they, once their
eyesight has become normal, through steady concentration,
perceive them as they are. 1
[1. Cf. Sphotasiddhi, verse 19 and the commentary thereon. It is
an echo of this verse and the Vrtti thereon. This and the following
verse are actually quoted there (p. 143.)]
90. In the same way, when the sentence is being
manifested by the sounds which are the causes of its
manifestation, there is at first a cognition in which
parts figure.
Even though the sentence is indivisible, the sounds pro¬
duced by the efforts intended to manifest it, cause a know¬
ledge consisting of the cognition of parts appearing as phone¬
mes and words, because of resemblance in their powers which,
in reality, are different.
91. Just as there is a definite sequence in the
transformation of milk or of the seed in the same way,
there is a definite sequence in which the cognitions of
perceivers take place in regard to the word (sentence) .
Just as, according to the creation theory or the manifes¬
tation theory, milk, prompted by its transformation clarified
butter etc., passes through definite stages like curds, having
or not having their special names, preserves, as far as possi¬
ble, the presence of the properties of the original material
and, without violating the fixed sequence of the stages, shows
the transformation which prompted it; or rice-seed, prompted
by its transformation, the rice-grains, passes through the
inevitable stages like stalk, sprout etc. and appears as its main
K. S. 13
90
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
transformation which prompted it, in the same way, the cog¬
nitions of ordinary hearers, prompted by the main result,
the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, preceded
by the grasping of the form of the sentence, show, when the
effect having its fixed means has to be brought about, appea¬
rances of parts having fixed sequence and proceed to perceive
the sphotcis (the words) 1 .
[1. The use of the expressions prayuktam, prayojikam, prayojakena
and prayuktanam is based on the idea, a figurative one, that the effect
prompts its own cause to act in such a manner that the effect is pro¬
duced. Vr. puts it in this way: Pradhdnam Kdryasytitmalabhaya Kara-
Tiani prayunkte = Primordial matter sets in motion the causes in order
that the effect may come to be. The activity of Primordial Matter is
attributed to the effect itself. This verse is quoted in Sphota-siddhi,
p. 159.]
92. Even if the words are accepted as having
parts, the difference in parts is due to the sequence of
sounds. And if they are partless, the appearance of
parts (due to the sequence of sounds) is the means for
their cognition.
According to those upholders of division who are of the
opinion that the word ‘gauh’ is nothing more than the
phonemes g-au-h, that there is no indivisible word-essence
beyond them to be cognised through the cognition of the
phonemes and who accept the eternality of the words, when
the unnameable minute parts in the form of phonemes are
gradually manifested, the form of the word would not be
cognised and the final clear cognition of the form would have
no object to be cognised. If it is held that all the parts are
manifested at the same time, there would be no difference
between vega and gave or tena and nate as far as the audible
side is concerned. If they are looked upon as two divisible
words with two different meanings, this difficulty would not
arise. According to that view also, their perception as two
different words would be due to the difference of sequence of
I. 93.
51
the manifesting sounds. It is seen that ropes etc., illuminated
by a lamp fed with the fat of frogs etc., appear like snakes etc.
How, according to the view that the words are indivisible,
the cognitions embracing different powers resulting from the
postulation of divisions become the means (of cognising the
word) has been explained in the immediately preceding
verses. 1
[1. Three views in regard to the word are referred to in this verse.
From ‘Ye’pi to ‘note iti ca’, the view discussed is that the phonemes
themselves constitute the word and that there is no word beyond them.
From ‘tatra sabddntdre’ to ‘sarpadipratipattibhedali’, the view mentioned
is that the word is eternal and so are its parts. From ‘nirbhdgesu’ till
the end, the view is that the word is indivisible.]
93. Some have declared the universal manifested
by the individuals to be the sphota and what are called
sounds ( dhvanis ) to be the individuals.
Some, proclaiming the eternality of the word because of
the eternality of the universals, declare that in statements
such as the following
“On both sides, it is only the sphota which is shown: in
place of the phoneme V comes the phoneme T.” 1
It is the universal of the word which is called the sphota,
it is different from the universal called Svord-ness’ and its
fitness to be perceived is brought about gradually by its
substrata which are produced in a sequence and do not co¬
co-exist. The individual sounds which are produced and
which make the unnameable sphota nameable get the name of
sound ( dhvani ). 2
[1. M. Bha I. p. 26, 1. 1.
2. Before, in verse 69, it was declared that the universal is the
name and that the individual is the named. Here, the view that tba
universal is the sphota is set forth.]
§2
VARYAPADIYAM OV BHARTRHARI
94. The sound, modified by its causes, becomes
the cause of the cognition of the changeless word, just
as the light from a lamp (becomes the cause of the
perception of an object).
Others, on the other hand, on account of difference from
the process which results in the use of the terms universal
and particular, assert that there is only one word which is
external, not subject to any change through the sounds modi¬
fied by their own causes and not residing in the sounds. It
is manifested as is done by the light of a lamp when there
is no vagueness in the object, with the colouring of the
changes in the manifesting sound, as though it has received
a new form. 1
[1. Another view of sphotd is referred to here. It is not clear who
held this view. Vr. gives the following quotation expressing this view:
Tasmin nitydrn, sabdasaktivi pratijdnate — they assert that there is
one eternal word-power in it (the ether). The main idea here is that
the sounds, which differ from one another because of difference in the
articulatory movements, cause the cognition of the one changeless word
without effecting any change in it, just as the light from a lamp reveals
the object without effecting any change in it. This process is said to
be different from the one relating to the universal and the individual in
wholes like a jar: akrtivyaktivyavaluLravaidharmydt. The parts of a jar
are the substrata of the whole, namely, the jar. The jar itself, which is
the individual, is the cause of the cognition of the universal in it and
of the application of the word ‘jar v to it. This is not the relation bet¬
ween the sounds and the word, because the sounds cannot co-exist. As
Vr. puts it: Yaugapadydblvdvdc chabdabhdgdndm .3
95. Manifestation is not necessasily confined to
that which is transitory. The manifestation of the
eternal universals by their substrata is admitted. 1
Some put forward the fact of manifestation itself as a
reason for concluding that it is non-eternal, as follows—The
word is non-eternal, because it is manifested, like a jar. It
seen that non-eternal objects like a jar are manifested by
93
I. 96.
a lamp etc. The word is manifested by sounds; therefore,
it is non-eternal. If it is held that it is not manifested, that
would mean that it is produced. That also makes it non¬
eternal. Now, to those who hold that universals exist and
that they are eternal, it is answered; the reason given (in
the above syllogism) is not a real reason, because it is seen
both ways. Against those who hold nothing to be eternal and,
therefore, maintain that the invalidity of the reason is not
proved, those who consider the word to be eternal declare
even before them that the invalidity is not established. How?
Against the opponent (one who does believe in eternality)
the reason “because it is manifested” is not a good reason
because it is doubtful and would lead to option and as the
other incidental properties also would be attributed, the dis¬
cussion would lead to regressus ad infinitum. 2
[1. Verses 95 to 101 answer objections to the manifestation theory.
The objections are made clear in the Vrtti.
2. Prasahgo vanusanginam ityanavastha syattarkcisya. If the word
is said to be non-eternal, because it is manifested, like a jar by the
light of a lamp, why not attribute the other properties of the jar, like
visibility also to the word? There would then be no end to the process
( anavastha )].
96. It is only material objects which are associat¬
ed with particular places. Even when difference of
place between sound and word is imagined, there is,
in fact, no real difference.
Another opposite view is now put forward: The word
is not manifested, because of difference in location between
the manifestor and the manifested). Jars and other objects
are manifested by lamp etc. because they exist in the same
locality. The word is found in a place other than where its
manifestos, the contacts and separations of the vocal organs
take piace. 1 This objection does not really hold good in the
case of the sounds, Still, it is argued as follows—How is
the word which is in one place manifested by the sounds
S4 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
which are in different places and very far from one another?
This is answered as follows—To be in one place or to be
in many places is a property of corporeal things. Even
material objects like the sun, while being actually restricted
to one place, are perceived as being in many places. Sound
and word, both, incorporeal, are beyond the range of such
expressions as location and located and, therefore, even
though the misconception of difference of location takes
place, really speaking, there is no difference between them
in this respect.
[1. The opponent s idea is that the manifesting sounds exist in the
vocal organs whose contacts and separations produce them, whereas the
word exists in ether (akasa).]
97. Just as there is an eternal fitness between the
senses and the objects, in the same way, there is the
relation of manifestor and manifested between parti¬
cular sounds and the word (sp hota ).
Another opposite view is now put forward:. The word is
not manifested because the (socalled) manifestators are fixed.
In this world, what is to be manifested does not require a
fixed manifestor, since all objects like jars are manifested
by any one of the following, a precious stone or a lamp or
a luminous plant or a planet or a star. In the case of words,
on the other hand, it is held that fixed sounds manifest them;
the sounds which are the causes of the manifestation of parti¬
cular phonemes cannot manifest other phonemes. Therefore,
words are not manifested. To this, the verse which begins
with the words: “between the senses and the objects (grahana-
grahyayoh) is the answer. Just as the colour which inheres
in the sense of vision is the cause of the manifestation of
external colour, not other qualities nor other senses, nor the
qualities of other senses, in the same way, they (the sounds)
become the causes of the manifestation of external objects. 1
[1. The answer to the present objection consists in pointing out that
even in regard to other manifestos, like the senses, there is a certain
I. 98-99.
95
fixity and restriction. While the sense of vision, which is of the nature
of fire according to the Vaisesikas, can reveal the colour of external
objects, it cannot reveal their smell or taste.]
Against the argument that such fixity does not exist
where a thing is manifested by a sense having the same
attribute as itself, the following answer is given—
98. In the case of smells etc., which are manifest¬
ed by their similars, it is seen in the world that there
is a particular factor in each case which is responsible
for it.
Even when things are perceived by senses having the
same attributes as themselves, this fixity can be observed.
For example, among substances like nail, bitumen etc., only
some particular substance in contact can manifest the smell
of some particular substance. 1
[1. When the colour in the sense of vision manifests the jar, it is a
case of difference between the manifestor and the manifested, because
the jar is a substance and the colour in the sense of vision is a quality.
Where there is such difference, the opponent points out, there is no
requirement of a fixed manifestor. But where there is similarity bet¬
ween the two, there should be fixity. But in the case of the word being
manifested by the sounds, there is similarity, because both are cognised
by the sense of hearing and yet there is a fixed manifestor. Against this,
it is pointed out that, in other cases also where there is similarity, a
fixed manifestor is required. The smell of an object is perceived only
by the sense of smell. Thus the manifestor and the manifested are simi¬
lar to each other. And yet smells are manifested only in contact with
a particular substance. The smell of Kunkuma is manifested only in
contact v/ith clarified butter. The only when it comes in contact with
boiling barly broth.]
99. The thing that is revealed follows the differen¬
ces of the revealors. This is evident in the case of
reflections in such different reflectors as oil, water etc.
Another opposite view is now put forward—The word is
j§ not manifested because (in its case) increase, decrease
96
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
and difference in number of the manifestors are seen in the
manifested (the word). When there is increase and decrease
of the manifestors, increase and decrease of the manifested
are not found. Increase and decrease of (the light of) lamps
(the manifestors) do not cause increase and decrease of jars
etc. Nor does any variation in the number of lamps cause
any change in the original number of jars etc. In the case of
the word, on the other hand, one sees variation in number
and magnitude following variation in the striking of the vocal
organs. Therefore, the word is not manifested.
This argument is answered as follows—one does see that
the manifested follow the variations of the manifestors. It
is as follows—When the surface of the mirror is sunk, the
reflection of the face is raised, when the surface of the mirror
is raised, the reflection of the face is sunk. In a dagger, the
reflection of the face is long, in mustard oil, it is dark, in a
Chinese dagger, Greek crystal etc. it follows the dimensions
of the reflector. Thus possibilities of variation are infinite.
Difference of number is also seen in the case of the reflec¬
tions of the sun etc. when there are many mirrors and many
waves of water. 2
[1. It is not clear what specific objects are meant by cmasastra and
yavanakaca. Obviously, they could reflect objects.
2. The Vrtti may be compared with the following passage from the
Mahabhasyatika of Bhartrhari—
“Yasyapi sabdavyaktih tasynpi nityah sabdali. Sa tu nadabhivyang-
yah. padaniyato nadah. Yathd caksurddayo niyata abhivyanjaka abhi-
vyangyesu rupddisu. rupavrddhirdsdnuvidhdyinasca . Yathadarsaman -
daladisu pratibimbdni dirghani parimandaldni mahanti anydni ca dri-
yante evam sabdd api nddabhedena bliidyante. Yatha saVde tarahgabhede
naikas candro 9 neka upalaghyate, pradApabheddcca chayd bhidyate
adarsabheddcca pratibimbabhedah. Tasmdnniyatdndddbhivyahgyji hrada -
vrddhihrdsdnuvidlidyino vyaktisabdd api nitydh .
Mahabhasyadipika of Bhartrhari, p. 20 (A.B.O.R.I, XLIII).
It might be said that the reflection which has entered a
nnrror etc. is different from its originals like the moon etc.
Against this, the answer is—•
I. 100-101-102.
97
100. Original objects like mountains cannot
possibly enter into reflectors like a diamond and the
surface of a mirror which have totally different dimen¬
sions.
It is not possible that objects like mountains having diff¬
erent dimensions should enter and be produced inside sub¬
strata like a diamond.
101. Therefore, due to the difference in time of
the manifesting sounds, their own time and that of the
duration of their cognition are attributed to the
phoneme (varna) word (pack) and sentence ( vakya )
whcih have no difference in time.
In the continued existence of eternal things, the power
of time as an auxiliary cause does not play a part. All the
sphotas, the phonemes, words and sentences, having a greater
or lesser magnitude and whose continued existence, during
the, according to wordly usage, earlier and later periods, is
understood from their cognitions (at the time of their mani¬
festation) do not differ as far as their duration is concerned.
When they become objects of cognition, though they have no
difference in time, they seem to have the duration of their
cognition. What is meant by speed and their own duration is
this—the primary sound whose duration is superimposed on
the essence of the word, in order that their difference may
not be grasped, becomes the cause of the use of the expression
short, long and protracted. The secondary sound brings
about the external difference of speed, quick etc.
102. Others have declared that whatever is pro¬
duced by the organs of articulation, through contacts
and separations, is the sphota; the sounds produced by
this initial sound are the dhvanis.
K. s. J?
98
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
According to the view that the word is transitory, the
first sound which is produced by the contacts and separations
between the points and organs of articulation is the sphota.
Those which are produced by that first sound and spread in
all directions carrying its reflection, are the dhvanis. All
things are in themselves without parts, but the parts of their
main associates are attributed to them. Similarly, ether
(which is one) has no parts but division into parts due to
relation with objects in contact with it, is attributed to it.
That being so, because of proximity in the form of succession
of parts and on account of uninterrupted succession of cause
and effect, those elements which have progressively diminish¬
ing power of reflecting the previous sounds are similar to the
forms illuminated by dim light, gradually disappear and cause
division in the phoneme, are called sounds. According to the
view of eternality, the sphota is manifested by sounds
produced by contacts and separations. According to some,
it is manifested by the resonance 1 produced by the
sounds caused by contacts and separations. Sounds, on the
other hand, are those which favour the cognition of the sphota 9
have progressively diminishing power of manifestation, cause
the distinction of the speeds quick etc. and gradually disappear.
[1. Dhvani and ruada. Here also, as in the Vrtti on verse 47, a dis¬
tinction is made between dhvani and ruada. The latter is produced by
the former. This distinction is mentioned in the course of the exposition
of the views of those who held the sphota to be the one indivisible word
( sabdavyakti ) as distinct from those who held it to be the Universal.
According to Vrsabha, the sounds produced by contacts and separations
produce a resonance (uada) which manifests the sphota. The sounds
produced by the first sound are the cause of the continued cognition of
the sphota or of the speed of utterance which is only another way of
looking at the same thing. See note 1 on verse 47.]
103. Whether the sound in question is short or
long, the time of the sphota is invariable. The series
of sounds which follows is susceptible of greater or
lesser duration. 1
r. 104.
99
basis of the common feat “* attnbuted f to the the
amount of space. Or S* T C ,° nS1St 7f 1 of coverin - a ce rtain
usage is the basis f Everywhere
Determining the nature o{ ft* ° f ° bjects -
tradition, would be unrel" ° D ^ baSlS ° f reaSon and
different views. As botb^ 6 bec ^ use W0lM result ^
those which are cause "7 ** which are effects and
distinction, there i s not the perisb wltbout
big and a small sound i sllghtest dlfference between a
of an elephant an a ’ tbere 1S none between th e cognitions
ot an phant and a mosquito. Due to difference in cir¬
cumstances, however th« r, r , , 1 C11
differs. The succession P °f « “7 *° Pr °? UCe effecls
one produced by the imoarf T ,, ° , a soun *be
, * . “f, e “npact of the drum and the stick
reaches far. Another sound like the one produced by strikin-
he hlard onlv f"“ “““ 3 TOi °" °* ^ds Jhich can
be heard only from near, but reverberates without a break.
the'mmSteta'am ,j ™ h “‘ ^2* '" '™!” * he of
j j u , , ^ * a accorc iing to the view that the first sound
Z 7. „ “ Pata,1 ” ! is «“ «**■ and the later “Zl
produced by the first one are the dhvanis.
2. If one looks upon sound as a quality, one can object to its
being: described as ‘small’ or ‘big’ because smallness or b gness am
quabties and they can reside only in substances and not in £ so£d
which is itself a quality. If 0 ne looks upon sound as a substance,
even then one can object that only material substances can be big or
small and not immaterial substances like sound. To meet this objec¬
tion, it is pointed out that these two expressions are used for sound
by courtesy (upacaryate ).]
104. From a distance only the sound is perceived
like the light from a lamp. The difference is clearly
visible in the sounds which are produced by hells, etc.
Here some thinkers consider that the sphota manifested
by the sound which comes into being at the same time and
spreads far in all directions like the light of a lamp is asso-
ciated with the sound from the very moment of its manifesto-
lot)
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
tion just as a substance is endowed with its smell from the
very moment it is produced. Just as, in a lamp, there is
the burning substance which is the material cause of its closely
packed parts (ghanasannivistavayavam pratyupaddnam)
and its light is based on it and follows its transformations, in
the same way, the sphota and the sound, very distinct when
a bell is struck, constitute the characteristic of the manifesta¬
tion of the phonemes. The difference between primary and
secondary sounds has been explained in the two preceding
verses. 1
[1. This verse puts forward another view of those who held the
sphota to be transitory. It is an answer to a possible objection that
the sound, apart from the sphota , does not exist at all. It is here
pointed out that it does exist separately. We can see the difference
when we hear from a distance the sounds which a crowd makes but
cannot distinguish the words (the spliotas). Or, it is like seeing the
light of a lamp without seeing the lamp itself. The sound produced
by the first impact of a bell is the sphota. In this verse, it is stated
that the sound ( dhvani ) is also produced at the same time whereas
in the previous verse it was stated that the sound produced by the
impact is the sphota and the subsequent sounds produced by the first
one are the dhvanis. In both the views, the sphota is transitory.
In the text of the Vrtti, ghatasannivistdvayavam is a mistake for
ghanasannivistavayavam .]
105. On account of the relative intensity in the
contact between the organs and the places of articula¬
tion, the long and the protracted also become different.
The sounds produced after the cessation of the vibra¬
tions bring about variation in the speed of utterance.
Even according to the view that the word is transitory, 1
it is not because of any increase in the manifesting sounds
that there is any increase in the long and protracted vowels.
How then ? Because of the greater intensity in the contact,
between the places and the organs of articulation. All that
contact can only bring about the form of the long and pro-
i. 108-107.
101
tracted vowels. Therefore, till they acquire their form, the
vibration, causing mutual contact of the parts of the places
and organs of ai'ticulation because of their striking against
one another and following closely the special movements of
the air, continues. When the vibration ceases, the sounds
which are produced by the original ones, become the cause
of the regulation of speed like quick etc.
[1. I have adopted the reading ‘anityapakse’ as Vrsabha has it.]
106. Even after the organs have ceased to vibrate,
other sounds are produced from the sphota as one flame
from another.
Even when the vibrations continue uninterruptedly,
whatever sound is produced by the contact (between the
places and organs of articulation) never disappears without
producing its effect. The sounds which are produced by the
vibration and are simultaneous (with the sphota) manifest
the sphota. The sounds which come in between, resemble them,
and shine like them, are called secondary sounds (anusahga)
It has also been said that each secondary sound among them
has its series of effects lasting as long as the vibration lasts
and helps in the manifestation of the sphota. This production
of sounds has been described on the analogy of the continuity
of the flames proceeding from burning fuel. Just as from the
flames of burning fuel proceed continuously other flames pro¬
duced by them and manifest objects by their light, so is the
continuity of the sounds.
107. Air, atoms, or knowledge is said to be trans¬
formed into the word according to some. Thus, in the
different doctrines, there is no fixed view on the
subject.
Some declare that it is air which becomes the word.
102
VAkyApadiyam of bhartrHaM:
108. The air set in motion by the effort corres¬
ponding to the desire of the speaker, strikes at the
different places of articulation and is transformed into
sounds.
109. By the impact caused by the force of the
original cause (the effort) even the solid forms of air
which has speed and solidity are diversified. 1
This and similar views must be understood.
[1. Vrsabha understands that the air brings about the contacts and
separations of the places and organs of articulation which are solid
(saravatyah). The translation connects ‘saravatyo ’pi murttayah’ with
‘tasya’ = of the air.]
Others have accepted that it is the atoms which become
the word. They have declared as follows—
110. Because the different kinds of atoms have
all powers, they, in combination or otherwise, trans¬
form themselves into shadow, sunlight, darkness and
sounds.
111. The atoms called words, when their power is
manifested by effort, are set in motion by the same
effort and they gather like clouds.
All such views have to be understood. Others expound
the transformation of knowledge into the word.
112. This inner knower, at first identical with
the subtle word, transforms himself into the gross
word, in order to manifest his own form.
t- 113-114-115.
103
113. He, the inner knower, becomes mind after at-
taining matunty through heat. Then he enters the air
called breath which is then emitted. 1
7St d thf b T f ? e St6PS by Which the self Hornes the
r/ L S o beC ° meS the capable of cognising
°bj' ects . , T . .. c fP acit y attains maturity through the bodily heaf
men se . in T 10 u- by . the desire to s P eak > the mind identifies itself
with the breath which is then emitted.]
114. Air becomes the substratum of the mind and
becomes coloured by the qualities of the latter and is
transformed by the inner heat. 1
[1. The Self becomes the mind of which the air becomes the
substratum. The air becomes impregnated with the attributes of the
mind and becomes the word.]
115. The inner air (prana), after splitting into
parts in the form of sounds and after suggesting the
phonemes, is merged into them.
All this and similar views have to be considered. What
has been given is only an illustration. There is much diver¬
sity in the views of the authors of the Siksas and the
Bbasyas! For example—
“Vital air, prompted upwards by the inner effort, aided
by the inner heat, accumulates, through the sound-carrying
.interstices, 2 fine particles of sound like masses of smoke.
When thus accumulated in the places of articulation, it
assumes the identical form of the inner word, because of its
illuminating aspect”. All such views have to be considered.
\t is as follows 3 —
“The air, prompted by effort from the region of the navel,
going upwards, strikes against one of the places like the chest
and then sound is produced”.
Such diversity of views of the authors of the Siksas
must be considered. It has been said by the teacher (Panini).
104
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
“The Self sees things through the intellect and joins the
mind with the desire to speak. The mind strikes at the heat
of the body which, in its turn, prompts the vital air.” 4
And so on. Another teacher says—
“The vital air reaches the stomach where the resonance
takes place. Reaching the throat, it becomes either breath
or sonority”.
And so on. Another teacher says—
“The heat of the body, struck by the mind, prompts
the vital air. It rises from the navel and strikes against the
head and when it comes into contact with another rising
wave of air, becomes sounds such as c k’ or e kh’”
Such different views are found in the treatises called
Siksa attached to each branch of the Veda and they must be
understood in detail.
[1. Vrsabha says that by Bhasyakara, the commentators of the
Siksas are meant.
2. Vr. says that the veins (wadis) are filled with fine parts of the
word and when they are set in motion along the veins by the inner
air, they accumulate in the places of articulation, like masses of smoke
3. Vr says —Tathety apis ally asikslidarsanam.
4. Paniniyasiksa, 6.]
116. The eternal word which, being fine, is not
perceived by the ear, becomes perceptible through its
own cause, as the air by fanning.
Now another tradition 1 is being recorded. There is sub¬
tle sound within and without all embodied objects like masses
of fine air. According to some, it is understood as ether
Just as, even though atoms of air exist everywhere it •'
only when, due to the impact of the fan ,2 they are dislodged
rom their place, that they become endowed with action^ in
toe same way, sound, when given a gross modified form’ by
I. 117-118.
105
its manifesting causes, reaches the region of the ear and
perfects it.
[1. According to .Vrsabha, this tradition is also current among the
authors of the 6iksas.
2. Both in the Karika and in the Vrtti, Pt. Charu Deva Shastri’s
edition has Vyanjana. But the context requires Vyajana and it is actu¬
ally found in the manuscript ‘S’, used for our edition of Vakyapadiya
Kanda I. So that reading has been adopted.]
117. The power of it which is in the breath and
in the understanding strikes at the different places of
articulation and becomes differentiated.
All these are different views. The sound mentioned in
the previous verse having the attribute of accumulation is not
refeired to here. The word, already under discussion, is
being explained according to different views. The word rests
on the bieath as well as on the mind.* Being manifested
by the powers of the two substrata, the breath and the mind,
the word conveys the meaning. The breath is penetrated by
the mind. Surging upwards like a flame, following the effort
which set it in motion, it strikes against the points of articu¬
lation of the phonemes and assumes a form favourable to the
comprehension of the eternal word. Having thus attained the
state of the effect of the two powers which are within it,
the breath assumes different forms, as the earth or the foetus
or the banyan seed does 2 and gives to the one essence of the
word the mere colouring of difference.
[1. The word has two substrata, the mind and the breath. While
explaining this idea, Vrsabha adds a third one: the vocal organs. As
he puts it —Sa cayam trtiyasabdah Karanadhisthanah.
2. The earth, the foetus and the banyan seed go through certain
stages before they attain their final form. Unfortunately, the text of
the Paddhati here is corrupt, so that one does not get a clear idea of
what Vrsabha considered to be the stages.]
118. The power which creates and regulates this
universe rests on words, It is through that eye that
K. S, 14
106
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
all this diversity of understanding (bhedarupah prati -
bhatma ) is perceived.
According to some, the universals (of words and mean¬
ings) rest on the substratum of the subtle word. They
become manifested when the substratum evolves and appear
as the expressed meanings and the expressive words. It is
like what some others say—“All objects merge into the senses
(as potentialities) and all the senses merge into the intellect
as potentialities and the intellect merges into the sequenceless
word as a potentiality. All this activity which goes on
during dreams and the wakeful state and involves distinction
into different individuals always exists in the subtle word, the
supreme cause (in a potential state). Others have also said
as follows—
“It is the word which sees the object, it is the
word which speaks, it is the word which reveals the object
which was lying hidden, it is on the word that this multiple
world rests and it is this very word which enjoys after the
differentiation.”
119. The difference between ‘sadja’ and others is
grasped when conveyed through words; therefore, all
kinds of meanings depend upon the powers of words.
Everything depends upon the word which causes its
cognition and enters into usage when grasped through re¬
membrance of it as intertwined with its word ( smrtinirii -
pand) , as identified with its word through memory (abhijol-
panirupand ) and as connected with some particular action
(akaranirupan'tt) . The distinction between sadja, rsabha
gindhdra, dhaivata, nisi da, pancama and madhyama, the
words expressive of which are not well-defined nor well-
known, cannot be understood without knowing the words on
which depend their understanding. Cowherds, shepherds and
others invent special words and accomplish their special
purposes in regard to cows and other animals. Therefore,
a thing with its distinctive feature, closely linked with general
I. 120.
107
or special words the meanings of which are clearly grasped
or otherwise respectively, is illuminated, embraced and iden¬
tified with a cognition which is united with the power of the
word, intertwined with the word and has the form of the
word . 1
[TJhe purpose of this verse is to show that distinction between things
can be known only through words. The distinctive features of some
things in this world are easy to see and they have their words to express
them. But the distinctive features of some things are not easy to grasp.
By merely listening to the musical notes sadja etc., one cannot under¬
stand their special characteristics. One can do so only with the help
of the technical explanation of the Science of Music. What we cognise
can enter into worldly usage only if we can express it in words. The
process of cognition has three stages which, as explained by Vrsabha,
aie * (1 to see a thing and to remember it as intertwined with its
word (Smrtinirupayjd), (2) to cognise the identity between word and
meaning^ (abhijalpanirupana) , (3) to see it as connected with some
action ( dkaranirupcnia ,).
The intimate relation in which the word and the meaning figure
in t e cognition is emphasised in the Vrtti by the use of several ex-
piessions coveiing different aspects of it: bhedavdnartliah sabdasakti -
savisi stay a,~ sabdctnuviddhayd sabd&tviikayd buddhya prakasyate upa-
9} lyate sviki iycite. The meaning is illuminated and embraced by the
cognition, it becomes one with it. The word, on the other hand, is also
intertwined with the cognition which has the form of the word. The
cognition has the form of the word which has the form of the mean¬
ing. (upgrhitarthakarasabdarapd sd buddhih—Vi\)]
120. Knowers of tradition (the Vedas) have de- i m ?
claied that all this is the transformation of the word.
It is fiom the chandas that this universe has evolved.
, aS °^ er thinkers , 1 while explaining causality, saw
a l e properties of the cause continue in the effects and
ave eclared as the source of everything, either the mass
oi atoms, free from mutual distinctions, subtle, imperceptible,
having the potentialities of all effects, with the tendency to
pro uce them kept in abeyance or Primordial Matter or the
co .ection oi Powers rooted in Nescience or something which
as no biith nor change (but is merely the substratum) of
appeal ances, in the same way, in the Scripture also, the word
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHART&HAKi
ios
iii which the powers of Enjoyer and Enjoyed are submerged
has been declared to be the cause of the world in many ways.
For example, it has been said: “The Lord Vairaja, is indeed
made up of Rk, Yajus and Saman. The Lord is the world,
the Lord is the sacrifice. In it, three oblations are offered,
pleasing to the three worlds. These oblations offered in a
three-fold manner, are the three worlds.” 2 Similarly—“He
who created the world is indeed the Lord of the world, made
up of hymns, existing at the very beginning, indestructible
(or a very bull). From him were born cattle, from cattle all
vegetation and from vegetation, fire. That is why it has been
said that one should not milk in a wooden vessel. A wooden
vessel is, indeed, fire. That is why milking is never done in
a wooden vessel.” 2
There is a RK also on this very subject—
“From the Lord first came knowledge, the food; from it
were separated name and form; the name came from life
(breath) and the form from knowledge. The one knowledge
appears as many.” 3
Again, it has been said—“It is the word which became
the worlds; the word became all that is immortal and mortal.
It is the word which enjoys, which speaks in many ways.
There is nothing beyond the word.” 3
There are also some ancient sayings on the subject—
“The Creator, mentioned in the Scripture, after dividing
Himself in many ways, into manifestations of Himself, entered
into Himself with all the manifestations.” 4
“Those persons in whom the pure speech is established
in a great measure, in them the holy light of the Creator
exists eminently.”
“The great Light of the Creator which is in the learned
as though covered with a lid, becomes merged with its
source, when their body dissolves.”
“When one is in possession of right knowledge, one is
identified with the shining mass of that wonderful light and
is merged in it.”
t i2i.
109
tl- The problem here is to decide what anye means. According
to Vrsabha, it means the Vaisesikas and others. If he is right, then
the Vrtti “yatliaivdnye ... vyavasthapayanti’ mentions different things
beginning with the mass of atoms ( anugrdma ) as the original cause of
the world, according to others. For Vaisesikas, it is the mass of atoms,
foi Sankhyas, it is Primordial Matter (PrcLdhdncL) , for others, it is the
bundle of Powers, rooted in Nescience and for others still, it is some¬
thing devoid of birth and change and is the substratum of appearances
(vivarta). The other way of interpreting the passage is to take it
as describing only the mass of atoms, linking all the adjectives in
the passage with anugrdmam \ The former way is more in accordance
with our text.
2. The source of these two prose texts is unknown. In the second
text, the word ‘ aksan’ may be ‘uksan.
3. These two verses are given as RK , but they are not found
in the Rg-Veda.
4. The idea in this verse is that all differentiation merges into the
ultimate at the time of pralaya. That is, it exists in a latent stage,
only to become patent at the time of creation. As Vr. puts it. vyakti -
rupena bhutvti saktirapeiiavatisthate.'}
121. All knowledge of what is to be done in this ' • -
world depends upon the word. Even the child, with
its residual traces from the previous birth, has such
knowledge.
Even that which exists is as good as non-existent as long
as it does not come within the range of verbal usage. Even
a totally non-existent thing like a hare’s horn or something
which appears and disappears in the sky like a celestial town 1
(gandharvanagara ), when brought to the mind by words,
figures, like something endowed with primary reality, 2 in
various usages. 'In children in whom the germs of the word
exist according to their kind, because of the existence in
them of the residual traces of their use of words in their
former births, there arises cognition based on vague words
(anakhyeyasctbda) in the course of their various purposeful
activities.
110 VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTHHARI
[1. Vrsabha points out that a celestial city may suddenly appear
to us in the sky and it may disappear equally suddenly. But when the
word brings the idea of it to our mind, it stays.
2. Mukhyascittayuktam iva. Mukhyasattd (primary reality), the
fact of something existing outside our mind is contrasted with Upa-
carasattd which consists in the fact of something figuring in our mind
through the agency of words. Words move chiefly in the realm of
Upacarasatta , as explained in Vak. Ill, Sambandhasanuddesa.]
122. The first movement of the vocal organs, 1 the
emitting of the air upwards and the striking of the
places of articulation are not possible without the resi¬
dual traces of the speech (in the previous birth).
This residual trace of speech has no beginning and it
exists in every one as a seed in the mind. It is not possible
that it should be the result of the effort of any person. Move¬
ments of the articulatory organs by children are not due
to instruction by others but are known through intuition.
Who, indeed, can make or make known these human proper¬
ties as other than residual traces of the word?
[1. Vr takes the word ‘Karana’ as denoting the vocal organs as
well as the mind (antahkarana) . Thus, it is due to sabdabhavarua. that
t e child makes, untaught, not only the first movements of the vocal
organs, but the very effort to say something. The first movement of
the vocal organs may not be necessarily to speak, but to eat or to
drink.
_ _ 2 : Pratibhagamyah. Pratibhd seems to be another name for sab-
dabhavana. It stands (1) for the residual traces of the exercise of the
3T 1 ^ ° f u s Pf ch ln th e previous birth; (2) for the faculty of speech
wrth which the child is bom; (3) for the child’s instinct to do some¬
thing in response to a situation.]
123. There is no cognition in the world in which
the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were
intertwined with the word
I. 124.
Ill
When, in the word-seed, everything is merged, then no
verbal usage can be accomplished with the indeterminate
knowledge which takes place in regard to objects. For in¬
stance, when one walks quickly and treads on grass and
clods of earth, even though knowledge of them takes place
(no usage is accomplished thereby). That stage of knowledge
is only sometimes reached in which, when the word-seed is
awakened and the powers, confined to particular meanings, of
expressive, explainable and unexplainable words are mani¬
fested, the object is given a shape and accepted by knowledge
which is intertwined with the word and follows the power
of the word and it comes within the range of clear cognition
and can be designated as such and such and is said to be
known. Where, due to circumstances, the manifesting causes
of the word appear, it becomes a cause of memory. Similarly
according to some, even one who is asleep has a stream of
cognitions like one who is awake. The only difference is
that the seeds of the word function in a very subtle manner
in that condition. That is why that condition has been called
one of darkness. Thus consciousness, mixed up with the
word, appears and disappears constantly as the cause and
effect of the manifested word.
124. If this eternal identity of knowledge and
the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to
be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identifi¬
cation possible.
Just as illumination is the nature of fire or consciousness
the nature of the Inner Controller, in the same way, all
knowledge is intertwined with the word. Even in the state
of unconsciousness (sleep), there is the persistence of the
association with the subtle word. Also, that first cognition of
external objects which does not grasp their special features
( nimitt&nam ) illuminates them in a vague manner ( avya-
padesyayd vrttya) as mere things, by referring to them as
this or that. At the time of remembrance also, when the
seeds of such indeterminate cognition are awakened, a mere
112
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
'outline, consisting of the previous vague cognition, figures in
the mind in the form: 'this is some hymn or verse which I
have heard before’. If knowledge were not mixed up with
the word, the (vague) cognition which arises, not being
intertwined with the form of another (the word) does not
become an auxiliary in the act of illumination. After the
cognition of the bare meaning of the words (in a sentence)
which are different from one another, mutually unhelpful
and independent of one another (atmdntar&natmandm) has
taken place, what takes place afterwards, namely, the mutual
determination of their meanings, the definite identification of
their meanings as such and such, their cooperation to fulfil
one purpose, the connection of the individual sentence-mean¬
ing with the expressive power of the words, all this is closely
linked with the fact of knowledge being closely intertwined
with the word. It is this (vdg'rupatd) which brings about
the identification and the mutual determination of the word-
meanings, a cognition (of the sentence) which is qualified
by all the qualifications and causes purposeful activity and
yet it does not abandon the appearance of difference within
it by a process of abstraction of powers. 2
[1. Atmantaratmanam. Vrsabha’s text seems to have been: ‘atman-
tardnatmanam 9 because he explains as follows— dtmdntaram esdm
dtmti na bhavati . Itaretarasya iti. Itarasyetara atmd na bhavati. Itaras-
ydpitdro devadattartho gavarthasyatmetyddi.
2. From f bhinnarupdimm to na vijahdti , it is explained that the
understanding of the sentence-meaning from the word-meaning pre¬
supposes that knowledge is of the nature of the word. The stages in
the process, as understood by Vrsabha, are: (1) the understanding of
the word-meanings from the words; (2) the identification of the mean¬
ings in a cognition intertwined with the word; (3) the unification of
these meanings by their mutual delimitation.]
125. It is this which is the basis of all the scien¬
ces, crafts and arts. Whatever is created due to this
can be analysed (and communicated).
Human transactions in regard to worldly things and in
regard to things taught in the Vedas takes place through the
I. 126.
113
sciences crafts and arts. The activity of the rest of the
animate and inanimate creation depends upon man. All
science is closely bound up with the intellect (thought) which
is of the nature of the word. It is on the basis of this fact
of knowledge being of the nature of the word that in cases
such as the making of a jar, all instruction and effort of the
prompter and the prompted respectively, proceed.
126. The consciousness of all beings going
through transmigration is in the nature of the word; it
exists within and without. The consciousness of all
types of beings does not go beyond this essence.
It is because consciousness is of the nature of the word
that the distinction between sentient and insentient is made
in the world . 1 It has been said—
It is the word which urges all beings towards purposeful
activity. If that were absent, everything would be insentient
like a piece of wood or a wall.”
The experience of pleasure and pain in the case of
those whose consciousness is turned inward is possible
only as long as consciousness is of the nature of the
word. As for those whose consciousness is external, their
transactions in the world are dependent upon that and
would, in the absence of that, cease to be. There is no
kind of being endowed with consciousness who knows
or causes others to know without the association of the word . 2
Therefore, there is no activity of consciousness which is not
closely linked with the powers of the word. Others go to
the extent of saying that the activity of consciousness is the
primciple of the word itself. For it has been said—
“The word which has been taught in all the Sciences as
the ultimate source assumes form through the appearance of
differences.”
The divisions of this word, cows and the like, made
known through the words , 3 having their source in the word,
are not beyond the unity of the ultimate even though they
appear to be different. "
K. S. 15
114
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
u
They conquer death who know the word which has six
doors, six bases, six forms of knowledge and six eternals. 4
[1. Samjna, sasamjna, visamjna , antahsamjna, bahihsamjna, these
five allied expressions are found in this verse and the Vrtti thereon.
Visamjna is also found in the verse quoted in the Vrtti. Sasamjna and
Visamjna mean sentient and insentient respectively. A piece of wood
is given as an example of what is Visamjna. Antahsamjna and Bahih -
samjna seem to stand for different states of beings: when conscious¬
ness is withdrawn from external objects it is antahsamjna, when it is
turned outwords, it is bahihsamjna.
2. Svaparasambodhah. Whatever has consciousness is capable of
svasambodha or both svasambodha and parasambodha _whatever is
sthavara , stationary, like a tree has only svasambodha. Men and other
animals have both, according to Vrsabha: svasambodhdnugama eva
sthavaresu, ubhaydnugamo jahgamesu manusyadisviti. l Parasambodlia >
can mean both knowledge of others and making others know.
3. Vdnnetvdh vannibandhandh. Things consisting of objects and
words, are brought to the mind through words ( vacanan niyante _Vr.)
So they are called vannetrdli. In other words, we see everything through
the word. S
4. The v/ord is said to have four sets of six things. What thev
stand for is not clear. Vrsabha explains them on the basis of the six
kinds of Pratibhd mentioned in Vak. II, 154. due to (1) svabhava *
(2) carana; (3) abhyasa; (4) yoga; (5) adrsza; (6) visistopanatd. Thev
are the means ( dvara ) of attaining the ultimate word, the six mean¬
ings which figure in them are its basis (adhisthana) , the six kinds f
cognitions which result from them lead to it and the six relations with
tne six meanings are eternal (avyaya) .]
127. Just as in the wakeful state ( pravibhdge )
it is through the word that the agent acts on the ob-
J ' ects ° f a11 acti ons, in the same way, in dream
(avibnage), it is the word itself which becomes the
object of all actions.
. . 'P le a PP eai ’ances of the Word-Brahman (in the wakeful
e consist of things to be accomplished and the means
the divisions Wakeful state > the see <k of
tne word, being of the nature of the word,
I. 128.
115
attain modifications like birth etc. through production, modi¬
fication and reaching and act as objects of action. In the
undivided states like sleep, on the other hand, the same word,
being deprived of (external) objects but being similar to them,
becomes the object of the actions of production, modification
and reaching. 1 It has been said—
The Lord of All, the All-Embracing, the Enjoyer, after
dividing Himself and after having created many different
things, proceeds to sleep.”
[1. See Vak. Ill, Sa 45.]
128. Whether everything is of the nature of the
Self or of the Supreme, as the word presents it, so it
is understood; it is through the word that the object
is established.
.. ng !° T- a “ is a product of
Ac Self. It exists within in every individual, but appears to
be external. That something is Internal and something else
is external is mere usage, based on rooted previous practice.
But this is impossible considering that the source of both is
one and incorporeal. According to others, all forms of know¬
ledge and all differentiation is a transformation of the inner
consciousness and so on. Such are the views of those who
hold that everything is a product of the Self. Others, how-
ever, think that the Supreme Self .
which emerges out of it as oil does from the sesame seed.
Others still think that the process is like the production of
sparks from fire of masses of cloud from subtle air, of streams
of flowing water from the moon-stone, of sala trees and the like
from the earth, of banyan trees with their downward growth
l r °m + , an / an See ? and S ° ° n ' Such are the views of those who
hold that everything is a product of the Supreme Self. The
views of those who are for the Self and these who are for
the Supreme have to be understood from the Philosophical
commentaries. What is meant by ‘as the word presents it’
is this — the word which is within is presented as pleasure
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARt
116
or pain in many ways in different beings. Even in such cases
as the throwing and falling of stones, 2 it is so presented accor¬
ding to worldly usage and established practice. What is meant
by ‘it is through the word that the object is established is —
It is the word which creates the object and preserves it.
[1. The views expressed in this verse and the Vrtti are not those
of Grammarians. It is intended to show here that many views are
just creations of words and do not correspond to reality. There are
some who hold that everything is a creation of the individual Self
while others hold that everything proceeds from the Supreme Self.
They are respectively called svamdtrdvddinah. and pdramdtrdvddinah .
Among those who hold that the universe is a product of the indivi¬
dual Self, there are those who do not specify whether, by individual
Self, they mean the Intellect ( Buddhi ) or the individual consciousness.
As Vr puts it:— caitanyam ekam karanam, purvatra tvanirupito ‘ ntali -
sannivesl purusa iti visesah. Among those who declare the Supreme
to be the source of everything, those who give the emergence of oil
from sesame-seed as example seem to think of gradual creation and
those who give the other four examples, of simultaneous creation.
2. Lostaksepapatddisu. Vr$abha gives reference to the following
passage from M. Bha. I, p. 123, 1. 11.
“Acetanesvapi. Tadyathd. Losth ksipto bdhuvegavi gatva naiva
tiryag gacchati , norddhvam arohati , prthivivikdrah prthivbneva gacchat -
yantaryatah”
In the course of the discussion on P. 1.1.50, where we are told that
of many possible substitutes, the nearest to the original must be chosen,
somebody argues that the word * antaratama 3 , in P. 1.1.50 is unnecessary
as the nearest would be adopted in any case, that being the practice
in the world, not only among living things, but also among insentient
things. To illustrate how even insentient things associate with what is
nearest to them, the example of a stone thrown upwards is given.
After going up to a certain height according to the strength of the
thrower, it does not proceed horizontally, nor does it go further up¬
wards, but being a product of the earth, falls and joins the earth below.
Here, however, the throwing upwards of a stone seems to be mentioned
in another context. The context is the idea that everything is under¬
stood by us and affects us as words present it. As Vr. puts it: —
Prdnidharmesvdkhydya b&hyesvapi sabdasya vyap&ram aha lostaksepa
iti” It is, however, a pity that the text of the Paddhati here has not
come down to us faithfully, so that the connection between the Bhasya
context and the present context, as understood by Vrsabha does not
become clear.]
I. 129-130.
11?
129. In the case of a thing like ‘a circle of
fire’ (alatacakra) where the circumstance is totally
different, merely by the force of the word, its form
clearly figures in the mind.
It is the audible word which shows all meaning as resid¬
ing in its own form, the word. It seems to create that mean¬
ing as it were. It always exists in it as something to
be conveyed by it. The word is not concerned as to
whether the object in question has real existence out¬
side or not, nor whether there has been a mistake or
not. Even in the case of a circle of fire, the pre¬
sence of a word which bears resemblance to the one which
denotes an action consisting of spreading in all directions,
creates a meaning for practical words like alatacakra (circle
of fire). The form of the object so fictitiously created, be¬
comes conventionalised, even in the face of strong inf erence
to the contrary. In the case of objects like a hare’s horn,
definitely known not to exist, it is the audible word which
creates or rather brings the idea thereof to the mind and
binds it to its own form. So also in the case of objects which
are accessible to the senses (pratyksari ). A meaning, whe¬
ther it has an external basis or not, is always present in the
word, as the thing to be expressed by it. (Whether the object
exists outside or not) in every individual, following the im¬
pressions of his previous experience and according to his
knowledge, meanings of different kinds are understood from
words.
130. It has been said that the Self, which is with¬
in the speaker is the word, the great Bull with whom
one desires union.
Here (in the Science of Grammar) the word is of two
kinds: it is eternal or it is a product. The product is that
which is found in worldly usage and it bears the reflection of
the Self 1 which is essentially the word. The eternal one is
the source of all usage, 2 it has all sequence suppressed, it
118
VakyApadiyam of bhartrhari
resides within everybody, the source of all transformations,
the substratum of all actions, the basis of pleasure and pain,
unimpeded anywhere in regard to the production of effects
(but) with its field of enjoyment restricted like a lamp cover¬
ed with a jar, the limitless source of all corporeal objects,
manifesting itself as all forms of knowledge and as all diffe¬
rentiations, imitating the states of sleep and wakefulness
through cessation of activity and resumption of it respectively,
endowed like rain and forest-fire with the powers of produc¬
tion and destruction respectively, the Lord of All, endowed
with all powers, the great word—Bull; those who know the
process of union with the word break the ego-sense and are
united with it, in complete absence of differentiation. It has
been said 3 —
He has four horns, three feet, two heads and seven
hands. He, the great Bull, is tied in three places and roars.
The great God has entered into human beings.”
[1.^ Purusasya prabimbopagrahi. Vrsabha comments— ‘Yo’yam
rathyapurusah so. vaktattvavikaratvat kdryasabdasvabhavah, vikara-
V&m prakrtirupdnvayat = The man in the street is of the nature of the
transitory word, because he is a transformation of the word-principle
and the source persists in the products.
2 . ^ Sarvavyavahdrayonih. According to Vrsabha, this means that
1 f 1S ii f Source of the distinction between the end and the means and
°' 1 the distinctions accepted in the different sastras.
3- RV IV, 58.3.]
131. Therefore the purification of the word is
(the means to the) attainment of the Supreme Self.
One who knows the essence of its activity attains the
immortal Brahman.
Once the essence of the word is purified by the form the
correctness of which is established and particular merit is
Manifested by the disappearance of obstacles in the shape of
incorrect forms, well-being ( abhyudaya ) is certain. Through
repeated practice of it and after attaining union (with the
word-principle) through the correct word and after fully un-
I. 132.
119
derstanding the Intuition which derives from the word-prin¬
ciple and which is the same as being, which is the source of
its modifications and possesses the powers of being the means
of accomplishment and the thing to be accomplished, attain¬
ment of the Supreme Good (ksema) is certain.
“After taking his stand on the word which lies beyond
the activity of breath, after having taken rest in oneself by
the union resulting in the suppression of sequence,
1 Aftei having purified speech and after having rested it
on the mind, after having broken its bonds and made it bond-
free.”
“After having reached the inner light, he, with his knots
cut, becomes united with the Supreme Light.”
132. Nobody admits that there is any written
tradition not associated with a particular author. When
all such written traditions disappear, the three Vedas
continue as the seed.
In all systems, somebody is thought of as the author of
the written tradition and so its human origin is accepted
Vedic sentences, on the other hand, are like consciousness
itself, not created by any person. When the authors of the
written traditions will have perished, they will serve as the
seed for the formation of other traditions.*
[1. The word agama is used in a wide sense t„ ,
the Vrtti and the Paddhati refer to the MahabhSsva a - Y P aCeS T ’ bot
Vrtti on verse 11, the word ‘dgamena’ occurs and it refers tTth m i!-
bhasya. Vrsabha calls the twelve verses quoted fa the Vrtt
1 at the end, the quotation suksmam etc. and v&maivedam J 'T®
in the Vrtti on vereee 5 end „ respee.iveiy,
quotations from the M. Bha and the Sahgraha, found fa the Vrtti h
the name agama. (See the Vrtti on verses 23 and 26 and the pfddhal
thereon.) ldl
Here the word occurs both fa the verse and the Vrtti. It stands
for ancient tradition, especially for written Tradition.]
120
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
133. Even if the doctrines perish and there are no
more authors to compose others, cultured people follow
the right path mentioned in the srutis (Scripture) and
the Smrtis (written tradition).
•
In all discussions, it is admitted that, like the authors, the
written traditions themselves can disappear. When they come
to an end and before other authors arise and other written
traditions are elaborated, there may be an interval during
which cultured people do not violate the rites taught in the
Scripture nor the regulations relating to what to eat and
what not to eat embodied in the written traditions.
134. If knowledge were spontaneous, there would
be no purpose in the composition of the sastras. If
spiritual merit is the cause of knowledge, the Veda is
the cause of the former.
If it is accepted that a particular person can acquire
knowledge without instruction, then written traditions prohi-
itmg what is harmful and enjoining what is beneficial would
ecome useless. If only a particular individual, due to special
merit, acquires knowledge without instruction, while some
°t ers have to be instructed by a treatise, then the merit
w ich has brought about that particular individual must have
a e mite basis. All other bases disappear. Therefore, writers
w o follow the right path which is based on Scripture, com¬
pose ifferent doctrines and attain different modes of reali¬
sation. ccilL
TT , 135 ' Reas °ning which does not go against the
‘ aS J md the sastra is authority for those who cannot
P " . e mea ning of a sentence does not become clear
a '°m its mere form.
mss^rtT mnS * makeS divisions within the words and mean
the benifit l* ,he Soripture ' A ” d that *>
efit of those who see superficially. That is why sue!
I. 136.
121
reasoning has been adopted by the ancients in the investigat¬
ing sciences (nyayavidycLsu). Only that much of reasoning
is to be adopted as will not go against one’s Scripture. In all
the sacred works, there is much that is beyond reasoning and
has to be accepted through faith. What purpose does he seek
to serve who does not follow reasoning, but accepts Scripture
alone as authority? Correct understanding of the sentences
of the Scripture would be his purpose. The power of the
sentences of Scripture to convey their meaning varies, even
when their form is the same, due to the presence of some
other factor. He who understands the meaning from the mere
form, without relying on context, connection etc. ends in con¬
fusion as to what is meant and what is not meant.
136. Sometimes what the words say is not meant,
sometimes it is included in something wider, sometimes
it is specified by other indications, many such conclu¬
sions are arrived at by reasoning.
In the sutras
“What the agent wishes most to reach is the object.”
(P. 1.4.49)
and
“The suffix has the meaning of ‘child of’ so and so.”
(P. 4.1.92.)
and in the sentence
“He cleans the vessel” (Cf. Tai. Sam. 3.2.2.3 and Jai.
Mi. Su. 3.1.13-14.)
and in the sutra
“The person for whom the object is meant is the rece-
pient.” (P. 1.4.32.)
and in
‘Those who live on a woman have attained the charac¬
teristic of a dead person’
JC. S. 16
122 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
gender, number and tense are not meant; sometimes
they are meant; such specification in regard to definitions
depend upon reasoning. Similarly, in the sentence
“He should release his speech after seeing the star.
(Ka. Sam. 23.5.)
the seeing of the star is meant to convey a particular time
(when the stars are ordinarily visible). Thus, it, the releas¬
ing (of speech), is done when the main thing (the time) is
otherwise ascertained or as (seeing the star) stands for some¬
thing else, the particular time is ascertained when the stars
are visible. In the sentence let the curds be protected from
crows,’ as it is meant to ward off all damage, even if there are
no crows, the curds are protected from dogs etc. As the sen¬
tence let the vessels be cleaned’ is meant to denote the com¬
pletion of all the preliminaries to the act of eating, even if
there are no vessels, the other preliminaries are completed.
Clarifications can be done by other indications also ( linga ).
In the sentence “he puts the sugar mixed with fat,” all kinds
of fat come to the mind, but through the indication contained
in the sentence—
“Clarified butter is indeed lustre itself”
a particular fat is understood. Such conclusions are reach¬
ed by reasoning and definitions are specified.
137. Reasoning based on human intelligence (as
distinct from written tradition) is also ultimately the
power of words. Argument not based on woids among
those who have no written tradition, is really without
any basis.
It is the word which is the instructor. Speakers follow
the power of words and act when urged by a desire to speak
based on the availability of the right word. When the hearer
follows the fixed power of words to convey a meaning,
through reasoning based on meaning, context, indication,
interconnection etc., people look upon the capacity of the
words as the reasoning of the hearer. 1 As for the reasoning
L 138.
123
which does not proceed from the power of words, but follows
the similarities and dissimilarities of objects, it is destructive
of all tradition, without any basis and it is called ‘dry rea¬
soning/ As in the following—
“If the drinking of wine contained in a big circle of rose-
coloured jars cannot take one to heaven, what can the little
that is drunk in a sacrifice do?” 2
Or in the following—
“To say that one should express oneself in words means
that one should do so in the Dramilaka language.”
[1. The relevant considerations for determining the meaning of
words are given in Vak. a. II, p. 214 ff.
2. M. Bha, I, p. 3, 1. 3.]
138. Just as colour and other qualities are seen
to have powers in regard to particular effects, so are
words seen to have such powers to remove poison etc.
For those who have understood from the sacred books
that divine happiness results from the knowledge and use
of correct words, accompanied by a knowledge of the science
of Grammar, this verse provides an argument strengthening
the tradition recorded in the sacred books. It is seen in this
world that colour, taste, smell and touch, whether singly or in
combination, have powers to produce particular visible or
invisible results. 1 Power to produce visible result is seen in
poisonous plants, magnet and trees. Power to produce invi¬
sible result is seen in wine and in the waters of holy places.
In the case of some words also, visible result such as the
curing of snake poison is seen. Similarly, it is accepted that
an invisible result is obtained by the repetition of mantras.
[1. Vrsabha gives the following examples. Blue and bright are both
colours, but one is soothing to the eyes and the other is irritating; sweet
and bitter are both tastes, but one causes phlegm and the other bile.
These are visible results. Only a white goat can be sacrificed to
Vayu, otherwise the invisible result expected will not be produced. The
124
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
touch of wine leads to a bad invisible result while that of the waters
of holy places leads to a good one. That the mantras of the Atharvaveda
have the effect of curing snake-poison is an example of visible effect
from the word.]
139. Let it be understood that just as they (the
words) have such powers, similarly they also have the
power to produce merit. Therefoi'e, good people who
desire well-being should use only correct words.
It is learnt from the sacred books that there are powers
leading to visible results associated with every word. As
there is such a tradition, let it be understood that correct
words are the means of acquiring merit and, therefore, those
who wish to attain divine happiness must follow the trust¬
worthy tradition uninteruptedly practised by the cultured
and use only correct words in worldly transactions.
140. Everybody understands things having invisi¬
ble effects from the sacred texts. In regard to every¬
thing mentioned in it, it would be possible to postulate
the opposite.
Some argue as follows:— Just as words have the capa¬
city to cure poison, in the same way, why not understand that
they have the capacity to cause demerit. From this very
illustration, let one conclude the existence of an opposite
power. Against this objection, it is maintained that, in regard
to all conclusions relating to visible or invisible results of
sacred texts, it would be possible to postulate an opposite
effect. Therefore, if after taking some sacred text as autho¬
rity, its meaning is settled, then any reasoning that is put
forward would strengthen the understanding of it.
141. Knowledge of the correctness of words is
the subject of this tradition called Grammar. It is here
that the uninterrupted tradition of cultured people is
recorded.
I. 142.
125
Just as traditions relating to what can be eaten and what
cannot be eaten, which woman one can marry and which
woman one cannot marry, what can be said and what cannot be
said are well established and cultured people do not go against
the code of conduct based on them, in the same way, this tra¬
dition called Grammar relates to what particular words can
be used and what not. What is remembered from generation
to generation, in an uninterrupted manner is again and again
embodied in woids. A tradition which has no written basis
but the observance of which is well-known is preserved by
the continuity of the practice of the cultured.
142. This Science of Grammar is the supreme
and wonderful source of the knowledge of the three¬
fold word, comprising many paths, of the Vailchari (the
Elaborated), the Madhyamd (the Middle One) and the
Pasyantz (the Seeing One).
That .s caUed the Elaborated (Vaikhan) the form of
„h,ch is cognised by others inasmuch as it comes within the
range of the sense of hearing, and is well defined. It is mixed
up or uttered indistinct phonemes; it has well-established
eorrectness or ,s devoid of correctness. It is what comes out
of the axle of a cart a drum, a flute and a lute («). th u s
it has minute varieties,. The Middle One (UaihyaL), on
the othei hand, is what exists within, it looks as if it has seau-
ence and mind is its only substratum. According to some it
is accompanied by the subtle functioning of breath (prfl)
and even though sequence is suppressed in it, yet it Tas
distinct functioning of breath in it 2 The Seeing Qne (Pos ,_
yanti) is'that in which sequence is merged and though it is
One, the power to produce sequence has entered into" it. It
is restless (caUcald) and also still in concentration^ hidden
and pure; 4 the forms of the objects of knowledge have entered
into it or merged into it or it has no form at all; it has the
appearance of limited objects or of connected objects or the
appearance of all objects has come to an end in it; thus it has
infinite variety. According to some, in all the states of the
126. vakyApadiyaw of bhartrhabi
word which come within the range of usage, the distinction
between what is correct and what is not is well-established
and brings about the perfection of the individual. But the
supreme form of the Seeing One is devoid of a 11 correct forms,
it is not mixed up and it is beyond worldly usage. According
to the tradition of some, it is the form of this (state of the
Word) which can be attained either by a knowledge of Gram¬
mar or through Union preceded by the word, obtained by the
knowledge of the correct form of the words. 5 On this point,
illustrations are found in the Itihfisci. G
'of them, the word—Gow, having a ladiant smile
and an excellent nature, in her divine and non-divine form,
yields milk as the Cow does.”
“See the difference between the two, both subtle and
throbbing; the other one is present in the interval between
prana and apana.” 1
“Another one, not being prompted at all, exists without
the breath. From that is breath born, which, in its turn,
strengthens the word.”
“Strengthened by the breath, it becomes the basis of
usage; by reaching the breath of everybody, the word does
not speak in any case.”
“That which has always resonance, that which has
acquired resonance, and that which has no lesonance at all,
exist. To the two which have resonance, that which has none
at all is superior.” 8
Again, it has been said—
“The Elaborated (Vaikhan) assumes the form of phone¬
mes when the air strikes against the places of articulation
and is based on the functioning of the breath of the speakers.”
“The Middle One proceeds by going beyond the function¬
ing of breath, has sequence and has the mind alone as its
substratum.”
“The Seeing One is indivisible and is entirely without
sequence. It is the Inner Light, the subtle word, imperish¬
able.”
I. 142. 127
“Though always attacked by adventitious impurities, it,
like the last digit of the moon, is never overwhelmed.”
“When its form is perceived, all obligations cease. 9 Of
man having sixteen parts, that is the immortal part.”
“The Elaborated One ( Vaikhari ) coloured by adventi¬
tious impurities, is not really affected by them, any more
than the pure Being is affected by qualities.”
This three-fold word, has, like the appearances of the
knots of Consciousness, indefinable dimensions, and a fourth
of it exists in man. Even of this, only a little comes within
the range of usage, the rest is beyond the usage of ordinary
man. It has been said—
“There are four states in regard to the word. The wise
among the Brahmanas know them. Three of them are kept
in a cave and do not move. Men speak the fourth part of the
word.” 10
The pure form of that word is embodied in this descrip¬
tive Science called Grammar, consisting of general and
special rules. The powers of those of lower visions, generally
admit of degree, are liable to meet obstruction and to com¬
mit mistakes. Hence this method of acquiring the words, free
from error and consisting of definitions and elaborations and
containing many paths, has been developed.
[1. Slista vyaktavarnasamuccdrana prasiddhasadhubhdva bhrasta -
sarnskard ca ... apariviaiiabhedd.
It is stated that Vaikhari has infinite varieties. To an objection that
what comes out of the axle of a cart is just noise and not vdk 9 Vrsabha
replies that the inclusion of it is based on a sruti which he proceeds to
quote.
By explaining slista ns avyaktdksavd, he makes it the opposite of
vyaktavarnasamuccaraiia. It is not clear whether the noise coming out of
the axle of a cart or a drum is meant to be an example of slista. If
even such noises can be examples, it is only natural that incorrect forms
of words also should be considered as varieties of it. They are, after
all, Vdk.
128
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
2. Kramasamlvarabhdve 3 pi vyaktapranaparigrahaiva. Vrsabha gives
as a proof of the presence of subtle prana in the Mahyama stage that
sequence can be observed when one silently recites something to one¬
self. As he puts it— Svayamapyasyopdmsutaram pathatah tat spastam .
3. Caldcala pratilabhasamddhdna ca. Vrsabha explains these two
expressions in terms of Yogic teminology. He says: calacalaiti rupadisv,
visayesv arvagdarsananam viksiptotpadyate buddhir, vageva hi sd. Pra-
tilabdhasamddhand ca iti aviksiptd Yogindm sabdapurvayogena samdhi-
tatvat.
4. Vrsabha explains visuddha in two ways: (1) free from all diffe¬
rentiation, as Yogis see it, (2) free from all corrupt forms, as Gram¬
marians know it.
5. According to some, the supreme form of the Pasyanti can be
attained in either of two ways: either through a knowledge of Gram¬
mar or through union with the word, induced by a knowledge of the
correct form of the word. Vrsabha also understands it in this way.
The use of the expression ‘ekesam’ suggests that this is not the ortho¬
dox view. In fact, elsewhere sabdapurvayoga alone is mentioned as
the means of attaining it. See the Vrtti on Vak. I. 14, 131.
6. The following verses are found in a very different form in the
Mahabharata, Asvamedhikaparvan, 22.
7. Pranapanantare. Vrsabha explains f antara 9 as absence. So the
absence of prana and apana would mean something beyond the range
of prana, ie, buddhi, the seat of the Madhyamd.
8. In these verses which are supposed, to be quotations from Iti -
hasa, ie, the Mahabharata, the names Vaikhari , Madhyamd and Pasyan¬
ti are not used (unlike the later quotations where they do occur), but
the descriptions are sought to be interpreted by Vrsabha as relating to
them. Thus pranapanantare tisthati is equated with Madhyamd,; dpur-
yamaneva vina prdnena tisthati is also understood as referring to Madh¬
yamd, vyavahdranibandhana means vaikhari. Ghosini and jatinirghosd
are interpreted as standing for Vaikhari and aghosd for Pasyanti and
Madhyamd together.
9. Adhikdro nivartate = all obligations cease. Adhikara is explain¬
ed by Vrsabha as niyogo bandhdkhyah. The bond of obligation which
is the cause of samsdra ceases to be and one attains Moksa.
10. R. V. I, 164, 45.]
143. As the powers of words are seen by those
who know the true nature of things, the Science of
I. 144.
129
Grammar is composed on the basis of analysis or with¬
out analysis.
What is called analysis is the postulation of divisions like
stem and suffix for teaching others. For example, the state¬
ment that the suffix tavyat etc. are added to the root. So it
has been said—
“Whatever he can teach in a general manner, he does
accordingly.” 1
There is absence of analysis where a word is given
as it is. For example, the words dddharti, darddharti,
etc. 2 and the words dasvdn, sahvdn? In some Grammars,
there is a great deal of absence of analysis and they teach
many words directly (pratyaksapaksena ). Others, on the
other hand, resort to analysis and by adopting the indirect
method of inference, teach whole groups of words. This Gram¬
matical tradition is established in different ways, according
to the times and keeping in view the mental capacities of
people. There are cultured people and that they are so can be
inferred only from their use of correct words. They, whose
inner vision is unobstructed in regard to all things to be
known, see, without error, the power of words, differing at
different periods of time and consisting in their being the
means of merit or demerit, according to the times.
[1. M- Bha on P. 1.1.46.
2. P. 7.4.65.
3. P. 6.1.2.]
144. Scripture ( Sruti ) has been declared to be
beginningless, continuous and without an author.
Written tradition ( Smrti ) is composed by cultured
Ancients and has continuity.
There are those who accept the authority of Scripture
only and consider only the sacred books as trustworthy in
regard to matters having invisible fruit and the views of men
as doubtful and, threfore, not authority. According to them,
even though there is no difference between Scripture and
K.§. 17
130
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
written Tradition as far as continuity of what is taught is con¬
cerned, yet Scripture has no deviations in the rules relating
to accent, phoneme, sequence, place and time of study nor
has it been established differently by any other person and
it has always been established in all the countries in divisions
according to branches. Written Tradition, on the other hand,
has continuity of meaning, but is composed by the cultured
differently at different times in prose, verses, sentences etc.
Some teachers think as follows: No act has, in itself, a
visible or invisible fruit. It is only by acting according to
Scripture that merit is manifested and by going against Scrip*
ture that one is tainted with sin. Scripture itself ordains that
an act like the killing of a Brahmana which is a sin in some
contexts becomes the cause of divine happiness if done in
another context. 1
Others, on the other hand, think that Scripture only
makes known the specific power of objects. What would be
the interest of Scripture to be a playful cause (of merit and
demerit) and favour or harass men? It is seen to be better to
assume that it (the causing of merit or demerit) is the nature
of substances rather than that it is the nature of Scripture.
In such written traditions as that of the Science of treatment,
it is things like poison or herbs which have the capacity to
fulfil a purpose and not the traditional texts. Therefore, it is
nature of substances which is followed by Scripture, as it is
the nature of Scripture in the other view. Just as, in the
world, causes of benefit or harm are clearly distinguished,
in the same way, there is uninterrupted establishment of the
means of knowing them. 2
[1. Vsrabha points out that in Purusamedha and Sautramani, braJi-
manavadha leads to heaven. As he puts it— Purusamedhe sautrdman -
yam ca svargangatvam.
2. What is meant is that the power to produce their effects, good
or bad, belongs naturally to substances, but, by uninterrupted tradi¬
tion, it is Scripture that makes it known. Similarly, the power of
correct words to produce merit and that of incoirect words to produce
demerit are inherent in them. Grammar only makes them known].
i. 145.
i3i
145. In those who evolved out of the un¬
differentiated, there is knowledge of the Sruti (reveal¬
ed Scripture) as in a dream. The Written Tradition, on
the other hand, is composed by the sages, after under¬
standing the nature of things and following the indi¬
cation (found in the Vedas).
It has been stated in the immediately preceding verse
what the dliarma is that is taught in the Scripture and in the
written Tradition according to those who believe that the
present diflerentiated condition of the world is eternal, that
distinctions such as Yuga, Manvantara, etc. do not exist nor
such an extraodinary division called the day of Brah¬
ma. According to those who hold that the ultimate cause
works in the manner of sleep and wakefulness and the diffe¬
rentiated individuals, some sages manifest themselves as iden¬
tical with Intuition; they see it, the great Self in the form of
Being, the source of Nescience and endowed with all know¬
ledge and they become one with it. Some sages manifest them¬
selves together with (the means of) knowledge. They iden¬
tify themselves with their Self in the form of mind-knot, free
from the elements ether etc., either severally or collectively,
ie., devoid of any sense of T in regard to them. All the activi¬
ty of those sages is the product of Nescience and, therefore,
adventitious and secondary. Their being essentially know¬
ledge is eternal, non-adventitious and primary. They see the
whole Scripture, endowed with all power of differentiation
and all power of unity, as one hears sound in a dream, inaudi¬
ble to the ear.
Some other sages, after perceiving the nature of objects,
conducive either to the welfare or to the harm of man and
after seeing in the Scripture indications thereof, compose the
tradition, (the observance of which) leads to visible and
invisible results. At first, they hand down the Scripture in
an undivided manner, without any deviation in the words, as
they saw it and later, they hand it down, divided into bran¬
ches. Such is the tradition.
132 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
146. The impurities which belong to the body,
the speech and the mind are removed by the sciences
of Medicine, Grammar and Philosophy.
Just as, after seeing forces leading to illness in the body
and the capacity of precious stones, herbs etc. to remove it,
the Science of Treatment has been initiated; just as, after
seeing that passions etc. cause disturbance of the mind,
systems of philosophy have been composed which are the
means of acquiring knowledge which leads to their cure, in
the same way, the Science of Grammar has been initiated in
order to make known the features of correctness in words and
to enable us to discard the corrupt forms which are obstacles.
Of what nature are the corrupt forms?
147. When one wants to utter the word gauh and
actually utters one which is devoid of correctness to
convey that particular meaning, it is called a corrupt
form ( apabhramsa ).
The author of the Sahgraha has said:
“The correct word is the original of the corrupt form.”
There is no corrupt form which is independent, with¬
out an original. Of every corrupt form, a correct form
is the original. But some corrupt forms acquire inde¬
pendence by being constantly used and becoming con¬
ventional. Instead of saying gauTi , one uses, either through
lack of capacity or through mistake and other causes, the
corrupt forms gcivi etc. having the correct form as the origi¬
nal. Such forms lose their correctness when used to denote
an object having dew-lap, etc. When used in another meaning
(which is its own) it is looked upon as correct. Their incor¬
rectness is not linked with their form only.
148. Words like ‘asva and ‘gom’ are correct in
regard to other meanings. Everywhere correctness is
determined by the particular meaning which the word
is to convey.
1 146 .
133
The two words genii and asva are correct, the former in
the sense of a receptacle and the latter in the sense of one
who owns nothing. These two words which have acquired
their correct form in regard to some other meanings are con¬
sidered to be correct if, due to some special reason,! they are
used to denote an object having dew-lap etc. and one which
neighs etc. respectively. When a cow carries much milk and
is, theiefore, like a receptable, one says: this cow is a recep¬
tacle because she is like a receptacle. In the same way, a
horse {asva) is called ‘asva’ when it is a priceless one. 1
Therefore, till some feature is isolated on the basis of which
correctness or incorrectness can be established, no object is
definite.
[ 1 . Tatlid* sasnddimati hresitddilinge ca .... tathdvidyamdnam
svam asya so’yamasva iti. What is stated here that, in certain circum¬
stances, the words ‘goni’ and ‘asva’, applied to a cow and to a horse
respectively, would be correct. Figurative use of words is meant here.
This passage of the Vrtti should be compared with the commentary
of Bhartrhari on the M. Bha (Paspasahnika), p. 13 (the edition now
being printed in Benares) or p. 11 (of the edition of K. V. Abhvankar
and V. P. Limaye) A.B.O.R.I., Vol. XLIII:
Sa eva sabdo’rthavisese Kasminscidasddhurityetaddkhyayate.
Yatha gonisabdah sasnddimatyasadhustatha asvasabdah kesarddimati
sddhur na nihsva iti. asva iti nirdhane sadhuli, naikasapliddilaksane.
Yadi tu gonisabdo’pi nimitt&ntarat sasnddimati prayujyeta goniva goniti
sddhur eva syat. Asve va asvasabdairi dhan&bhdvadvdrakam prayunjxta
s a sddhur eva.]
149. They (the incorrect words) are the cause of
the correct words (figuring in the mind) by inference.
By identifying themselves, as it were, with them, they
convey the meaning of the correct words.
When corrupt forms are used to denote objects which
are the sphere of the correct forms, they convey the mean¬
ing through the correct words, just as winking etc. are,
through familiarity, well known to appear as having taken
0 n the form (of the words which express the same idea).
134
VAKYAPADIYAJVi OF BHARTKHAHi
The purpose of another verse 1 on the subject is to say that
corrupt forms do not convey the meaning directly.
[1. That corrupt forms do convey a meaning was already stated
in Vak. I. 147. Visistarthanivesinam.]
Why is it that gon\ etc. are not considered to be syno¬
nyms of gauli? In regard to such matters which are embodied
in the written Tradition, no other cause other than being
well-known in the practice of the cultured can be adduced.
If gavl etc. were synonyms, they would also have been in¬
cluded in their rules and actually used. That word is correct
which is used, like perception, to convey the thing which
cause its use. The correct words convey that meaning which
directly prompt their use. Therefore, it is being said—
150. Since they are not explained like correct syno¬
nyms by cultured people in the written Tradition
(smrtisdstra ), therefore, they are‘not directly expres¬
sive.
The meaning of the verse has already been explained.
151. Just as the child who is learning the words
amba, amba, pronounces them indistinctly and those
who know his speech understand their distinct forms,
When the baby makes the necessary effort, but due to
deficiency in the vocal organs, utters indistinct sounds when
it wants to use the correct word, those who hear it understand
the distinct word which is the original thereof. And they
look upon the correct word as connected with the meaning
and not the corrupt form used by the baby.
152. In the same way, when an incorrect word is
uttered in place of the correct one, the understanding
of the meaning is preceded by the correct word coming
to the mind.
I. 153-154.
135
When words are mixed up, corrupt forms are used
instead of correct ones. But the cultured people who know
Grammar understand the correct ones. They also look upon
the meaning as having been expressed by the correct words.
The corrupt form is the cause of the inference of the correct
one as smoke is of fire.
153. In the case, however, of those ignorant
speakers among whom incorrect words have become
established through habit, the correct words do not
(first come to the mind and then) convey the meaning.
Corrupt forms are used habitually by women, sudras
and candalas and by speakers who make mistakes and
thus they enter into convention and usage is more based
on them (than on the others). When a doubt arises
after the use of the correct form, now it is resolved with
the help of its corrupt form. They look upon the corrupt
form as being on the side of perception and place the correct
form on the side of inference.
154. This Divine Speech has been mixed up (with
the corrupt forms) by incapable speakers. Those who
consider words to be transitory are mistaken in this
matter.
It is heard that, in the old days, the word of those whose
body itself was light was free from all corrupt forms as it
was free from falsehood. But it became contaminated and
through the persistence of the tendency towards contamina¬
tion by the repetition of the first corruptions, it became,
for those speakers, the original and the convention. Up¬
holders of non-eternality, on the other hand, do not believe
that correct words lead to merit and look upon the rules
relating to correctness as similar to the rules among wrestlers
and consider the whole collection of correct words as
prakrta, i.e. derived from prakrti (the original, i.e. the cor¬
rupt forms). The form which is settled by some narrow-
136
VAKYAPADIYAM OP BHARTRHARI
minded persons by regulating accent, correctness and so on
is a modification and established later.
155. Both (the correct and the corrupt forms)
have been handed down to us uninterruptedly. Still,
when, intending to use one (the correct form) the
speaker uses the other (the corrupt form) it is not the
latter which must be deemed to be expressive of the
meaning.
Even according to those who do not believe in old times
nor in an unmixed Divine Word which existed sometime
ago, this distinction between correct and corrupt words, as
the distinction between which woman one can marry and
which not, has always been transmitted, without a break,
by the cultured. The word, which, like the talk of children,
is actually used to convey a meaning when some other word
was meant to be used and has entered into usage and the
one (which is similarly used) but which has not entered into
usage, neither is expressive of the meaning. In such cases,
either the meaning is understood preceded by the remem¬
brance of the correct word or, as with the ignorant, something
is understood from those words as from winking and the
like.
Thus has ended the chapter relating to Brahman, en¬
titled “Collection of Traditions” in the ‘Treatise on the
Sentence and the Word’ composed by Harivrsabha, the Great
Grammarian.
CHAPTER II
In the previous chapter, the nature and purpose of the
Word were briefly stated. It was stated, in a general way,
that the Word is expressive of the meaning. There is difference
of opinion as to whether it is the individual Word or the
Sentence which is expressive. The purpose of this chapter is to
expound in detail the nature of the expressive sentence.
1 - 2 . In regard to the Sentence* opinion is
widely divided among thinkers inasmuch as they
declare it to be (i) the Verb, ( 2 ) the collection of
words, ( 3 ) the Universal inhering in the collection
of words, ( 4 ) the One indivisible Word, ( 5 ) the
Sequence (of the words), ( 6 ) the Unification in the
mind, ( 7 ) the first Word, ( 8 ) each Word requiring
the others.
[These are the eight alternative ways of looking at the
Sentence current among thinkers :—The Universal inhering
in the collection of words, the One indivisible Word, the Uni¬
fication in the mind, these three definitions of the Sentence
come within the view that the Sentence is indivisible ( akhaiida -
pakfa). The Verb, the Sequence of the words, the collection
of words, the first Word and each Word requiring the others—
these five definitions come under the view that the Sentence
has divisions (sakhcindapak$a) . That the sentence is the collec¬
tion of words or that it is their Sequence, these two views are
held by those who accept abhihitdnvayavdda = the view that the
sentence-meaning is the inter-connection of the meanings con¬
veyed by the individual words. That it is the Verb or the
first Word or each Word requiring the others, these three views
are held by those who follow anvitabhidhdna= the view that
the word conveys a meaning already potentially connected
with those of the others. These two theories result from inter¬
preting the statement padaprakrtih samhita (Rk-pratiSakhya 11,1.)
as a tatpurusa or as a bahuvrihi . That the Verb is the Sentence
is explained much later, in verse 326. The eight verses from
2 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
41 onwards explain that the collection of individual words
constitutes the Sentence. Verses 7-14 and 19-27 explain that
the indivisible Sentence is the sphota. Sphota is of two kinds:
External and Internal. The former is either the Universal
or the Particular. Five verses from 49 onwards expound the
view that the Sequence of the words is the Sentence. Verses
47 and 48 elucidate the view that the first Word or each Word
requiring the others is the Sentence. The Mimamsaka defi¬
nition of the Sentence would come under the sanghata (collec¬
tion) view. Definition of the sentence naturally leads to state¬
ments on the nature of the sentence-meaning. If the verb
constitutes the Sentence, then the sentence-meaning is in the nat¬
ure of Action. If the collection of words or their Sequence con¬
stitutes the Sentence, then its meaning is the interconnection
of the meanings of the individual words. If the first Word or
each Word requiring the others is the Sentence, then the con¬
nected meanings make up the sentence-meaning. According
to some, the sentence-meaning is in the nature of purpose
( prayojanam ). Vidhi , niyoga and bhavana , mentioned by others,
are not different from Action ( Kriya ) and so they are not given
separately here. The Buddhist view of the Sentence is very
near to Unification in the mind {buddhyanusarrihrtih) and their
view of the Sentence-meaning is very near to that accepted in
this work, namely, that it is in the nature of Intuition ( prati -
bha). The Nyaya view of the Sentence and Sentence-meaning
would amount to samghdta and samsarga respectively.]
The author now discusses whether the definition given by
the author of the Varttikas and by the Mimdmsakas would agree
with the above definitions or whether they have a different
scope altogether.
3. With the definition of a sentence given in
this sTistra for regulating loss of acute accent etc.
the [Mimamsaka) definition does not fully tally.
[Katyayana gives the following two definitions of a sentence:
dkhydtam sdvyayakdrakavi$e$anam vakyam and ekatiri vakyam (va
9, 10. M.Bha.I, p. 367, 1. 10,16). The Mimamsaka definition
is contained in Mi.Su.Il.\A2 :—arthaikatvad ekamvakyamsakan -
k$am ced vibhage sydt. It is referred to in verse 40. In ay am
dando haranena, there is syntactical connection (samarthya ).
II. 4-5
3
Therefore there should be loss of acute accent ( nighata ) in
hara by P. 8.2.28 but that is not desired because, according to
the definition of Katyayana given above, there are here two
sentences and nighata takes place only if both the words, the
nimitta and the nimitti are in the same sentence. In nadyds
tiffhati kiile , Sdlindm ta odanam ddsydmi , there is no syntactical
connection between the first two words and yet nighata in the
first case and substitution of te for tava in the second case take
place, because the two words are in the same sentence. To
decide whether the two words are in the same sentence, one
should know what a sentence is and Katyayana tells us what
it is in the vdrttika quoted above. If we follow the Mi. defi¬
nition of a sentence, there would be nighata in hara in the sentence
quoted above and that is not desired. So here the two defini¬
tions do not tally. In nadyds ti$thati kule> they do.]
The Mimdmsaka definition is now referred to.
4 . A sentence is a collection of words which
in isolation require one another for particulari-
sation, which, as a whole, do not require an
outside word, in which the verb is the predominant
word, which has qualifying words and which serve
one purpose.
[In this definition, the verb is said to be the most important
word, but not the only word. That is why the sentence is said
to be gunavat . The verb is also essential. Otherwise, nilo
ghatah would also be a sentence. Unless the words require
one another, they would not form a sentence. All this is an
elaboration of the idea contained in Mi.Su.ll. 1.42.]
5 . The word in the vocative case in the sentence
vrajani devadattal (=let me go, Devadatta!) is a
qualifying word. That being so, loss of acute accent
results.
[In Katyayana’s definition of the Sentence there is the word
vi$e$ana which includes kriyavi§e$ana also. So in vrajani deva¬
datta !, the word devadatta ! which is in the vocative case is
a kind of vise$ana of the verb vrajani. So it is in the same sen¬
tence and the suppression of the accent takes place according
to the rules.]
4
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
6 . Just as many words ending in the suffix ktva
can qualify (that is, can be subordinate) to a verb,
in the same way, they declare, a verb can qualify
another verb.
[In Katyayana’s definition of the sentence, the word akhya -
tam is in the singular number. That means that there can be
only one verb in a sentence. There can be more than one
verb if one of them is the main one and the others subordinate
to it. Just as many words ending in the suffix k ! va can be sub¬
ordinate to one verb and be in the same sene mce, in the same
way, more than one verb can be subordinate to the main verb
which follows them in the same sentence. That being so,
there would be nighata in the verb vrajati in the sentence:
purvam snati pacatitato vrajati tatah, because thatis the main verb.
The siitra : tinatinah (P. 8.2.2S.) also implies that there can
be more than one verb in the same sentence. More than one
verb can result in more than one sentence if they are indepen¬
dent of one another. Thus Katyayana’s definition is not too
narrow.]
7 . Just as the one entity, comprising the cog-
nition of all objects is differentiated on the basis
of distinction in what is cognised, so is the cognition
of the sentence-meaning.
[Bhartrhari really wants to set forth the following view:
The sentence is the sfihota, either external or internal. It is
external when it is clearly uttered. Till then, it is internal.
In any case, it is indivisible. It has two aspects : the sound
aspect and the meaning aspect which are identified with one
another. It is essentially in the nature of knowledge or con¬
sciousness because it illuminates an object. Because of arti¬
culation, it assumes the form of sound. Though indivisible,
it appears to have divisions just as our complex cognition,
though one, appears to have inner differentiation because of
the objects in it. The picture is one but we seem to see differ¬
ent colours within it. That is what happens with the sentence
and the sentence-meaning. Both are indivisible like the
flavour of a cold drink, or the juice in a pea-hen’s egg, or the
form of a picture, the narasimha, the gavaya and our perception
II. 8-12
5
of a picture. The indivisible sentence is the sphota and the
indivisible sentence-meaning is pratibha . But both appear to
have divisions.]
8 . Just as the One picture is explained through
its different colours like blue which belong to its
parts,
9 . in the same way, the One sentence, entirely
self-sufficient and complete, is explained through
individual words which require one another.
[A colour-pattern is one but it is explained in terms of the
different colours which figure in it. In the same way, the
sentence is one and self-sufficient but it is explained in terms
of individual words which appear to figure in other sentences
and which require one another.]
10 . Just as a word is analysed into stem, suffix
etc. in the same way, the analysis of a sentence
into individual words is also described.
[In the varttika : na va padasyarthe prayogdt (Va.19 on P.
1.2.64.) it is stated that it is the word as a whole which conveys
the meaning and that its division into stem, suffix etc. is arti¬
ficial. In the same way, the division of a sentence into indivi¬
dual words is artificial. The words have no real existence.]
11 . Just as one sees in phonemes parts resem¬
bling other phonemes, in the same way, one sees
(in a sentence) parts which resemble other words.
[Just as the abstracted parts of diphthongs like ai, au seem
to resemble independent phonemes like a , 0 , i, u etc., in the same
way, the abstracted parts of a sentence seem to resemble in¬
dependent words. But that is not true because these parts
have no real existence.]
12 . The words Vrsabha , Udaka and Tavaka
have meaningless parts. Analysis through the
method of agreement and difference is the basis of
worldly usage.
6
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[Everywhere the parts which we artificially make in a word
are meaningless. Ifwe make these parts and attribute meanings
to them, it is only in an artificial sense. Words like Vrjabha,
Udaka , Yavaka contain meaningless parts in the form of Rjabha,
Uda and Yava respectively. Similarly, words like pacati>
pacaka have meaningless parts in the form of stem, suffix etc.
But the splitting of a word into stem and suffix and attributing
meanings to them atleast serve the purpose of teaching the
formation of words to the ignorant. But the artificial parts
Rfabha, Uda and Yava in Vr$abha , Udaka and Ydvaka do not
serve any such purpose.]
13. The word has no division, how can the
meaning have any? But the ignorant person sees
division through artificial splitting.
[The available Vrtti on the Ilnd Kanda of the Vakyapadiya
begins from this verse and goes on till the end, with many gaps
big and small, in the middle. On this verse, what it says can
be summarised as follows—The sentence, the Vdkyaspho\a>
is indivisible. Its meaning, namely, pratibha , is equally indi¬
visible. This has been stated also later on in verse 145. This
artificial division of the sentence and the sentence-meaning is
a means to the understanding of the indivisible sentence and
the sentence-meaning. To understand the indivisible straight¬
way is as difficult as learning each word of a language sepa¬
rately. As the Vrtti puts it :— guruprakramd tvatra saqifrfta-
rupasya pratipattir avibhagena, pratipadam pathavat = “The under¬
standing of the unified word without dividing it is a difficult
process. It would be like learning each word of a language
as a whole. 5 ’ A good student, however, knows that division is
only a means to an end and that indivisibility is the truth.
In any case, doubts sometimes arise as to how the division
should be effected. For instance, in the case of words haridru
and dustara. Even when it is effected, it is only a means to an
end. The word is really indivisible.]
14. Just as, in the compound, brahmanakam -
bala, the term brahmana has no meaning, in the same
way, in a sentence, words like Devadatta are without
a meaning.
II. 15-16
7
[In the compound word brdhmanakambala , the element
brahmana has no meaning. Similarly, in the sentence : Deva-
datta gam abhydja dandena , the words Devadatta etc. have no
separate meaning. Individual words are, therefore, meaning¬
less. The truth is that the sentence is anindivisible self-suffi¬
cient unit, quite different from the individual words. Simi¬
larly, the sentence-meaning is an indivisible, self-sufficient
unit. When the compound brdhmanakambala is uttered in
isolation or after some words or sentences, even though the
word brahmana is heard and some meaning understood from it, it
is known to have no meaning. Similarly, even when the word
is not uttered in isolation or after other words and sentences,
parts of sentences which resemble individual words do not
really exist and have, therefore, no meaning.]
15 . The general meaning, having disappeared,
cannot lead to the particular. How can what has
already been conveyed be abandoned and where
can what is already gone rest ? *
[The M imams aka view is that it is the individual words
themselves which constitute the sentence and not anything
beyond them. This is not sound. Words are uttered in a
sequence. When the second word is uttered, the first one has
already vanished. So its meaning which is of a general nature
cannot become particularised in association with the meanings
of the later words because it is not there at all. Even if it has
an existence in memory, how can the general meaning which
was first conveyed be abandoned ? To do that would go
against the eternal relationship between the word and the
meaning, which the Mimavisaka would not accept. In any
case, if the word gives it up, where would it rest?
The Vrtti points out that a word which, at the time of its
utterance, conveys the general cannot denote the particular
after its disappearance. Nor can the speaker mean to convey
the general and the particular at the same time : na ca samanya-
vi§e$ayor vivak$a yugapat sambhavatiJ]
16. If the sentence-meaning is not derived
from the words (but from their interconnection),
the meaning of the word would also be in the same
8 VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhari
position. Thus the relation between the word
and the meaning would be destroyed.
[The criticism contained in the above verse is answered
as follows— After all, a particularised meaning is understood
from the sentence. How to account for that? The Mlmarn-
saka view does not explain it either. If the particularised
meaning does not come from the words which cease to exist
after conveying the general meaning, it means that it does
not come from words. It is aSabda. The same thing can be
said about the meaning of the individual word. Because, the
phonemes are uttered in a sequence and they disappear. So
they do not co-exist and cannot constitute a word. So there
cannot be a word-meaning. Thus, the relation of expression
and expressed between word and meaning, accepted by the
Mimamsaka> would cease to be.
The Vrtti argues differently to reach the same conclusion.
17. According to some, words expressive of
the particular ( visesa ), resembling those which are
expressive of the general, become clear to listeners
when they are (later) connected with the other
words in the sentence.
[When a sentence is uttered, it is done in order to express a
particularised meaning. So the very first word, even when
it seems to be the same as in some other sentence, expresses,
not a general meaning, but a particularised one. This becomes
clearer when each succeeding word is heard. So the meaning
of the sentence is the meaning of each word as connected with
the meanings of the other words. No word conveys an un¬
connected meaning. It conveys an idea with its connection
with other words implied. This is an explanation of the two
views regarding a sentence, referred to as padam adyam and
prthak sarvapadam sakanksam.
The Vrtti explains this verse in one long and rather obscure
sentence. It seems to say this : The very first word of a sen¬
tence denotes its meaning as qualified and delimited by the
meanings of the other words of the sentence which are yet to
come and when they do come, they do not say anything new,
II. 18-19
9
they only make clear and patent what is already latent in the
meaning of the first word. The very first word is as good as
the sentence.]
18. According to them, the whole of the sen¬
tence-meaning is concentrated in each word.
Hearers understand the meaning all the better
when all the expressions are uttered.
[Nor can one object that if the very first word conveys the
meaning of the whole sentence, the other words would be
useless. The first word conveys the sentence-meaning only
vaguely. The others make it clearer. But this view is not
accepted because the utterance of the other words would be
either for the sake of restriction or restatement. Neither is
necessary if the very first word or any word in the sentence
can convey the meaning of the whole sentence. As a matter
of fact, neither the first word ( padam adyani) nor any word
•separately ( prthak sarvapadam) can convey the meaning of the
whole sentence. If the other words are uttered at all, no matter
for what purpose, the anvitdbhidhdna view falls.
What the Vrtti says on this verse amounts to this:
According to those who accept the use of many words to ex¬
press one meaning, all the particulars, the whole of the indivisible
sentence-meaning is concentrated on each word and on each
phoneme. As the Vrtti puts it— te$dm evamupagrhitascirvavi -
Jesa ekasminnarthe bahuSabddnabhyupagacchatdm avikalpah krtsno
vakyarthah pratipadam prativarnam va samapyate. Thus, when
all the expressions are actually uttered, the sentence-meaning
becomes clear to the hearer and not by its mere existence be¬
fore all the words are uttered.]
19. The indistinct word which is uttered in
silence appears to have sequence. The intelligence
perceives it as having extension (that is, sequence)
though it is really without any.
[The sentence is really indivisible. But it is manifested
by the sounds and it seems to have divisions like the phonemes
and individual words. This indivisible Word has an inner
and outer aspect. As something existing within the speaker,
10
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARI
it is inner. As it is externalised by utterance, it is outer also.
It is indivisible and eternal. It is this which is expressive of
meaning. All distinctions such as spoken to oneself, spoken
slowly, spoken quietly etc., are based on the sounds which mani¬
fest it and not its own. When one utters something well within,
to be heard by oneself only, it is called upamfu. When no
utterance takes place, that is, when the prana plays no part
but the word is thought of in one’s mind and has assumed
divisions and sequence, it is called paramopainhi. As the Vrtti
puts it— Tatra pranavrttyanugrahe satyevayatra Sabdarupam parair
asainvedyam bhavati tadupainSu. Antarena ta pranavrtiyann -
graham yatra kevalam eva buddhau samavi$tarupo buddhyupadana.
eva sabdatma tat paramopamhi . When the activity of the mind
is suspended and the divisions and sequence are not there but
due to their impressions they are superimposed, it is pratisam -
hrtakramam. ]
The next two verses are meant to elucidate the view that
the sentence is jatih samghatavartini.
20 . Even though it is particular movement
which is made the specific action is not cognised
but when it is repeated, the universal of actions
like turning is manifested.
21 . In the same way in the case of (the sphota
of phonemes, words and sentences which may be
different from another, the manifesting sounds
appear to be the same.
[A movement like turning consists of a series of
momentary movements. Each movement consists in coming
into contact with a point of space and then disappearing. It
is then replaced by the next movement which does the same.
As these point-movements are momentary, they cannot co¬
exist and cannot form a whole of which they would be parts
and in which the universal of the movement called turning
can inhere. Such a universal, different from the wider universal
caUed ‘action’ is accepted and if it does exist, it would inhere
Tn the momentary movements relating to turning. Even though
this universal exists in each point-movement, the latter is not
II. 22-24
11
capable of producing the cognition of the universal because of
too much resemblance between the movements of turning and
the movements of another movement like, say, lifting. The
movements of each movement are the result of a special effort
to produce that movement and so they are the substrata of the
universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be
cognised until a series of point-movements has been cognised.
It is not enough to cognise one or two such point-movements.
The universal really inheres in each movement and it is also cog¬
nised. But the cognition is too vague and unfit for verbal
usage. After a series of movements is cognised, the direction of
the movement becomes clear and so the cognition of the univer¬
sal, inherent in each movement also becomes clear. In other
words, it becomes quite clear that the movement is turning
and not, say, lifting. The process is similar in the perception
of the Word (Sentence.)]
22 . How can there be really priority or posterio-
rity in eternal things ? It is the power of the One
that it so appears.
[The Sentence is One and indivisible without any sequence
involving priority and posteriority. But it has within it the
power to appear as many, as having sequence. It is really
the sounds which manifest it that have sequence but the vakya -
sphota itself appears to have it.]
23. Just as the cognitions ‘slow 5 and ‘quick 5
appear to have temporal difference even though
they have none, in the same way do long and short
vowels appear to have temporal difference.
[The cognitions‘slow 5 and ‘quick 5 have, as cognitions, no
difference in time, but appear to have it because of the differ¬
ence in their object. In the same way, the sphota has no dis¬
tinction such as slow and quick but appears to have it because
of the difference in the manifesting sounds.]
24. Time, which is eternal, cannot be differ¬
entiated through divisions belonging to something
else. (According to the view that there is no eternal
12
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
entity called Time) the phenomena, being of a
transient nature, cannot exist at the same time.
How then can there be sequence ?
[The latter half of the stanza is an answer to an objector
who might say that he does not believe in Time as an entity
separate from the phenomena. Time is nothing more than
the phenomena themselves following one another, in succession.
It is on the basis of these phenomena that we speak about
sequence and simultaneity and not on the basis of a separate
entity called Time.
The main idea in the Vrtti on this verse may be expressed
as follows—If Time is eternal, One and indivisible, it cannot
have divisions on the basis of something external like action.
Secondly/ Time conditioned by some action, is a measure.
Therefore, there cannot be something else to measure and
divide it. If everything is eternal, it cannot bring about
division in Time. If everything is momentary, there cannot be
any sequence between any two non-simultaneous moments
and, therefore, sequence cannot be attributed to time on the
basis of the sequence of the momentary objects. As there is
no sequence in the things or in Time, to see temporal difference
in long, short and prolated which are temporally identical is
not right.
The words of the Vrtti say something like what I have said
above but I do not claim that the idea is very clear to me.]
The idea that the notion which arises on the basis of these
phenomena would explain Time is now answered.
25. The cognition which is produced by them
is One and indivisible but through its own power,
it seems to be differentiated and assumes sequence.
[Though bhagavartini is found in some editions and manu¬
scripts, bhagavarjita is a better reading and is confirmed by
Punyaraja’s nirvibhdga and the Vrtti 9 s bhagavarjita . The gist
of the Vrtti seems to be this:—Cognition is One because it
is essentially in the nature of illumination, (sa tveka bhagavarjita
buddhih prahasasvarupatvat...). Therefore its homogeneous and
heterogeneous divisions are one with it. Being of the nature
of illumination, cognition is partless and sequenceless, but it
II. 26-27
13
displays the sequence of the objects now mixed up with it
within itself. Strictly, it (the sequence) should not be so dis¬
played but the cognition displays it without dissociating it
from the objects. Such indeed is the way in which cognition
displays sequence.]
According to Punyaraja, the next verse is meant to refute
the following view:—Even though cognition is one and indi¬
visible, it appears to have parts and sequence because of the
sequence of the objects which figure in it. The cognition
appears to have the sequence of the objects. This is due to an
immemorial and eternal predisposition of cognitions. This
appearance of sequence in the cognition is not contradicted.
It is of the nature of cognition itself. A cognition displaying
sequence leaves a similar impression ( samskara ) so that the next
cognition also displays sequence. That is why in our cognition
of short, long and protracted vowels or of words and sentences,
temporal distinctions figure though these are eternal and have,
therefore, no temporal distinctions.
26. It is not possible to explain as identical
with the intellect or as different from it the seed
which is sown in it by the display of sequence (in
the cognition).
[The impression of sequence which is supposed to be left
by the cognition in the intellect is either identical with it or
different from it. If it is different from it, it cannot do any
service to it. It cannot bring about temporal distinction in
short, long etc. If it is identical with it, then intellect or cogni¬
tion would remain one and indivisible and there would be no
sequence at all. Therefore, it is futile to try to explain sequence
in cognition through the impressions of the sequence of objects
which figure in the cognition.]
Indivisibility is now set forth in a different manner.
2 /. This indivisible (Sentence) is understood
as having the capacity for sequence (or division)
at the time of the artificial separation ( bhavana -
samaye). Hence its meaning, though devoid of all
division is perceived as having division.
14
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[In the Brahmakanda, the nature of sphoia has beendeter-
mined. It is the sentence as sphota which is expressive. At
the time of analysis, the sentence-meaning is understood as
having sequence and division, but it really has none.
The Vrtti gives the analogy of Dik to explain how the One
appears as many. Dik (Direction, Space) is one but when
we use expressions like urddhvam, adhah , tiryak , we are speaking
about it as though it had divisions, knowing that it has none:
urdhvam adhas tiryag ityekatve’pi disamyathayatham vinivif tab/ia-
vanavisefdh sarvapraninah= All beings have an inner disposition
to divide Dik (Direction, Space) which, though one, is regard¬
ed by them as being above, below, across and so on.]
The view that the sentence is nothing more than a collec¬
tion of words and not an entity over and above them and that
the word is nothing more than a collection of phonemes and
not an entity over and above them is now criticized.
28-29. If the words in the sentence are those
very ones (which are found singly outside the sen¬
tence) and if the phonemes in a word are those very
ones (which are found singly outside the word)
then there would be divisions like atoms in the
phonemes also.
As the parts cannot combine (because of their non-exis¬
tence) there would be neither phoneme nor word. As they
cannot be determined what other thing could be determined
as the expressive element ?
The Vrtti argues as follows—
[If it is held that the words in a sentence are the very ones
which are found separately and if the phonemes which are
found separately are the very ones found collected in a word
and if it is held that there is no essence of the sentence or of the
word apart from the phonemes, then there would be atom¬
like divisions within the phonemes also by going to the extreme
limit of division. These divisions would have sequence and
would never be simultaneous and would, therefore, never come
into mutual contact. Thus there would ensue nothing called
phoneme or the word. The final divisions being indefinable.
11-30-31
15
they would not enter into usage. Therefore what would be the
verbal unit which would be clearly defined as ‘this 5 ? There
cannot be any usage with a verbal entity the divisions
of which arc indefinable and which are not collected together
in something different from knowledge. The idea is that the
sentence is a collection of words and if the word is only a
collection of phonemes, one can divide the phonemes also.
Ultimately, there would be no unit at all which would be looked
upon as the expressive element. Therefore, the sentence is an
entity over and above the phonemes and words. This entity
is described as something outside the mind. But the Scistra
is of the view that the sentence is buddhyanusamhrtih .]
The view that the sentence is buddhyanusamhrtih , mentioned
in the very first verse of this Kanda is now explained.
30. Others declare the Word (that is, the Sen¬
tence) to be the word-Principle which is within
and One and is manifested by the sounds. It is
that unity which appears in the manifested sentence.
[Others emphasize the inner aspect of the word. Its ex¬
ternal aspect as jati or vyakti has already been considered before.
The chief characteristic of this inner aspect is that it is one and
indivisible and without any inner sequence. It is an inner
entity, consisting essentially of cognition or consciousness and
an amalgam of word and meaning. When manifested by the
sounds, wrongly thought of as its parts, itbecomesthe external
sentence. The Vrtti points out that this external sentence is
like the written symbols ( aksaracihnavat) which are mistaken to
be the word. The external sentence is only a symbol of the real
sentence which is within and is an indivisible unity.]
It is now stated that not only the sentence but the sentence
meaning also is indivisible and manifested by the word meanings.
31. According to them, the inner meaning,
(that is, the Sentence-Meaning) is manifested by
parts of it. Word and Meaning (that is, Sentence
and Sentence-meaning) are inseparable ( aprthak -
sthitau ) divisions of one Inner Principle.
16
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[Just as the Sentence is an inner entity, so is the Sentence¬
meaning. They are identical with each other and with the
One Inner Principle but, externally, they appear to be differ¬
ent from each other. Pur.yaraja does not say anything more.
The Vrtti interprets this verse in a deeper manner. From
its terse and rather obscure language, one understands some¬
thinglike this: —
It is well-known that the Word-Principle is mainly the
indivisible inner entity and that it is grasped through its inde¬
finable and unreal parts. Similarly, the meanings reflected
in the intellect are experienced as identical with the external
objects. This is according to the view that the external object
is transient. According to the view that it is eternal,
it manifests itself according to the power of sequence of the
intellect {Kramasaktirupanirbhdsama.traya) . An external object
is not fit for practical purposive usage without the intellect
with which it is wrongly identified. All worldly usage is done with
objects which have been grasped by the intellect. Thus both
the word and the object are in the intellect. Others, on the
other hand, declare that as the intellect in which the object
is reflected inheres in the Self, the latter which is essentially
consciousness, assumes the form of the intellect which inheres in
itand this explains the experience ofthe individual {piiru$arth asya
prasiddhim). When the intellect which is transparent assumes the
character of consciousness and of the object through their
reflections, the powers ofthe enjoyed and of the enjoyer ( i/zogjrt-
Sdkti and bhoktrsakti ) quite distinct from each other and not at
all mixed up with each other, seem to attain the state of non¬
distinction in the intellect, which has apparently assumed the
nature of consciousness and of the object and then distinctive
worldly usage becomes possible. The power to experience is
unchangeable and is not reflected anywhere but it appears
to be reflected in the intellect. It is through the imitative
transformation of the intellect in which the consciousness is
reflected that one speaks ofthe operation of specific knowledge.
The transformation of the intellect is said to be imitative {anu-
karamatrd) because, on the onehand, it imitates the objectwhose
form it takes and, on the other, consciousness is reflected in it.
In the background of all statements, there are three views :—
n. 32
17
(1) The external word is transitory and is an unreal manifes¬
tation of the eternal inner word. (2) According to satkarya-
vada, all objects are eternal and they are experienced when
manifested. (3) When the object is reflected in the transpar¬
ent intellect ( Buddhi ), it is experienced. According to all
the views, the inner word is One, with all multiplicity resolved.
From it, meanings which are also inner and undivided, with
all multiplicity resolved, are understood without their original
division being abandoned. What then remains is the single
entity Intellect in which multiplicity has been resolved, in which
the distinct powers of being the conveyor and the conveyed are
not separated (pratipadakapratipattavyaSaktyor avibhagcna) even
though their distinction is not abandoned. In the view that
both the word and the meaning are eternal, neither is adven¬
titious, subject to increase and decrease and to change.]
If the word and the meaning are identical, how are they
said to stand in the relation of expression and expressed to each
other ?
32. Of that Word-Principle which is within,
there is always this character of being the Illumina¬
tor as well as the Illuminated, the Cause as well as
the Effect.
[The idea is that the Inner Word-Principle has got both
powers : that of being prakcUaka and that of being prakdsya,
that of being the Cause and that of being the Effect. The One
inner Reality contains the seeds of all manifestations, as
already stated in Vak.1.4.
In explaining this verse, the Vrtti emphasizes the nature of
the Sabdatattva within. The inner word is endowed with two
powers : the power of being the Illuminator and that of being
the Illuminated. Though the latter is not separate from the
former, it appears to be so. As they are mutually dependent,
there is the relation of causality between them. As the Illu¬
minator, it is the cause and as the Illuminated, it is the effect.
The former power is constant and the latter occasional ( anapayini
and apayini). The Word-Principle is not associated with any
particular place, but, because of its association with the intellect,
it is spoken of as the inner word. Nor is it associated with
18
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
time, divisible into past, present and future. That is why the
word sarvada is used in the verse. The Word-Principle, being
identical with Consciousness, is beyond existence and non¬
existence (bhdvdbhdvavibhdgabhdvdt). The expressions past,
present and future.can be used only in regard to bhava or
abhava .]
What other power the Word-Principle has is now stated.
33. It is that (the Word-Principle) whicn has
the two powers of existence and non-existence which
have no sequence but appear to have it and are the
basis of all worldly usage.
[The inner Word-Principle has the two powers of existence
and non-existence. These two powers cannot have any sequence
because of the eternality of their substratum, but they appear to
have it. The indivisible sentence appears to have the sequence
of the phonemes and individual words. Their existence and
non-existence seem to have sequence. All manifestation involv-
ing multiplicity and sequence is due to the powers of the Word-
Principle and not merely its manifestation as the Illuminator
and the Illuminated].
The view that the individual word has a reality is again
criticised.
34. If the mere understanding of the word¬
meaning is taken as proof of the reality of the word
and its meaning, as it is abandoned when it is mixed
up with the meaning (of the following words) it
would become useless.
[If the mere fact that the individual word and its meaning
are cognised, are taken as proof that they have reality, there
would be a difficulty. Each subsequent word of a sentence
conveys its meaning as mixed up with that of the preceding
word or words and so the meanings conveyed by the preceding
word or words are abandoned as such. Thus the utterance
of the preceding words becomes useless. Therefore, when
the sentence-meaning is ultimately understood, it would not be
due to the useless preceding words. The understanding of the
II. 35-36
19
individual word and its meaning were only temporary and,
therefore, unreal phases.]
It is now stated that, as the individual word is something
indefinite, its reality should not be accepted.
35. (ab). The word raj an conveys the idea of
‘king’ through its different forms.
[The word rajan does not occur in speech in a particular
form but in its different inflexional forms like raja, rdjdnam ,
rajna , rajiie , rdjnah , rdjni (or rajani). If the word had a reality,
its form would not thus change.]
35. (cd). In a complex formation, a word (a
noun) resembling a verb could mean something
different (from what it ought to mean).
[The compound word rajapurusa could be understood to
mean : Shine ! O Man ! and yet.that is not its meaning.
Which shows that what looks like an individual word has no
reality.]
It is not only independent individual words which have
no definite fixed form but as parts of compound words also they
have no fixed form.
36. Just as the compound word asvakarna con¬
veys a special meaning without the part asva con¬
veying any meaning of its own, so do other compound
words.
[We understand from the word asvakarna a particular class
of objects, having a particular universal inhering in it. The
meaning of the part afva does not contribute to it. The mean¬
ing comes from the word as a whole. It is better to be¬
lieve that the same thing happens in all compound words.
If the meaning of asva plays no part in the meaning of the whole,
it is wrong to think that there is a part called a$va in the com¬
pound at all. Similarly, there is no part called karna in it.
Here the Vrtti points out that, for the purpose of grammati¬
cal derivation, one may explain the meaning of the compound
asvakarna as asvasya Karnaviva parnau yasya = a tree of which
the leaves are like the ears of a horse. But this is only artha -
20
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhari
pradarsika = ‘showing of an alleged meaning 5 and should not
be taken seriously. It does not prove the reality of parts.]
If all compound words are in the same position, what
would be the basis of the distinction between rudhi *= ‘conven¬
tional 5 words and arudhi= c non-conventional 5 words ?
37. While resemblance is postulated (bet¬
ween the meaning of the compound word and the
analytical sentence which explains it) in the case of
some compounds where the analysis conveys a
totally different meaning, the Science of Grammar
itself looks upon them as conventional words.
[A difference is pointed out between compound words
like rajapurusa and tailapayika. The meaning conveyed by the
former and the meaning obtained from its analysis are very
similar. So it is not looked upon as a mere rudhi word. The
meaning conveyed by the second compound is that of cockroach,
a kind of insect. The meaning obtained by analysis is :
“that which drinks oil 55 which is quite different from what the
whole compound means. That is why it is a rudhi word.
In regard to such words, grammar teaches some special opera¬
tions as in P. 6.2.76, 77, 146 ; P. 6.3.53 etc. This is pointed
out by the Vrtli.]
38. Means ( upayah ) are so called because they
are first accepted ( upadaya) and then abandoned
[heyah). And no fixity necessarily exists in regard
to the means.
[The Vrtti points out that when correct forms are being
taught in the Science of Grammar, as in the case of compounds,
secondary derivatives, denominative verbs and ekase$a , indivi¬
dual words are brought in for making analytical explanatory
sentences. When the purpose of teaching their correct form
is achieved, these individual words are abandoned. Similarly,
some rules relating to accent (such as P. 8.2.4, 5, 6; P. 6.2.2,65)
teach correct forms of words on the assumption that there are
individual words in compounds or sentences, that they have
their own meaning and that they come in a certain order.
II. 39-40
21
All this has to be understood in order to grasp the correctness
of the forms in question. Once that is done, the rest is for¬
gotten.]
39. One understands the facts in some way or
another. Whether united or separated, the divisions
are based on the sentence.
[One can understand the facts of the Sanskrit language
either through Panini’s grammar or through some other. All
of them have to analyse the sentence and sentence-meaning to
do their work. The latter are, therefore, the real entities and
not what is obtained by analysis.
The Vrtti gives examples of the different ways in which the
same word is derived, by different grammarians. The word
srotriya is one of them. According to some, it is a word
expressive of the meaning of the whole sentence chando’dhite=
£ he studies the Vedas’. Others say that the word chandas
becomes srotra to which the suffix ghan is added in the sense of
tad adhite (P. 4.2.59.) or in the sense of action done by the ears.
Similarly grammarians differ in their derivation of words like
ustragoyugae and asvasadgavae . The Vrtti also gives two expla¬
nations of the second half of the verse. The difference is chiefly
in regard to the meaning of the words samsrstall and vibhaktdh .
In the first explanation, the former means ‘united’, that is, one
word and its meaning united with another to form a compound.
The second word means ‘separated’, that is, each word stand¬
ing separately in the sentence. Whether a word combines with
another to form a samasa or not, its meaning is determined
by the sentence as a whole. In the second explanation, the two
words mean ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ respectively.]
It is now stated that the sentence-meaning can sometimes
be understood even from a single phoneme.
40. Sometimes, when the relation of identity
in the form c it is this 5 is understood, then even a
single phoneme can be expressive of the meaning of
the whole sentence.
[When the identity of the sentence and the sentence-mean¬
ing is already in the mind of the speaker, then it is not necessary
22
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
that the sentence-meaning should be understood after the word-
meanings have been understood in the sequence in which the
words have been uttered. A mere phoneme without any inner
sequence may sometimes be able to convey it. Punyaraja does
not give any example. The Vrtti does and ends by referring
to the way in which the sages, those who are experts in Vagyoga,
grasp the integrated Word-Principle within.]
Now the view of the sentence referred to by the word
sanghata in the very first verse is being explained.
41. It has been declared that a word, as part
of a sentence, expresses the same extent of meaning
as it does when it is in isolation.
[Punyaraja points out that this samghata view is held by
the Abhihitanvayavadin. The Vrtti illustrates by saying that the
isolated word Vrkfa conveys a particular universal, namely
tree-ness. It does the same in the following sentences: Vrkpo’sti,
Vrfoo nasti Vrk$a$cchinnah. Because of its connection in these
sentences with existence, non-existence and cutting, it does
not become associated with another universal. In any case,
these actions are not connected with a universal, but with the
individual in which the universal inheres.]
42. Whatever extra meaning is understood
when the words (in a sentence) are connected to¬
gether is the meaning of the sentence and it rests
on many words.
[According to this view, the sentence meaning is the inter¬
connection ( samsarga ) of the meanings of the individual words.
The Vrtti points out that the extra meaning which comes
when the words are joined together does not play any partin
determining the form of the individual words. They get their
form on the basis of the meaning or meanings which they them¬
selves express.
The words of somebody, referred to as tatrabhavan, are
quoted in the Vrtti. In the writings of Abhinavagupta, tatra¬
bhavan always stands for Bhartrhari. If that is the case here,
it means that the Vrtti is not by Bhartrhari. But the title can
very well stand for somebody else. Who is the question?]
II. 43-45
23
Another view on the subject is now given.
43. Even though it rests on many words, it is
found in full in each like the universal, or, like
number, it is said to rest, by others, on the whole
collection of words also.
[The universal is supposed to exist in every individual in
full. Number is supposed to exist in all the units together.
Similarly, the view that the sentence-meaning rests on many
words is understood by some to mean that it exists in each
part of it in full like the universal and by others to mean that
it exists in the totality of words also. Those who hold the
latter view go by the principle that what does not exist in the
part cannot exist in the totality. As the Ambakartrl puts it:
na hyavayavaparyaptasya samudaye paryaptir asti. Both Punya-
raja and the Vrtti speak about these two views.
The samghata view is now explained from the anvitabhidhana
point of view:
44-45. Others declare the meaning of the word
to be so general as is adaptable to all the particulars.
When connected with the meaning of the other
words, it assumes the form of the particular.
Contact (with the meaning of the other words) removes
the vagueness which arises when it requires particularisation
by fixing it to one particular.
[It was stated in verses 41 and 42 that a word in a sentence
gives the same meaning as in isolation. When the meanings
of the words are connected together, a qualified meaning
emerges and that is the meaning of the sentence as a whole.
In verse 43, it was stated that the meaning of the whole is con¬
tained in a single word according to some and in the totality
of words also according to others. In 44 and 45, it is stated
that the individual word conveys a general meaning which is
potentially capable of being connected with the meanings of
other words and when it is actually connected with the other
words, it conveys a meaning actually connected with particular
meanings of other words. The general meaning and the parti-
24
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhari
cular meaning are those of the individual word and not of the
sentence and is not conveyed by dkdiik$d,yogyatd and sannidhii]
46. The connection is to be inferred from its
effect; it has. no particular form. That is why
some declare it to be absolutely non-existent (as
distinct from the meanings of the individual words.)
[The effect referred to is the fact of the meaning of the
individual word referring to the particular and not merely to
the general. The connection inferred has no concrete shape or
form. That is why it is said to be asattuabhfita.']
The same view is further explained.
47. An accessory (sadhana) necessarily pre¬
supposes an action to be accomplished ( sadhya )
and an action is necessarily connected with acces¬
sories. This necessity which is present becomes
evident in the presence (of the meaning of other
words).
[Action and accessory presuppose each other. It is only
when the words expressive of them enter into the sentence that
what is presupposed becomes manifest. So the sentence is
nothing more than the individual words presupposing one
another and the sentence-meaning is nothing more than the
word-meanings presupposing one another.
The Vrtti points out that this mutual requirement of action
and accessory is one and indivisible. It is not felt in the absence
of the other. It becomes manifest in the mere presence of
the word expressive of the other and not because of the help
of any other factor. As the Vrtti puts it :
nityaniyatatvacca niyamo'pyatra vidheyah , sanstu niyamah
prayoge sannidhimatrena padantardnam puru$am prati prakasate ,
nanugrhyate.']
If the mutual requirement of the meanings of the words
of a sentence is equal, how to decide which is primary and which
is secondary.
48. In it, (that is, the sentence), the noun,
being secondary (to action) requires the verb. The
II. 49-51
25
verb, being expressive of something to be accom¬
plished, requires (the words expressive of) the means.
The meanings of the individual words of a sentence require
one another. Some looked upon this mutual requirement
as a property of the meanings while others looked upon it as
property of the listener. The Vrtti refers to this difference of
view. It says that the listener understands mutual requirement
(;vyapekfa) according to what the words convey, whether it
actually exists or not in the meanings : arthe$u satim asatim va
sabdavrllyanukarena purufo vyapekfam samihate .]
The view that the sentence is nothing more than the
sequence of the words is now explained.
49 . The particularisations which already exist
in the word-meanings are understood from their
sequence and there is no expressive sentence beyond
that.
[If the sentence is nothing more than the sequence, it is
not anything verbal, it is not something which can be heard.
As the Vrtti puts it : naparam vakyam nama kiiicicchabdarupam
abhidhayakam vidyate .]
The same view is further explained.
50. The mere sequence of the words being thus
expressive, there is no other verbal element which is
so. And sequence is a property of time. There
is no separate entity called sentence.
[What is denied here is the existence of some verbal element
characterised by sequence, which could be called the sentence.
The sentence is nothing more than the sequence itself. Se¬
quence which is a property of time is superimposed on the words.
What is called sentence is a mere name without any reality
behind it. As the Vrtti puts it— tena vakyam ityavastukameve-
damabhildpama.tram, padamevarthavaditi .]
It is now stated that the same is not true of the sequence
of phonemes.
51 . The particularisations which already exist
in the meanings of individual words but are not
26
vakyapad!yam of bhartrhari
evident become manifested in the presence of the
other words. But such a (meaningful) sequence
does not exist in the phonemes.
This point is now concluded.
52. The names Word and Sentence may be
applied to the sequences of the phonemes and the
words respectively but they are not the expressive
element ( sabdatva ).
[The phoneme and the word are audible but mere audi¬
bility does not entitle them to be called sabda. For that, they
must convey the meaning, they must be vacaka. They are not.
Only sequence is so.]
53. Even though the fact of being word ( sabda ,
something audible) is common (to both the phoneme
and the word), the meaning is understood from the
word (conceived as the sequence of phonemes)
but not from each phoneme. Hence the meaning
belongs to the word.
[As audible entities, the phoneme and the word are both
sabda but the sentence-meaning is understood from the sequence
of the words and not from the phonemes. So sequence
is the sentence and interconnection of word-meanings is the
sentence-meaning.]
The sanghata view is now restated.
54. Just as phonemes, parts of a word are
devoid of any meaning, so is the case with the sen¬
tence.
[All the phonemes put together may have a meaning,
but^ach one, taken separately, has no meaning. Each indivi¬
dual word, by itself, cannot express the sentence-meaning which
is in the nature of a connection between the meanings of indivi¬
dual words. Only a collection of such words can do it and so
that is.the sentence.]
Now the sequence theory is restated.
11.55-58
27
55. Individual words, meaningless being only
a means to an end or having their own meaning
only when uttered in a sequence, convey the sentence¬
meaning which is different from the meanings of
individual words.
[The meaning of a sentence is the meaning of the individual
words in it as syntactically connected with one another. No
single word can express this mutually connected meaning.
There is not only temporal sequence between the words, but
also syntactic connection.]
The sphota view is now stated.
56. The sentences, looked upon as collections
of words, being eternal or when the sentence-uni¬
versal is postulated, it is the one sentence which
expresses an inalienable meaning.
[The sentence may be looked upon as one unit. As uttered
by different persons, it is something different and yet it is recog¬
nised to be the same. The different sounds uttered by the
different speakers ultimately manifest the same sentence. Or
the sentence may be looked upon as a universal which inheres
in the different utterances of it by different persons. In whatever
way it is looked at, it is one and it expresses a meaning in
the nature of intuition (pratibha) and is indivisible.]
57. According to the upholders of the (indi¬
visible) sentence, unity precedes division which is
fictitious. The upholders of the individual word,
on the other hand, hold that the unities of the sen¬
tence are preceded by their divisions.
The statement padaprakrtilj sainhita (Rk-pra.lisakhya.2. 1.) is
now considered.
58. The fact of the sainhita (the connected
text) being the source of the individual words is
explained by resorting to a different complex for-
28
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
mation ( Vrtti ). padaprakrtih can be explained either
thus : ‘the samhita is the source of the individual
words 5 or thus : the samhita has the individual
words as its source.
[The compound word padaprakrtih is laken as a fhi-
tatpurusa according to those who follow the akhandapaksa.
The others take it as a bahuvrihi . If the Vedic sentences are
indivisible and not composed by humans (apaurufeya), then the
individual words obtained by analysis are of human origin
( pauru$eya ). On the basis of this very statement, the other
view, namely, that the individual words are real and that the
sentence is a fiction can be justified. It is like this: The
individual words are eternal and not formed by men. Their
connection is man-made. Each word conveys its own mean¬
ing, plus its connection in general with the meanings of the other
words. In the presence of the other words, this connection
becomes specific and is realised. Thus, the sentence-mean¬
ing is conveyed by the words themselves and not by the
sentence.
The Vrtti also refers to the statement of the Btk-pratisakhya
and says that some held the padapatha of the Vedas to be
eternal and the connected text (samhitapa tha) to be of human
origin while others held just the opposite view.]
A statement of Patanjali is now explained.
59. If the other tradition, namely, that of the
separated words ( padapatha ) shows the way to the
connected text and is eternal, how is the separated
text to be constituted according to the rules ?
The very fact that Patanjali says that the authors of the
padapatha have to follow the rules in doing their work shows
that, according to him, that text is man-made. His words
are : na lakfanena padakara anuvartyah; padakarair ndma lak$anam
aiiuvartyam== “Joules are not to be framed according to the text
made by the authors of the padapatha ; it is the latter who have
to follow the rules.” In other words, Patanjali is in favour of
the akhandapaksa. See M.Bha. II. p. 85,1. 4.5.
II. 60-62
29
[The Vrtti points out that the word used in the world is
eternal. It is for the rules to conform to the eternal word and
not for the latter to conform to the rules : atah sastrena nityasya
laksyasydnuvidhdnam kartavya , na til nityena lak$yena sastram
anuvidheyam .]
60. Just as the meaning of the word is not
understood from each phoneme, in the same way,
the meaning of the sentence is not understood from
each word.
[Here the Vrtti makes an interesting observation. It says
that the cognition of the sentence meaning is self-luminous,
besides illuminating the external object. Being self-luminous,
the cognition of the sentence-meaning is authority in
itself. The sentence-meaning which its cognition grasps is
one and indivisible and being authority, it confirms the unity
and indivisibility of the sentence-meaning.]
To meet this, the upholder of the individual word says—
61. Just as the meaning of the sentence is un¬
derstood when all the words are together, in the
same way, the meaning of the word is understood
when all the phonemes are together.
[The idea here is that each phoneme does denote the mean¬
ing of the word and so does each word denote the meaning of
the sentence, but only when the other phonemes and the other
words are also uttered in the same context. So the analogy
brought forward by the upholder of the sentence is not valid.]
The point is now further elucidated.
62. Just as a minute perceptible object, when
associated with something else, is perceived with it,
in the same way, a phoneme becomes expressive
(of a meaning) when it is associated with other
phonemes.
[What is meant here is that a phoneme really has a mean¬
ing but that is understood only when the other phonemes of the
word are uttered. All of them express the meaning together,
30
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhari
but each one has the potentiality to do so. The hearer cannot
understand it unless the other phonemes are also uttered.
63. Just as some meaning is understood when
a word is uttered, in the same way, when the pho¬
nemes are near one another, the same meaning is
understood.
[The point sought to be made here is this :—Just as, when,
the phonemes are together, they become expressive by pooling
their powers ( parasparasaktyaveiavasat ), so do individual words
together convey the sentence-meaning. So there is no need to
postulate a sentence apart from the phonemes and the words.
The Vrtti points out that the upholder of the meaningfulness of
the phoneme can argue exactly in the same way as the upholder
of the individual word.]
It is further pointed out that if the reality of the individual
word is denied, it would not be possible to have substitutes if
what is prescribed is not available.
64. The purpose of the text (the word vri-
liihhih ) is restriction to one possibility which occurs
to one (in any case) due to the power of the verb.
Therefore, if the accessory in general is set aside by
a particular accessory,
65. If mere substance which occurs to the mind
through the power of the verb yajeta is set aside by
the mention of the particular substance, there would
be no substitute if rice ( Vrihi ) is not available.
[If the verb yajeta in vrihibhir yajeta brings to the mind sub¬
stance in general and not the universal of any particular sub¬
stance, then, if rice, denoted by the word vrthibhih , is not avail¬
able, a similar substance like barley can be used. But if it is
held that the mention of a particular substance sets aside sub¬
stance in general also, then there can be no substitute at all,
because the substitute barley would come under substance in
general which has been set aside.]
II. 66-68
31
Therefore, another view is adopted as follows—
66 . Therefore, the word rice, bringing the
additional idea of rice, has a positive meaning
( praptyarthah ) and does not set aside substance in
genei'al as there is no opposition between the two.
[According to this view, vrihibhir yajela is a positive in¬
junction and not a restriction. It specifies and does not exclude
other things. From yajela, substance in general is understood
because without some substance, yaga cannot be performed.
From vrihibhih, we further learn that the particular substance
is rice. If rice is not available, another similar substance is
not excluded.]
67. When substance in general ( dravyaiva ) is
taken away by it (from other substances) with
which it co-exists, other substitutes are not seen
there (that is, in the sacrifice) because of impossibi¬
lity.
68 . The verb does not bring to the mind all
particular substances as it does substance in general.
A word indeed does not express all the meanings
which it has.
[Here the Vrtti explains as follows—
If the verb yajela brings substance in general to the
mind and not a particular substance and so the word
vrihibhih is a positive prescription of rice and not an
exclusion of other substances, it means that a substance
like barley has not been excluded. That beingso, why doesit not
come optionally ? The answer is that prescriptive words are
of two kinds : (1) Some have a restrictive effect. They pres¬
cribe something and in effect, exclude others (2) Others do not
emphasize the restrictive side. Some scholars of Mimamsa say
that, in some matters this becomes, a kind of restriction
through impossibility ( asambhavaniyamah) when, through the
mention of the word rice, the universal of rice ( vnhitva) be¬
comes an extra accessory of sacrifice, it is not possible for other
universals like yavatva to become accessories though they have
32
vakyapadIyam of ishartrhari
not been openly set aside, because they cannot coexist with
Vrihitva in the same thing. If they could become accessories
at all, it would be because they come to the mind due to lack
of contradiction. They would then be combined with other
things and not adopted optionally. Only, that which is openly
stated by the words can become an option. The verb does
not convey a particular accessory but only substance in general.
A word does not express all that actually exists.)
Now an illustration is given.
69. Just as qualities like white, though present
(in the rice) are not meant to be conveyed (by
the word vrihi= rice) in the same way, theuniversals
of being particular substances which co-exist with
substance in general (i dravyatva ) are not meant to
be conveyed.
[A word does not express as its meaning everything that
exists in an object. An object, to be expressed by a word,
depends upon the desire of the speaker to speak about it. Even
existing objects do not exist as meanings of words. The
speaker’s desire to speak about a thing depends upon the capacity
of the form of the word to express it: rupasdmarthyanjbandhana
as the Vrtti puts it. Due to the natural power of words, the
verb cannot denote the colour which exists in the substance in
general which it brings to the mind. Similarly, the verb
cannot denote all the particular substances in which dravyatva
co-exists with their particular universal.]
The purpose of substitution is now stated.
70. A substitute is taught in the absence (of
what is prescribed) in order that there may be no
omission of a compulsory ( nitya ) ritual or of an
optional one which has already been begun.
[What is pointed out here is that even in the case of an
optional ritual, if what is prescribed is not available, it should
be performed with a substitute. This is all the more so in the
case of a compulsory ceremony, because its omission would
result in sin. As the Vrtti puts it : Nityam yat karma tasyakarane
pratyavdyali\
II. 71-72
33
Thus it has been shown how a substitute becomes possible
by taking the view that the verb brings only the substance in
general to the mind and that the word vrlhibhih is a positive
injunction and not meant to exclude other substances. It is
now stated that if the sentence is indivisible, a substitute would
not be possible.
71. For him who looks upon a sentence as
expressive of a particularised action, when a substi¬
tute is used for a substance which is not available,
there would result a different action altogether.
[It is accepted by all that, while another substance may
be substituted if the prescribed one is not available, the prescrib¬
ed ritual, an act, should not be substituted by another. But
if the sentence is looked upon as expressive of an indivisible
meaning, what looks like substitution of material would really
be substitution of ritual which is not allowed. The sentence
being indivisible, it does not teach two things. It does not say:
(1) One should perform the ritual, (2) One should do it with
rice. That would imply that the sentence has two parts which
the doctrine of unity and indivisibility does not accept. So the
sentence teaches only one thing, a ritual to be done with a
particular material. When that is not available and the ritual
is done with some other material, it would not be a mere sub¬
stitution of material, but of the ritual itself. But that is not
allowed. When the Veda enjoins one ritual, it would be wrong
to perform another.]
It is now stated that, if the individual word does not exist,
one cannot explain why people sometimes enquire about the
meaning of a particular word.
72. When the meaning of the known words (in
a sentence) has been understood, why does one
enquire about the meaning of an unknown word
like pika ?
Punyaraja and the Vrtti explain this karikd in the same way,
except that the latter gives two examples instead of one. It is
well-known that listeners sometimes fail to understand the
meaning of just one word in a sentence and enquire about it.
34
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartriiari
In vandt pika aniyatam, the word pika may be obscure to
somebody, who would therefore enquire about its meaning.
In the sentence vdrangi jarjard vrfalaya diyatdm= let the torn
z/dra 7 i£i'=‘turmeric-coloured dress’ be given to the jur/ra, some¬
body may not understand the meaning of Vdrangi and may just
enquire about that. This shows that the enquirer has the
consciousness that the individual word has a meaning. No¬
body makes a similar enquiry -about the meanings of a or
Kin the words Vrjabha and kandira after having understood the
meaning of the remaining portions of the two words, r^abha
and andira, showing that people have no consciousness that
phonemes have a meaning.]
73 -74. When what is implied is mentioned for
the sake of clarity, it is a case of direct statement
(sruti) and it sets aside indication ( lihga ) and juxta¬
position ( vakya ).
A quality like white, when not implied, is
understood through proximity and is therefore
conveyed by a special effort and is different from
direct statement.
[If the individual word has no reality, the principle that
when there is opposition between direct statement and juxta¬
position, the former prevails would not work. Six principles
are laid down by Jaimini in order to determine the meanings
of doubtful sentences. Of them, each preceding one is stronger
than the following one. In the sentence : svetam chagam alabhe-
t a =‘ 0 ne should sacrifice a white goat’ the connection of the
act of sacrificing with the goat is conveyed by direct statement
(sruti), namely, the second-case-affix. The quality white
becomes connected with the act because the word expressive
of it is in apposition to the word expressive of the goat. In
other words, through juxtaposition. If both the words—
chagam and Svetam —are connected with the verb at the same
time because of the second case-affix, then the connection in
both cases would be through sruti, with the result that if either
is not available, there can be a substitute.]
75 . If the sentence is indivisible and its mean¬
ing also is indivisible, then everything would be
II. 76
35
direct statement ( sruti ) and there would be no such
thing as contradiction with direct statement.
[If the sentence and its meaning are indivisible, then one
cannot, within the sentence-meaning, distinguish between
what is conveyed by direct statement and what is conveyed by
juxtaposition. Everything would be conveyed by direct state¬
ment. There could arise no conflict and what is more, there
would be no substitute if what is prescribed is not available.]
It is now shown that if a sentence is indivisible, intermediary
sentences would become meaningless.
76. There would be no sentence-meaning (in
the case of a big sentence) consisting of a collection
of minor sentences requiring one another and used
for conveying one single meaning.
(If individual words do not exist and are meaningless,
intermediary sentences would be in the same position. Also,
a meaningful sentence can become a part of a bigger sentence
and so become meaningless which is a contradiction.
The Vrtti explains the same idea with an example : gaur
duhyatam , upddhyayah payasa bhunktvd mdmadhydpayi$yati = 'let
the cow be milked, the teacher will eat (his rice) with milk and
then teach me. Here a big sentence, having an intermediary
sentence as its part, is expressive of an action which is qualified
by another action having its own accessory. If the parts (in
the form of intermediary sentences) requiring one another are
not connected with the one main meaning, then the main
sentence would also be meaningless. Besides there is no fixity in
limits of intermediary sentences. Sometimes, gdmabhydja= 'drive
the cow on’is the sentence,sometimesitis: Devadatta\ gam abhyaja
= 0 ! Devadatta ! drive the cow on. Sometimes it is : Deva -
dattagam abhyaja §ukldm= O ! Devadatta, drive the white cow
on! That being so, one would have to accept the contradictory
position that the same thing is sometimes meaningful and some¬
times not. The first sentence is meaningful, while the same
words are meaningless in the next, being only a part thereof.]
It is now pointed out that, if the individual word and its
meaning are denied any existence, certain principles followed
36
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
in the world and in the Sastra would become inexplicable. These
principles form the subject matter of the Mimamsd-sidras of
Jaimini. _
77. That this action is prasahgika, this is ob¬
tained through tantra (extension), this through
avrtti (repetition) or bheda (difference), there is
badha (suspension) here and combination there
( samuccaya ).
[The principle of prasanga is established in the twefth
adhyaya of the Mi.Su. Madhava, in his Jaiminiya-nyayamala-
vistara XII. 1. defines it thus:— anyoddesena anyadiyasyapi sahd-
nu$thdnam prasangah= ‘the single performance of a subsidiary
action, accepted as helpingaprimary action other than the
one to which it belongs.’ For instance, prayaja and anuyaja
offerings, taught as subsidiary to the agtifyomiy a animal sacrifice,
serve as subsidiary to the cake-offering also. See Mi. Su. XII.I,
1-6. This principle is sometimes followed in the world also.
When a teacher is teaching one student and other students arrive
and profit by the same teaching instead of asking the teacher to
instruct them separately, it is a worldly example of the principle.
It is sometimes followed in the Vyakaranasastra also. For exam¬
ple, P.1.1.27 not only gives the name sarvanama to some words
but tells us incidentally that in the word sarvanama, nis not
changed to n, as it normally should. If individual words have
no meaning, this principle cannot be applied.
The principle of tantra is established in chapter XI of the
Mi. Su. It is similar to the principle of prasanga. The differ¬
ence is that in tantra, the single performance of a subsidiary
rite is prescribed and it is intended by the sacrificer to help
more than one primary rite, whereas in prasanga no such pres¬
cription or intention is discernible. The prayajefti, performed
once before or after, serves all the six sacrifices. An every-day
instance of the application of such a principle is that of many
students using one lamp for their study. Panini’s use of the
word tapara in P.1.1.70 in two meanings is an instance of tantra
in grammar. The two meanings are : (1) tab. paro yasmdt
so'yam taparah, (2) tatparah taparah. For a Vedic application of
this principle, see Mi. Sit. 1, 14.
Each of these principles has its opposite which also goes
II. 78
37
to prove the existence of the individual word. Avrtti or repe¬
tition is the opposite of tantra— extension. A Vedic instance of
avrtti is the statement that there are seventeen mantras for kin¬
dling the sacrificial fire (saptada§a samidhenyo bhavanti ). This
number is reached by repeating the first and the last of eleven
three times. Bheda or difference is also an extension of tantra .
A Vedic instance of it is graham sammar^ii— he cleans the
vessels. As there are many vessels, each one has to be cleaned
separately ( bheda). The cleaning of one would not do for all.
Badha or suspension is the subjectmatter of adhyaya'K ofMf.
Sit. An instance of it would be the prohibition of the eating
of the domesticated fowl {abhaksyo grdmyakukkulah) which would
otherwise be possible, considering that it can also satisfy hunger.
An instance from the world would be : After the statement:
“Give curds to Brahmanas,” it is said c and butter-milk to
Kaundinya 5 . The latter statement suspends the operation of
the previous one as far as Kaundinya is concerned. The oppo¬
site of this principle is samuccaya. Instead of one operation
cancelling another, both become applicable to the same case.
An instance of it would be the statement : Feed Devadatta with
salt, ghee and vegetables. All are given to the same person.
These principles would not be sound if the individual word
and its meaning did not exist.]
78. That uha (modification) in this matter
is justifiable, the relation here is not barred, that
this is an instance of general transference and this
of particular transference.
\TJha is dealt with in chap. IX of Mi. Sft. In the Veda,
this principle consists in the modification of the mantras pres¬
cribed for a prakrti-yaga in order to suit the circumstances of the
Vikrtiyaga. In the agjieya sacrifice which is a prakrti , one has to
say : agnaye tva ju$tam nirvapami , when one offers vrihi to Agni.
In the Surya sacrifice which is a vikrti of it, one has to substitute:
Suryaya tva, while offering nivara (wild rice) instead of vrihi
(cultivated rice). Thus, we modify the mantra to suit differ¬
ent circumstances. The opposite of this principle would be
not to make any modification. For instance, in the Vedic sen¬
tence yajamanam dandena dik$ayati , mekhalayd dik$ayati , the word
38
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHAR1
yajamanam is joined on to each one ofthe verbs without its case-
affix being changed. It is clear that to pick out one word of a
mantra and substitute another for it is an admission that the
individual word has a meaning of its own.
Transference or atidesa is the subjectmatter of adhyaya VI I
and VIII of the Mi. Sii. It means the transference of the details
ofthe prakrtiyaga to a vikrti-yaga. as, for instance, those of the
Darsapurnamasa ifti to other if (is. In everyday life also, such
transference often takes place, as,for instance, when one says:
Behave towards this kfattriya as towards a brahmana. In the
Science of grammar also, there are many cases of such trans¬
ference. For instance, the siitra: Sthanivad adeso’nalvidhau
(P.1.1.53.) actually teaches such transference. As such, trans¬
ference involves the removal of a word or its meaning from its
original context and placing it in a new place. 11 goes to prove
the existence of the individual word and its meaning.]
79. That here candidature (for the fruits of
the sacrifice) means the fact of being entitled to
perform it, whereas no differentiation exists there
in regard to the fruit, that one who gets his right
to perform an action through the fastra is prohibited
from performing another.
[Only the sdstra can tell us who is entitled to perform
a ceremony and who is not. This subject is discussed in the
sixth chapter of Mi. Su. The three factors which confer the
right are : (1) Desire for the fruit, (2) Capacity, (3) absence
of prohibition by the Sdstra. Only the Sdstra can determine
capacity or the absence of it in regard to invisible matters.]
80. T hat here the sequence is understood through
direct injunction, there through utterance etc., that
the sequence is important here, insignificant there.
[How to determine the order in which the different minor
rituals belonging to a major sacrifice are to be performed is
discussed in Adhyaya V of the Mi.Sii. Many guides are given
there. In the sentence: hrdayasyagre’vadyati, athajihvayah, the
two words agre— first and atha — ‘afterwards’ indicate the order.
In the sutra : parasmaipaddnairi nalatus .. (P. 3.4.82), the order of
enumeration indicates the order of application.
II. 81-82
39
This order is sometimes very important, as, for instance m
the Vedic sentence : pratliamam bhojayitavyah tato ’ bhyan-
y j anam = he should be fed first and then anointed. Sometimes,
it is quite significant. Thus, though a tiaimittika sacrifice maybe
mentioned after a kdmya one, the two need not be performed
in their order, because the two are not connected together by
one purpose. Therefore, if the occasion ( nimitta) arises earlier
than the desire, the naimittika sacrifice may be performed earlier.
See Mi.Su. V. 3. 32-36. All this is possible only if the individual
word and its meaning have a separate existence, because, the
determination of the order involves picking a word out of a
sentence.]
81. That this is connected with the subsi¬
diary actions of another and, therefore, brings into
existence the subsidiaries of the ritual in question,
that this does bring into existence (the subsidiaries),
that here, this is inevitable.
[The motive of actions is discussed in adhyaya IV of Mi. Su.
For the principles referred to in the present stanza, examples
canbefound (1) in theworld, (2) in the Vedas, (3) in Vydkarana.
Punyaraja gives only one example. The king who sits on the
elephant causes the umbrella to be held over him and thus
brings into existence its shade. It is not for the elephant that
the umbrella is held and so it does not bring it into existence,
(aprayojako), but as it also benefits by the shade, it also may be
said to bring it into existence. Both the king and the elephant
enjoy the same result, namely, the shade. This is an example
from the world. An example from Vydkarana is this : P. 4.1.92
and P. 4-1 -95 produce the same result, namely, the form dakfi=
son oidakfa. In these two examples, two things become prayo-
jaka, because they lead to the same result or benefit by the
same result.]
82. That this is primary and this is secondary,
that this is the mode of procedure, that this is directly
useful and this is indirectly useful.
[Much space is given in Mimarrisd to the question of what is
primary and*what is subsidiary. In the process of threshing
40
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the corn, for instance, the threshing is subsidiary to the corn
to unhusk which it is performed. Among the different actions
constituting a Vedic sacrifice, some are directly useful while
others are only indirectly so. For instance, the threshing
of corn is directly useful for the performance of the Daria
purnamasa sacrifice while prayaja is so only indirectly. In
Vyakarana also, this distinction can be found. For instance
the stem is directly useful to the suffix; that which qualifies the
stem as a preposition is only indirectly so. An example from
the world is : the ornaments which a man himself wears are
directly useful to him, while those worn by his wife and children
are only indirectly so. This distinction between primary and
secondary, directly useful and indirectly useful, presupposes the
existence of parts of sentence and sentence-meaning.]
83. That here there is difference of power as
well as of function, while there, there is a difference
in the result, that here the distinction has arisen
out of the (particular) relation while there the
difference is insignificant.
\Bheda or difference among actions is dealt with in adhyaya II
of the Mi.Su. As in the other cases, difference can be illustrat¬
ed also by examples taken from the world and the vyakarana-
Sdstra. Lightning can be described as follows : valahakad vidyo-
tate=‘ it flashes from the cloud’, valdhake vidyotate= ‘there is a
flash in the cloud’ valdhako vidyotate=‘ the cloud flashes’. In
these three sentences,the cloud is described as the starting point
(apadana), the abode ( adhikarana ) and the agent ( karla ) of the
act of flashing. There is difference in power and, according to
that, grammar prescribes different endings. This is the differ¬
ence in function. Sometimes, there is only difference in power.
For example, in dhanufa vidhyati= ‘he hits with the bow’. Here
there is only one case ending, the third one but there are two
powers. The bow is thought of as an instrument of the act of
hitting but it cannot be so unless it is the starting-point for the
departure of the arrow. The bow is both apadana and karana,
two distinct powers, but the former is not expressed. The
making of a gift with a view to attain long life, health and pros¬
perity is an instance of difference in result. When different
II. 84-85
41
suffixes expressing different agents are connected with the same
root, the action expressed by this root also appears to be diffe¬
rent. For example, pacati , pacanti. In the sentence pakivaudanam
bhunkte-= ‘he cooks the rice and then eats it’, there really ought
to be a difference in the actions performed by the agent and the
object, but this difference is not emphasised. Hence, there is
only one agent for both actions.]
In addition to the foregoing arguments, the Mimamsaka
wants to put forward some others based chiefly on vyakarana,
in order to prove the existence of the individual word.
84. That here the negative particle is connect¬
ed with the verb while there it is connected with
the noun, that this is secondary while that is primary,
that this is pervasive while that is long or short.
[ Prasajyapratifedha means a negation in which the negative
particle is connected with the verb. Paryudasa is a negation
in which the negative particle is connected with the noun.
Brahmano na hanlavyah is an example of the former and the siitra :
dto’nupasarge kali (P. 3.2.3.) is an example of the latter. In the
siitra : tatpurus ah samdnadhikaranah karmadharayali (P. 1.2.42.)
the word samanadhikarana qualifies tatpuru,sah. This is a sec¬
ondary use of the word, because, primarily, it is not the tatpuru}a
but the component words which ar t samanadhikarana. In ekasruti
durat sambuddhau (P. 1.2.38.), the word satnbuddhi should be taken
in its pervasive ( vyapi ) worldly meaning. All this is possible
only if words are taken out of the sentences and that means that
they have a separate existence.]
85. That this is secondary to many severally
while there the options are numerous, that this is
restricted while that becomes entitled to such a
thing under these circumstances.
[When one verb is connected with many nouns in a sen¬
tence, we have an instance of one thing being secondary to many
severally. The options sometimes allowed in the application
of the rules of Panini are explained by commentators in their
remarks on the siitra: na veti vibhdfd (P. 1.1,44.) An example
of restriction in Grammar is that contained in the siitra :
42
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
patih samasa eva (P. 1.4.8.)which means that the word pati gets
the name of ghi only when it becomes one of the members of a
compound. When one syllable in a word gets the udatta accent,
the others become entitled to nighata *= suppression of the acute
accent, by the sutra: anudattam padam ekavarjam (P. 6.1.158.)
86. That the distinction here is understood
from indications found in another sentence while
the meaning of the word there is obtained by ana¬
lysis.
[When one reads of aktdh sarkarah= ‘sugar mixed with fat’
in the Veda, one wants toknowmixed with what fat. From the
sentence : tejo vai ghrtam= ghee is indeed splendour, one under¬
stands that the sugar is to be mixed with clarified butter ( ghrta).
This is an instance of a distinction being understood from an
indication found in another sentence. When one says :
rdjapuiufah, to ask ‘of which king’ and to get the answer ‘of king
Sudraka’ is an instance of analysing the meaning of a sentence.]
87. Such properties of sentences which depend
upon the meaning of individual words would be
incompatible if the individual words were considered
to be inexpressive ( avacaka ).
The above arguments of the Mimamsaka are now answered.
88. What has been pointed out above is not
inexplicable if one analyses a big sentence into
minor sentences, even though its meaning is really
indivisible.
[The idea is that just as a big sentence is divided into
small sentences on the ground that these latter express minor
ideas, in the same way, though the meaning of a sentence is
really indivisible, we can recognise within it the meanings of
individual words also. Once this is done, all the objections
raised by the Mimamsaka are answered.
The upholder of the individual sentence may argue in one
of the two following ways :—>■
Even if meanings of individual words and of subordinate
sentences exist, one does understand a sentence-meaning in
addition to them. It does exist as a cognition, if not in reality.
II. 89-91
43
Such a sentence-meaning can be analysed on the basis of differ¬
ence in power (fakti) and the meanings of individual words
and of subordinate sentences obtained. The Buddhists believe
in the svalakfana only, something which is absolutely unique,
having nothing in common with anything else in the world.
And yet, they talk about jdti on the basis of apoha, that is, differ¬
ence from everything else. In the same way, the upholder of
the sentence believes in its indivisibility. And yet, on the basis
of analysis through difference of power, individual words and
subordinate sentences and their meanings are recognised as
taking place in cognition, though not' having reality.]
An analogy is now given for seeing differentiation where
there is really unity.
89. Just as the same scent appears to be differ¬
ent when it is found (in different objects like)
flowers, in the same way, differentiation of meaning
can be made within the sentence also.
[One speaks of the smell of a flower or of sandal-wood as
though they were totally different from each other, not realising
that, they are really the same. The idea here seems to be that
scent is one and all-pervasive, even though it may seem to be
different according to the substance where it is found.]
Another analogy is now given.
90. It is like the perception in a gavaya or in a
man-lion, grasped by a single cognition of a part
that is similar to a universal external to it.
[ In a gavaya, there is no universal called gotva, in a man-
lion (narasiniha) , there is no universal called naratva or simhatva.
Whatever universal there is in these two objects is totally differ¬
ent from these two universals. But the average man thinks
that the universals gotva, naratva and simhatva, similar to those
existing in a cow, a man and a lion, exist in a gavaya and nara-
simha. They do not, but mind creates the fiction. In the same
way, the mind creates the fiction of word-meaning within the
indivisible sentence-meaning.]
91. When one sees the unseen and unfamiliar
portion (in them), it is the whole thing which has
44 VAKYAPADfYAM OF BHARTRFIARI
become unintelligible to the man of feeble intelli¬
gence.
[When one sees in a gavaya a part that resembles the cow
and another part that resembles some other animal, the fact is
that one does not see correctly the object at all.]
92. In the same way, in sentences that become
totally different by the addition of the word pika
(cuckoo) and other elements,, what appears to be
similar is really non-existent.
[Though apparently the only difference between vanad
vrk$a aniyatam and vanat pika aniyatam is that, in the latter sen¬
tence, there is the word pika instead of the word vrk$a , still it is
held that the latter sentence is totally different from the former.
The portion that appears to be common, namely, vanad aniyatam
is really non-existent as a sentence is indivisible. When there
appears to be a doubt about the meaning of one word, it is really
the meaning of the whole sentence which is in doubt.]
93. Just as one indivisible knowledge appears
to resemble another indivisible knowledge in one
part and to differ in another.
94. In the same way, even though the sentences
are indivisible and differ from one another com¬
pletely one perceives difference (between them in
parts).
[The knowledge of blue resembles the knowledge of green
in that both are knowledge but differs from it inasmuch as the
contents of the two are different. Or the point might be illus¬
trated by taking two pictures, the colour of one of which is
green and blue while that of the other is green and yellow.
The two pictures would resemble each other in parts and
differ in parts but in reality they are two different partless
wholes. Similarly, two sentences which appear to resemble
each other in having a common word and word-meaning are
really two different indivisible wholes.]
II. 95-99
45
95 . How is one to determine the limits of an
individual word considering that its form changes.
If its limits are not determined, how can its meaning
be fixed ?
[ In the sentence dadhy anaya, the word dadhi has changed its
form into dadhy because of what follows.]
If a sentence is indivisible, how can the sentence Sveto
dhavati be the answer to two different questions at the same time?
This is answered as follows—
96. In the other view (anyatra= that of indi¬
visibility) there is a kind of coalescence of forms in
such words as sveta h; by the law of extension (tantra),
it is to be taken as different for these two different
forms.
[By tantra, the same word stands for both the forms. For
the meaning of tantra, see the notes on Ka.77.)
97 . In one and the same word (sveta) there is
a coalescence of different forms. Though not really
different from each other, they are separated (because
they convey different meanings.)
(In Ka.96, it is said that Svetah brings two separate expres¬
sions to the mind : Svaitah and Svetah, each of which conveys
its own meaning. Here we are told that Svetah directly conveys
the two meanings.]
It is now shown that, in grammar also, one verbal form
sometimes conveys two things.
98. In this Science, sometimes there is an equali¬
ty of number between the conveyor and the con¬
veyed and sometimes there is difference.
99 . In the sutra : ukalo’jjhrasvadirghap luiah (P.
1 . 2 . 27 ) it is on the basis of equality of number that
mutual correspondence is established; but in the
46
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHAR1
sutra : syaiasi Irlutoh (P. 3.1.33.) a difference in the
number as between the conveyor and the conveyed
is present.
[The sutra P. 1.2.27 means : vowels having the duration
of u, u and u are called short, long and protracted respectively.
Thus, this sutra teaches three names to be applied to three differ¬
ent things. There is equality of number between the names
and the named. P.3.1.33 means : let sya and tasi be added
to roots when followed by Ir and tut lr stands for Irt and
Irh. Thus there are two conveyors and three conveyed.]
100. Ta in the sutra : yasyeti ca (P. 6.4.148.)
denotes the two vowels ( i and a ) and stands for
all the named (samjninah) through identity ( abheda).
Because the bare thing which is understood cannot
convey all of them.
[Yasyeti ca (P. 6.4.148) means : i or a, belonging to a stem
called bha is dropped when followed by i or a of a taddhita suffix
or by long i. Ya in the sutra stands for f. and a. In the same
way, the word §velah stands for sva-\-itah and Svetah. ]
101. The form u (in P. 1.2.27) though in¬
divisible, is the cause of the understanding of three
separate ‘u’s through separate sentences. This sep¬
arate application is just like the latter element
[pararupa ) standing for itself and the preceding
element (purvarupa) when it becomes the substitute
for both.
[ Panini often teaches that when two vowels meet, the latter
should remain and take the place of both. For example in
P. 6.1.94— ehi pararupam='wh.&n a preposition ending in a is
followed by a root beginning with e or 0 , the latter vowel takes the
place of both. This is an exception to P. 6.1.88 which re¬
quires vrddhi in such cases. The sound which comes in the
place of both is called pararupa. It stands for both. Similarly,
svetah stands for both : svd itah and Svetah.]
All this has been said on the basis of abheda. It is now
stated that Katyayana believes in bheda and not in abheda.
II. 102-104
47
102 . By rejecting the prolongation of a parti¬
cular portion (of a diphthong) in connection with
protraction (pluti) and by rejecting the combina¬
tion of two vowels, he (the varttikakdra ) has adopted
difference.
[The siilra : plutav eca idutau (P. 8.2.106.) = when e, ai, o
or au is to be protracted, it is their first element, namely, i or u
that is protracted. Punyaraja apparently quotes the follow¬
ing : ahgavivrddhir nopapadyate , na hy aico’vayaua akara, ikara,
ukaro wz=This protraction of a part of the diphthongs in ques¬
tion, that is, e, ai, o, au, is not right because a, i, or u is not a part
of c, ai, o, or au. This passage is not found in the vdrttikas or the
Mahabhasya.
While considering the sulra : samaharah svaritah (P. 1.2.31.)
Katyayana says :— samahdro'coicet, nabhavat= if it is said that
it is the vowels which are combined, it is not right, for there is
no such thing. Thus Katyayana rejects the idea that here
there is a combination of vowels.]
Tiantra is the accepted view. That is now explained.
103. Just as there are different forms for
ardharca and other such words on the basis of the
sequence (of their elements) in the same way,
according to the view that they are one, different
forms can be understood otherwise (that is, as one).
[The compound word is ardharca (P. 2.4.31.) but its ana¬
lysis is : rco'rddham. Thus, the same thing has two forms on
the basis of the sequence of its elements. Similarly, two differ¬
ent things can be combined into one on the basis of tantra as
in ivetah ]
104. The phonemes, in themselves unchang¬
ing, become different by taking on new powers
when there is connected speech ( samlrita ).
[The one word svetah appears to have the power to convey
more than one meaning. When it is looked upon as the result
of the unification of artificially analysed elements (that is.
48
V v \KYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRIIARI
§va and itah) it acquires the power to convey another meaning.
Really speaking, there is no unification of separate elements.]
105. Objects, without giving up their real
form are perceived differently as a result of some
defect in our senses. The same is the case with
words.
[ A defect in our eyes makes us see the same thing in differ¬
ent forms. In the same way, on account of artificial analysis,
the same woi'd can take on many forms.]
106. As a result of the mode of pronouncing
it, the same word appears to be different though
no change has taken place in it.
[The word Svetah, while remaining the same, appears to
consist of iva and itah on account of a particular mode of pro¬
nunciation.]
107. What is called saman is either the rk sung
in a particular manner or it is the song itself. It is
not a separate entity. These very transformed
hymns (rks ) differ from one another according to
the particular method in which they are sung.
[It is well-known that the hymns included in the Sama-
veda are found in the Rg-Veda also. They are collected together
separately only for the purpose of singing them in a particular
manner. This is what is meant by the sutra : gttifu samakliya
{Mi. Sii. II. 1.3.6.)]
The principle of tantra is again explained.
108. Many forms, different from one another,
resembling those of which only one will be retained,
are, in this way ( upayat) coalesced into one. Be¬
ing uttered in a compressed form, it is considered to
be cofrect in the sastra.
[Tantra means compressing several forms into one. The
compressed form stands for all of them. In the verse, the word
ekase$inam is used because of the resemblance of the process
adopted in tvetah to what happens in an ekaSe$a likcdevau which
II. 109-111
49
stands for devasca devasca . A real eka§e$a is the retention of one
out of many identical forms. In Svetah, there are no identical
forms, but there are many forms which are coalesced into one.
There is only resemblance and not identity.]
109. By accepting it (the word svetah ) to be
a form common to different phrases, it should be
used for conveying more than one meaning. Other¬
wise, such forms would not be correct.
[ Svetah is an indivisible word having the meaning of‘white 5
or it is a combination of Sva and itah and, therefore, divisible.
It is really two words but because of the identity of the phoneme
sequence, it is looked upon as one. That is why it can be used
to convey two meanings. Ordinarily one word conveys one
meaning only.]
no. By means of compressed utterance, one
correct form is obtained for sentences that are similar
to one another.
[Just as Panini has taught the retention of one of many
identical individual words, he has not taught the retention, in
the same manner, of one among many identical sentences. But
padatantra^vakyatantra and vdkyaikase$a do play a part in gram¬
mar. Svetah is an example of padatantra : the use of adjectives
and verbs in a sentence in such a manner that they can be taken
in the singular or dual number. What is called tantra by the
grammarians is $abda$le$a and artha$le$a is ekaSe$a . There is
vakyaikaSe$a when a general statement sums up several special
statements. For example : TaSo vidhatuh kathayanti khanditam—
‘they declare the glory of the Creator as marred 5 . This
general statement sums up the previous special statements
found in the same verse. See Ainbdkarin on Vak. II. 110.]
An example is now given.
hi. Just as one and the same sound appears
to be different according as it is produced by a
flute or some other musical instrument, in the same
way, different forms are reduced to one.
[What is pointed out here is that just as one can become
.i-
50
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
many through some conditioning factor, in the same way,
through compression ( tantra ) many can become one as in
ivetah.~\
The author now refutes the view that if the doctrine of
indivisibility were true, intermediary sentences would become
meaningless.
112. Just as the intermediary sentences (form¬
ing part of a big sentence or passage) and resem¬
bling words (forming parts of a sentence ) are recog¬
nised as separate, in the same way, these senten¬
ces may be recognised as separate (even when they
do not form part of a sentence.)
[The idea here seems to be that by resorting to analysis
(apoddhara) we ascribe meanings to intermediary sentences
which form part of a big sentence. When these intermediary
sentences are independent, they would have a meaning all the
more. So the objection raised in verse 76 does not hold good.]
The author now points out a defect in the view that purpose
{prayojana) is the meaning of a sentence.
113. He who holds that the expressed sense
belongs to the word and that the sentence denotes
purpose cannot establish any connection between
one sentence and another.
[Punyaraja, in his commentary on verses 1-2 enumerates
six views on the nature of the meaning of a sentence. That
is, purpose ( prayojana ) is one of them. This is supposed to be
common to all the views on the nature of the sentence-meaning.
According to this, what is understood on hearing a sentence,
that is, its abhidheya is not the sentence-meaning but the purpose
to fulfil which the speaker utters it. But if the sentence has no
abhidheya , an expressed meaning, there would be no connection
between sentences because such connection is always through
the expressed meaning.]
But the defect can be removed according to the anvita -
bhidhana .
114. It is only verbs which have mutual
re-
II. 115-116
51
quirement and a relation, based on such verbs is
understood between sentences (even if purpose is
taken to be the meaning of a sentence).
[According to anvitabhidhana , the verb which expresses
action brings the means ( sddhana) to the mind. Words expres¬
sive of the means do not bring action to the mind in the same
manner. As between action and the means, the former is
primary and the latter secondary. In this view, the verb
brings the means to the mind and the relation between the two
is the expressed meaning of the sentence ( abhidheya ). Thus
sentences are not devoid of abhidheya and so there can be con¬
nection between them.]
It might be said against the anvitabhidhana that, if the very.
first word expresses the particularised meaning, the remaining
words would be useless. This is answered as follows—
115. Repetition or restatement tends to make
the meaning of the word clearer. All the words
belonging to a sentence being present the meaning
of (the whole) sentence is present in each of them.
[The defect mentioned is removed by pointing out that the
other words would serve the purpose of restricting and speci¬
fying the other words with whose meaning the meaning of the
first word is connected. It is also pointed out that even when
the other words are not yet uttered, they are already present
in the mind of the speaker and so they serve to determine the
meaning of the first word, to give it a certain completeness.
See verse 18.] .
It is now stated how the indivisible sentence is divided by
some.
116. Even though the meaning of a sentence is
without differentiation, divisions are brought about
by the difference in the background of their authors.
On this subject, there have been many views among
ancient thinkers. • •
52
vakyapadIyam of bhartrhari
[What is pointed out here is that thinkers are in*
fluenced, by the systems of thought to which they belong, in
their view about the nature of the meaning of a sentence.
They try to make it conform to their other doctrines.]
117 . Others have declared that all words are
the cause of a flash of understanding through prac¬
tice ( abliyasa ), even in the case of children and
animals in their understanding of things as they are.
[All words, of whatever kind, are the cause of a flash of
understanding according to some. This is as true of those
who know the language as of those who do not, like children
and animals. That is why fixed words are used by men in their
dealings with animals, so that they may have this under¬
standing through practice. After they get this flash of under¬
standing, they act in particular ways. What is meant by
practice or lohg usage is the repeated use of the same word
for the same purpose or in the same situation. It is a kind
of predisposition. When the horse hears the sound of the
whip, it understands something and acts in a particular way.
The relation between that sound and the action of the horse
is natural and spontaneous.]
118 . That practice is not the result of agama
(transmission of tradition in this life) . Some look
upon it as convention. It is in the form of : this
should be done after that.
[The abhyasa mentioned in the previous vei'se is not the
result of the transmission of tradition to the child in this life.
It is something which the child has inherited from its previous
life. The word agama in that verse may not mean anything more
than cause. As we cannot see its cause in this life, the practice
is called anagama. As it comes from previous lives, it is as good
as eternal. Others look upon it as a result of convention, estab¬
lished by man or god.]
Thus, it has been concluded that the sentence is indi¬
visible and that its meaning is Intuition which is also indi-
II. 119-121
53
visible. But, for practical purposes, we analyse a sentence into
words and word-meanings. The nature of these meanings is
now set forth. There are twelve views. The first view:—
119 . All words have a meaning amounting to :
‘something exists 5 . This meaning is the characteris¬
tic of the thing denoted by each word. In the case
of words like go , they say, it is similar to what is
denoted by such words as apurva , devoid and svorga.
[The meaning of a word is in the nature of a generality,
having no particular form. When we hear the words apurva ,
devala and svarga , we visualise no definite shape or form. This
is what Punyaraja says. Kamalasila also says the same thing
in his Pafijikd on Tattvasangraha 886. It is true that we visua¬
lise a form when we hear such words as gauh, aSvah etc., but
that is due to the concurrence of the senses. From these three
words, we just understand a meaning, without any shape or
form.]
Why not include shape and form in the meaning of a
word wherever they are understood ?
120 . The perception of a particular form which
takes place as a result of our seeing a word used
constantly for a particular object does not come
within the range of a word. That is the result of a
special effort.
[The special effort is the experience of the repeated use
of a word for a particular object. It must be distinguished
from the normal power of a word. ]
The second view
121 . Certain distinctive features are revealed
by the words expressive of them while others under¬
stood subsequently are also considered to be this
meaning.
54
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[What is expressed directly by the word is the universal.
Whatever else is understood with it is not the expressed mean¬
ing of the word. But some consider what is subsequently under¬
stood also as the meaning of the word.]
This is now refuted.
122 . The word expressive of the universal does
not express the varieties of the particular which is
necessarily understood when the word expresses the
universal (primarily).
[A universal must have a substratum. The particular is
the substratum of it and so it is necessarily understood, but
not its varieties and peculiarities. What is necessarily under¬
stood cannot be considered to be its meaning.]
123 . An expressive word (like ghata = ajar)
does not denote the shapes and forms of a jar as it
rests only on the general idea (that is common to
all the jars). One, however, inevitably understands
them.
[When we hear the word ghata, we understand only what
is common to all jars and not all the possible forms and shapes
of a jar.]
An illustration of this inevitability is now given.
124 . An action expressed by a word is never
seen except with (the means necessary for) its accom¬
plishment. The understanding of the means [pra-
yoga) happens subsequently. The same is true of
the meaning of words.
[The word prayoga which means execution or accomplish¬
ment is understood by Punyaraja in the sense of association
with the means of an action. The idea is that when one thinks
of an action, one necessarily thinks of the means of its accom¬
plishment.]
II. 125-126
55
The third view
125. Others accept as the expressed meaning
of a word both the fixed actions as well as the
means necessary for their accomplishment.
[In this verse, the word prayoga seems to be used in a
different meaning. It cannot mean sadhana as in the previous
verse, because it is mentioned separately. Punyaraja does not
discuss it. It appears to mean action or application. What is
emphasised here is that all that is understood from the word,
action as well as means of action, the universal as well as
the particular, is its expressed meaning. There is no ground
for distinguishing between what is expressed and what is
implied. The different elements may stand in the relation of
primary and secondary to each other.]
The fourth view
126 (ab). According to others, the particular
forms taken as a whole but without choice or combina¬
tion are the expressed meaning of a word.
[ If a word denotes all the forms and shapes taken on by
the individuals coming under it, it would always have to be
put in the plural number. If, on the other hand, it denotes
an indefinite number of such forms and shapes, there would
be indefiniteness in regard to number. That is why the author
says : avikalpasamuccayah . What it appears to mean is that
the exact number of forms and shapes is not present to the
mind. See Tattvasahgraha , 887, with Paiijika. Punyaraja says
that this matter will be discussed in detail in the upamdsamud -
deSa. There is no such samuddeta among the fourteen which
make up the third kanda . Can it be a lost samuddeia ?]
The fifth view
126 (cd). Still others think that it is the unreal
connection (of things with their universal).
56
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[The view is that a word like ghata denotes the relation
between the object and the universal etc. which inhere in it.
As this relation cannot be perceived apart from the things
which it unites, it is said to be unreal. See Tattvasangraha 887
with the Panjikd .]
The sixth view
127 (ab). The real, conditioned by the unreal,
is the meaning of the word.
[See Vak. III. DravyasamuddeSa where it is declared that
all words denote the ultimate Substance as conditioned or
limited by some unreal thing, just as all gold ornaments stand
for gold, conditioned by the particular shape of that orna¬
ment. See Tattvasangraha , 888 with Panjikd. ]
The seventh view
127 (cd). Or the word itself, when it becomes
the abhijalpa , is its meaning.
[What abhijalpa is becomes clear from the next verse.
See Tattvasangraha , 888, with the Paiijika .]
128. When the form of the word is identified
with the object, in the form : ‘that is this’, the word
is called abhijalpa.
[The word is superimposed on the object. The object
is, as it were, hidden by the word. The two are identified.
This identification itself is called abhijalpa and the word which
is superimposed on the object is also called abhijalpa. See
Tattvasangraha, 889, with the Panjikd. It is the word which
is superimposed on the object and not vice versa. That is why
the object is said to be hidden.]
129 . Word and meaning, being thus invariably
identified with each Other through long usage, one
II. 130-132
57
of them assumes predominance over the other on
occasions.
130 . In the world, a word is known chiefly as
identical with the meaning (object): in the Science
of Grammar, on the other hand, there can be im¬
portance of both, according to the speaker’s
intention.
[Word and meaning are so intimately united that to
separate them and to consider one of them to be more
important than the other is difficult. In the world, the mean¬
ing (object) is more important than the form of the word. In
Grammar, sometimes the word as in P. 4.2.33. and sometimes
the object as in P. 4.1.92. assumes importance.]
The eighth view
131. Either because it (the object) has no
power or because it has all powers, it is through
words that it is presented in a fixed form such as
action.
[An object is as the word presents it. A word can present
it emphasising its action aspect or its universal aspect oi its
qualities. The object has no power of its own. Itisasthe
word presents it.
The ninth view
Another way of looking at it is that a thing has all
powers, but the word emphasises one of them according to
circumstances.]
The tenth view
132 . Others declare that the meaning is some¬
thing mental but resting on an external object and
is looked upon as the meaning of the word when it
is externalised.
58
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
[See Tattvasangraha 890 with th z Paiijika. There it is
pointed out that as long as the meaning or the object is purely
rtientalj it does not become connected with action. A word
must convey something capable of being connected with action.
So what is mentally grasped must be externalised. It is only
then that it becomes the meaning of a word.]
The eleventh view
133. The external forms conveyed by some
words are based upon distinct reminiscences. The
meaning of others is in the nature of bare under¬
standing.
[Words like ghata , pata, go, convey a meaning having a
shape which is the residual trace of the actual experience of
the corresponding external object having a shape. Words like
apurva, devata, and dharma convey a meaning which is not
characterised by any shape or form. A bare understanding
takes place.]
The twelfth view
134. Just as our senses perceive the same object
in different ways, in the same way, an object is
understood from words in different ways.
[Punyaraja attributes the difference in our way of
perceiving the same thing to defects in our senses. It may be
due to other causes such as distance and the absence of suffi¬
cient light.]
135. The meaning of words, intended by the
speaker to be one thing, is understood by different
listeners differently, according to their own back¬
ground.
[Punyaraja points out that everybody, in using and
understanding a word, is influenced by his own background.
A VaiSe$ika may use the word ghata to convey a whole but the
II. 136-140
59
Sankhya will understand from it a mere combination of qualities
and the Jaina and the Bauddha a collection of atoms.]
13 6. With regard to the same thing, one’s
views undergo change. The same person sees the
same thing differently at different times.
[Punyaraja attributes the difference to the study, by
the same person, of different Sastras at different times.]
137. To one and the same word are attributed
many meanings by one and the same person or by
many persons according to undefined ciicum-
stances.
[The same person understands different meanings from
the same word at different times according to the different
disciplines under whose influence he comes. On the other
hand, many persons, trained under the influence of different
systems of thought, understand different meanings from the
same word at one and the same time.]
13 8. Therefore, cognitions and words of people
who have not seen the truth, being full of mistakes
and deceptions, are unreliable.
139. Nor can the vision of the sages, based on
truth, be brought into human transactions, foi it is
not the basis of the use of words.
[In the empirical stage, the sages are on the same level as
ordinary men. They perceive things with their senses and
the mind and use words according to what figures in theii
mind. See Vak III. Sam 53.].
140. The sky is perceived as a surface and the
firefly as fire. There is no surface in the sky nor is
the firefly fire.
60
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
[ Tala is explained in the Bhdmati and in the Ratnaprabhd
as a big frying pan made of sapphire. Naiva casti talarri vyomni =
there is no tala in the sky leads us to take the vat in talavat as
a matup suffix and not as the suffix vati. If this is correct, tala
may mean nothing more than a part or division. See Ambd-
kartri on this stanza. See Mahdbharata , Santiparvan , adh. 112 for
this verse and Nilakantha’s commentary thereon.]
141 . Therefore, the wise man should examine
by reasoning even an object apprehended by direct
perception. He should not form his idea of the
object on the authority of the perception itself.
[An object is not necessarily as we see it. A little re¬
flection may convince us that it is otherwise.]
142 . In regard to objects which are difficult to
define, the wise man should not deviate from the
definitions of them adopted by men of the world in
their usage.
[According to Punyaraja, what is emphasised here is that
the indefinability of worldly objects being understood, it is
better to follow in practical life the worldly conception of
them. To try to have another worldly conception of them
would be useless repetition ( piftape$ana ) of work already
done.]
The author now continues his statement on pratibha.
143 . When the meanings (of the individual
words) have been understood separately, a flash of
understanding takes place which they call the mean¬
ing of the sentence, brought about by the meanings
of the individual words.
[Even though the meanings of the individual words are
not real or rather have only a practical reality, they serve
the purpose of bringing the sentence-meaning to the mind.
They are the manifesters of the sentence-meaning.]
II. 144-147
61
144. It cannot be explained to others as such
and such. It is experienced by everyone within
himself and even the subject (of the experience) is
not able to render an account of it to himself.
[The difficulty of defining the special taste of a drink
made up of many ingredients is usually given as an example
of the difficulty of defining the meaning of a sentence.]
145. It is something indefinable ( avicarita ) and
it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the
meanings of individual words, covering the whole
sentence as it were, it becomes its object.
[Even though this flash of understanding called sentence¬
meaning is indefinable, its affect can be indicated : it brings
about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of the indivi¬
dual words. One can also say that it is the meanings of the
individual words which manifest it. Otherwise, the under¬
standing of the meanings of the individual words before the
final understanding of the sentence-meaning would be useless. ]
146. None can avoid in one’s activities that
(flash of understanding) produced either through
words or through the working of one’s predisposi¬
tions.
[All activity of living beings is preceded by this pratibha,
which is either produced here and now or is inherited from
previous births. It is words which we hear from others that
produce it here and now (in addition to other factors). In
the case of children and animals, they are born with a predis¬
position. Pratibha and itikartavyata are not the same. The
latter is the result of the former.]
147. The whole world considers that to be the
authority (in daily life). Even the activities of
animals develop because of that.
62
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[Punyaraja compares this intuition to the conscience
of good people which is able to decide what is right and what
is wrong quite instinctively. He quotes Kalidasa’s famous
verse : satarn hi sandehapade$u vastusu pramanam antahkarana-
pravrttayah = in matters of doubt, one’s own conscience is the
guide of good people.]
148 . Just as some substances acquire the power
to intoxicate and the like by mere maturity, without
the help of any special effort, in the same way are
intuitions produced in those that possess them.
[The Intuitions are caused, says Punyaraja by predis¬
positions, peculiar to every living being of every species.
Instead of mada, another reading is manda. Punyaraja obviously
had mada which seems to me to be a better reading.]
149 . Who transforms the voice of the male
cuckoo in spring ? Who teaches living beings to
build nests etc. ?
[It follows from the way in which the subject is treated
that in the case of human beings also, the Intuition pro¬
duced at the moment when we hear words is not only caused
by the words but also by something inherited from previous
lives.]
150 . Who goads beasts and birds on to actions
like eating, loving, hating, swimming etc. associated
with particular species and pedigrees ?
[Plavana can mean floating, swimming, jumping etc.
which animals and birds do well instinctively.]
151 . This Intuition is the result of Tradition
(agama) accompanied by bhavana. The Tradition
is differentiated inasmuch as it is proximate or
:remote.
II. 152-154
63
[The words agama , bhavand , asatti and viprakar$a are not
clear. They can mean many things. The difficulty is to decide
what Bhartrhari meant. Punyaraja understands by agama
the word. Did he have the words of the Veda in mind ?
The word, proximate or remote is the cause of Intuition.
As such, it is assisted by bhavand , that is, the tendency to act
according to the nature of the different classes of beings. This
tendency is either inherited from previous births or it arises
in this very life. From the karika , it appears that the relation
of causality is bhavand^>dgama^>pratibhd. By bhavand , does
Bhartrhari mean what he calls Sabdabhdvand in Vak. I. 114
( 122 )?]
152. This Intuition is of six kinds according
ns it results from nature, adherence to one’s own
Veda, Practice, Toga , Invisible factor, intervention of
specially qualified persons.
[The Vrtti and Punyaraja differ widely in their examples
of svabhava . Punyaraja cites the behaviour of a monkey as an
example of Intuition caused by Nature (svabhava). The
Vrtti, on the other hand, mentions the natural tendency of
Prakrti to evolve into mahat etc., our natural tendency to awake
after sleep. The knowledge of Vasistha and others is given as
an example of pratibha resulting from adherence to one’s Veda.
Intuition resulting from practice is exemplified by the know¬
ledge of well-diggers as to the exact location of water in the
ground. Yogis have Intuition of what is going on in other
people’s minds. The power of Raksasas etc. to enter into other
people’s bodies and to disappear suddenly is attributed to
adr$ta (Invisible factor). Lastly, the knowledge which Sanjaya
and others got of the progress of the widely scattered fighting
in the Mahabharata war was due to the intervention of
specially qualified persons like Krsnadvaipayana.]
The author now begins the consideration of the question
of what is primary and important and what is secondary and
implied in the meaning of a word.
153-154. Just as the word go (cow), though it
64
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
might be applied to an animal adorned with arti¬
cles which cling to it, cannot be said to be expres¬
sive of these articles.
In the same way, a word, though applied to objects
which are characterised by shape, colour and parts, cannot
include these characteristics (in its denotation).
[A word denotes either the universal as Vajapyayana
thinks or it denotes the particular as Vyadi thinks, though
both are understood. Even the shape, colour etc. of an object
are not included in the expressed meaning of a word, what
to say of external objects like ornaments, temporarily asso¬
ciated with an object.
The Vrtti says the same thing slightly differently. Both
for one who considers the individual to be the meaning of the
word and for one who considers the universal to be it, the
other things which are different from the real meaning of the
word are just understood, that’is, they are not part of the
denotation of the word— nabhidheyatvena Srutibhili prakaSyante .]
Something is now said about words whose primary
meaning is form, shape or colour.
155 . A word which is applied to an object as
qualified by a shape, colour and parts, cannot be
considered to denote only a portion thereof.
[Words like sthula , hrasva , karbura , Sabala do express parti¬
cular shapes and colours directly. They are not merely im¬
plied. Some shape or colour is the very basis of their appli¬
cation. They do not denote a part of these shapes or colours.
Hundred may include fifty as its part but the word Satam does
not denote fifty.
The Vrtti says the same thing but gives its own illustra¬
tions. Words like parimandala , dirgha , caturaSra denote things
having these shapes and not parts of these shapes. Similarly,
words like muffi , granthi , sandhi , kundala denote things having
that shape and not parts of that shape. Words expressive of
colour such as citra, kalma§a , sarahga do not denote parts of
these colours. Words like iatam , sahasram y prastha , drona y md$a y
II. 156-158
65
samvatsara are expressive of wholes and do not denote their
parts.]
Apart from such words, ordinarily a word denotes the
universal.
156. A word denoting water applies equally to
a drop and to a large collection of it, irrespective of
number, size and shape.
[The M. Bhd says that the word ghrta = clarified butter,
can be applied to a drop or to a whole gallon of it. (See
M.Bha. I. p. 184, line 19. and on P. 5.1.115.)].
157. A word (like taila or ghrta applied to oil
etc, particularised through improvement etc. really
denotes a part of it, identified with the whole. It is,
therefore, really a word expressive of a part.
(Both improvement and pollution of substances like oil
mean their particularisation. Still, we use the general word
to denote the improved or polluted substance. Thus used, it
denotes a part of it only, but a part identified with the whole.
This is a reference to M. Bhd. I. p.12, 1.18-20. The context is
the explanation of the varttika which says that Vydkarana stands
for both the forms tc be explained ( lak$ya ) and the rules
which explain them ( lak$ana ). And yet, sometimes, ,we apply
the word to the rules only. In the world also, a word which
means the whole is sometimes applied to the part. Pancdla is
the name of the whole country but when we say ipiirve pancaldh ,
it is applied only to its eastern region. When we say tailam bhnk-
tam , though the word taila stands for all the oil that has been
medicated, here it means only the dose which has been taken.
In other words, the word for the whole has been used for a
part.]
15 8. A word, the use of which is connected with
a particular meaning, ceases to be used if that mean¬
ing is absent.
66
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
[This karika gives the fixed definition of the cause of the
application of the word (prayojana) of what is conveyed by the
word ( abhidheya ).
It is given as verse 160 by Dr. R. Pillai but the Vrtti
. gives it here. ]
15 9. A word which is used after including in
its denotation attributes which happen to be present
does not invariably depend upon the presence of
these attributes before it is used.
[There may be certain things which are not the cause
of the application of a word to something, but accompany the
cause, are connected with it and are understood at the time
of the use of the word, as though they are part of the meaning
of the word. But their presence or absence does not affect the
application of the word. As the Vrtti says : te$am sannidhyam
asannidhyam vo, §Q,bddpr&vrttdvQ.kdrQjicirii .]
160. Even though the word ‘co^w 5 may be used
even in the absence of hair, hoof etc., it cannot be
used when ‘cow-ness 5 itself is absent.
[Here also, a distinction is made between that which
is the real meaning of a word and causes its application to an
object and that which may ordinarily accompany it. The latter
is not included in the meaning of the word. A part is included
in the whole but the word which denotes the whole does not
necessarily express its parts. Similarly, a particular shape or
colour may accompany the universal but it is not the meaning
of the word as the universal is.
The Vrtti points out that it is the presence or absence of
the universal which determines whether a word can be used
to denote an object. When the universal is understood from
the word, its substratum is also understood. One does see
the use of a word expressive of the original material for its
modification ( vikara ) also. Similarly, a word expressive of
the whole is used for a part also. In the words of the Vrtti —-
II. 161-163
67
JDrfta ca vikdre ca prakrtau ca prakrlisabdapravrtlih. Avaycive ca
samudaye ca samudaya§abdapravrtlidar§anam. ]
161. It is difficult for anybody to see all the
parts of an object. From the few parts which are
perceived, the whole object is inferred.
[Here a kind of analogy is made between perceptive
knowledge and knowledge obtained through words. It is
well-known that the word expresses what is understood
through the senses. It was said before that it expresses the uni¬
versal and not the things which may accompany it. In other
words, it does not denote the whole object. Similarly, percep¬
tion also does not cover the whole object.
The Vrtti points out that sometimes, after seeing a part
of an object, one cannot infer the whole. A doubt may linger :
kvacitta sandeho naiva nivartate. tadyatha dadhimatradarSane .
The example, however, is not clear. The text may be wrong.
Or it may mean that when we see curds only, we cannot
decide from which milk (cow’s or buffalo’s, for instance), it
has been made.]
162. In the same way, it is seen that one under¬
stands (from the words jdtigandha , utpalagandlia
etc.) those qualities which accompany and are
always associated with the smell (of these two
flowers).
[The idea here is that though the qualities which accom¬
pany the smell are understood, they cannot be looked upon as
the meaning of these two words. The Sarikhyas who look upon
an object (substance) as nothing more than a combination of
some qualities and not as an entity over and above them may
hold that the words express the qualities. The Vrtti is pro¬
bably referring to them in its last sentence on this verse.]
163. Therefore, even though qualities which
happen to be present are understood from a word,
68
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
it is that which is invariably present which is inti¬
mately connected with the word.
[A possible accompanying quality is not recognised as the
expressed meaning of a word. A natural relation of such a
meaning with the word is not acceptable:— j\'a hi tathdbhutenar-
thatmana sabdasya sambanddho ’piyujyate, as the Vrtti puts it.]
Now begins the consideration of the meaning of parts or
nouns.
164. Case-endings are either expressive or sug¬
gestive of numbers like two. Or it might be consi¬
dered that the whole (consisting of stem and suffix
combined) denotes an object qualified by number
etc.
165. Or it might be considered that words like
‘cow’ denote objects possessing number according
to their nature, without (actually) expressing this
number.
[Three views are expressed in the above two verses : (1)
the case-endings express or suggest (illuminate, manifest)
number, means etc., (2) the stem and the case-ending together
denote number etc., either by itself being meaningless, (3)
words ending in case-endings denote objects qualified by
number, etc. without being actually expressive of them. Such
discussions are the early forms of the discussions in later gram¬
matical literature as to whether the stem ( pratipadika ) denotes
one, two, three, four or five things. See M.Bha. on P. 1.2.64.
As usual, the Vrtti is written in rather obscure language
and here and there the text is also doubtful. Its contents may
be summarised somewhat as follows—-Just as worldly
usage is done by dividing the sentence into words and word-
meanings, in the same way, fastraic usage is carried out by
abstracting stems and suffixes from individual words. In this
matter, some think as follows—If the method of agreement
and difference is adopted there is, in a word, only as much
II. 165
69
meaning as can be obtained by this method and nothing
beyond that for the whole. Whatever additional meaning is
understood from the whole does not come from the word itself.
The Mimamsakas argue as follows—Stems and suffixes have
been mostly put forward on the basis of analysis by the cul¬
tured and their meanings, the basis of the iastraic work of the
Acaryas , are analysed by the practical method of agreement
and difference {anvaya and vyatireka) .This analysis is for the pur¬
pose of showing that these two meanings are only a means of
•conveying the whole. In the world, for the cognition of the mea¬
ning of the whole, there is no division into stem-meaning and
suffix meaning. Therefore, according to some, the stem conveys
its own meaning ( svartha) the individual (dravya), gender, num¬
ber and case. The case-endings only illuminate the cases like
the object {karma) . According to others, the stem expresses
only its own meaning, the individual, and gender and the case-
endings denote number and case. The expression of number
and case by the stem is only optional, according to possibility.
According to some, gender is an expressed meaning while
according to others, it is only illuminated. Illumination is of
two kinds : (1) conveying something which has no verbal
element of its own ( andvirbhutdvirbhavanam ), (2) eliminating
one and retaining the other. For example, in prati^thate y
utpucchayate and abhimandyate . Retaining one takes place in the
case of words the usage of which is well-known or not well-
known. For example, upaste prapacati y adhite , adhyeti . Or the
stem and the suffix together convey a single idea as in pdcaka ,
gopayita , brdhmanadhma and jugupsate. In these words, the
suffixes aka , dya y kha and san do not convey any separate
meaning.
Alternatively, the whole, undivided into parts, endowed
with many powers, closely linked with one another, expresses
a meaning having a number. Without directly expressing a
number at the time of the use of the word, meanings deter¬
mined by different numbers which are transitory, are conveyed
by words having different forms.
The Vrtti says that the different numbers are transitory
like carpets round the neck of a crow :— samkhydvi$e$aih kdka -
kanthe gunakambalavadanityaili. The analogy is not clear.]
70
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
166. The meaning of those words whose rela¬
tion with meaning is eternal and whose power to
denote their meaning has been understood by
analysis, can also be understood by agreement and
difference.
[Words and their meanings are analysed by the method
of anvaya and vyatireka. That is, recurrent parts of the meaning
are ascribed to recurrent parts of the word.]
167. The meaning of a particular part of a
word (stem or suffix) is to be taken as settled only
if these (agreement and difference) can be applied
without fail. That is not the case (for instance) in
nut and sap.
[The last point in this verse can be illustrated as follows
—In bhavatam (genitive plural of bhavat) there is no nut, still
it expresses the sense of the genitive plural just as well as
devanam where, ml is present. Can we say, therefore, that
nut has a meaning ? In the same way, in atti, third person
singular form of the root ad, there is no Sap. But in pacati,
there is Sap. Can we say that Sap has any meaning of its own ?
All that we can say is that it just helps the other elements to
express their meaning. ]
168. Where there is a possibility (of the stem
and the suffix) having each its own meaning, it is
not right to include the meaning of one in that of
the other. The powers of words, when in contact
with one another, are fixed and dependent upon
one another.
[One does see that stem and suffixes can express a mean¬
ing when the other is absent. The word kim has no suffix
and yet it denotes a meaning. I n"iyan,~iyat, there is ho stem
and still they are expressive. In alet , there is no suffix to see
and yet it is expressive. Though ordinarily, stem and suffix
II. 169-170
71
come together in usage it is possible, by using the method of
anvaya and vyatireka, to isolate the meaning of each and ascribe
it to it. It would be wrong to include the meaning of each
into that of the other.
The Vrtti says something like this :—If the stem and the
suffix have their own meaning, anybody would accept that the
latter is expressed by the former. To consider it as included
in something else would not be right because that would
affect the natural power of words. That would lead to all
meaning being considered as included in something else
according to one’s fancy. Therefore'whatever meaning is under¬
stood from a word in usage should be ascribed to that word.
Even though when words are used, stems and suffixes are not
used in isolation and so their meanings are found to be mixed
up, still it is accepted that stems and suffixes are expressive of
their meanings separately. Because the powers of words have
been handed down in the Sastra as distinct on the basis of
regulation arrived at by the method of anvaya and vyatireka. As
the Vrtti puts it —pratiniyamena krtapravibhaga vyavasthitali Sabda-
nam saktayah pratijnayante ].
Where analysis would not result in a distinct meaning
for the different elements, it should not be resorted to.
16 9. In the words kupa, yupa and supa, one
does not see any recurring meaning (for the re¬
current word element). Therefore, it is the whole
word which expresses a different meaning.
[Kupa, yupa and supa have up a in common. The remain¬
ing element is peculiar to each word, but the meaning of the
word is not due to its peculiar element. It belongs to the
whole word. (See. M. Bha. I. p. 32, lines 2-7.) ]
170. In the derivations of words, one resorts
to many ways of explaining them. Where many
meanings are possible, a particular one is taken as
the basis of derivation.
[The Vrtti argues as follows—When experts put forward
72
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhari
derivations of words, either by giving them readymade ( nipa -
tana) or by giving rules of word-formation, one sees various
kinds of explanations of correct words on the basis of some
characteristic which is either fundamental ( savyapara ) or
secondary, the worldly meaning of the word being invariable.
Among the many powers of an object, any one may be resort¬
ed to as the basic characteristic and used as help in deriva¬
tion : anekasaktiyukte'rthe yd kdcinnimitabhdvendsriyamdnd
saktih sadhutvanvakliyane 5 ngatvam pratipadyate. For example, the
derivation of the word tandula is given in the Unadisutra —
Vrnlutitanitadibhya ulac tandasca (U.S.5.8). It is possible to
derive the word tandula by adding the suffix ulac to other
roots and substituting tanda for those roots.].
171. Words like vaira, Vasistha, gii isa and ckaga-
rika have been explained by some on the basis of a
variety of meanings.
[Vaira c an be explained as virasya idam or as virdyd idam ,
Vasifthasya idam or Vasi$thena krtam proktam va can result in
Vasistha. Girisa can stand for girav Sete or girirn Syati .
In addition to the words mentioned in the karika itself,
the Vrtti points out that the Varttika : tap parvamarudbhyam on
P. 5.2.121 is used to explain parvata and marutta. Similarly
the idea of giving or what has happened ( Vrtta ) is used to
explain various forms. Thus various meanings and various
limits of stems and suffixes are used by grammarians in order
to explain forms without any restriction.]
172. Just as there is no contradiction in show¬
ing the same path in relation to a tree, an anthill
or a mountain, in the-same way, words like go can
be derived through different accompanying attri¬
butes.
[The word go really denotes the universal gotva but it
can be derived on the basis of any one of the many attributes
which co-exist in the cow with its universal. These attributes
may be actions or qualities.]
II. 173-175
73
17 3. People who observe the different condi¬
tions of the object (denoted by the word in question)
explain a word like, say, kimsuka by taking hold of
one particular condition.
[Punyaraja points out that somebody might explain the
word kimsuka which means the palaSa tree by reference to its
state when it is devoid of all fruit and, therefore, of parrots.
The tree is called kimSuka = what ! parrot! meaning some¬
thing where there is no parrot because there is no fruit. Ob¬
jects have many powers or states according to time and place.
Man observes them and applies a word to it according to any
one of these powers or states. The two become closely asso¬
ciated.
The Vrtti points out that there is no contradiction in fix¬
ing the form of a word on the basis of one particular power
as in the case of the word kimiuka for pal as a, arrived at on
the basis of the absence of any parrot (hika) on it when there
is no fruit : kimsukdndm iva kalabhede Saktau kasyaiicicchabdasya
vyavasthayairi na virudhyate .]
174. Some have derived the word go from girati
(to utter) or garjati (to roar) or garni (to go) or
gavati (to sound or) gadati (to articulate).
[The purpose of the verse is to show the extraordinary
variety that there can be in the derivation of the same word
by different scholars. Here the word go is taken as the exam¬
ple. Though usually it is derived from gacchati, it is possible
to derive it from any one of the other roots mentioned in
the verse. Both the sound of the verb and its meaning have
something to do with the derivation.]
175. Others have declared that the word gauh
is applied to a cow because of its form (and not
because of any meaning). All words are devoid of
any derivation. Others take both (the form as well
as the meaning) as the basis.
)
74
VAKYAPAD]YAM OF BHARTRHARI
[If the meaning of the root is the basis of the derivation
of a word, one can think of several alternative roots as the
basis of derivation. But there was another view on the
subject, namely, that the form of the word itself is the basis of
the derivation. This view is attributed to the Aukthikyas.
Words are devoid of any derivation based on meaning. This
is the avyutpattipak$a = the view that words are not made up of
smaller meaningful elements. The opposite view is that both
form and meaning are the basis of the application of a word
to an object. This is the Vyutpattipaksa.
The text of the Vrtti is not clear in some places. It also
connects the avyutpattipakja with the Aukthikyas : Apare cacarya
aukthikyadayo gauh kasmad gaur ityeva gaur iti nirvacanam ahull ].
The next question is : The same word or sound is found
in different contexts in the language. Is it the same every¬
where ?
176. For the sake of simplicity, instruction in
grammar is based on what is generic. The parti¬
cular forms are expressive of this common element
as in the case of the other universals.
[The Vrtti says something like this : In the Science of
Grammar, whatever can be taught on the basis of what is
generic, of what recurs in the form or .the meaning in the
midst of changes is so taught. But the particular relating to
the form or the meaning conveys another universal, as it were.
The root gam, expressive of its conventional meaning, does
not express the real meaning of the word gauh. The verbs
sravati, syandate, plavate, patati are taught in the sense of
motion in general ( gatisamanye ) also, but they denote naturally
particular movements coming under motion in general. In
the same way, the word gauh, also denotes a particular
motion. In the word gauh the root gam does not stand for
mere shifting of the legs. Roots being polysemic, there is
nothing to prevent the root gam from denoting all movements
coming under motion in general. It is actually seen that the
root gam stands for other activities as in 'gurutalpaga. Thus
II. 177-178
75
from conventional words, not only is the generic meaning
understood, but also the particular meaning.]
17 7. The same stem used in another meaning
is considered to be a different one. Though it has
the same form in usage, it is not reckoned the same
in the other case.
[This verse further explains the idea contained in the
previous one. A separate word is applied to every separate
object (praly art hath iabdaniveSah). The root gam in the word go,
standing for a particular kind of movement, is different from
gam standing for motion in general. The root pac in tandulam
pacati is different from the root pac in pacyate tandulah svayam
eva. because there is a difference in meaning. The two roots
look alike, but they ai'e not the same.
The Vrtti also points out that a root must be considered to
be different when it is used in a karmakartr formation. Even
though there may be resemblance in form and meaning,
there is difference also and so there is no trace of the conven¬
tional roots in the non-conventional ones and vice versa :
Karmakartrvifayavat satyapi tulyavifayariipatve ’tyantabhedanna
rudhivisayandmarudhifvarudhivisaydnatn vd rudhisti kascid anu-
<tango vidyate.].
17 8. Iji and Taji, two different roots, each
restricted to its own scope, are explained different¬
ly by different people. There is indeed much va¬
riety in the process of derivation.
[Punyaraja points out that some grammarians teach the
root yaj and its samprasarana (change of y into i) when
followed by a kit suffix. We would then get istah, iflvd etc.
When followed by trc or tumun, no such thing takes place and
we get yafta, y as turn etc. Others say that the root is ij and
when followed by trc, the i is changed into y.
The Vrtti says the same thing but gives different exampl¬
es. It say's that in stall and santi the root is different from
what it is in asti and it consists of s only and has its own
76
VAKYAPAD1YAM of BHARTR.HARI
special scope, that is, when followed by a nit suffix. All these
views about words are of a practical character and only
resemble reality. In fact, there is no such thing as a root.
It is only a practical postulate resorted to by scholars : na hi
dhaturupam paramdrthena kihcid vidyate , vyavaharastu-kailcit kri-
yate. Some declare that the root in asti consists of s only and
that, when followed by a pit suffix, it takes the augment a.
Some teach the roota/»=‘to speak’, ‘to explain’ the five forms
aha etc.]
179. Thus one should do as in the case of
balavaya and jitvarl. There is no contradiction in
taking identity or difference as the basis.
[ Vaidurya is explained as something coming from vidura.
In reality, it comes from balavaya and is only polished at
vidura. It is, therefore, assumed that balavaya and vidura are
the same. Or, it may be that among grammarians balavaya
is known as vidura, just as Varanasi is known as Jitvari among
merchants. Likewise, Visravana and Ravana are the same. The
Vrtti adds that grammarians consider vidura to be a substitute
for the stem balavaya when the suffix syaii follows. What
the Vrtti and Punyaraja say is based upon the following
slokavarttika on P. 4.3.84:—
Balavdyo vidtiram ca prakrtyantaram eva va /
na vai tatreti ced bruyaj jitvarivad upacaret/l
180. It is for such purposes as the fixing of the
position of the augment at that roots and preposi¬
tions are regarded separately in the discipline. In
reality, the root itself is like that (that is, joined to
an upasarga).
[The whole or unity is real and not differentiation. But
grammar has to adopt differentiation in order to do its work.
upasargas and roots together constitute a unity and convey one
idea. But the sastra treats them as different in order to
regulate the position of the augment at and reduplication and
so on.]
II. 181-182
77
181. The word samgramayati is an instance
where (the augment a and the reduplication)
are taught (not before the pure root) but before
the root and the preposition combined. Particular
actions are conveyed by particular combinations (of
root and preposition).
[The forms asamgrdmayat and sisamgramayisati can be
explained only if the augment at and the reduplication are
taught before the root preceded by a preposition. See M.
Bhd, II. P. 23, lines 7-8.
The Vrtti remarks—Roots are taught as separate ele¬
ments, expressive oi particular actions. In the verbs nivasa -
yati, asphotayati, jugupsate, mutrayati , the suffix lyap and redupli¬
cation would get their proper place when the preposition and
the root are regarded as separate elements. It is the combina¬
tion of sam and gram which is taught as expressive of the parti¬
cular action called‘fighting’. It has been made clear again that
derivation must take place from the root samgrdma with the
preposition included in it.]
182. The grammatical operation relating to
the combined root and preposition is of an inner
nature (antaranga ). It is such an action (conveyed
by root and preposition together) which becomes
associated with the means of its accomplishment.
[Punyaraja quotes the following passage from the M, Bhd
on Va 11. on P.1.3.1 and Vd, 5. 6. on P. 6.1.135.
kdrakdnam pravrttir vitistakriyayam, anyathakrtvamanis -
audane pravarttante , anyatha ca $u$kaudane.
It is only after the action is fully determined that the
means are employed for its accomplishment. In other words,
the root is first united with the preposition. Thus united, it
expresses a fully determined action and such an action is
united with the means. As the Vrtti puts it : tasmdd viti$ta-
prakrtirupavacya viti$takriyd tathabhutaiva sddhyd sati sadhanasam -
bandham pratipadyate .]
78
vakyapadJyam of bhartrhari
Now the opposite view is explained.
183. It is only when the meaning of roots, fit
to be used, is fully determined that it is qualified.
Before being connected with the means of its accom¬
plishment, an action does not attain its form at all.
[The view expressed here is that it is only when the action
denoted by a root is connected with the accessories denoted by
other words in the sentence that it attains its full form and be¬
comes fit to be qualified by prepositions.
The Vrtti puts it as follows—When an idea has attained
its full form and is to be qualified and there are several possible
ways of doing so, the qualification is actually done by words
actually used and then the relation of qualifier and qualified
is attained. As an action is to be brought about, its relation
with the accessories takes place first. Therefore, before that,
action is formless ( niratmika ) and cannot enter into the rela¬
tion of qualifier and qualified with the prepositions which
only manifest what is already there. According to some
scholars, a root first enters into relation with the words ex¬
pressive of the accessories : purvam dhatuh sadhanena yujyata
ityeke$am matam. ]
The other view is now further explained—
184. Just as the quality of being a root and the
object of an action are assumed on the basis of a
future connection with the means of its accomplish¬
ment, in the same way, a similar process can be seen
elsewhere also.
[The reference here is to P. 3,1.7, which teaches the
formation of the desiderative verbs. The suffix san is added
optionally, to a root when it becomes the object (of‘to desire’)
and when it has the same subject as the action of desiring.
We are here asked to add san to a root which is a karma , but
it becomes a karma only when san is added. What is going to
happen is assumed here to have taken place. The same
II. 185-187
79
thing can be done in regard to association of a root with
prepositions.]
185/ Just as lac and other dyes applied to the
seed at the time of sowing prove useful to the fruit
by changing its colour,
186. in the same way, a distinction introduced
on account of the connection in our minds bet¬
ween a root and a preposition appears at the time
that words develop.
[These two verses are meant to explain the view that a
root first enters into relation with preposition and then only
with words expressive of the accessories. The analogy of dye¬
ing the seed with lac in order to bring about some difference
of colour in the fruit is used here. Root and preposition to-
o-ether express a particular action. That particularity cannot
be expressed by the root alone, no matter with how many
accessories it is connected. The particularity which exists in
the action, expressed by the root and the preposition together,
may be made cleaner by association with the accessories. In
all this discussion, a distinction is made between mental
connection and actual connection in speech. The former
naturally always takes place first. The Vrtti also refers to
this previous connection in the mind. ]
The author now proceeds to speak about the other
parts of speech, now that something has been said about the
noun and the verb [iiama and dkliyata).
187. Distinctions already existing in some
(roots) but not expressed (bythem) are brought out
when they come into contact with preposition like
pra and para .
[The view about prepositions mentioned here is that
they only reveal ( dyotaka ) a meaning and are not expressive of
it.
The Vrtti refers to the author of the Sangraha in support of
this view, namely, that the preposition reveals a meaning
80
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
already present in it and is, therefore, not expressive of it. As
the Vrtti puts it :— Sabdantaropcigraham antarena sambhavi
sannalabdhaniyamoyo'rthas tam dyotako niyamayan vacakatdm atikrd-
matiti Samgrahkara aha . According to the author of the San -
graha, the function of the preposition is to specify one of the
peculiarities or modifications which are all potentially present
in the action denoted by the root. Because it specifies ( niya¬
mayan) it is called dyotaka , revealer, manifestor and so it is far
from being expressive ( vacakatdm atikramati .]
Are prepositions only dyotaka or are they vdcaka also ?
188. A preposition is expressive of some distinc¬
tion in the action. It is also possible for it to be a
manifestor of it. Or it is used as a help to give
strength to the root (to express its meaning).
[Thus, this verse mentions three views about preposi¬
tions—(1) that they are expressive (2) that they are manifes¬
tos of something which exists elsewhere ( dyotaka ) (3) that
they are helps, that is, they and the roots together express a
meaning.
The Vrtti clearly says that three views regarding the upa-
sargas are held by the Acaryas : Vacakatvam dyotakatvam sahd -
bhidhayitvam ityupasargesu trividha pratipattir acarydnam. If, due
to association with a preposition, a meaning which a root
cannot have is understood, then it is said to be expressive of
it ( vdcaka) . If it manifests a meaning which the root can have
but does not convey, it is said to be a manifestor ( dyotaka ). If
the root and the preposition together convey a particularised
action, then it is like a svarthika suffix.]
The reasoning which establishes that prepositions manifest
and do not express is now given.
189. The ideas of going etc. which are not ex¬
pressed by the bare roots stha etc. are manifested
by the prepositions pra etc. as can be established by
the two kinds of reasoning.
II. 189-190
81
[The root stha conventionally means : to stay, to stand.
When the preposition pra is placed before it, it means c to go 5 ,
c to start 5 . So it is the preposition which expresses the idea of
going. This is refuted by the present verse and the double
reasoning referred to is as follows—
(1) Pra§abda adikarmadyotakah
praSabdatvat
p urvodi tapacyadidrftapra -
Sabdavat
(2) Tifthatir anekarthah dhatutvad
abhayavadisammatanekartha-
yajatyadidhatuvat
These two kinds of reasoning
manam and viSesato dr$tenanumanam
also.
= The word pra reveals the
beginning of an action.
Because it is the word pra.
Like the word pra seen
elsewhere.
The root stha ispolysemic.
Because it is a root.
Like the root yaj etc. ad¬
mitted to be polysemic
by both sides,
called samdnyato dr$tenanu -
are referred to by the Vrtti
It is now stated that the root and the preposition
together convey the meaning. Neither by itself can do it.
190. When adhi and pari are not used some
other action is expressed by the root. The .root,
by itself meaningless, expresses the meaning together
with them.
[In adhyagacchati and paryagacchati , adhi and pari are
meaningless because what these two words mean is conveyed
by dgacchati by itself. Whatever additional meaning we
attribute to adhi and pari can be understood from the context
without the help of these two prepositions. They are used
only for the sake of clarity. The root by itself is also mean¬
ingless. So the meaning is conveyed by the two together.
See.Af. Bha on P. 1.4.93.
The Vrtti points out, following the M. Bha that when
P. 1.4.93 says that adhi and pari are meaningless, what is
meant is that they do not convey a meaning different from
that of the root. Whether they are used or not, the same
82
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
meaning is understood. As a result of grammatical tradition,
the root and the preposition are looked upon as separate.]
As upasargas are joined to roots, so are svdrthika suffixes to
stems. The latter are now considered.
191. In the same way, some svdrthika suffixes,
finding themselves in other combinations (and,
therefore) connected with a meaningless element
express, with the help of the latter, a meaning
belonging to this element considered separately.
[Yava means a certain food prepared from yava = barley.
Yavaka. also means the same thing. Here the suffix ka is
found in a combination ( yavaka ) which is different from java,
a separate word altogether. It is, therefore, natural to ask :
What is the use of ka \n yavaka ? The answer is that in yavaka,
the yava portion is really meaningless, though the word yava
has a meaning. This very meaning is expressed in yavaka by
the yava portion plus the ka portion. Prakrtyarthanuvadihah =
the prakrti in yavaka is yava which has no meaning. As it
looks like the meaningful word yava , the suffix is said to ex¬
press the meaning of the prakrti . This is a mere grammatical
tradition : arthavadbhih samsr$ta iti sastravyavahare vyopadtiya-
manah , says the Vrtti. ]
Now something is said about nipatas , the fourth part of
speech recognised by Yaska.
192. Some nipatas (particles) manifest a mean¬
ing, some are expressive of a separate meaning,
some, like augments ( agamah) , express a meaning
together with other elements.
[It is stated in this verse that nipatas can be dyotaka =
manifestos of meaning existing elsewhere, or vacaka , directly
expressive of meaning or lastly, they can express a meaning
in cooperation with other elements. Punyaraja does not give
separate examples of each kind. The Vrtti quotes some Vedic
passage in the course of the explanation but the text is not
clear. Those nipatas are dyotaka which are not used except
II. 193-195
83
in association with other words. Such are ca, va and so on.
Those are called expressive which can convey a meaning by
themselves like i a$vat,yugapat. There is no restriction as to the
position of the former in the sentence.]
193. It makes no difference to the manifesting
nature of particles whether they are used before or
after the associated words from which they differ
in meaning.
[The Vrtti points out that even though, logically, the
general precedes the particular in speech, one may sometimes
put the particular before the general as in Gargyo brdhmana
aniyalam = let Gargya, the brdhmana be brought or SimSapd
vrksai chidyatam = let the SirriSapd tree be cut.]
It is now stated why some nipatas are said to be dyotaka
while others are said to be Vacaka.
1 94. A suffix, though expressive, is not used by
itself. Particles ca etc. though they are separate
words, are not used by themselves.
[What is dyotaka is sometimes not used by itself; what is
vacaka is also not used by itself sometimes. The difference is
that if a particle, even though a pada, is not used by itself, it
is dyotaka. If it is a pada and expresses a meaning by itself, it
is vacaka, lik e$aSvat,yugapat etc.]
195. Even if they denote the things collected
(and not the collection), there is no diversity
(which is the basis for the use of the sixth case-end¬
ing). It is a thing which is not an entity (that is ex¬
pressed by the particles). Action is expressed by
other kinds of words.
[It might be said that if ca denotes samuccaya , then the
noun used with it would take the sixth case-ending as it does
when used with the word samuccaya . One says Vrkfasya samuc -
cayah , plak^asya samuccayah . So it must be deemed to denote
84
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
not samuccaya = collection but the samuccita= things collected,
which, when expressed by ca is asattva , something which is not
an entity. This is due to the nature of words (fabdafakti ).
The main idea in this verse is that words denote meanings
according to their nature. It is the nature of particles like ca
to denote the asattva , the non-entity. Pacati and paka both
mean cooking, but the former conveys cooking as asattva , not a
concrete entity but a process, whereas the latter conveys cook¬
ing as a thing, an entity, not as a process. This difference in
the power of words is natural and not the result of teaching.
The Vrtti had the reading : tiilpadair abhidhlyate , instead
of kriyanyendbhidhiyate adopted by Punyaraja. The translation
follows the latter.]
196. Only such words as denote qualified ob¬
jects are connected with attributes. Ca and other
such particles are always dependent on others even
if they denote the collected.
[Words which denote objects in which the universal and
other properties inhere have a certain independence and they
can be qualified by adjectives with some qualifying property.
As far as particles like ca are concerned, they denote by their
very nature, non-concrete things and are always dependent
upon the use of other words. They have no independence
and so they cannot be qualified by adjectives like independent
words. Therefore, though particles denote non-concrete
collected things, they are not used independently and are not
connected with adjectives. This is their nature.
The Vrtti also emphasises what has been said above and
adds that in the different types of dvandva compounds, it is the
collection to which the collected are subordinate which is ex¬
pressed : karmasadhane’pi samucclyata iti samuccitopasarjanah samtic-
caya evabhidhlyate. ]
The author now says something about karmapravacaniya.
197. Sometimes an action creates a relation and
disappears (that is, it is not mentioned). Some-
II. 197-198
85
times, a relation is produced while the verb is
actually heard.
[Rajapurusa is an example of an action producing a rela¬
tion and not being mentioned. In mdtuh smarati, an action is
mentioned and it brings the relation of mother and child to
the mind. In vrkfain prati vidyotate vidyut=‘ the lightning flash¬
es towards the tree’, prati is a karmapravacaniya. It specifies
that the relation between the tree and the flash of lightning
is that of aim and what aims ( lakfyalakfanabhdva). It does not
manifest the action because the verb vidyotate does it. Nor
does it denote a relation in general because the second case¬
ending in vrksam which comes in place of the sixth, does it.
Nor does it bring some other action to the mind, because it
is not understood. What it does is to specify the general
relation. All relation is brought about by a previous action.
It always subsists between two things which were kdrakas in
relation to some action. In raja purusam bibharti=‘ the king
supports the man’ the king is the agent and the man the object
in relation to the act of supporting.
The Vrtti also speaks about two kinds of relation and
•claims that it is based on the Sangraha. The two kinds are : (1)
that which is understood when no verb is used and (2) that
which is understood when a verb is used: tirobhutakriyapadah and
sannih'takriydpadah. While explaining these two terms, it seems
to quote a passage from the Sangraha. As this passage is in
prose while some other quotations from the same work are in
verse it appears that this famous work was partly in prose
and partly in verse. Here the two kinds of relation are illus¬
trated by rdjhah par us ah and mdtuh smarati.]
198. It is for the sake of preventing com¬
pounds that the sixth case-ending has been taught
in some cases. The third case-ending comes after
guna in order to show that it is the instrument (and
not the object).
[There are eight sutras which teach the sixth case-ending
in special cases (P. 2.3.52ff). No compound can be made of
86
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
the two words connected by the sixth case-ending in the exam¬
ples of these rules. For example, P. 2.3.52 teaches the sixth
case-ending in mdtuh smaranam. One cannot make the com¬
pound matrsmaranam , because the karmakaraka is here thought
of as a general relation : karmani Sesatvena vivaksite. If the
compound is made, the sixth case-ending would have to be
elided. No other karaka is thought of as a general relation
according to this rule. So the case-ending would be used accord¬
ing to the karaka , as in matur gunaih smarati . P. 2.3.52 teaches
a restriction which is understood in two ways. Theifa $\kd
understands it thus : — karm'nyeva Se$atvena vivak$ite jafthi, na tu
karakantare. Bhartrhari understands it thus : karmani fafthyeva ,
na tu samasalugadi. Thus one can have a matur gunandm smara¬
nam and matur gunasmaranam .
The Vrtti also discusses why the eight siltras prescribing
the sixth case-ending with particular roots have been given
and why the same purpose could not have been served by the
general rule Safthise$e (P. 2.3.50). Its view is that it has
been done to prevent compounding : pratipadam punar
arabhyate , samasaprati$edhah katham syad iti. ]
199. When the verb is not mentioned, a rela¬
tion created by it is specified in some places by the
post-position.
[In vrk$amprati vidyotate vidyut=‘ the lightning flashes at
the tree’, there is, first of all, the action of flashing. Secondly,
there is the action of aiming. The lightning aims the flashing
at the tree. The tree is the aim. Between the aim and the
action of aiming, there is the relation of laksya-lak$anabhava.
This relation is created by the action of aiming which is not
mentioned^ in the sentence. The second case-ending after
Vrksa tells us that there is a relation. What it is and by what
action it is brought about is specified by prati , the post-posi¬
tion ( karmapravacaniya) . Its function, therefore, is to specify
the particular relation brought about by the action which is
not mentioned. It does not manifest the action of aiming
because this action creates this particular relation between the
tree and the action of flashing and is not mentioned. Nor
II. 200-201
87
docs it manifest the action of flashing, because the verb is
mentioned. It only specifies the relation already expressed in
a general way by the second case-ending.
The Vrtti contains a quotation defining the function of
the karmap'-avacaniya. Can it be from the Saugraha ?]
Why not say that the post-position brings to the mind the
action which is not mentioned ?
20 0. That which brings the action to the mind
would be connected with karaka case-endings, just
like vi (in viparilikhati) . vi is not a preposition of
the root likh.
[ In pradesam viparilikhati, the vi brings to the mind the
action of measuring ( vimana) and when it is connected with
in deles am, it is connected with a karaka case-ending, pradesam
being a karmakdraka. Thus, it is not parilikhati which would
be connected with pradeSam. Vi would become the upasarga
of md and not of likh. Similarly, if the post-position brings
the action to the mind, it would be connected with a karaka
case-ending and there would be no need for the sutra P. 2.3.8.
But if the view is that it does not bring an action to the mind,
then the relation between vrkfa and dyotana would be a gene¬
ral one and the sixth case-ending would result. To prevent
it P. 2.3.8. teaches the second case-ending.]
201. In the word apratyajayan, it is seen that the
preposition prati brings to the mind the action
denoted by tisthati. Abhi by itself is used in the
sense of direction in connection with the verb
sunvati (that is, in abhisunvanti ).
[In the word apratyajayan, the preposition prati suggests
the action denoted by the verb tifthati. The sentence in
which it occurs is, according to Punyaraja : Devd asurati aprati-
tifthatah prati? tham alabhamanan ajayan = the gods defeated the
asuras who were not firmly established. Aprati is understood
as apratitifthatah, that is, prati brings to the mind the action of
prati?tha. It is not connected with the root ji in ajayan. In
88
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
abhi$unvanti, abhi by itself denotes direction. It is not that the
root denotes its action qualified by direction and that abhi
merely manifests it ( dyotaka ).
The Vrtti, while explaining apratyajayan, quotes Taitti-
riya Samhita. V, 4.6.3.4. to which probably the verse refers.]
202. When they are connected with an action,
the name karmapravacardya is given to su, ati etc.
which are really of a different nature in order to
prevent the change of x into s.
[£« becomes karmapravacaniya by P.1.4.94 and ati by
P.1.4.95. But for P.1.4.54, su would be upasarga and that would
have the effect of causing the change of a following s into f
by P.8.3.65, as in sufiktam bhavata. In this sentence su has not
the characteristic of a karmapravacaniya, because it does not
specify a relation, but modifies an action. And yet the name
is given to it in order to explain why a following j does not
change into s- So we get su siktam and not su fiktam.
The Vrtti points out that su and ati do not have the charac¬
teristic ( pravrttinimitta ) which would justify the name karma¬
pravacaniya being applied to them. And yet, it has been
applied to them in P.1.4.94, 95. on the basis’of their form
(svarupa) only in order to prevent the names upasarga and gati
being given to them. The name upasarga would result^in
loss of udatta accent and the change of s into $ : tena gatyupa-
sargasamjiiasrayanighdladikdryam na pravartate, concludes the
Vrtti.]
203. Once the relation of cause and effect has
been specified by anu, the third case-ending would
result but that is prevented by special teaching.
[The special teaching referred to is P.1.4. 84. Hetu (cause)
is of two kinds : it is either that which brings about some¬
thing or that which makes known something. By P.1.4.90,
anu gets the name karmapravacaniya when the idea of laksana
is to be expressed. Laksana stands for both kinds of cause.
In vrkfam anu vidyotate vidyut, the second kind of cause is ex-
II. 203-204
89
pressed. The tree is what makes the lightning known. In such
a case, anu gets the name karmapravacaniya by P. 1.4.90 and
takes the second case-ending by P. 2.3.8. But laksana can mean
the first kind of cause also and that takes the third case-ending
by P. 2.3.23. But as there is a separate *w/ra(thatis, P.1.4.84.)
giving the name karmapravacaniya to am when the first kind of
cause is to be expressed, the third case-ending is set aside
and the second case-ending comes according to P. 2.3.8.
The Vrtti says the same thing as follows—The word am
has been seen elsewhere to suggest the action of hearing (ntia-
mayatikriya ) and so here it brings to the mind the action of
hearing as the cause of the relation produced by it. The
sixth case-ending expressive of cause should therefore be used.
But the third has been taught as expressive of cause (P.2.3.23.)
That would then come in place of the sixth. But then anu
has been given the name of karmapravacaniya which takes the
second case ending which, therefore, sets aside the third case¬
ending. ]
204. It does not manifest an action, nor does it
directly express a relation nor does it supply a verb
but it specifies a relation.
[This stanza states the position in regard to the karma -
pravacaniya . In vrk$am anu vidyotate vidyut , the karmapravaca¬
niya anu does not manifest an action, in this case, the action
of aiming. Such an action does not come to the mind from
the sentence. Nor does it directly express relation because
the second case-ending does it. Nor does it bring some other
action to the mind as vi does in pradetam viparilikhati . All that
it does is to specify the relation, namely, lak$yalak$anabhava .
The Vrtti explains this verse on the basis of the sentence :
Sdkalyasya samhitam anu pravar$at. Here the word anu does not
bring the action of ‘hearing 5 to the mind. Nor does it imply
an action as vi does in viparilikhati . Nor does it express an
action because the case-ending in samhitam would become a
Karakavibhakti which it is not. Nor does it express a relation
created by the action of hearing. So it specifies the relation
created by the action of hearing. It specifies that the relation
is that of cause and effect. As it performs this special function.
90
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
it is regarded as a separate part of speech by some. The
concluding words of the Vrtti are worth quoting —Tasmdd
anyaprakarasambhavad ayam ntiamayati kriyopajanitam sambandham
avacchiiiatti. Hetuhetumatsambandho' yam , nedam sambandhantaram
iti. Etasmacca vrttibhedat pancamam padajatam karmapravacaniyah
kaikid deary aili pratij nay ante.]
The author again speaks about the indivisibility of the
sentence and of the sentence-meaning.
205. A collection of meaningless phonemes is
cither with meaning or without meaning. It is the
individual word which is endowed with meaning.
There are no parts in a word.
[The doctrine of indivisibility is challenged as follows—
If the individual word is a collection of phonemes, if the
phonemes have a meaning, if the word has a meaning, if the
sentence is a collection of words and if the collection has a
meaning, how can indivisibility be maintained ? The varttika —
Samghatarthavattvat(V a. 12, M.Bha.I.p. 30, 1. 24.) seems to imply
this objection.
It is answered thus—The phonemes are never felt to be
meaningful. Nobody has the feeling that the meaning of the
word is made up of the meanings of phonemes, just as one
seems to recognise in the meaning of the sentence the mean¬
ings of individual words. If phonemes have no meaning, they
cannot be parts of words because division of the sound part of
a word must correspond to the division of the meaning part.
The Vrtti which is none too clear contains a reference to the
Sangraha which is said to speak about ten kinds of meaningful¬
ness: tad ubhayarri parigrhya dasadharthavatta svabhavabheditd iti
Sangrahe. . . .]
206. A collection of meaningful woids, on the
other hand, is different, being expressive of a
meaning different from that of the component
words (when there is connection between them)
II. 207-208 91
and because of the absence of a connection (bet¬
ween these words.)
[The Vrtti points out that a collection of meaningful
words may be of two kinds: (1) one in which the meanings of
the words are interconnected, so that the collection, as a whole,
has a meaning different from that of the words and (2) one
in which the meanings of the words have no connection at all
with one another.]
20 7. Some say that when a word is analysed
( bhede ) its two elements, one meaningful and the
other meaningless, do not enter into any relation with
each other while others declare that they do, as
there is the example of the word kutira.
[The word kutira is analysed into two parts: kutx and ra .
The former has a meaning while the latter has not. So they
cannot be connected, according to some, while others think
that ra suggests the idea of smallness and so the two can be
joined. ]
208. Taking compounds and words ending in
svarthika suffixes respectively as their basis, some say
that from elements having a meaning, a collection
having a meaning is produced while others hold
that such a collection is not produced.
[The word rajapuru$a is an instance of a compound having
a meaning and made up of elements having a meaning. From
a word made up of a meaningful stem and a svarthika suffix,
no collection having a different meaning is produced.
In the Vrtti on this verse, there is a quotation from the
Sahgraha in which words as collection of smaller units are said
to be of three kinds: (1) Sabdanvayinah — those in which the
sounds of the smaller units can be traced but not their mean¬
ings, like gaurakhara and aSvakarna , (2) arthdnvayinah= those in
which the meanings of the smaller units can be traced, but
92
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
not their sounds, like Srotriya and vaidurya and (3) Sabdarthanva-
yinah.= those in which both the sounds and the meanings of the
smaller units can be traced, like rajapurufa and nilotpala. The
verse gives the views of different thinkers. One of them is
called Dhyanakara, the author of the Dhydna (graha). See
Bhartrhari, p.29.]
209. Some collections are made up of separate¬
ly meaningful parts. When divided, each ele¬
ment is separately recognisable and meaningful.
Some (on the other hand) have to have their deno¬
tative power inferred by means of agreement and
difference.
[ Samivrksa and Dadimivrkfa are examples of the first
kind. Samjnu and Prajnu are examples of the second kind.
Samjnu is explained as sarhgate januni asya— one whose
knees are joined together. The word januni , though seen in the
analysis, is not easily recognisable in the compound word. ]
210. It is only a meaning current in the
Science of Grammar which is shown to prove that
phonemes are meaningful. Pure roots, stems etc.
have no recognised meaning in the world.
[The varttika: Arthavanto varna dhatupratipadikapratyayani-
patanam ekavarndnam arlhadars, ndt ( Vd. 9. M.Bhd. I. p.30,1.2.) is
considered here. The question whether single phonemes
have a meaning or not is considered in the M.Bhd on the
pralyahara sfitra: ha-ya-va-rat. The conclusion reached there
is that they have a meaning only when they happen to be roots,
stems, suffixes or particles. Even this meaning is obtained
by the analysis practised in the Sastra. It is not seen in the
world.]
211. The meaning of the bare krt and taddhita
suffixes is likewise not known in the world. Similarly,
II. 212-214
93
before the inflexional suffixes are added, a word
ending in a krt or taddhita suffix has no meaning.
[The Vrtti quotes va. 7 on P.1.2.45, to show that bare
suffixes have no meaning as against the alleged opposite
view implied in the sutra P. 1.1.19— iditdc.ii ca saptamyarthe.]
212. The meaning which is observed as being-
expressed by words ending in such suffixes is really
of the same nature (that is, just assumed in grammar)
because the context is that of meaningful elements.
[This has been said in answer to the objection that if
words ending in krt and taddhita suffixes have no meaning, how
is it that such words are called pratipadika, considering that to
be a pratipadika, something must be meaningful. The answer
amounts to saying that the meaning ascribed to words ending
in krt and taddhita is only the result of analysis in grammar
and not something seen in the world, because such woi'ds,
without a case-ending, are not used in the world.]
213. If the word and the sentence are not diffe¬
rent from the phonemes, the latter would ultimate¬
ly become expressive by virtue of the power of
mutual requirement.
[The view which is criticized here is that there is no such
thing as the word or the sentence apart from the phonemes. If
the phonemes are expressive and if the word and the sentence
do not exist as distinct from the phonemes, the latter cannot
be said to be expressive and that would go against the accepted
view that it is they which are expressive.]
214. If a collection of phonemes, with some
missing phoneme but still expressive of the meaning
(of the whole collection) is not considered to be a
different word, then it is the complete word which
is brought to the mind by it.
94
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[ If i$kartaram and niskartaram mean the same thing and if
the former is not taken as entirely different from the latter, then
it is the complete word which is first brought to the mind by
the incomplete word and from the complete word so conveyed,
the meaning is understood.
The above note is based on Punyaraja. The Vrtti is not
clear, but it also speaks about remembering the complete word
through the incomplete word in connection with the Vedas :—
Chandasesvapi lopesu prasiddhivikalani yani sabdantardni tair anyvna
avaikalyayuktahprasiddhah samudayah smaryante. It also quotes
words from the Taittiriya Samhita I, 8.10.1. and IV. 1.10.2.]
215. Such an incomplete word, due to a
particular reason (here the grammatical tradition)
reminds one of the really expressive word (that is,
the complete word) and conveys, as though directly,
the meaning which is a step removed from it by the
real word.
[It is one step removed from the meaning because it first
reminds one of the complete word and then expresses its mean¬
ing.
Whether the incomplete word is looked upon as the same
or as different from the complete word, it is clear that the parts
have no meaning. Even if the incomplete word is looked upon
as a different word, as long as it can convey the meaning only
after bringing the complete word to the mind, the conclusion
is that the incomplete word which is a part has no meaning.
The Vrtti points out that through habit and practice lis¬
teners think that they understand the meaning from the com-
lete word:— tatra paricayat pratip attar ah sakfadivavikalavayavasabda-
janitam abhimanyante . It also compares the understanding of
the meaning from the incomplete word to the understanding of
the meaning from gestures and signs like winking ( akf inikoca )
which are also supposed first to bring the corresponding word
to the mind. ]
That the parts cannot convey the meaning of the whole is
now further explained by means of examples.
II. 216-219
95
216. Just as in compound words \\kz gaurakhara
no separate meaning exists for each term and even
if any be understood, it is not understood from the
whole,
217. in the same way, it is of no use to detect
meanings for individual words in the apparently
connected meaning that is conveyed by the different
words comprising a sentence.
[From compound words like gaurakhara one understands
an animal having a particular universal. No meaning is under¬
stood from each term and even if it is held to be understood,
it is not taken note of at the time of the understanding of the
meaning of the whole. Similarly, when the meaning of the sente¬
nce is understood, the meaning of the individual words does
not figure in it. The sentence-meaning is like the flavour of a
cool drink. It is something different from the flavour of the
ingredients.
The Vrtti also says the same thing and discusses the same
words : gaurakhara and aSvakarna . ]
218. If the parts and the whole have different
meanings, then, in compounds such opposite attri¬
butes as differentiation and unity would result.
[This verse points out the difficulty that would arise if
the meaning of each term in a compound word is considered to
be real. From gaurakhara as a whole, an object having a parti-
- cular universal is understood. From each one of its terms, an¬
other universal would be understood and these two would be
different from each other. It would mean that from one word
both difference and unity would be understood which is un¬
sound. ]
219. Who would think of adhi etc. as expressive
of the means (to the accomplishment of the
action) ? In a bahuvnhi compound, how could a
96
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
meaning belonging to no word actually used (that
is, anyapadartha ) be expressed ?
[If the divisions are looked upon as real and not ficti¬
tious, they could become expressive instead of the whole. In
adhibhuvi or adhistri the adhi would express location instead of
the compound as a whole as it is generally believed. Secondly,
if the parts are expressive, what would express the anyapadartha
in a bahuvrihi?. The parts cannot do it and yet that is the real
meaning of a bahuvrihi according to P. 2.2.24.
The Vrtti mentions the compounds antastiram and adhistri
for discussion. One can infer that in adhistri , adhi merely con¬
veys the power of location ( adharaSakti ) which is favourable to
the action in question. In a bahuvrihi compound, the whole
conveys the meaning of a word the form of which is different
from that of its parts :— bahuvrihau ca rupanvayayuktam avayava -
padam antarena padantaram tadabhidheye vartamanah samudayo
drSyate.
220. In the words prajnu and samjnu 5 one
does not understand a meaning from the different
parts. Therefore, it is the whole which conveys a
definite meaning.
[Thus, four arguments have been given against the ex¬
pressivity of the parts : (1 ) Both differentiation and unity
cannot be understood as real from the same word, (2) adhi
etc. by themselves cannot express the means ( sadhana ), (3) in a
bahuvrihi , the anyapadartha cannot be understood from the parts
(4) in prajnu and samjnu , jnu has no meaning when it is by
itself.
The Vrtti also discusses prajnu and samjnu which convey
a meaning only as wholes. It is only in the Sastra that these
words are analysed and a meaning ascribed to the parts. But
that is fictitious, not known in the world. It concludes as
follows— tasmad anarthaka avayavah sarvatra sanghata evdrthavdn .]
Some objections against indivisibility are anticipated and
answered. The first objection is that if individual words and
their meanings have no reality, then a dvandva compound would
II. 220-223
97
only denote an integrated object and cannot, therefore, take
the plural number. It is answered as follows—
221. Just as the word gargah is used for many
belonging to the family of garga even though only
one word garga is used there, in the same way, the
whole called dvandva is expressive of many.
[From the mere fact that a dvandva compound denotes
many things and takes the plural number, one cannot conclude
that the individual words of a compound and their meanings
are real.
The Vrtti says that the word gargah conveys a meaning
which is grasped by a single cognition and in which parts
thought of as one figure. Similarly, a dvandva compound seems
to have parts similar to other independent words and conveys
many objects grasped by one cognition.]
The second objection is that an action would have to be
performed at the same time to all the objects denoted by a
dvandva compound and that is impossible. The answer is_
222. Just as the action of feeding is applied to
each part, in the same way, an action is applied
separately to the things expressed by a dvandva
compound.
[In the sentence : brahmana bhojyantam = ‘let the brahmins
be fed’, the action of feeding is understood in regard to the
brahmins as a whole. But when the action is implemented each
brahmin is mentally separated from the whole and fed separate¬
ly. That is exactly what happens to an action enjoined in re¬
gard to the objects denoted by a dvandva compound.]
The reference by a pronoun, a part of a compound, to the
meaning of the other part of the same compound is now ex¬
plained.
223. When the meaning of one of the words in
a dvandva compound is referred to by the word tad y
there also, the word only resembles the pronoun.
98
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[In the sutra : janapadatadavadhyosca (P.4.2.124.) the word
tad refers to the word janapada. The whole sutra is in the form
of a dvandva compound. If janapada has no separate meaning,
how can the pronoun tad refer to it ? The answer is that the
word tad only resembles the. pronoun tad . Really speaking,
there is no pronoun here at all. The word is a unity and so
is its meaning. There is no division in it. What looks like
the pronoun tad does not really exist at all: tasmad vyavrttabheda
evayam vitiate*rthe sarvanamavisesitavayavasarupah Sabdo vartate>
says the Vrtti .]
From the sentence : dhavakhadirapalaSas chidyantam , one
understands just one meaning which cannot be divided
and in which one cannot trace any sequence. If that is so,
the cutting of all the trees would have to take place at the
same time, which is impossible. This objection is now
answered.
224. Just as, in regard to the cutting of a
khadira tree, the action can proceed only gradually,
part by part, in the same way, there is an order in
the different parts of the meaning of a dvandva
compound.
[The idea is that order or sequence is necessary for
worldly purposes but the words convey the indivisible sequence¬
less idea.
According to the Vrtti 9 this verse is meant to answer the
objection that if the individual word and its meaning did not
exist one cannot explain how we do understand the meanings
of the different terms of a dvandva compound in a certain
sequence. The answer consists in comparing the process to that
of carrying out an order to cut just one tree, say, a khadira .
The cutting can be done only in a certain order, first tfiebark,
then the inner trunk and so on. In the same way, the action
enjoined in regard to the objects conveyed by a dvandva com¬
pound is carried out in a certain order though the compound
does not mention any order.]
If only one among the above-mentioned trees is cut, we
still consider that the order has been carried out. How to
II. 224-227
99
explain this if the meaning understood from a word has no
parts in it ? The answer is:—
225. Just as actions (described by a sentence)
relating to the whole are applied part by part, such
is the case with the elements comprising a dvandva
compound.
[Even though the action mentioned in a sentence may
relate to all the elements in a dvandva compound together, yet
it is applied part by part as is done in the case of the dif¬
ferent elements forming part of an ekaJesa word.
The Vrtti says the same thing and concludes:— tastnad
ekadesasambandhinyo'pi kriydh samudayam evdnupatanti. Avayava-
dvarikaiva hi samudayanam kriyapratipattih.]
226. While explaining the compound to the
ignorant with the help of the analytic sentence
(vigrahavakya) the teacher (that is, Panini) has
spoken about the relative importance of the mean¬
ings of the different terms (obtained by analysis).
[This verse is an answer to the question: if the meaning
of the individual words has no reality, how does one speak
about the relative importance of the first or second term in a
compound. First and second terms of a compound are ob¬
tained by artificial analysis, done for the sake of teaching
derivation to the ignorant. They really do not exist.
In explaining this verse, the Vrtti quotes M.Bha. I, p.
404, 1. 3-4.]
22 7. Even though the meaning is a unified one,
many views regarding the importance (of the
different terms of a negative compound) are set
forth in the Bhasya. Their limitations are due to
the exigencies of grammatical derivation ( prahriya ).
[• A-brahmana is an example of a negative compound.
100
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
The meaning of such compounds is discussed in the M.Bha, I,
pp.410-411.
The Vrtti points out that in the M.Bha, a preference is
shown for the uttarapadarthaprddhdnya as far as the negative
compound is concerned: tatha hi nahsamasa etasminneva sarva-
parikalpandsambhavat sarvapakfopanyasam krtva kciScid eva pakfah
parigrhitah. Tatha hyuktam—idain khalvapi bhiiya uttarapadartha-
pradhanye sati samgrhitam bhavati. kim ? anekam iti. M.Bha. I, p.
412. lines 1-2.]
228. By declaring that, according to the jahat-
svartha view, words entering into a compound give
up all their meaning, the Bhasyakara has shown
that in a bahuvrihi compound all the terms give up
their meaning.
[This verse is an answer to the objection that if indi¬
vidual words have no meaning, how can one speak about the
idea of the different terms giving up or not giving up their
meaning when they enter into a compound word (jahatsvartha
vrttih and ajahatsvartha vrttih ). In the M.Bha on P.2.1.1-,
Patanjali goes into the question whether a compound word
has a meaning different from that of the words entering into
it. The two main views on this question are represented by
the two expressions given above. If, in a bahuvrihi, the whole
denotes a meaning totally different from that of the parts, it is
a further proof that the meaning of the parts has no reality.]
229. In Grammar, sometimes, the meaning of
a stem is expressed by a suffix when the former is
absent while the meaning of a suffix is expressed by
the root when the former is absent.
[The author wants to show that individual words and
their meanings are a fiction and exist only for the sake of
grammatical derivation. Iyan is a word where the suffix alone
is seen and it expresses the meaning of the stem. The word
means ‘so much’. As taught by Panini, only the suffix is left
here, as the stem has been elided. Ahan = ‘he killed’ is an
II. 229-233
101
instance where the suffix has disappeared, its meaning being
expressed by the root.
The Vrtti says the same thing with the help of other
examples, some of which are taken from the Vcd(i.~\
230. The meaning expressed by two suffixes as
in pac-a-nti [sap and jhi) is sometimes expressed by
only one as in ad-ti. Sometimes, when both are
absent, the root expresses it.
[According to Panirii, in conjugation, something may
come between the root and the suffix but not always. He has
divided all the roots of language into ten classes on this basis.
Whether something comes between or not, the meaning is the
same which shows that its meaning is unreal.]
231. Those very meanings of suffixes which are
taught as their basis in some school of grammar
are taken as belonging to the stem (or root) in
some other school.
[The Vrtti says that some grammarians looked upon all
suffixes as svdrthika, that is, they do no more than manifest the
meaning of the prakrti, root or stem:— tathd hi kef am cit smartr-
tidm sarva eva pratyayah svartliikah prakrtyarthamvddina itydkhyd-
yante. ]
232. Being well-known, only shortened forms
like udvami and kari are used in the sastra. All
grammatical derivations are meant to serve practi¬
cal purposes.
[Grammar has its own conventions which do not conform
to worldly usage. In grammar, one would sometimes say
udvami for udvamati and kari for karoti or karomi, because that
would serve some practical purpose. Such forms are not used
in the world. ]
233. It is only Nescience which is described
102
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
in the Science of Grammar through the different
modes of derivation. But knowledge arises sponta¬
neously, free from the alternatives of tradition.
[The Vrtti here is not at all clear and that is a great pity
because one would very much like to know what, according to
the Vrtti, Bhartrhari means by Avidya and Vidya here. Accord¬
ing to Punyaraja, what is stated here is that avidya. is the
means of attaining Vidya. Sastra is all avidya, but through it,
one ultimately attains Vidya.]
But bow can vidya come through avidya ?
234. Just as the effect is not related to the
cause in a definite manner and, is therefore, indescrib¬
able, in the same way, knowledge, even though
unconnected with any special means {anakliyeya) is
still thought of as coming from the sastra.
[The fact is that knowledge does not really come from
avidya , that is, from the sastra. Looking upon vidya as an effect,
it is like all other effects. No effect is related to its cause
in a definite form. But it comes out of it in a definite manner
and so seems to be wonderful. Adbhutena rupena upajayate , says
Punyaraja. In the same way, the understanding of the word
and the sentence as unity is vidya and their division into stem
and suffix is avidya. Their understanding as a unity takes
place when avidya in the form of division disappears. It dis¬
appears really because of the rise of awakening, but as awaken¬
ing takes place after the study of Sastra which stands for
avidya , one thinks that vidya comes from the study of Sastra.
The Vrtti also describes this rise of vidya from avidya as
something wonderful: Tathavidya . . . . kuto 5 pyadbhutaya vrttyd
pradur bhavati. Punyaraja’s adbhutena rupena is an echo of the
Vrttis—adbhutaya vrttyd. In fact, the expression adbhuta Vrttih
occurs already in the karikas. Once in III. Sambandha—81
and again in III. Ka. 17. In all these occurrences, there is a
similarity of context. The expression is used in connection
with the appearance of the effect from the cause, with the
II. 234-238
103
appearance of many from the one and with the realisation of
unity from plurality. Here, emphasising the wonderful
character of this process of vidya arising out of avidya, the
Vrtti concludes as follows —tasmad anyatrabhyasah kriyate ,
nantariyakatayanyad eva pradur bhavatiti = one studies one thing,
namely, the Sdstra, that is, avidya and what results from it is
the opposite of it, namely, vidya. That is why it is a wonder¬
ful process.]
2 3 5. The word conveys a meaning according to
long grammatical usage. This long wrong usage
appears to be natural.
[The Vrtti here points out that the wrong usage of words
only reflects our wrong understanding of the world around us
which is unreal, the only reality being the ultimate one.]
2 36. The ignorant person sees parts in the
primordial atom. Likewise, he sees its parts also as
wholes endowed with parts.
[The Vrtti points out that, due to our experience of all
objects as having parts, some think of the atom also as having
parts and indulge in discussions as to whether an atom is
connected with objects through one of its parts or through all
its parts : paramdnur ekaddena va sambadhyete, sarvdtmana veti .]
23 7. By r our seeing jar and other objects, the
universe also seems circumscribed. Due to the fact
that objects are created, even the eternal Brahman
appears to have had a beginning.
238. These sastras which are a means (of attain¬
ing knowledge) are really misleading to ignorant
people. But by following the unreal path, one
attains truth in the end.
[The Vrtti reminds one that the unreal is the means of
attaining the real. Similarly the meaning obtained by analysis
104
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
(apoddhara) is the means of understanding the integrated
meaning ‘.—Vindpoddharena ndsti sthitalakfanasydrthasya firatipattir
The author again denies the reality of the individual
word and its meaning.
239. As the words are (gradually) grasped, one
undeistands the meaning in one particular way but
when the whole sentence is grasped the same
meaning appears to be quite different.
[The Vrtti points out that this verse only states a general
idea and that its illustrations are given in the following verses
The general idea is that one sets aside at the sentence stage a
meaning understood at the stage of the individual word If
the latter were real, that could not happen, the relation bet
ween the word and the meaning being eternal : nityatvdcca
iabdarthasambandhasyayadupattam sabdena tasya punaraiakyah parit-
yagah kartum iti.']
240. Those sentences in which, after manv
meanings (are conveyed by the individual words) a
negation follows, (in these sentences) these mean¬
ings are discarded and should not be taken as real.
[In the sentence dhava-khadira-palasdS chedamyd na
the meaning understood until the last word is heard is that
the trees dhava, kliadira and paldsa should be cut. But as soon
as the last word is heard just the opposite meaning is under¬
stood which shows that the meaning of the individual word is
unreal. It is better not to take it seriously even before the
last word is heard.]
241. The sentence : ‘tree, there is not’ is the
cause of our understanding a particular kind of
absence. There is no connection in our mind bet¬
ween the negative particle and the object.
II. 241-243
105
[ If each word has its own meaning, the first word c tree 5
(in the sentence ‘tree, there is not’ = vrkfo nasti ) conveys the
tree as something which exists and the negation which
follows denies its existence. If the tree exists, its existence
cannot be denied. If it does not exist, its negation is un¬
necessary. In either case, the word expressing negation is
useless. If the sentence is taken as a whole, this difficulty
does not arise.]
242. If it is maintained that the idea of the
existence (of the tree) takes place in isolated under¬
standing ( vicchedapratipattau ) how can an idea not
conveyed by a word disappear (simply because of
its connection with negation) ?
[ The idea which is refuted here seems to be this :—
The idea of the existence of the tree arises when the sentence is
split up, that is, apart from any word and that is set aside by
the negative particle. It is said in answer that the negative
particle can set aside only an idea conveyed by a word. An
idea which arises apart from any word is not conveyed by the
word and such an idea cannot be set aside by the negative
particle. ]
243. If it be held that the idea (of the existence
of the tree) is declared false (by the negative parti¬
cle and does not disappear) then the negative parti¬
cle performs a new function and how can one under¬
stand the non-existence of the tree (from the
sentence Vrkso nasti)?
[The new function of the negative particle na is to
declare a certain idea false and not to set it aside. The non¬
existence of the tree cannot be understood if this new func¬
tion is accepted. Punyaraja points out that the new function
attributed to the negative particle would be possible only if
its function is paryudasa and not prasajyaprati$edha. If vrkso ?iasti
is paryudasa , the negative particle would be connected with
Vrk$ah and the sentence would mean : not a tree, but some-
106
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
thing similar. If the sentence is prasajyapratifedha, the nega¬
tive particle would be connected with the verb asti and the
meaning would be : ‘the tree does not exist’. It is clear that
the function ascribed to the negative particle here is possible
only if the sentence is paryudasa.~\
244. If it be said that the negative particle is
used without reference to any substratum, then it
could be used even before. If it be said that what
is negated is the substratum, then the purpose of
the mention (of the substratum) would be merely
restriction.
[ If the negative particle by itself could denote negation
as well as what is negated, the separate mention of what is
negated would be for the sake of restriction or elimination
and not for its own sake. This is an unsatisfactory way of
construing words.]
245. Or (the particles) would only suggest a
restriction or they would restate (meanings expressed
by other words). Only one word (in a sentence)
would possess a meaning and the rest would be
meaningless.
[If the view that the particles ( nipdta ) are only mani-
festors (of the meanings of other words) and not expressive of
their own meaning is adopted, then in the present case, in
vrkfo na the word itself would denote the object and its nega¬
tion and the negative particle would only manifest that nega¬
tion. What merely manifests the meaning of another word is
useless. It would do no more than restrict the object to be
negated to the tree. To interpret a word as merely restrictive
is not satisfactory. Nor would it do to say that one of the
two words denotes both the object and its negation and the.
other word only restates it (anuvada ), because restatement is
a kind of repetition. All this is the result of looking upon
II. 245-247
107
the sentence and its meaning as divisible. Therefore, it is
better to look upon it as indivisible.]
246. In the sentence udahari etc. one under¬
stands a contradictory relation between the words.
But once the whole sentence is finished, a quite
different meaning is understood.
[The sentence : udahari ! bhagini \ yd tvam krasdnadvaham
vahasi sa tvain pracinam kumbham abhidhavantavi adrdksih , referred
to in the verse, quoted by Punyaraja and the Vrtti is probab¬
ly older. Here, once the sentence is finished, a quite diffe¬
rent meaning is understood : As the Vrtti puts it—
vakyasamaptau arthantaropadanam arthantaraparityagaka dr^y ate .]
247. From sentences the chief meanings of
which are praise, blame etc. a different meaning
is understood than the one obtained from the indi¬
vidual words.
[ Sometimes, when the meanings of individual words are
considered, it consists in condemnation, but the sentence as a
whole denotes praise. Sometimes, it is vice versa. Punyaraja
quotes illustrations. In the first one, the verse as a whole is
meant to praise some king by saying that his glory has whiten¬
ed the whole world whereas the parts of the verse enume¬
rate four things which continue to remain dark even after the
king’s glory has spread everywhere. The four things are :
(1) The spots on the moon, (2) the neck of Siva, (3) Murdri ,
(4) the temples of the elephants of the regions, soiled by the
flow of their dark liquor. How can one accept the existence
of these parts of the sentence if they denote the opposite of what
the whole sentence denotes ? The second verse, as a
whole, is meant to blame the ocean. But each part of it
seems to praise it. Another proof that the parts, namely,
the meanings of the individual words, are unreal.]
The author now expresses the view of the defender of
the individual word.
108
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
248. From each word (in a sentence) a mean¬
ing not connected (with the meanings of other
words) is understood which ultimately becomes the
means of our understanding one single meaning
from the whole sentence.
[After understanding the unconnected meanings of the
individual words, we connect them together and get the
sentence-meaning which is thus in the nature of connection
( samsarga ). ]
This view is now refuted.
249. The meaning which is first unconnected
and later joined on to others and thus accumu¬
lates becomes something quite different, because it
is like putting together broken pieces.
[The translation is according to Punyaraja’s commen-
tary. His text does not seem to have had na in it. There is
no na in M. either. It is a pity that the Vrtii on this verse is
not clear because there are two gaps in the text of it. Though
T (R) has na in the verse, the commentary Ambakartri explains
it as though it was not there. ]
The author now begins the topic of the distinction bet¬
ween the primary and secondary meanings of words.
250. Some thinkers have declared that the
word which has many meanings is the same word.
Its power to convey all meanings is differentiated
according to circumstances.
[Once the sentence is analysed and we get the individual
words, consideration of the meaning of the latter begins.
Twelve views are mentioned :—(1) That the word is the
same in all its meanings, (2) that it is different with each
meaning, (3) that the individual word and its meaning are
II. 250-251
109
unreal, (4) that they are real. Each one of these four views
can be differentiated according to Sabdopacara and the two
kinds of arthopacara. Sabdopacara means : the application of a
word to an object primarily, as the application of the word
go to a cow or figuratively, as the application of the same
word to a vdhika, because of his resemblance to a cow in dull¬
ness. In both these cases, the word go is applied to an object
which has gotva, really or figuratively. Arthopacara is of two
kinc j s ;_When the form of the word, whether applied primari¬
ly or figuratively, is considered to be its meaning, it is one
kind. When an outside object is its meaning, whether
applied primarily or figuratively, it is the second kind. When
each of the first four views is combined with each of the next
three views, one gets twelve views in all. But speaking broadly,
there are two main views, designated as ekafabdadarsamm and
anekaSabdadarfanam . The present verse begins the consideration
oftfie former. See, on this topic, my paper on “Bhartrhari on
the primary and the secondary use of words.” Indian Linguis¬
tics, Vol. 29, 1968, pp. 97-112.]
251 . Therefore, due to purpose or context or
contact with another word, a word gives up its pow¬
er of denoting many meanings at the same time and
conveys them one by one.
[ If it is the same word which has many meanings, how is
it that it does not convey all of them at the same time ? The
answer is that purpose, context and contact with another
word determine which meaning is conveyed by the word on
£ particular occasion. In verses 315-316, othei factors foi
determining the meaning of a word will be mentioned. Here
only those three factors are mentioned which help one to
decide which is the primary meaning and which the secondary
one. The other factors mentioned later help one to decide
what is expressed and what is implied.
The Vrtti says the same thing with examples and adds
that sometimes words convey more than one meaning at the
same time: Examples : Sveto dhavati, alambusdnairiydta. See M.
Bha. I. p. 14, line 14.]
110
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
252. Just as the word ‘cow’ denotes an object
endowed with dewlap etc. so does it denote a vahika
also.
[All this is being said according to ekasabdadarsana, the
view that when a word denotes different things, it is still the
same word. The word cow denotes a particular class of
animals through its power called abhidhd. When it is applied
to a vahika who has not the physical characteristics of a cow
it denotes that object through the same power and not some
other. ]
253. The primariness or secondariness of a word
having many attributes, that is, the power to denote
many things, depends upon frequency of usage.
[Therefore the word gauh primarily denotes the cow
and secondarily an object like vahika because of more frequent
usage in the former case. It is the same word which denotes
both. So this is ekasabdadarsana.
Commenting on 252 and 253 together, the Vrtti says :
the same word gauh sometimes denotes the universal as in
gaur anubandhyah. Sometimes, it denotes the individual or
substance in which the universal inheres, as in the sentence
gaur aniyatam or gaur duhyatam. Sometimes it denotes a parti¬
cular individual as when one asks a cowherd seated in the midst
of a herd of cattle: do you see a cow in this herd of cattle? (aslya-
tra kahcid gam pasyasi )? Sometimes it is applied to a totally diffe¬
rent object like vahika because of the presence in him of qualities
like suffering everything, and eating a lot. Where it is used
primarily and where secondarily depends upon whether it
requires the help of other factors like context for conveying its
meaning. ]
Another effect of the ekasabdadarsana is now being
shown.
254. One and the same sacred hymn is accept¬
ed, without any confusion, as having many mean¬
ings and different powers according as it is consider-
11.254-255
111
ed from the point of view of the atman , or of the
gods, or of the ritual.
[A sacred hymn remains the same even if it is used for
different purposes such as meditation, muttered prayer and
sacrifice. On each occasion, it would have a different mean¬
ing but the mantra is looked upon as the same. ]
So far, sabdopacara according to ekaSabdadarSana has
been shown. In Sabdopacara, the word now denotes one
meaning and now another. That affects the eternality of the
relation between the two. So he now considers the question
from the point of view of arthopacara.
255. Some hold that due to special circumstan¬
ces (in this case the dullness and slowness of the
vdhlka) the quality of being a covv is traced in a
vdhlka. There has been a change in the external
object but the word expresses its own meaning.
[In this context, two views have been put forward :
ekasabdadarsana and anekaSabdadarSana. The first view means
that when a word has many meanings, it is the same word.
The second view means that it is not but that it becomes as
many words are there are meanings. In the former view,
there can be Sabdopacara and arthopacara. When the word
h is applied to a cow primarily and to a vdhlka secondarily,
it is the same word. This is Sabdopacara. Within ekaSabdadarSana,
there can be arthopacara also and that has two aspects : the
meaning ofa word can be the form itself or an outside object.
Whether the word gaah is applied to a cow or to a vahika, its
own form is understood first in any case. Whether applied
primarily or secondarily, gotva is understood in both applica¬
tions. Thus, the form and the meaning are the same in both
cases. These are the two aspects of arthopacara. As, in Sabdopa-
cara the word is applied now to one thing and now to an¬
other, the eternality of the relation between the world and
.and its meaning is affected.
112
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
The Vrtti points out that a word is really never used in a
meaning other than its own. When the word gauh is applied to
a vahika , it is because some qualities associated with a cow are
attributed to a vahika : eke$am dcarydndm mukhydt svavifayad
anyatra §abdasya vrttir nasti. ]
256. The same form of a word is superimposed
on all its meanings. It is the object that changes.
The word is unchangeably fixed to its form.
[The point mentioned here is that a word never deserts
its meaning consisting of its external form, namely, a particu¬
lar pattern of phonemes.
The Vrtti attributes to some Acaryas the view that the
form of a word, specifically its own and internal to it, invari¬
ably associated with it and normally never shared with other
words, is its first meaning. It is superimposed on the object
which it denotes. The two are identified : Anye tvacarya man -
yante svarupe Sabdo nityam vartate. Sa eva tasyantarahgo savyabhi -
cdri $ abdant arena sadhar atio rthah . Tatra cdnupade§ ap r a tip at till
sarvefdm. rupam tu sabdanam arthe$vadhyaropyate. ]
The anekasabdadarsaria is now explained.
257. Those who follow the path of difference
maintain that though the primary and the secondary
words are different from each other, they appear to
be the same because of resemblance in their form.
[Here Punyaraja points out that those who follow the
path of difference declare that a word used in a secondary
meaning is different from the same word used in its primary
meaning. This is the result of accepting identity as the rela¬
tion between a word and its meaning. Once a word has been
identified with its primary meaning, it cannot again be identifi¬
ed with another meaning. One wants a totally different
word for it.
A similar question is discussed in the M. Bha on va. 4-10
and 11-12 in the second ahnika. The question discussed is
113
:r~ II. 257-259
whether a phoneme occurring in different contexts is the same.
Here the question relates to words having different meanings, j
258. It is thus that a Vedic hymn for kindling
the lire becomes different by mere repetition. In
the same wav, a Vedic mantra that is the object of
usage or guess also becomes different.
[ It is prescribed in the Vedas that a certain number of
mantras should be recited for kindling the sacrificial fire. The
number is sometimes eleven, sometimes thirteen and some¬
times seventeen. Repetition of a mantra is also taught in this
connection. It follows that a mantra repeated becomes a
different mantra. It is by repetition that the required number
is obtained. In the same way, a word used in a secondary
meaning should be considered to be different from the same
one used in its primary meaning.
What is interesting to note here is that the question of
sameness or difference is thought of in connection with phone¬
mes, words and whole mantras. The same phoneme comes in
different contexts and becomes the object of grammatical
operations; the same word denotes different meanings in diffe¬
rent contexts; the same mantra is repeated in the same context
and is counted as a different mantra. All this has been said to
strengthen aiiekaJabdadartana. ]
2 59. They (the hymns thus repeated) are also
Veda. For, it is only some that have, been handed
down. Or rather what is actually handed down is
meaningless whereas the rest is really subsidiary (to
the ritual).
[The mantras which are actually handed down in the
Vedas are only illustrative. They stand for others also which
have not been handed down but which are also nonetheless
Veda. As long as the sequence of the words is the same as
that of the mantra actually handed down, it is also Veda. Not
everything is actually handed down.
114
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHAR1
Another way of looking at it is that what is actually
handed down has no meaning other than its own form. So it
is not mantra. Only that which has a meaning other than its
form and brings to the mind what is connected with the actual
ritual is mantra. It is only then that it is subsidiary (Sesa) to
the ritual.]
260 . Some maintain that the outward form it¬
self is the purpose of the transmission of the Vedas,
so that everything possessing the form is different
while those that are used in the ritual are different
on account of their connection with what is actually
handed down.
[If the outward form is the meaning of the Vedas , the
mantras are different from one another because their outward
form is different. Not only the mantras which have been
handed down but the others also have an outward form and
as that is always different, the mantras are also different. As
far as the outward form is concerned, a word conveys it
through Sakti and not through lak$ana.
261 . The savitrl mantra is different according as
it is used at the sacrament of initiation or at a Vedic
ceremony or at low recitation. But it is taken to be
the same.
[The savitri mantra used on different occasions is a diffe¬
rent mantra , but due to similarity in the sequence of the
phonemes, it is looked upon as the same. Similarly, according
to the anekasabdadartana , the word gauh is different according as
it denotes the cow or the vahika but identity is superimposed
and so, in regard to the cow, it is said to be expressive ( vacaka )
on the basis of prasiddhi and in regard to the vahika , it is said
to be lak$aka on the basis of aprasiddhi. If there is no super¬
imposition, it is a different word and so each is expressive in
regard to its meaning. Neither is laksaka. To look upon the
two different words gauh as the same is sabdopacara.
11.261-263
115
A mantra, used on different occasions, is a different
mantra, says the Vrtti. Used in the upanayana ceremony, the
savitri is called samskarasavitri. When one who has already had
his upanayana uses it at some other ceremony, it is a different
savitri altogether. When recited a definite number of times
as part of an expiation ceremony, it is again different. In
other words, a mantra differs according to application. It is
looked upon as the same for practical purposes only. As the
Vrtti says : vyavaharikam ekatvani].
262 . It is on account of the particular form of
words that they denote their object and so also a
sentence denotes its meaning by virtue of its own
form and not of anything else.
[The Vrtti seems to say here that to look upon the form
only as the basis for the application of a word to an object is
cvyutpattipaksa. In the vyutpattipakfa, on the other hand, there
is some circumstance ( nimitta ) besides the form which is the
basis of the application : uyutpatti pak;e tu nimittany eva prayo-
jakani .
263 . According to those who hold that one and
the same word has many meanings, the distinction
between primary and secondary is based on estab¬
lished usage or lack of it.
[Really speaking, the question of primary and secondary
in regard to meaning cannot arise if the word becomes diffe¬
rent with every meaning. As there are as many words as there
are meanings, each word has one meaning only and that is its
primary meaning. It has no secondary meaning at all. But
the question does arise in the ekaSabdadarsana and then long
usage or the lack of it is the basis for the distinction between
primary and secondary.
What the Vrtti wants to say here is not clear as the text
is doubtful here and there. The point raised is : When a
word has many meanings, what is the criterion for regarding
■one as the primary one and the others as secondary ? The verse
116
VAKYAPAD1VAM OF BHAETRHARI
says that the criterion is siddhi or asiddlii. The Vrtti concludes
thus :— tathaparyayenayasmim vakyc prasiddharthah sabdas tatra
mukhyah. Anyatra tu gaunah. ]
264. Others declare that word to be secondary
which denotes a meaning with the help of the context
or the presence of another word.
[ The help of the context or of the presence of another
word makes the meaning understood from a word secondary.
This test is said to be common to both ekaSabdadmiana and
anekasabdadarsana. ]
The author now wants to express the same idea in the
words of the author of the Sahgraha.
265. A word which, when uttered by itself, de¬
notes its well-known meaning is the primary one, be¬
ing dependent on its own form only.
[Just before the Verse, the Vrtti says Sangrahakarah
pathati and then follow 265, 266 and 267 on which there is a
common Vrtti. Does it mean that all these verses are quota¬
tions from the Sangraha ? Punyaraja seems to regard 265
only as a quotation from the Sangraha.
266. A word which finds its application through
the use of another word and by means of a special
effort as it were is declared by others to be second¬
ary, conveying as it does, the secondary meaning.
[By ’'special effort’, the context is meant here, according
to Punyaraja.]
267. In a case where a word takes its chief mea¬
ning as the basis for application (to another object)
the chief meaning is the cause and the secondary one
the effect.
II. 267-268 117:
[That meaning is the primary one to which the word
can be applied without any impediment or hitch. That mean¬
ing is secondary to which the word is applied after some
incompatibility is felt. When the word go is applied to a
vahikci , there is first incompatibility but it becomes alright
when gotva is attributed to the vahika. This is arthopacara.
This takes place when the word go is supposed to be the same
in both cases. Though the same, it is looked upon as different
on the basis of Sciktibhedci and so it is alright.
The Vrtti here concludes by saying that when a word
conveys a meaning on the basis of its form only, without
depending on the context or some other word, it is said to be
primary in regard to that meaning. If it does depend upon
these other factors, itis said to be secondary.]
The author now points out the difficulty in trying to
take purpose or context as the guide for determining what is
primary and what is secondary.
268. The words pur a and drat ; are used in mutu-
ally conflicting meanings and it is by context that
we determine what the meaning is on any particular
occasion.
[The word purd denotes both the future and the past.
Similarly drat means both near and far. Only the context
can tell what the actual meaning is. If the meaning deter¬
mined by the context is the secondary one, the meaning of
these words would become secondary but that would be
wrong. Both the meanings of these two words are primary.
Therefore, context is not the correct basis for determining
which meaning is the primary one and which the secondary
one.
The text of the Vrtti is doubtful in places but it says
the same thing and gives other examples besides purd and aiat.
The point which it makes is that in the case of such words,
the question of primary and secondary does not arise at all.
Nor does it arise in the case of pairs like vdyuli vdyuh , aivah
aSvah , teua tena in which one is a noun and the other is a
verb, though the two have the same form. Both the meanings
118
VAKYA P ADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
are primary here also as in the case of pur a and drat :—
tatha vayur vaytih, atvoivah, tena tena iti ndmdkhyaidndm tulyaru-
patve visaydntarasyasamsparfdn na gaunamukhyavyavaharo’sti. ]
How can the question of primary and secondary arise if
the words and word-meanings are unreal and only the sen¬
tence and the sentence-meaning are real ? This question is
never raised in regard to the sentence-meaning.
269. Once the analysis of the meanings of the
individual words from that of the sentence is done,
the meaning of one word so obtained can be connect¬
ed with another, also so obtained.
[When the sentence and its meaning are considered
indivisible, there are no individual words and their meanings
and so the question of primary and secondary cannot arise.
And yet for practical purposes the sentence is split up into
words by a process of abstraction ( apoddhara ). When this is
done, the distinction of primary and secondary is based on
long usage or lack of it. ]
But then a word is sometimes used without being linked
to another word. That means that the individual word is real.
270. When a word is sometimes used by itself
with the verb asti (understood), it is really a sentence.
That is why it is not connected with any other word.
[What is meant here is that the verb ‘tobe’ is understood
and added on mentally to a single word when it is used. Thus,
it is really a sentence and so no other word is connected with
it.]
271. When the word ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ is uttered
as an answer to the question ko’ yam? (what is this?)
there is some action like seeing hidden in the question
itself.
[The question K’yam ? = What is this ? really means :
What is this that is seen ? =Ko\ym drsyate ? in which the action
II. 271 273
119
of seeing is understood. Or it may be some other suitable
action. In the same way, the answer ‘cow’ reallymeans: ‘it is
the cow which is seen’ or some other suitable action is implied
in it. An action is implied both in the question and in the
answer.
[The Vrtti also points out that a single word is never
used. Whether it is a question or an answer, it always
implies an action :—. . Mi kriydvisesam abhyantarikrtya praina-
pralivacane bhavatah. If the question implies an action though
it is not openly mentioned, it is natural that the answer also
should imply it :— tatra ca prainakala evantaritayam kriyayam
prativacane’pi tadvifayah caritakriyah Sabda upadiyate. ].
Some have taken the presence of the original properties
in a greater or less degree as the basis of the distinction bet¬
ween primary and secondary.
272 . Nor can abundance or deficiency in the at¬
tributes be the basis of the distinction because some
consider even abundance to be deficiency due to
long usage.
[Dullness is associated with the cow. When the word
cow is applied to the animal, it is a case of primary application
because, in the cow, dullness is found in a greater degree.
When the same word is applied to a vahika, it is a case of
secondary application because dullness is found there in a
lesser degree. But this criterion is unreliable as abundance
and deficiency are relative terms. The vahika may be really
duller but long usage considers that dullness exists in him in a
lesser degree.
The Vrtti discusses, besides the above example, simho
manavakah also :— sampurnaka saktyadayah simhe, nyund mdna-
vake. gavi ca sampurnajadyadayo nyilnastu vahike.
The author now speaks about similarity as the basis of
the distinction between the primary and the secondary.
273 . When a word expressive of the universal is
applied to something in which the universal is absent
120
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
but a similar attribute is present, that word is said
to be used in a secondary sense.
[According to thisview, the word cow denotes the uni¬
versal ‘cowness ’ (gotva). It exists only in the cow. But when
the word is applied to a vdliika, it is not because there is gotva
in him, but because he resembles the cow in being dull.
Resemblance in some attribute is, therefore, the cause & of the
secondary application of the word.
As the Vrtti puts it :—taira rudhasambandhasya prasiddliasa-
hacaryasya dharmdnlarasya darsandd atajjdtlyefu jatitabdal, prayu-
jyama.no gauna ityucyate. ]
The author now speaks about viparydsa, misapprehension
on the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.
274. When an object appears like another as
though by misapprehension, then words like cow ex¬
pressing the latter are said to be in a secondary sense.
[One can apply a word expressive of one thing to an¬
other, either through misapprehension or deliberate superim¬
position. To call mother-of-pearl ( sukti) silver after misappre¬
hension in the dark is an example of the first case. To apply
the word cow to a vahika on seeing some resemblance between
the two and not. because of misapprehension is an example of
the second case. Here there is no wrong identification be¬
cause one clearly sees the difference. That is why the word
ivais used after viparydsa. ]
The author now speaks about shape and power as the
basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.
275. Just as a,v plough or a sword or a pestle, be¬
ing endowed with a particular shape and power, is
understood as the fixed accessory ( sadhana ) of a
particular action,
276. (Just as )these things have no power connect¬
ing them with other actions but are invariably under-
121
II. 276-278
stood as meant for the performance of particular
actions because of their shape,
277. In the same way, a word endowed with a
form and power from the very beginning has its
purpose fixed. Through some power, it can also be
applied to other things.
[ These instruments and tools perform their particular
actions on account of the particular shape with which they
are endowed. One cannot cut grass with a plough nor fight
a battle with it. In the same way, the power of a word to
denote its meaning is fixed from eternity. This is the view
not only of the grammarians but also of the Mimamsakas. See
Jaimini, Mi. Su. I. 1.5. Also Vak. III. Sambandha. 29.]
278. The meaning which is understood to be
the purpose (that is, the main one) of a word as
soon as it is heard is considered to be the mainmean-
j n cr whereas the one to which it is applied by a
special effort is the secondary one.
[ If a word like go has many powers and it can be appli¬
ed to a vdhika also, how is one to decide which is the primary
meaning and which the secondary one ? The answer is : that
which is understood directly from the word without the help
of the context, by merely hearing the word is the main one.
That which is understoodwith the help of the context and
otherwords in the sentence is the secondary meaning.
Commenting on 275-278 together, the Vrtti points out
that certain tools and instruments, by virtue of their shape
and power, are associated in the world with particular
actions. Not that they cannot be used for doing other
actions, but normally, they are meant for particular actions.
They are not associated with nor called by the other actions :
loke te tu karmantaresupadiycimanah sadhayanto’pi tamartham
tadangatvena vypadesam na labhante. Similarly, words have
normally the power to convey particular meanings, but they
are sometimes used to convey other meanings secondarily but
122
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
they do not become known in the world as being expressive of
these meanings : pratyayanaSaktimairam tupadayanyatra prayujya-
mdndyah pratydyayanto'pi tanarthanstatsambandhitvena loke
vyavasthayd prasiddhim na labhante.']
279. When the words go, Yusmad and mahat have
the suffix cvi at the end and are used in a meaning
other than their own, what was not so becomes so
secondarily and sometimes also primarily.
[In the expressions : agaur gauh sampadyate, go'bliavat,
atvam tvam sampadyate, tvad bhavati, the quality of being a cow
and of being ‘thou’ is superimposed on what is not a cow and
what is not thou. What is not a cow does not really become a cow.
It is onlya superimposition. In amahdn mahan bluitah, mahadbhu-
tas candramah, what was not big does actually become big. This
case is therefore different from the two previous cases. The
word mahat is used in its primary meaning in mahadbhutah, but
in go’bhavat, go is used in a secondary sense, because it is
applied to something which does not really become a cow.
Being used in a secondary sense, the o in go is not considered
to be pragrhya. For the same reason, there is no second person
suffix in tvadbhavati. There is no real yusmad here. It only
exists secondarily. In the words of the Vrtti—agaur gaur
abhavat, go’bhavat iti pragrhyasarhjna. na bhavati. Atvam tvam
sampadyate, tvad bhavati madhyamo na bhavati. ]
But, says the objector, this is alright in such expressions
as go'bhavat and tvadbhavati. But in mahadbhutas candramah, the
use cannot be called a secondary one as the moon does really
become big {mahat) on full-moon day. That being so, the
long a, taught in P. 6.3.46, at the end of mahat should come
in. To show that even in mahadbhutah candramah, the use is a
secondary one, the author says—
280. The original state is changed into m agnitude
or whiteness. Considered as something different,
it (the original state) is the cause of secondariness.
II. 280-282
123
[ In mahadbhutas candramah = ‘the moon has become big’,
and Suktibhavati patafi = ‘the cloth has become white’ also,
there is secondary usage. The moon remains the same, but
it is thought of as having two different states. The former
state is considered as the original one and the later state as
the modified or secondary one. It is a question of the speakers’
intention. When the former state is thought of as the original
'ne ' the later state appears as the superimposed one and then
’ j arv usage results. On account of this secondary usage,
the final of mahat does not become a by P. 6.3.46. The pre¬
sence of secondary usage here also is stated by the Vrtti as
f UoWS __ purvottarayor avastliayor aSritayoh savyaparatvat purva-
sya avast hay a vivakfayam satyam vikaraiabdasya tadupagrahi gauna-
tvam vijnayate. ]
281 The proper nouns Agni, Soma, etc., which
are united with their names on the basis of their ex¬
ternal forms are really used in a secondaiy meaning
in phrases like Agnisomau manavakau ) because these
words (as applied to manavakau) are not well-known.
[Words like agni, and soma are names of deities which
flr _ their primary meaning. When they are applied to human
, • s on the basis of some resemblance such as brightness, it
be T S case of secondary usage based on superimposition. When
thev are given as names to new-born individuals, they are
ajn used secondarily, but this secondary usage is not based
on resemblance but on the mere fact that these words are not
known as the names of new-born infants. In other words,
abrasiddhi is the basis. That is why there is no sattva in Agni¬
somau according to P. 8.3.82.]
It is now stated that when there is superimposition, the
usage is, of course, secondary.
282. When Agnidatta is called Agni, the word
makes its primary meaning (of god Agni) subordi¬
nate and, therefore, the usage becomes secondary,
as it also stands for datta.
124
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[ When Agnidatta is referred to by the word Agni, the
primary meaning of the latter word, namely, the god Agni, is
made subordinate and it now denotes a person called Agni¬
datta by superimposition ( adhyaropa ) . This is also secondary
usage. ]
It is now explained how the augment sut in HariS-
candra is justified even when the word is only the name of a
student ( manavaka ).
283. In the derivation of words which is based
on different circumstances, the presence or absence
of sut in such words as Hariscandra are regulated.
[There is the augment sut in the word Hariscandra and
it is correct when it is the name of a r$i (P. 6.1.153.) When
we make a compound word in the sense of HariScandroyasya,
the resulting form would be Haricandra , that is, there will be
no sut. The circumstance being different, the form is also
different.
The Vrtti points out that sometimes the form with sut
can be correct when it is the name of the Rsi :_ tatha sati
Rser anyatrapi sasutkasya sadhutvam vijnayate . ]
284. A word which attains its correct form as
the name of a jRsi and is then applied to denote
something else does not lose its inner correctness of
form when applied to a different object.
[A word gets its correct form before it enters into a
sentence and ibkeeps that form even after entering into the
sentence in a secondary sense. As the Vrtti puts it . . .tadd
svavifaye siddhah samskd.ro bahirangdrthapradurbhdve na nivartate .]
Some deny the distinction between primary and second¬
ary meanings. They are answered as follows—
285. Whenever a meaning, however contradic¬
tory it may be, is understood from a word,then accor¬
ding to that understanding, that is its primary
meaning.
II. 285-287
125
[ Whatever meaning figures in the mind when a word or
sentence is heard is its meaning, however unusual or contra¬
dictory it may be. This is based on the Adimmnsaka principle,
expressed in the following Mi. Su : —Sabdavattupalabhyate
t add game hi ddyatc tasya jiianamyatha? nye$am . (Mi. Su IV 1.6.15)
The Vrtti gives the example of the mirage. The mirage
looks like water’from a distance. So it is mistaken for water
and the word water applied to it. This application should be
looked upon as a primary one because it is based upon the
well-established meaning for the > application of the word
water : —jalaiiirbhasdydm lii mrgatrpiikdydm buddharutpannayam
mukhya eva jalaSabdah prayoktavya iti. Tulyam hi pravrttinimittam
sarvatra sabdasya prayojanam bhavitum arhali. ]
It is now shown that even if the meaning is what
figures in the mind, there can be a distinction between what
is primary and what is secondary. To show this, the author
says something about what is real and what is not.
286. Even though the determination of an object
depends upon our understanding of it, still all un¬
derstanding of it does not go in vain (or, all under¬
standing of it is not as in the case of the well-estab¬
lished object, if the correct text is prasiddlia iva, in¬
stead of asiddhaiva.)
[ The Vrtti seems to point out that even though the
determination of an object depends upon our understanding
of it still our subsequent experience in regard to such ob¬
jects’ brings out a distinction between the primary and the
secondary :— ‘pratyayadhine ’ pyarthasyavadharane kvacit tadvisaya-
nam pratyayandm avyabhiedrena yd pravrttir loke ( sa ?) gauna-mukhya-
bhavam vyavasthapayati .]
287. The perception of (real) water and of such
things as a mirage is the same. In spite of the simi¬
larity of perception, mirage is not water.
[ The point here is that mere cognition is not enough
126
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
for determining the existence of an object. We take a mirage
to be water, but there is no water there.
The Vrtti points out that our perception of real water
and our perception of mirage as water resemble each other.
But the difference becomes clear when we go to the place and
try to touch the water in the mirage, drink it and have a bath
in it. So the use of the word ‘water’ to the water which we
see in a mirage is only secondary usage. As the Vrtti puts it—
tathapi spars ana-snana-panadinam abhavdt taddesapraptau
cadarsanan nedam salilam iti . . . tasu mrgatr$nikdsu nasti rnukhya-
sya sabdasya pravrttih.]
288. Even though there is similarity in the per¬
ception of a serpent and that of a rope, still their
difference is obvious from their well known special
activities (that of biting in the case of a snake and
that of binding in the case of a rope.
[We can conclude that the objection is non-existent if
we do not see its special activity, even though it may figure
in the cognition. The snake may figure in our cognition of
the rope, but as the rope does not bite, we can conclude that
it is not a snake. Further, that our perception ofit was wrong. ]
289. Whatever difference is perceived as a result
of any circumstance causing a contrary perception,
that they call a false perception.
[A defect in the senses or in the object itself may cause
a false perception. What is seen because of such a defect is
said to be false.
The Vrtti mentions the following as possible causes of
wrong perception :— Santamasa timiropaghata , madya , visapdna ,
anyadesavasthana. When, due to these causes, the wrong per¬
ception takes place, it can be corrected by comparison with
perception under normal conditions and by verification
through touch etc.— tattu spar sanadibhir yathabhutamavadhdry ate.
timiropaghatad darsanabhede dvitiyasya vastunah sparSabhavada-
paricihinnacaksu$o yd pratipattih saiva nydyyetyavasiyate. ]
II. 289-293
127
More examples follow to show that two cognitions may
be similar if their objects are similar and refer to their special
property but that they are really different.
290. Even though one sees ups and downs in a
picture, similar to those of mountains (nimnonmtGm
citre) still it does not cause obstruction etc. (as a real
mountain)
[ R and RP have nimnonnate citre but nimnonnatam is a
better reading. The Vrtti and the Karikd text of M. have it.]
291. Just as it is possible to have continuous
contact of the hand with the wheel, that is not possi¬
ble in the case of the torch-wheel which can be touch¬
ed only with interruption.
2 92. While it is possible to have contact and
protection in the case of cities by means of forts,
walls and turrets, it is not possible to have these in
the case of imaginary cities.
2 93. As much work as it is possible to get from
real animals cannot be got from earthenware imag¬
es of them. That is why the affix Kan has been
taught by Panini after (words expressive of imi¬
tations ).
[ It has been shown so far that the distinction between
primary and secondary on which some grammatical opera¬
tions are based depends upon the reality or unreality of the
objects denoted by the words in question. One can tell
whether the objects are real or not from the nature of their
cognition which, though similar, may be different because of
difference in their nature. Now the author speaks about
difference between primary and secondary words, the basis
for the use of thesuffix Kan. P. 5.3.96. teaches the suffix Kan
after words expressive of images of objects. One thus gets
128 VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
forms like asvakt z, ns It ole a , gardabhaka, As the objecls'are not
real animals but ouly their images, the suffix Kan can be add¬
ed. Mere resemblance is not enough. It must be an arti¬
ficial image. There is, of course, secondary usage here also.
As the Vrtti puts it Tasmat. kasyacid eva sadriasya dharmasya
bhdvadupamanopameyablmvasambandhe sati ‘ivepratikrtau’ (P 5.3.
96). ityetatprakaranavihitanam pratyaydndmutpattau nimittam
labhanle. ]
294. Mountains and other well known objects
cover a wide area but their reflection covers only a
small area.
[The use of the word Parvata in the sense of the reflection
of a mountain is secondary usage and so it takes the suffixfan
and we get the form parvataka. To call an earthenware image
of a horse asvaka is secondary usage based on similarity of
shape. To call a reflection of a mountain parvataka is also
secondary usage based on resemblance but resemblance due to
the relation of original and reflection. ].
295. While real poison and other such things
are the cause of death, the same things seen in a
dream are not capable of causing the same.
[The implication is that the suffix Kan can be added to
words expressive of things seen in a dream, because they do
not have the effect which the same things have in real life.
The Vrtti says :—Vi ? abhojanddayo hiyathd prasiddhd marana-
ksutp ip as dp ratighatahetutvena vyavasthitd loke na tathd svapnonmSda-
murcchadisu. tasmanna te mukhyavisayatvam labhante'].
296. Things that seem to be otherwise as a
result of changes relating to time, place or the senses
are, however, understood rightly by following world¬
ly tradition.
[ Whether a thing is distant or near is due te difference in
place. The rays of the sun shining in summer and thus causin° r
o
297-299
129
sing the illusion of water in a desert is due to time or reason.
One who suffers from an eye-defect sees two moons instead of
one. This is an instance of an object looking different due to a
defect in the senses.
The Vrtti gives other examples which unfortunately are
not clear due to gaps in the text. ]
297 . The world does not regulate its verbal
usage on the basis of knowledge arising from defec¬
tive senses or which is of a supernatural character.
Words are based on worldly tradition.
[ Knowledge due to some defect in the senses is the
opposite of truth and is illustrated by mirages and the seeing
of two moons. Supernatural knowledge is that of Rfis.
Neither of them is fit for worldly transactions.
Though the Vrtti has gaps here also, the following rele¬
vant sentences may be noted—. . .yoginam sarvajnandm ca
jnanam SabdavyavahdrefU tair apt ndnugamyate. Prakrtalokadrfti-
nibandhanatvacca Sabdarthasambandhasya sarvenarthabhidhdne yat-
nam kurvata lokahprathito nugantavyah.]
298. Just as a lamp reveals, in an object like
a jar, through association (or proximity) other
things than that for the illumination of which it was
employed,
299 . In the same way, a word conveys, from
among the things which are connected together,
those that are different from the one to convey
which it was used.
[When a lamp is used to illuminate an object, it illuminates,
not only that object but whatever else is invariably associated
with it. If a lamp is lighted to see ajar, one sees not only the
jar but also the properties which are inherent in the jar. This is
inevitable. Thejar itselfis the main thing, its properties are the
invariably associated things. In the same way, when a word
is used to convey a particular property from among the many
130
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHAR1
which are connected with one another, it conveys not only
that property but also others which are always associated with
it. Punyaraja takes the word bhava as an example. On the basis
of its derivation, it can convey several connected notions such
as the fact of being something finished ( siddhatva) , the mas¬
culine gender, singular number and so on. If it is used for
conveying the idea of being something finished, it will not stop
there. It will also convey the masculine gender, singular
number etc.
The illustration of the lamp and of the -word bhava go back to
the Vrtti. The former, of course, is mentioned in the verse298 it¬
self. The Vrtti contains several references to the Mahabhasya on the
sutra: Bhave (P. 3.3.18.)
The lamp and the word bhava were jfidpaka examples. The
author now takes a karaka example.
300. Though the churning of the ignition
sticks ( arani ) is done for producing fire, it also pro¬
duces the unintended smoke in the same process.
301. In the same way, a word also, when a
particular meaning is meant to be conveyed, denotes
by association, an unintended meaning also.
[The Vrtti points out that neither the unintended smoke
which is produced nor the unintended meaning which is con¬
veyed plays any part in the action :■ —aprayojakatvdttu pratito’-
pyarthah kriyasadhanabhdvena na parigrhyate. agniprayuktena hi
nirmanthanenaikasadhano pi dhumasannipatah pdkddi$u ca drs ta~
phale$varthe?u agnivannopadiyate.
That a lamp should illuminate not only the intended ob¬
ject but also what is next to it is natural. A word, on the other
hand, is used to convey a particular object. Why should it
■convey something more than that?]
This objection is now answered.
302. Just as one cannot abandon (while taking
a thing) something which is very closely connected
with it, in the same way a word cannot but denote
II. 303-305
131
•what is intimately connected with its primary
meaning.
[ Punyaraja, following the Vrtti explains that this is like
one’s not being able to avoid bones when one buys fish or meat.
Similarly, a word not only conveys its primary meaning but
also its gender and number— tathaikavacanadir api sabdo vinapi
tena pratipadikarthasydpratyayakatvadairitasairisargah tyaktum na
Sakyate.~\
303. Even when the unintended meanings are
present and they are conveyed, it is still the
meaning which led to the use of the word that is the
accepted one, even though there is no difference in
the form of the word (with which the others are also
connected).
[The word which conveys the main meaning, that is, the one
which led to its use is the very word without any difference in
form which conveys the other meanings also.
The Vrtti points out that even though it is the same word
without any change in its form that conveys all the meanings,
it is always possible to distinguish between the one which leads
to the use of the word on a particular occasion and the
others’_-. .tulyaSrutir dpi sabdasteuaiva rupena piavartamdiia iha
viiaye pr ay oj akenar thcndr thavdn ihaprayojakeneti samarthyad avadha-
rayiturn §akyate. ]
304. Sometimes the meanings are not meant to
be primary or secondary, sometimes even proximity
is not the cause of a meaning being conveyed.
305. Sometimes a meaning not belonging to the
word actually used is conveyed and sometimes it is
the chief meaning which conveys another.
[ Even when the meaning which is the cause of the appli¬
cation of the word is the expressed meaning and not what
is necessarily understood, there are four possibilities:
132
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
(1) reversal of what is primary and what is secondary, (2) part
of a meaning is not meant, (3) the whole of the meaning is not
meant, (4) the conveying of another meaning without giving
up the first meaning. These possibilities are now explained one
by one. ]
The following is an example of the reversal of what is
important and what is secondary.
306. ( In the sutras setting forth the meanings
of words ending in taddhita suffixes) the verb just says
something about the meaning of the taddhita suffixes
(and does not insist on action as it usually does)
One sees a reversal of the relation of primary and
secondary meanings.
[The following is an example. P. 4.4.2. teaches the
meaning in which certain suffixes are added to stems. As the
verb is the most important word in the sentence and as a verb
like divyati primarily expresses action, the word ending in the
suffix concerned should primarily express action. But, in fact
the usual relation of primary and secondary between action
and accessory is not meant here. In divyati, the action is
primary but in akfika the word formed according to that sidra
P. 4.4.2., (akfair divyati =dkfikah) , the agent is primary and not
action. In the suttra Bhdve (P. 3.3.18) the masculine gender
and the singular number are not significant.
While Punyaraja explains this verse on the basis of P
4.4.2, the Vrtti does it on the basis of P.4.2.59 and P 5 2 84
where also the meaning of the suffix is indicated by means of a
verb. The word formed by the suffix concerned, however, expres¬
ses the agent primarily and action secondarily : sarvadhdtnpa-
sarjanibhutakriyaparicchinnam dkhydtdpratyavamrs taruparriprddhdnyena
sadhanam abhidhiyate . ]
Now follows an illustration of a part of the meaning
being not meant:—
307. (ab) Proximity is not the cause of the
gender and number being conveyed in the sutras
teaching meanings of suffixes.
II. 307-309
133
[ In the siitra Blidve (P. 3.3.18). the masculine gender
and the singular number are not significant. Words formed
by the suffixes concerned can be in other genders and numbers
like paktih, gamanam, pakau, pdkdh, etc. ]
30 7. (cd) From the word hrasva= short (in P.1.2.
32.) it is the unmentioned measure which is under¬
stood.
[ In P. 1.2.32. the word ardhahrasva means half a mdtrd.
The Vrtti points out that in P. 3.3.18 the word bhava
cannot convey its meaning without some case-ending or other
which brings about the correctness ( Sabdasamskara ) of the word
which is its only purpose and not to convey the masculine
gender and the singular number as significant items ; bhava
ityevamadifti svarthasydnyatlia vaktum aSakyatvdc chabdasamskdra-
nimittalvdcca sannihite pi lihga- samkhye pratyaydnte samuddye vacya-
tvam na pratipadyete. Similarly in ardhahrasva in P. 1.2.32, the
word hrasva has no significance. It means one mdtrd and
nothing more. Ardhahrasva, therefore, means half a matra and
nothing more:— na hyatra hrasvendsannihitena vd prayojanam
kiilcit. . . . hrasvasyardhopalak$anatvenopadanam. ]
308. Half of a short syllable is really what is
meant even though the short syllable itself may
not be mentioned because short is meant to include
everything that has the duration of one matra.
309. The words ‘long’ and ‘protracted’ may
qualify ‘half’ (so that it means half of the mdtrd
belonging to the long or the protracted) or mdtrd
may quality ‘half’ so that the whole means half a
mdtrd. Or the word ardhahrasva may refer figuratively
to the universal of half a mdtrd just like saptaparna.
[ The word ardhahrasva in P. 1.3.32 may be understood
in three ways : (1) hrasva means mdtrd, so ardhahrasva means
half a mdtrd. (2) hrasva stands for all the three ; hrasva, dirgha,
134
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARl
and pluta and ardha means a part, equal or unequal When
added to hrasva , it would stand for equal part, because the
total duration of hrasva is one matra and half a matra would be
an equal division of one matra . As hrasva means half a matra ,
when added to dirgha or pluta , it would mean an unequal part,
the other part in dirgha and pluta being 1£ and 2\ mdtras
respectively, (3) the word ardhahrasva is indivisible and it
stands for the universal (jati i of half a matra.
The above interpretations are all found in the Vrtti as
the following relevant sentence shows —sa hi tadavayavopalak$a -
natvad dirghacaturbhaga iti vocyate , plutasadbhaga iti vd mdtrarddham
iti vd. Tat sarvatha tasya parimdndvasthd vyakhydtd bhavati.]
It is now shown that, sometimes, it is the chief meaning
that indicates another.
310. ‘One has to go, look at the sun 5 though
this sentence says something about the sun, it really
indicates time, because it says, with a hint at the
means ( upaya ) that time should be ascertained.
[The main meaning of the sentence relates to the sun
but that is only a means to an end which is the ascertainment
of time. ]
311. In the sentence vidhyaty adhanusd ‘he
pierces with something else than a bow 5 the parti¬
cular weapon stands for weapon in general or for
anything that can be the substratum of the power of
being a weapon.
[This is an example of the particular standing for the
general taken from the vyakaranaSastra. It is an example of
kvacit pradhanam evartho bhavatyanyasya laksanam (v. 305), be¬
cause the word dhanuh , without giving up its main meaning
‘bow’ stands for any weapon.
The Vrtti is not clear because of gaps in the text but it
seems to say that in P. 4.4.83, the word adhanusd is a paryudasa
kind of negation and means ‘something else than a bow’. But
II. 312-314
135
in this verse it is taken as standing for weapon in general.
The idea is that by negating a particular weapon, weapon in
general is conveyed. ]
A similar example from the world is now given.
312. When a boy is told : ‘save the butter from
the crows’, he does not refrain from protecting it
from dogs etc. knowing that the order refers to des¬
tructive agents in general.
The Vrtti says:— Kakebhyah kakdd va sarpih samraksyatcm
ityukte upaghdtahetusamdnyamdtropalaksanatvdt kakajdter ydvan
upaghdtahetuh sa bratiyate. By saying that kdka in the
verse stands for any destructive agent ydvan upaghdtahetuh, the
Vrtti makes it clear that in worldly verbal usage also, the
particular stands for the general.]
313 . ( When an order for feeding somebody is
given) the washing of the dishes and plates, though
not actually mentioned, is also understood because
it is part of the action of feeding.
[The point made here, is that what is invariably concomi¬
tant with the chief meaning is also conveyed even though no
word expressive of it is used.]
The factors which enable us to decide which meaning is
primary, which secondary and which implied are now enume¬
rated.
314 The meanings of words are determined
according to the sentence, situation, meaning, pro¬
priety, place and time and not according to mere
external form.
[The following examples are given by Punyaraja. By sen¬
tence is meant the fact of construing together several words
occurring in the same sentence or taking together several
sentences occurring in different contexts. For example: in the
136
VAKYAPADiYAM OF BHARTRHARI
sentence katam karoti b hism am udasam darsaniyam , the connec¬
tion of the verb karoti is with the word katam but as there cannot
be a substance without qualities and as qualities must have a
substratum in which to inhere, the other words like bhismam
ending in the second case-ending are taken as qualifying
katam and so a mat having those qualities is made and not any
other on the basis of interconnection within the sentence,
when someone is asked to fetch saindhava in the context ( praka -
rana) of battle, he would fetch a horse but when the same
word is uttered in the context of eating, he would fetch salt.
Thus context helps to determine the meaning of a word. When
the same word is used in different sentences, its meaning is
determined by the meaning ( artha ) of the other words in the
sentence as in the following:— anjalina juhoti, aiijalind suryam
upatifthate, anjalina purnapatram aharati. In these three sentences
anjalina means something different due to its association
with the meanings of the other words. It is propriety ( aucitya)
that helps to determine, when sira, asi and musala are mention¬
ed without reference to any particular action, that sira is for
ploughing, asi for fighting and musala for unhusking again.
When one says that he comes from a town to the east of Math¬
ura, from the word ‘to the east’, one would understand that he
comes from Pataliputra. When one only says ‘the door’ in
winter ‘the listener’ would understand that it has to be closed
and when the same thing is said in summer, he would under¬
stand that it has to be opened. Here it is time or season which
helps to determine the meaning.
In the Vrtti, some examples are the same while the others
are different. But the text being corrupt, the meaning is not
clear. ]
The author now gives two verses giving a more complete
list of the factors which help to determine the meaning of
words. These may be quotations from some unknown work.
315. Connection, separation, association, oppo¬
sition, meaning, context, indication, the presence
of another word,
II. 316
137
316. Suitability, propriety, place, time, gender
and accent etc, these are the causes of our determin¬
ing the meaning of a word when there is no definite¬
ness in it.
[The Vrtti and Punyaraja record that it is always samarthya
= ability or capacity of the word which helps to determine its
meaning when there is indefiniteness. The so called factors
enumerated only reveal this capacity : Tatra kecit sdmarthyame -
vaikam bhedavadharananimittam iti many ante . yasydrthaprakara -
ndbhydm svdbhaviko blicdah samad bigamy ate so'pi samarthyad eva.
samar thy am hi bahudhd pravibhajyate. (Vrtti).
As for the examples of the different facts, the Vrtti and
Punyaraja give the same ones mostly. It is obvious that the
latter has taken them from the former. Here and there the
Vrtti gives examples which are ignored by Punyaraja. It also
raises some points for discussion which are ignored by Punya¬
raja. It is anxious to give an idea of the variety of views
which existed in its day on some of the points raised. That is
why the expressions : anye, anye tu , anyetvahuh , kecit, keciddhuh ,
ye$am, te$am , ke$am-cit occur in the Vrtti in v. 315 and 316.
The examples common to both are as follows— Samsarga =
connection:— sakiSora dhenur dniyaldm. Here on account of
the connection between dhcnuh and ki$ora> a mare is understood
from the former word and not a cow. Viprayoga= separation—
akiSora dhenur aniyatam = c let the dhenu without its ktiora be
brought. 5 Here also, by dhenu a mare is understood because
it is only a mare which can be without kiiora . Sahacarya
(association) — Rdmalak$maiiau. Because of association with
Lakmana , Rama here means son of Dasaratha, Virodha
(opposition) — Ramdrjunau. Here Rama means ParaSurama
because of his well-known opposition to Arjuna. Artha
= meaning and prakarana — context have been illustrated
under the previous verse. Linga — indication— aktdh Sarkardh
= sugar mixed with grease. From indications found elsewhere
it is understood that butter is used for mixing. Ramdrjunau
can be taken as the example of the determination of meaning
through the presence of another word. Samarthya^ suitability,
abhirupaya kanyd deya= the girl must be given in marriage to a
138
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
good-looking person. Through suitability, one understands a
good-looking bridegroom. Auciti = propriety, desa~ place, kala =
time have already been illustrated under v. 314. It is well
known that in the Veda, the meaning of a word is often deter¬
mined by its accent ( svara ).]
317. Even, if it is held that a word having many
meanings is different in each case ( bhedapakse ), the
external form being similar, confusion arises and
it is with the help of context etc. that difiniteness
in meaning is arrived at.
[Whether one holds the nandtvapakfa or the ekatvapakfa, one
has to take the help of the context in determining the mean¬
ings of words having more than one meaning. If the word is
different with each meaning, the form being the same, one
cannot decide which meaning to take and the help of the
context is necessary. If the view is that it is the same word,
the help of the context is all the more necessary.]
Sometimes a word has more than one meaning, because
from its form only, it can be a verb or a noun. Then also
context alone can determine the meaning.
318. When words have the same form as nouns
and as verbs and are to express a different mean¬
ing as each, then the meaning cannot be understood
from the external form only.
[The word a$va as a noun means a horse but it can also be
a verb. From the root tu o tvi gativrddhyoh one would get the
form a$va in the aorist second person singular ( luhmadhyama -
puru$aikavacana). In the same way, ajapayah can mean goat’s
milk or the word can be the causative form of the root ji =
to conquer. In such cases, only the context can be the
guide. ]
319. An enlightened hearer knows that praise
and blame, meant to promote action and abstention
from action respectively, are really unreal.
II. 320-324
139
320. The praise of a prescribed action having a
visible or invisible fruit only serves to prompt the
agent thereof.
[These verses are meant to show that the individual word
and its meaning do not really exist. Only the meaning of the
sentence is real. The chief meaning of a sentence is action and
though a part of it may consist of praise of this action, it has
no real existence. In the same way, the condemnation of an
action contained in a sentence meant to keep people away
from it has no real existence, that sentence being meant only
to keep people away from that action.
The Vrtti gives the following example of praise— brahmacary-
enaivehanantam dyur avdpnoti, ghrtena pdfimdnam apahantiti. tatra
brahmavraiam caritavyam, ghrtam pdntyam ityetdvdn upadesah.]
32 1 - Tust as a crying child is put off when he is
threatened that a tiger would eat him, in the same
way, some bad consequence though unreal, is held
up (before one who does some prohibited act).
322 . Therefore, a learned man does not undei-
take an action prohibited by the sastra after having
arranged for averting its bad consequence.
32 3. One should not violate the injunction that
‘one should not touch it (the sacrificial cake) with
the teeth while eating it, for, if one does so, serpents
would destroy him’ after having first provided some
antidote to serpent poison in the form of some
mantra or medicine.
[The eating of the sacrificial cake by letting the teeth
pierce it is prohibited as follows —na dato gamayet , yad dato
gamayet, sarpa enatn ghatuka bhavanti.
324 . Even if, sometimes, the truth is told in
connection with praise or blame, the object is always
to teach action or abstention from action.
140
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
Having thus shown that individual words and their
meanings are unreal and that only the sentence and its
meaning are real, the author wants to point out that the
sentence is the source of the individual word.
325. The meaning of all individual words has
its souice or basis in the meaning of the sentence.
If the meaning of any sentence is incomplete, it
is on a level with the meanings of the individual
words.
[The Vrtti, echoing what is going to be said in v.419-420,
compares the relation between the meanings of words and
that of the sentence to the relation between the senses and the
body as a whole: . . . tathapi indriyanamiva Sariropanibandhanartha-
kriyd vakyoparibandhanaiva sarvapadarthanam arthavyavastha. ]
326. If a single word (a noun) is pregnant with
the idea of action then, that also, they say, is a sen¬
tence, devoid of a verb, because (the understanding
of action) is seen to take place from a sentence
only.
[The translation is based on the Vrtti text of the verse the
second half of which is : antarena kriyaiabdain vakyad eva hi
darUnat. This second half is missing in R and RP gives it in
the footnotes with the remark that it is found in the manu¬
script gha and numbers the first half together with the first
half of the next verse, though not for the purpose of
translation. Though the Vrtti on 326 is by no means clear
because of several gaps in it, it certainly seems to take
this half as the second half of 326. I have translated the verse
accordingly.]
326(a) So is a mere verb said to be a sentence
if a definite means for the accomplishment of the
action denoted by it is understood and its meaning
thus becomes complete.
II. 327-328
141
[It is a pity that the Vrtti has gaps here also. It seems to
give examples of bare verbs which we mentally complete by
supplying the necessary means for the accomplishment of the
action denoted by them. Parjanya and MdtariSvan are mentioned
as substrata of the iakti ( karakaSakti , kartrSakti)? This
verse is also numbered as 326, (a) being added to distinguish
it from the previous one, in order to maintain uniformity
of numbering with R and RP.]
Here the Mimamsaka objects as follows_
3 2 7. It is a certain completeness of idea, sepa¬
rated by and depending upon the words that are not
used, which through inference, appears to be the
cause of our understanding the meaning (of the
words not used).
[ When we hear the bare noun vrkfah tree we understand a
complete meaning from it such as: ‘the tree stands’ or‘the tree
is seen’. It means that we supply the word tifthati or drsyate
mentally. This is irutarthdpatti. The point of the Mimam¬
saka is that a single word cannot convey a complete meaning.
We supply some word or other mentally to complete the sen¬
tence and the sentence-meaning. In other words, the under¬
standing of the complete meaning is separated from that of the
incomplete meaning of the word actually used by the unused
word coming to the mind. asminneva fabde viii$tarupe yd
buddhir utpadyate taya vyavahitam buddhyantaram buddhau prdpta-
sannidhanam tadarthapratipattinimittam bhavati. ]
The objection is answered as follows.
328. Whatever meaning is understood when¬
ever a certain word is u ttered, that meaning belongs
to that word (and to that word only). There is no
more correct definition of meaning than this.
[The point of the grammarian is that no part of the meaning
should be attributed to any word supplied mentally. In other
words, he does not admit Srutdrthdpatti .]
142
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[The Vrtti begins its remarks on this verse with the words:—
anyc tu many ante . It obviously means somebody other than the
Mlmamsaka. It can very well be the grammarian and the
author himself is one. His remark neha kaScit Sabdartha-
sambandhasya kartd vidyate also confirms that the grammarian
is meant. ]
That being so the sutra :—kriyarthopapadasya ca karmani
sthaninah (P. 2.3.14) is unnecessary, but it is based on srutar-
thapatti= supplying a word mentally.
329. That being so, in cases where a vei'b deno¬
ting an action meant for something else is the proxi¬
mate word, the action denoted by the unused verb
is understood and so does the mere preposition like
nih express the meaning of kranta etc. in a complex
formation.
[The purpose of this verse is to show that the supplying of
non-existent word mentally is unnecessary. In the sentence
edhebhyo vrajati, the verb expresses an action meant for some
other action, the word for which is not mentioned but is under¬
stood from the word edhebhyah = ‘for fuel’, that is, for bringing
fuel. The action of bringing is understood from the word for
fuel itself. That is why P.2.3.14 has been declared to be un¬
necessary, as the fourth case ending in edhebhyah can come by
tadarthye catuarthi. Similarly, in nifkauSambih, nih by itself can
express the idea of krantah.
The Vrtti remarks as follows:— edhebhyo vrajatityasmin
vakye edhebhya ityevamadina gatarthatvad aharanakriyartham prthak
Sab do na prayujyate. ]
If half a sentence can express the meaning of the full
sentence and both are sentences, what is the use of ever using
the full sentence ?
330. They are separate expressions and are like
synonyms. The meaning of sentences consisting of
single words is determined by purpose and the
context.
II. 331-333
143
[ When the sentence consists of a single word only, noun or
verb, how to complete it mentally would depend upon pur¬
pose and context.
The Vrtti points out that Vrk$ah and Vrk$as tifthati are
both complete sentences and not that the former is the latter
devoid of the word ti$thati. Both convey a meaning. They
are like the pair Vrsa and Vrsabha, or Tdva and Tdvaka or
praparna and prapatitaparna in which each of the two is com¬
plete and not that the former is an incomplete form of the
latter:— tani tvaprayujyamdnapadaikcideSasarupdni samuddyd -
ntarani vrsavr$abha—ydvaydvaka—praparna prapatitaparnavad \.
If only the sentence is real, what is the use of analysing it
into words ?
331. The means whereby the meaning is under¬
stood and which differ in the case of each person are
not in any way connected with the thing to be
known from the sentence.
[ The idea is that the artificial divisions are the means of
understanding the integrated sentence.
332. Even when no meaning is understood or
when a wrong meaning is understood words are still
eternally connected with their meaning.
[The relation between word and meaning is eternal. That
is not affected by the fact that the listener may not under¬
stand the meaning due to absent-mindedness or due to igno¬
rance. ]
333. When the word dvaram (—the door) having
the second case-ending is heard, then, according
to the context one understands either ‘shut’ ( badhdna )
or ‘give way' ( dehi ).
[This is said in support of srutarthapatti. According to the
context, one is entitled to supply mentally some word or other
144
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
in order to complete the sentence. Otherwise, one would not
understand meaning and the relation between the word and the
meaning would be affected. ]
The opponent points out a disadvantage in not accepting
Srutarthapatti.
334. A word expressive of a finished thing
( sattva ) and standing for the means (whereby an
action is accomplished) cannot also express the main
meaning of a sentence, namely, the action to be
accomplished.
[The point sought to be made is that to avoid the disad¬
vantage, the required word must be mentally supplied. In
other words, srutarthapatti must be resorted to. ]
335. Therefore, when a sentence consists of a
single word (whether that word is a noun or a verb)
it does no more than express its own meaning and
retires incomplete. Its meaning suggests the proxi¬
mity (of the other meaning required for complete¬
ness through the medium of the word to which the
meaning belongs.)
[In this way, Srutarthapatti is justified by the Mimamsaka.
The upholder of indivisibility now criticizes the Mimairisaka.
336. As there is no difference in the matter of
being meant for something else, the word (actually
uttered) cannot bring another word to the mind,
nor can its meaning bring it nor can the uttered
word bring the meaning ( of the non-uttered word)
to the mind.
[The word actually uttered cannot bring the word not uttered
to the mind, because its function is to convey its own meaning.
II. 337-338
145
Nor can its meaning bring the unuttered word to the mind,
because there is no relation between the two. Nor can the
uttered word bring the meaning of the non-uttered word to
the mind because there is no relation between a word and the
meaning of another word. A fourth possibility is that the
meaning of the uttered word brings the meaning of the non-
uttered word to the mind, but that would be a case of infer¬
ence. The conclusion is that when a word, noun or verb, is
uttered, it brings to the mind without the intervention of any
other word but with the help of the context another meaning
which is required to complete it. In this way, the Mlmam-
saka view is rejected.
The Mimamsaka replies:—
33 7. If the word expressive of the object (of an
action, dvdram in the present case) makes the verb
non-existent as it were (nasiarupam iva ) and (there¬
fore) unnecessary, then both action ( bliava ) and the
finished thing ( sattva ) would acquire equal impor¬
tance.
[The Grammarian himself believes that both action and the
finished thing cannot be equally important in a sentence. If
the actually uttered word dvdram conveys the meaning of the
verb also which is not used, then both action and the finished
object would be conveyed by it on an equal footing which is
impossible.
Now the Grammarian says:—
338 (ab) They describe it (the word dvdram ) as
a verb similar in form to a noun.
If that is so, how to account for the second case-ending in
the word ?
(cd) Usage is regulated by the positive and the
negative reasoning (anvaya and vyatireka ).
[The word dvdram is really a verb similar in form to a
noun. Like other verbs, therefore, it also denotes action
146
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
primarily. If one sees the second case-ending in it, it is only by
analogy. In sentences lik ebhandam pidhehi , dvaram pidhehi where
both noun and verb are present, one sees that the verb denotes
action primarily and the noun denotes substance and takes a
case-ending. Where only the noun is used but both action and
substance are understood, the word takes a case-ending be¬
cause it denotes substance also.
Here the Mimamsaka asks a question : If the word dvaram
denotes more than one thing, is not its expressive power there¬
by lost as there might be a doubt as to which meaning to take ?
The grammarian answers—
339. Even though doubt arises on account of
(similarity) of form, still its expressive power does
not disappear as in the case of the expression ardham
pasoh (=half of the sacrificial animal) where compe¬
tence decides what the meaning is.
[In ardham pasor iva, because of the word iva, a doubt
arises as to whose half is meant, of the animal or of Devadatta,
but the doubt is resolved with the help of context and appro¬
priateness. Similarly, where only the word dvaram is used,
context and appropriateness would help one to decide whether
it should be taken as a noun or as a verb.]
Mimamsaka objection:—
340. If, when a word expressive of sattva (con¬
crete object) stands by itself it is to be considered as
being expressive of a process ( bhava ), if, when they
come together the word expressing sattva is consider¬
ed to have a different meaning and if the verb does
not have its own separate meaning,
341. Then, the statement (of old thinkers like
Yaska) that a verb expresses chiefly a process whereas
a noun denotes a concrete thing ( sattva ) and that
there are four parts of speech would be contra¬
dicted.
II. 342-344
147
[There is a reference here to Yaska’s definition in his
Jsfirnkta of the verb and the noun : bhavapradhanam dkhydtam,
sattva-pradhanani namani. It is also in the Nirukta that one
finds the earliest mention of the four parts of speech : ndma-
khyatopasarganipdtah. See Yaska Nirukta I. 1.]
The Grammarian answers—
342. Having seen the eternality of the sentence
in the mind and its connection in the world with its
meaning, Varttaksa and Audumbarayana have
declared that there are no four parts of speech.
[When the hearer grasps the indivisible sentence, he is
not conscious of any parts in the form of individual words.
Nor is he conscious of word-meanings when he grasps the sen¬
tence meaning consisting of pratibhd.
As the sentence is indivisible the individual word does
not exist and so the question of the different kinds of words or
arts of speech does not arise. Those who believe in srutdrtha-
patti would naturally accept divisions within the sentence and
their being brought under four classes.,
What then is the function of the Sastra ?
343. Both in the world and in the Science of
Grammar, the easy and very comprehensive treat¬
ment of sentences on the basis of individual words
is resorted to by convention for the sake of conve¬
nience.
The Mimamsaka objects—If the individual words and
meanings are non-existent, how is it that action and abstention
from action based on them take place in the world ? The
Grammarian answers—
344 . In the world, traditions of men are not
always based on reality. Therefore, there is nothing
beyond the sentence which is not a mere creation of
the world.
148
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[The point is that when we are trying to understand the
truth, we cannot rely on the practice of the world. In the
world, one sometimes reaches the real through the unreal. We
can understand what kind of animal a cow is by looking at a
picture of it. That does not mean that the picture of a cow is
a real cow. Similarly, we sometimes act on the basis of word-
meanings but that does not mean that they are real. ]
345. Even when the meaning of a sentence is
made clear by means of indications, found in other
sentences, that meaning is its own. It was not clearly
noticed on account of identity of forms.
[The Sruti says : aktah sarkara upadadhati= he places
sugar mixed with grease.
It is not clear from this sentence whether the sugar is to
be mixed with oil or clarified butter. But another Sruti says :
tejo vai ghrtam= ‘clarified butter is indeed lustre’. That is a
clue, an indication that the sugar is to be mixed with clarified
butter. The first fruti thus means : ‘he places sugar mixed
with clarified butter’ and this meaning belongs entirely to the
first srati in spite of the fact that the clue is found in the second
one.]
Something is now being said about the relation of badhya
and badhaka (what is set aside and what sets aside) between
the original rules and their exceptions.
346. Whatever is excluded implicitly, if not
explicitly, from the operation of the general rules, is
explicitly mentioned in the special rules of exception
and that is really part of the meaning of the general
rule.
[A general rule does not really cover special cases though
there is nothing in the rule itself to tell us so. But when the
author of the general rule framed it, he knew about it.
An example of the same from the world is now given—
347. The injunction regarding the serving of
II. 348
149
curds to Brahmins operates by excluding Mathara.
The word Mathara (in the subsequent sentence
takram mdiharaya) because of its connection with
butter-milk, only confirms the correctness of the
meaning of the previous sentence (brahmanebhyo
dadhi dlyatam).
[What is pointed out here is that the sentence takram
mathardya does not set aside the giving of curds to Mathara
because that was never envisaged by the first sentence brah -
manebhyo dadhi diyatdm which enjoins the giving of curds to
Brahmins excluding Mathara. So there is no question of
contradicting something which was enjoined before. Serving
of curds to Mathara was never enjoined.
Thus what is called bddha of the first sentence by the
second sentence is nothing more than the inferential under¬
standing that curds were never meant to be served to Mathara
aprdptyanumdna .
What was said in the previous verse was based on look¬
ing upon the two as two separate sentences. It is thus that
bddha amounts to aprdptyanumdna : The second sentence be¬
comes the cause of our inferring that the injunction in the
first sentence was never meant to apply to Mathara.
If the two sentences are treated as one what would be
the nature of bdidhyabadhakabhava ?
348. Even though there is more than one verb,
some look upon the original injunction and the ex¬
ception to constitute one sentence which appears to
be divided.
[If they are looked upon as one sentence, the exclusion,
of the sphere of the exception and the application of the
original injunction to the rest would take place at the same
time and so there would be no need for aprdptyanumdna.
Just as an exception is supplementary to the original
injunction, in the same way, restrictions and prohibitions can
be looked upon as supplementary to original injunctions.
150
vakyapadIyam of bhartrharj
349. That being so 3 restrictions and prohibitions
are also supplementary to the original injunction.
The aluk (which is taught in P. 6.3.1) has been
declared to be supplementary to the luk (which is
taught in P. 2.4.71).
[Exceptions, restrictions and prohibitions are looked
upon as making one sentence with the original injunction on
the basis of either vakyaikavakyata or padaikavakyatd. The former
is defined thus :— upakaryopakarakabhavapannabodhajanakatvcm .
Without using these technical expressions, the Vrtti ex¬
plains the same ideas in its own words : vidhikdla evotkrftasya
punahSruter apraptir anumiyate = At the time of the original injunc¬
tion itself, it is inferred that it would not apply to what
would not come within its scope. Similarly when P. 2.4.71.
teaches the elision of the case endings of words which are to
enter into a samdsa, it is understood that this elision does not take
place when particular words become the second term in a com¬
pound. In other words, the original injunction and the later
exception or restriction or prohibition are understood as one
sentence and so understood together : yasca supo dhdtuprdti -
padikayor iti dvitiyena lug anvdkhydyate tasya tasminnevavadhivakye
uttarapada-vi§e§am varjayitveti prathamameva vidhina prakalpitah
fefo’numiyate.']
Those who are against looking upon them as one sentence
argue that the sentences in question are complete in their
meaning and so there is no relation of primary and secondary
between them.
350. The sentences in question are independent
as they do not require one another when they con¬
vey their meaning. As they do not serve one an¬
other, how can they constitute one sentence ?
[The Vrtti points out that two separate sentences can make
up one sentence only if there is some kind of dependence or
mutual requirement between them. If each is self-sufficient
it is concerned with itself only. If they cannot render service
II. 351
151
to each other, there is no question of their making up one
sentence:— Ilia sdkar.ksanamsamsargat parasparam upakare vartama-
ndndmekavdkyatvam upapadyate. Pradhandni iu prthagdtmanirvrttau
vyaprtdni. Tesdm nirakanksatvad asatyupakdre ndstyekavdkyatvam.]
The upholder of the single sentence argues as follows—
35 1. (As the original injunction) requires the
special injunction, the latter is taken to be supple¬
mentary to it. The special injunction also requires
the other in the matter of determining what is ex¬
cluded by it. Therefore, mutual requirement is
similar in each case.
[What is pointed out here is that the original and special
.'unctions ( n iyama, apavada or pratisedha) require each other
'• order to determine their own meaning. As their mutual
requirement is equal, it is better to look upon them as consti¬
tuting one sentence. Each requires the other in order to ex-
clude & the scope of the other from its own scope.
While explaining this verse the Vrtti takes a different kind
of example altogether. It takes the sfitra P. 3.1.96, that is,
tavyat-tavya-aniyarah = ‘After a root occur the suffixes tavyat,
tavya and aniyar. It says that according to some, the verb ‘to
occur’ is one though it has three different agents. The verb
° . one, there is only one sentence here :— bhavater ekatvad
ekavdkyatvam. According to others, the action denoted by the
verb becomes different with each different agent. With each
agent, the action is self-sufficient and so there are as many act¬
ions as there are agents and so as many sentences. Those who
uphold the view' that there is only one sentence say that each
of the three suffixes is separately the agent of the verb bhavati,
while mutual requirement does exist. The agent-power (kartr-
jakti) is one, but it exists in three different suffixes : ekavd-
kyavddinastu manyante—satydm apeksdydm tavyadddayah prthak
prthag bhavateh kartdro vijndyante. Bhinnddhdrd vd tavyadddindme-
kaiva kartrlaktir iti.~\
The question whether individual w'ords can also be analysed
into parts is now' discussed:—
152
vakyapadIyam of bhartrhari
352. There is no elision of the part of a name.
A name with a particular sequence of phonemes has
been given to something and that does not disappear.
[Devadatta is a name. Some people sav only Deva or
only Datta. That may happen in the world but the lustra does
not teach the elision of either Deva or Datta. As the Vrtti
puts it : ko.th.Gvi ca visistarupaydin krtdydrn sovijiidydvi nirjiidta-
pravrtti prasiddhaprayogam rudharupam punar anyalhd sakyam
kartu/n .]
353. From Delta etc, a different name alto¬
gether, another name (Devadatta) cannot be under¬
stood. Nor can Datta bring to the mind the named
(individual) Devadatta, because it is the named of
some other name.
[A part of a name can neither bring the full name to the
mind nor bring the named of the full name to the mind. The
Vrtti says the same thing in its own way. Ilia yo’rthena krta-
sambandhah Sabdah sabdantaram tasya vdcako na bhavati = When
there is a relation between an object and a word, another word
cannot be expressive of that word, that is, another word can¬
not bring that word to the mind. All this has been said in
answer to the suggestion, that Datta first brings Devadatta to
the mind and, from the latter, the individual Devadatta is
understood. The possibility of this process is denied here.]
Others believe that the ‘named’ is connected not only with
the full name but also with parts or abridgements of it.
3 54. Others are of the view that there is a rela¬
tion between the named and all the parts of the
name as with the full name.
[ In other words, a part of the name can bring the ‘named’
to the mind as well as the full name can. Or rather, the whole
and the parts bring the 'named 5 to the mind at the same time.
As the Vrtti says .... iti tatra sanijiidkale sarva eva sarnjnino
yathaiva scimudayais tathdvayavair api smnbadhyante = at the time
II. 355-357
153
that the name is given, the named individuals are connected
with the full name and parts of that name at the same time.]
Two defects are pointed out in this view:—
35 5. In this way, even the phonemes which are
parts of the name would become expressive of the
named. Nor does one see the expressive power of
the part once it is separated from the whole.
[The two defects are : (i) If a part of a name can denote
the ‘named’, why not each phoneme of it. ? (2) Whatever ex¬
pressive power a part has exists only as long as it is part of the
whole, not when it is separated from the whole :— sambaddhefu
vavayavcsu samjndtvam pratipadyamane'u kevald daitddaya uccdrya-
manah samjiidtvcin na pratipadyeran dvirvacanavad eva iti, says the
Vrtti.]
356. If the whole name, together with its parts,
is expressive of the ‘named’, then it is not possible
for what looks like parts to be expressive of it.
[What is emphasised here is that what looks like a part
is really not a part. It only looks like it.
The Vrtti points out that the parts which depend upon the
whole cannot perform the same function apart from the whole
._ na hi samuddyatantramm avayavdndm ekdrthakriydydrri hitvd pra-
dhdnam pravrttih sambhavati .]
Another view is now given.
35 7. According to some, from the part the
whole is remembered. From the whole thus remem¬
bered, the meaning of the whole is understood.
[The Vrtti points out that it is not merely a word that is act¬
ually heard which can convey a meaning. A word which is
regularly inferred can also, like the word which is heard, con¬
vey a meaning :— Kecit tu manyante—navaSyavi iruyamana eva
sabdah pratyayakah. niyamendnumiyamdno 5 pi sruyamanavad eva
pratyayam ntpddayati. From the parts, perceived apart from the
154
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
whole, one does remember the whole and the whole thus re¬
membered, does cause the cognition of the object named :—
tatha ca smaryamanah sa eva krtasambandhah samuddyah samjninam
pratyayayati .
That view is now refuted.
358. How can there be remembrance from the
part of the whole which is different from it ? How
can a word which is only understood (and not
heard) be expressive of its meanings;
[The whole is different from the part. So, on seeing the
part, one cannot remember the whole. Even if one does re¬
member it, it cannot convey the meaning because the whole
has not been uttered or heard. To believe that what has not
been heard can convey a meaning would result in undesirable
conclusions.
The Vrtti points out that what looks like a part can be a
part of many wholes having different meanings. Which whole
would one remember on seeing the part ? :— sddhdrano'asdv
ekadesas tulyena rupend nekasamghdidnupatx . Tatra bhinne$u sam-
ghatesu niyamat katham smrtih ?]
Now the siddhanta is set forth.
359. (When names are applied to objects)
words similar to their parts and endowed with their
different characteristics arise later and are applied
as names to the same object.
[The Vrtti points out that when full names are given to ob¬
jects, other names, similar in form to parts of the full names,
come into existence as by-products. The process is similar to the
coming into existence of by-products when we try to obtain
any main product; Ke$ancittu samudayasvarupe samjiidtvena prakal-
pyamane samjndntaranyeva parikalpitaikadesarupani ekasadhandn -
yanuni§padyante . Niyata ceyam apauru$eyikasarvasamjndsamjiiini
sambandh avis ay a sab dan tarandmek adesasar up an dm an u nispatt i r i ti .
What is pointed out is that these words which arise later
(anunispattih) are not really parts of the name, but only look
II. 360-361
155
like them. According to the doctrine of indivisibility, they
cannot be parts.]
These words which arise later and look like parts of names
sometimes cannot invariably convey the individuals expressed
by the names themselves. Deva which looks like apart ofDeva-
datta can mean a god or the person whose name is Devadatta:
The form is the same in both cases and so a doubt can arise.
How the doubt is resolved is now stated—
360. The form being common, their meaning is
doubtful and their substratum (in the form of mean¬
ing) is determined through competence ( samarthyat).
The sastra teaches elision etc. in the case of those
which are grammatically correct.
rof the words which arise later, some like Deva and Datta
are grammatically correct and the Sastra teaches elision (lopa)
etc in their case. Others likej>, dr a, kha are grammatically
incorrect. It is in the case of the former that the meaning can
be doubtful because of similarity of form. The doubt is re¬
solved through context taken in its widest possible meaning.
The sastra also says something about their derivation. But not
about the derivation of jye, dra, gha etc. which are therefore
'ected. As the Vritti puts it— tatra sadhavo lopasdstrendnvydkhya-
X yam anarupaparicchedah parigrhyante. Tat o' nye tyajyanie. ]
361. Though there is similarity as far as arising
later is concerned, dra, kha are incorrect. There¬
fore, in the sastra which explains derivation, they
are not mentioned as Datta etc. are.
[According to the Vrtti, the incorrect forms are jye, dra and
kha abbreviations of jyeftha, ardrd and visdkha, all names of
stars. But these abbreviations are mere collections of
phonemes and not words and, therefore, meaningless. There¬
fore, the sastra takes no notice of them: Tatra ye ndnvdkhyatdh
sastrend tulyaydmanu nispattau jyefihdrdrd visdkha ityevamadisu
jye-dra-kha ityasadhavo vijhayante. JVa hi te ’nvakhydyake smrtisastre
156
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
dattadivat smaryante . There were apparently some who be¬
lieved that once the whole is taught as a name, its parts are
also automatically taught as names. In other words, it is not
necessary to derive the parts separately as names:— Tathdsyapi
tantrena prasaiigena vdsamudayasya samjiidtvenopaddne tadavayavdna-
mapi samjndtvam vyavatisthate.]
A doubt as to the eternality of the relation between names
and the named is removed as fellows—
362. Names like kharanasa have n instead of n
eternally and as they denote a particular individual,
they have been declared to be correct.
[The woid kharanasa has this form when it is not a name
but it becomes kharanasa when it is a name. They are really
two different words. It is not that the word kharanasa be¬
comes kharanasa when it is to be used as a name. So the
question of the non-eternality of the relation between the
name and the named does not arise at all.
The Vrtti quotes a verse stating the doubt to resolve which
the present verse has been given. The doubt is: If the word
kharanasa is formed before it was a name then how did it get n
which depends upon its being a name ? If the word was khara¬
nasa when it was formed and it was changed to kharanasa when
it became a name, the eternality of the relation is
affected. To resolve the doubt, it is stated that forms
with na and forms with na are both eternal. One is
not a transformation of the other:— krtanatvdscdkrtanatvdka
nityah samudayd vidyante. Tatra krtanatvah samuddye niywiyamd-
nah sddhavah. Anyatrakrtanatvdh sddhavah. Whether with n or
with ? 2 , they are both incorrect if used outside their scope:_
nbhayesam ca visayaviparyaye sadhntvam na vidyate. ]
3 63. These words (like kharanasa) are names of
individuals because the power to be a name inheres
in them. In such cases one does not necessarily
look for the presence of the corresponding charac¬
teristic (nimitta ) in the named.
II. 364-365
157
[What is meant here is that even though the word kharcinasa
means ‘one who has a sharp nose 5 , one does not look for a
sharp nose in a person before giving him that name. It can
be applied to any body. The power to be a name exists in
that word because of the n in it. A word having a particular
form is given as a name to an object irrespective of whether
that object has any feature corresponding to the meaning of
the name: Kdnicit tu nimittasydbhave viparyayena svariipamatra -
nibandhanani sannipatanti says the Vrtti .]
The fact that names are given to objects by persons accord¬
ing to their wish does not mean that the relation between the
names and the named is not eternal.
364. For the sake of worldly transactions some
names are restricted to particular objects in parti¬
cular places. But the relation in the case of a name
like JDittha is as eternal as in the case of the name
g°-
[Even though we see persons giving names to objects, it is
not they who create the relation between these names and
the objects. That relation, being eternal, was already there.
Persons only make use of it in particular places and times.
The Vrtti points out that all names have the capacity
to denote all objects and all objects can be called by all the
names : samjndndm sarvasamjnipratydyanavi$aydh iaktayo vidyante.
Sarnjnindmapi pralyekam sarvasamj ndpadavisayatdkhyah saktciyo
vidyante. It is only for the sake of convenience that particular
names are given to particular objects in particular places.
In the Sdstra also, names are restricted to particular things
in order to facilitate grammatical operations.
365. In this Sastra , the non-artificial relation of
names like Vrddhi (with the named) consists in res¬
tricting their power to particular objects. This
relation is like the relation of the qualifier and the
qualified.
[All words are capable of being the names of all things and
158
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
all things are capable of being named by any word. But in
the Sastra , a particular name is restricted to a particular thing.
In other words the relation of the name and the named is
eternal. All that human beings can do is to restrict it in
particular cases for the sake of convenience. The person who
says blue jar does not create the relation between the blue
and the jar. The expression nilo ghatah only states a relation
which was already there: tad yathd nilam iti sarvaSrayaviSe$ana -
Saktir utpaladivisaya paiigrhyate. Utpaladinapi sarvaviSe$anavi$ayd
viSe$yaSaktir niladi$uniyamyate= when one says nilam utpalam, the
power of blue to qualify any subtance is presented as relating
to the lotus and the power of the lotus to be qualified by any
quality is here restricted to the blue, says the Vrtti.
Something is now said about the two kinds of names.
366. A name is given on the basis of its own
form, sometimes when there is some circumstance
in the object corresponding to the form and some¬
times when there is not.
[Both in the world and in the Sastra names are given mainly
on the basis of their form. Sometimes, a name is said to be
anvartha when there is some circumstance in the object corres¬
ponding to the form of the name as when a person who is
good at destroying his enemy is called Satrughna. But there is
no need for it: for example, the name Dittha in the world and
the names ti, ghu , bhd etc. in the Sastra .
Not only small names consisting of just one syllable but
also big names are given in the Sastra on the basis of form
only.
367. In th c sastra, a big name is based on its
form but when some circumstance is present in the
object, that is also inferred to be the basis of the
name.
[When the form only is the basis of the name, the mean¬
ing of its parts is not considered to be the basis. But when
there is some circumstance in the object and it is expressed by
II. 368-370
159
the parts of the name, then the meaning of the parts also be¬
comes the basis of the name.]
How it is inferred is now stated.
368. Because of repetition of form, its repeti¬
tion is inferred. Or it is understood as another word
altogether or a difference of power is understood.
[In the case of the long names found in the Sastra , three
possibilities are envisaged: (1) it should be taken twice,
once as a whole having a particular form and again as a whole
made up of parts through the meaning of which it denotes
the object, (2) it should be taken as two separate words,
(3) it should be taken as one name having two distinct
powers. Both the Vrtti and Punyaraja speak about these three
possibilities, the former in a somewhat obscure language and
the latter a little more clearly.]
It is now shown that there are four possibilities in the
matter of names in the Sasira.
369. Sometimes, a technical name is applied
differently in different contexts. In the case of the
name Samkhya, both the technical and non-techni-
meanings may be applicable in the same text.
[In P. 1.3.14, the word karma has a non-technical meaning,
namely, action, but in P. 3.2.1, it has its technical meaning
namely karmakaraka = the object of an action. In P.5.1.22,
the word samkhya has to be understood in both its technical
and non-technical meanings.]
3 70. Sometimes, a worldly name when used,
covers the field of the technical name also, as the
word sambuddhi in P. 1 . 2. 33, where it should be
taken both in the technical and non-technical senses.
[,Sambuddhi , in the world, means calling or addressing some¬
body. Technically, it is the vocative singular by P. 2.3.49. In
P. 1.2.33, both the meanings apply according to this verse.
160
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
Compare, however, the following remark of the kafikd on
P. 1.2.33— Durat sambodhayati yena vakyena tat sambodhanam
sambuddhih. Naikavacanam sambuddhili . The kdsikd seems
to exclude the technical meaning here but it does not really
do so. All that it means is that while understanding
the sutra> the non-technical meaning should be taken and
not the technical one, though the latter is also included in it.
The Vrtti with a little correction in the text, makes this point
clear— Diirdt sambuddhav ityatra laukika eva kriydSabdali krtrimdyd
api vi$ayam sannidhanad vydpnoti. If the sutra is understood by
taking the technical meaning of the word, it would not cover
all cases:— krtrimd tu na saknoti lydptum sarvakriydh Sabda-
insayah.]
It is the sentence which is being discussed in this part of
the text. One point which is discussed is whether the action
conveyed by the sentence is carried out individually or by the
group.
371. Scholars declare that when expressions
relating to the class are used or when there is reten¬
tion of one or when the dvandva compound is used,
the actions are related to each one of their substrata
because of the nature of the word itself.
[By substrata ( dsraya ) of the action, the agents are meant.
The examples of the three cases envisaged are : (1) brdhmand
bhojyantdm (samgha = class). (2) brahmano bhojyatdm {eka$e$a),
and (3) Devadatta-Yajnadatta-Vi$numitrd bhojyantdm {dvandva).
In all these sentences, the action of feeding has to be applied
to each agent separately.]
It is now stated why an action like eating cannot rest in
many at the same time.
372. The action of eating, consisting of a parti¬
cular form and a particular result, rests in each
person separately. Otherwise the meaning of the
root bhuj =to eat, would not be carried out.
[The action of eating is not like the action of dramatic
II. 373-375
161
representation ( natya) which is a name applied to the different
actions of many taking place at the same time. The name
‘eating’ is applied to a particular action of a person, resulting
in his satisfaction ( trpti) . If its parts and its result are found
in different individuals, it would not be called eating at all.
As the Vrtti puts it— Tadi hi bhinncsu bhoktryu anyatra rupain
rupaikadebo vanyatra drSyate, anyatra phalatn phalaikadcso va vyava-
tistheta bhujir evasau na syat.~\
3 7 3. All eaters individually perform the act of
taking the food and so on and attain the result
namely satisfaction and not (collectively) as in the
case of dramatic representation.
[The different subsidiary acts which constitute a dramatic
performance are meant to be performed by different indivi¬
duals and it is only when they do so that it is said to be well-
done : As the Vrtti puts it— Tathaiva ca sa nirvartyamana samya-
ganufthitetyucyate. This is not true of eating where each indivi¬
dual has to do all the acts like taking the food, moving the
jaws etc. himself, right till final satisfaction: Annadanahanucala-
nariipo hi bhujis trptiphalo bhoktrbhih pravibhaktali parisamaptaru-
paphalo nirvartyate .]
Another illustration is now given.
3 74. It (the action of eating) is like the water
for washing the feet of guests; by its very nature
( samar thy •at) it is arranged separately for each person.
The action of eating does not produce its effect
(satisfaction) for several at the same time as a lamp
does.
The difference between the action of eating and the action
of seeing is now pointed out.
3 75. An action like seeing is one and without
being repeated in each case it can cover all its ob¬
jects which are suitably situated at the same time.
162
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[An action like eating can cover many agents only if each
agent performs that action separately. But the action of
seeing can cover many objects at the same time, provided they
are situated in the right place. Of course each object can be seen
separately also but the point here is that they can be seen at
the same time also. As the Vrtti puts it— Vanam drsyatom,
sangho dr Sy at am iti drsirupasyobhayatha darSanasambhavad ekam vd
darsanam samudayakarmakam nirvartyate, pratyavayavam vd kramena
bhinnadarsanamavartate. ]
The question now arises as to whether the name ‘cooking’ is
applied to one particular act or to a series of acts understood
as a whole.
376. The perception of the different accessories
( karaka ) witli their different activities when one
observes worldly transactions makes one conclude
that the action (of cooking) covers the activities of
the different accessories taken together.
[Two views are mentioned about the action of cooking.
One view is that it stands for the softening of the material that
is cooked, that is, for viklitti. Another view is that it stands for
all the activities taken together of the different accessories
which play apart in the cooking, such as the cook, the fuel, the
pot and so on.]
It is now shown that in the Sastra also sometimes the
sentence-meaning is applied to each case separately.
3 7 7. As the form to be derived is well-known
in the world and as there are indications in the
sastra itself (for separate application) and as each
item requires application, one applies the name
Vrddhi to a , ai and au separately.
It is now shown that sometimes the meaning of the
sentence is applied to the group as a whole.
378. As the taking of one hundred is the main
thing in an order relating to the realisation of a fine
II. 379-381
163
of hundred, even though the persons to be fined are
many the amount of fine to be realised by the au¬
thorities does not vary.
[According to the order : Gargah Satain dandyantam = Let
the Gargas be fined a hundred, all of them are collectively
fined hundred and not each one hundred separately. Because
the total amount to be realised is hundred and that is the
main point in the order. If each one is fined a hundred the
total would exceed hundred and the order would be violated.
As the Vrtti puts it— Tatradanasyapi Satdrthatvdt tadarthyena
$ a t am pradhanam na gunabhedad bhidyate . . . Yathaiva Sat am
dandyantam ityukte na sahasram dandyante tathd pratyekam satam na
dandyante. ]
It is now stated that in the Sastra also, the meaning of the
sentence is applied to the whole.
3 79. As, in order to teach some grammatical
operation, it is the name of the whole that is taught,
the names samdsa and abhyasta are connected with
them (the wholes ) by tantra.
[T antra means the power of a word, uttered only once, to
convey more than one thing. The siltras : saha-supa (P. 2.1.4.)
and ubhe abhyastam (P.6.1.5.) teach the names samdsa and
.abhyasta respectively. The words saha and ubhe show that the
names are to be applied to all the items together.]
It is now stated that sometimes the meaning of a sen¬
tence is applied to the whole as well as the parts.
380. When a word standing for a certain
property denotes many things in relation to a certain
action, it does so severally and collectively.
381. According to the order : Sudras should not
enter this house, their entrance is prohibited seve¬
rally and collectively.
164 vakyapadIyam of bhartrhari
The same idea is now expressed differently.
382. When a collective prohibition in regard
to earning and the like is expressed, merely because
the prohibition is not stated severally, its application
severally is not contradictory.
[What is pointed out is that the use of the singular or
the plural number in prohibitory orders is accidental. In
either case it can apply severally or collectively.
The Vrtti points out that when the prohibition is collec¬
tive, it is the collection or the group which is the object of the
prohibition. As to the individuals, it is left to them to do
what they like. . . Samhananatmadharmasya irutyd prakrantatvat
sanghata eva lipsatikriyasadhanabhavena pratisiddhyate. Pratyekam
tu kamacarah .]
An illustration from the sastra is now given.
383. In the same way, as in P. 8.4.2. at, ku, pu,
ah and num are causes of separation (vyavaya) whether
they do so severally or collectively, they do not
prevent the change of n to n.
[P. 8.4.2 does not say in so many words that at etc. do
not prevent the change of n into n when they come between
the nimitta and the nimitti individually or collectively. The
fact is that either way they do not prevent the change. As
the Vrtti puts it— Tatha ca pratyekam samastair vd vyavaye natvairi
bhavatyeva .]
Whether the action of eating is one or many is now
considered.
384. When the act of feeding is done for favour¬
ing those who eat, then, if there is no difference in
time, place, etc. it does not favour them.
[The idea seems to be that it is not by feeding them
irrespective of time and place that one favours them. One would
II. 385-387
165
favour them either way, by observing difference of time and
place and by not observing it :— Bhedena tu pratyekam prakrame
sarvo’ nugrhy ate, says the Vrtti. If the feeding is for favouring
the eaters, one has to act in such a manner that they are favour¬
ed, by not observing difference or by observing difference,
according to what is needed : Tathd tesdm anugraho bhavati tatha
viniyogavyapeksa. ]
After this preliminary remark, the question is considered.
385. The action of eating which is one has been
declared to be many because of difference in vessels
etc. Or the action of eating which is really varied
(because of difference in the satisfaction of the eat¬
ers) is thought of as one (because of identity of
time, place etc).
[Thus difference of opinion on this matter has been
shown.]
The final position is now stated.
386. The eaters, mentioned separately and act¬
ing together, eat their food served separately but
together (that is, at the same time).
What has been said in v. 378 is now further explained.
387. The fine of hundred is to be applied to
the group (of Gargas) because (1) there has been
no separate mention (of the persons to be fined), (2)
otherwise the amount to be realised would conflict
with the other amount (that is, the amount actually
realised) (3 ), the meaning of thesentence cannot be
applied in a two-fold manner.
[Gar gall satam dandy antam is the order and not Gargyo
gargyo satam dandyatdm . Gargya has not been repeated. Instead
of that, the ekafefa has been used. If each Gargya is fined a
hundred, the amount realised would far exceed hundred which
166
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
is the amount mentioned in the order. Lastly, the order can¬
not be applied in two ways, individually as well as collective¬
ly. By two ways, Punyaraja understands that the verb cannot
be connected with the main object (hundred) as well as the
secondary object (the Gargas). The conclusion is stated
by the Vrtti which, otherwise, is none too clear, as follows—
Tasmat s&nghdtci Bvaikain §Q.tcan avo,ti$thcLte'=P\, hundred has to be
realised from the group (of Gargas).]
Sometimes, however, the meaning of a sentence is connect¬
ed both individually and collectively.
388. Where the action of eating is ordered to
be performed together with others, either through
the dvandva compound or through ekasesa, there also
the meaning of the sentence is to be connected in a
two-fold manner because the verb conveys its mean¬
ing through laksana.
[Sentences like the following are here kept in mind I—
Devadatta-Yajnadatta-Vismmitraih saha bhoktavyam=T)evadatta,
Yajnadatta and Visnumitra must eat together. Here the action
is ordered through dvandva. In brdhmanaih saha bhoktavyam =■ the
Brahmins must eat together; it is done through ekaSesa. Here
the root bhuj in bhoktavyam conveys the action of eating in a
general manner. The verb bhoktavyam must be repeated for
fully understanding the meaning of the sentence.]
389. Some point out that major sentences apply
individually (and collectively). Therefore, they
include minor sentences, different from one another.
[The Vrtti points out that the dvandva sentence ordering
the action of eating quoted above should be split up into
several sentences like Devadatto bhojyatam, Yajiiadatto bhojyatam,
Vifnumitro bhojyatam .]
It is now stated that this does not mean that the major
sentence is expressive of the meanings of the minor sentences.
II. 390-392
167
390. The minor sentences do not become the
expressed meanings of the major sentence but when
the latter is uttered, one understands the other
meanings of the minor sentences.
[The Vrtti elucidates the point as follows:—The major
sentence does not bring about the minor sentences through the
relation of abhidhdnabhidheyabhava = the relation of word and its
expressed meaning. The minor sentences which are, after all,
words cannot be the expressed meanings of the major senten¬
ces : Na tasya vdkyasya sabdapadarthakatvam Sakyamabhyupagantum.
All that is meant is that when the major sentence is uttered,
the minor sentences, though not uttered and heard, come to
the mind. Therefore, a minor sentence comes to the mind in
regard to each of the eaters and thus the meaning of the major
sentence is applied to each eater:— Tasmdt pratyekam vakyantara-
prddurbhavah pratyekam vakyasamdptir abhipretd.]
The upholder of the indivisible sentence criticizes the
upholder of the individual word.
391. According to those who believe that the
whole of the sentence-meaning is contained in that
of the individual word, of what use then is the exis¬
tence of the meaning of the individual word ?
[If the whole of the sentence meaning is contained in
the meaning of (any) individual word in the sentence, of what
use is the meaning of the remaining individual words . . .
tefdm evambhute pratipadam av as tinted the kimavaSiftendparenapadar-
thena vikalpitena, says the Vrtti.]
The upholder ol the indivisible sentence criticizes both
the possibilities in the opposite view.
3 92. If the sentence meaning, produced by the
meanings of the individual words exists in each one
of them, it is either opposed to it or it co-exists with
it.
168
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
393. If the particularised and the non-parti-
cularised co-exist, there would be opposition bet¬
ween the two. If the meaning (of the individual
word) is abandoned, then the relation becomes im¬
permanent.
[What is meant here is this : The individual words ulti¬
mately convey the sentence-meaning after having first convey¬
ed their own meaning. If, once the sentence-meaning is under¬
stood, they abandon their own meaning, then the relation
between the word and the meaning becomes temporary which
is against the opponent’s own belief. Therefore, according to
this view, there cannot be real individual words and their
meanings.
The Vrtti points out that the meaning of the individual
word is of a general nature and it can become particularised
only when its general nature ceases to be : Samanyarupani-
vrttyaiva hi vi$e$a atmanam labhate. But if the general meaning
which is first conveyed is abandoned, then the relation bet¬
ween the word and the meaning cannot be considered to be
eternal and that would go against the accepted view of both
sides:— Atha tupurvam upattarthah {am ?) parityajati nityatvam
sambandhasya hiyate. ]
If the sentence attains completion in the collection, is the
sentence-meaning the meaning of the collection of words or is
it the meaning of the individual words also?
394. The one sentence-meaning is the common
expressed meaning and it is related to each indi¬
vidual word. It is related to the collection and to
each unit in the collection and it is understood when
all the words are there.
[The Vrtti here brings in the analogy of the relation
called samyoga = contact. When two things are united by the
relation called contact, does this relation exist in each of the
two objects or in both of them together ? Some think that it
exists in both ways :— kecin manyante yatha samyogasaiijnd dvayor
II. 395-396
169
dvayoh samuddye cdvatifthate tatha pratyekam dvayoh samuditefu ca
sa evaiko'rthdtmd vyavaslhita eva. In this connection, the Vrtti
reminds us of the dvandva compound. When two words together
form a dvandva compound, they stand for the group and that
group is expressed by each one of them. Each word in the
compound expresses the group in which the parts are also
manifested. Each word conveys at the same time all the things
meant to be conveyed by the dvandva compound as a whole.
This principle is called Tugapadadhikaranatd. (See Bhartrhan,
371 ff) The Vrtti says:— Tatha tar hi dvandvavdcyo bheddnuga-
V tah samudayah pratibhedam samdpto’bhidhiyate, dvandvasamjnakasya
samudayasya sa evdithah. . „
Samyoga and dvandva were brought in only for the sake of
analogy The point that has been sought to be made here is
diat both the sentences as a whole and the individual words
become meaningful with the meaning of the sentence.]
An illustration is now given.
395. Just as all have the feeling of ownership
towards common property and all enjoy the fruit of
charity (given out of the common property) and all
feJl the same amount of joy, in the same way, the
meaning is related to its words (the individual
words and their collection.)
An illustration is now given from the Sdstra.
396. Even if the phonemes are expressive of
meaning and the stem having the phonemes also has
the same meaning, the case-ending expressive of the
singular number comes after the stem which is a
collection and not after each phoneme.
[This verse is based on M.Bhd. I. p. 22o, 1. 10-24. The
particular sentence in the M. Bhd. referred to here is : Sanghd-
tasyaikdrthydt subabhdvo varndt = As it is the whole group of
phonemes which is expressive of meaning, the case-ending is
not added to (each) phoneme.
170
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
The Vrtti has a gap 5 but the relevant passage is this =
Samuddyasya tadarthayogad ekalvam, samuddyad ekenotpadyamdnena
supd vyaktam ityekatvdntardbhdvdt prativarnam vibhaktyutpattau
nimittam na bliavati. ]
The same idea is explained by an illustration.
397. Just as everybody sees common property
by means of the same lamp, in the same way, by
means of one case-ending the number is understood.
[The Vrtti points out that the one case-ending added to
the stem as a whole expresses the singular number and there
is no need for another case-ending : Tathaikena supd prak&titam
ekatvam sarvasambandhigate tasminnarthdtmani pratiyamdnam na
subantarenabhidhiyate. ]
398. As far as meaningfulness is concerned,
theie is no difference between the individual word,
the phoneme and the sentence. This procedure
based on practice (tradition) is different and
appears to contradict the accepted doctrine.
[It was stated in v. 396 that the case-ending added at the
end of the stem indicates the meaningfulness, not only of the
stem but also of the phonemes and of the individual words if,
an y, included in the stem. This seems to go against the accept¬
ed doctrine of the grammarians that only the indivisible sen¬
tence is real and expressive of meaning. Really speaking, there
is no contradiction. It has already been said that the meaning¬
fulness of the individual word is accepted for the sake of conve¬
nience. But as this question of convenience comes up on so
many occasions, it appears to be taken seriously but it is not
so. It is accepted only for the sake of. convenience. Conve¬
nience includes also accommodation to other Sastras because
Vyakarana is sarvapdr$ada = common to all schools of thought,
as so often repeated by commentators like Helaraja and
Puny a raj a.]
II. 399
171
The function of the word in conveying its meaning is
now considered.
399. Without its application, a word does not
convey its meaning. That is why it has been declared
that the relation between a meaning and the word
is through ukti, that is, application.
[The following are the points in the Ambakartri on this
verse. The power of a word to convey its meaning is called
abhidha. Some consider this abhidhd to be different from
pratibha, others not. Pratibha when conveyed by the words ukti
and viniyoga is a vagdharmo, a property of words. When con¬
veyed by the words anusandhana and abhisandhdna, it is a mano-
dharma. When conveyed by the word pranidhana, it is a property
Qp the vision. Here the word pratibha is used in a sense diffe¬
rent from its usual one. It only amounts to the conscious use
of a polysemic word in one of its meanings. In other words,
it becomes a synonym of ukti and viniyoga. What is conveyed
in this verse is that when a polysemic word conveys a parti¬
cular meaning in a particular context, it is due to the delibe¬
rate application of that word in that meaning by the speaker.
This is called viniyoga or ukti.
Two new words are used in this verse: ukti and viniyoga
and they seem to have the same meaning, namely, the use, by
the speaker, of a word deliberately in a particular meaning.
Punyaraja understands them in this way and for him, ukti or
viniyoga is necessary in the case of words having more than
one meaning: Iha eka evatabdo bahvarthah, he says at the begin¬
ning of his all too brief remark. The Vrtti also seems to speak
about the deliberate use of a word in a particular meaning
by the speaker. The relevant words of the Vrtti are: Talrdnena-
yam vaktavya ityubhayor vdcyavacakayoh parigrahani krtva buddhis-
thasabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyujyate pravanikriyatc satyapyane-
kdrthatve tatrasya samarthyam avacchidyate. What the Vrtti says
amounts to this: when a word has more than one meaning,
the speaker mentally chooses one of them and decides that it
should be expressed by the word: anenayain vaktavyah. The word
172
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
in the mind is applied to the meaning which is also in the
mind: buddhisthasabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyujyate . Then the
capacity of the word to convey that meaning is brought out
fully: tatrasya samarthyam avacchidyate .]
The fact that conscious and deliberate application of a
word to a meaning is necessary does not make the relation
between word and meaning man-made. It is eternal.
400. Just as it is when the eye is directed to¬
wards an object that it perceives it, in the same
way, a word denotes an object when deliberately
applied to it.
[The power of the eye to see the object is natural and
eternal but it does so only when it is consciously directed to
an object. Similarly, the power of the word to convey its
meaning is natural but it has to be deliberately applied to it
especially when it is a polysemic word.
Punyaraja uses the words abhisandhdna , pratibha and
pracdra in his commentary on this verse. The word has the
power called abhidhd but unless the speaker has the desire to
apply a word to a particular meaning, this abhidhd of the word
will not function. So some identify the abhisandhdna , the deli¬
berate application by the speaker, with the abhidhd of the
word. This abhisandhdna of the speaker is nothing more than
pratibha. It is this very pratibha which becomes pranidhdna when
we direct our eye to a particular object.
The analogy of the word to the eye is already given in
verse. While explaining it, the Vrtti concludes : Tathd tabdo'-
pyanekdrthapratydyanayogyo yamartham pratyabhisamhito bhavati
tam upasamgrhndti svatmani sannivesayati prakd£ayati = In the same
way a word, even though capable of conveying many
meanings, whatever meaning it is directed at by the speaker,
it embraces it, it becomes one with it and it illuminates it.]
Something is now said to explain the use of new words
like viniyoga, ukti, abhisandhdna and abhidhd.
401. One sees that the relation between the
object and the instrument is through action.
II. 402-404
173
Similarly, the relation of expression and expressed
between the word and meaning is through the func¬
tion called abhidlia.
[It is this function called abhidha which is called ukti.
viniyoga and abhisandhana. The words may be new but they
denote a well-known function.
The Vrtti makes the following points:—The accessories
of an action, like the steps of a ladder, are not directly con¬
nected with one another. But they are directly connected with
the action and through the action indirectly connected with
one another. In the process of the word conveying the meaning,
the word is the karana, the meaning conveyed is the karma.
There can be neither karana nor karma except in regard to an
action or process: karanakarmanoka kriydm antarena{na) praklptih.
It is the action or the process which brings about the result
and not anything else: Phalavati ca kriyaiva , nanyasyarthasya
phalavattd. The process can be compared to that of unhusking
grain in which the mortar and pestle are the adhikarana and
karana respectively and the grain is the karma. Raising and
lowering the pestle is the action which produces the result,
namely, unhusking: udyamana-nipdtanarupo , vahantih phalaprasa-
vanimittam.']
402. When many things are denoted by a word
and all of them can be equally well-connected, with
an action, that thing, which the speaker intends to
convey, is conveyed by the word.
[The purpose of the verse is to emphasize the speaker’s
intention in the process by which words convey their meaning:
As the Vrtti puts it:— Tatra yat prayoktabhisandhalte tadvacana-
tvam avyabliicarena sabdasya pratiyate.']
403,404. Some scholars who believe in the same¬
ness of the word (in all its meanings) declare that at
the time of the practice (of learning the words of the
Veda) they are without a meaning, that they stand
174
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
for their form only when they are taught to others
but that (at the time of the performance of a sacri¬
fice) they are expressive of different meanings be¬
cause of difference in expressive power based on
difference of intention.
\_Niyogabhedat = Abhisandhanabhedat = due to difference
in intention. Abhidhanakriyabhedat = due to difference in
expressive power.
The same Vedic passage is put to different uses and
therefore, functions differently. As the Vrtti concludes—
Ekasabdatve hi nimittabhedad ekasyaiva tathd tatha vyavasthd
many ante.']
All this has been said according to the view that a word
having many meanings is the same word. What particular
meaning it conveys in a particular context depends upon
abhisandhana , pratibha , the intention of the speaker and not
the context itself.
Something is now being said according to the other view,
namely, that the word is not the same. There are as many
words as there are meanings.
405. Those who believe in difference declare
that the word is absolutely different in each case,
like the words aksa etc. though it appears to be the
same because of the presence of sameness (that is,
the same sequence of phonemes.).
[The word aksa can mean a kind of fruit, or playing dice,
or the axle of a cart and so on; but it is a different word in
each case, according to this view.]
406. In such cases,there is no intention beyond
utterance. As the power of the word is restricted
to a particular meaning, it is attached to it.
[In the other view, the intention of the speaker was given
as the factor which makes a polysemic word convey a particular
II. 407
175
meaning in a particular context. In this view, that factor is
eliminated. As the form of the word resembles that of others
having other meanings, only the context can tell us which
meaning is to be understood.
The Vrtti points out that undue importance should not
be given to the speaker’s intention because, sometimes, mean¬
ing is understood from words uttered by children who do not
know the many meanings of a word and who cannot, therefore,
have the intention of conveying one of them: Tatlid hi balenap-
ycirtham avidusa prayuktena Sabdenanabhisamhitenapi bhavati frotrna -
m arth ap ra tip at till. In this view, there is no such thing as one
word having many meanings. What looks like the same word
is really a different word. So each word has one meaning only
which is invariably linked to it: Tasya Sabdasya yo vifayah sa
tatrdvyabhicdrena vyavasthita eva . As the word may look another
because of the sameness of the sequence of the phonemes, the
help of context may be needed to get at the meaning invari¬
ably linked with it.
40 7. From the fact that the meaning is deter¬
mined with the help of the context (artha and
prakarana ), one understands that it is a different
word. A word which has a certain meaning cannot
express another.
[ What is pointed out here is that the very fact that one
has to have recourse to the context to determine the meaning
shows that it is a different word : Tat tu tat svabhdvikam asam -
kirnam arthayattam nityam §abddndm svenarthena nityasambandhan
nandtvam tatpratip attar am pratisandehanivrttyartham prakamadibhih
pravibhajyate . The relation between the word and the mean¬
ing being eternal and not man-made, a meaning once con¬
veyed by its word, cannot be abandoned nor can a meaning
not conveyed by it be ascribed to it : na tu kadacid updttasya
svasabdena punastyago ’ sti 3 anupattasya vopadanam . Apauru$eyo
hyautpattikah fabdarthayoh sa?nba?idhah.\
If context can determine the meaning of a word and if
such a word is different from another having the same sequence
176
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
of phonemes, the established doctrine of the indivisibility
of the sentence and the sentence-meaning seems to be affected.
But that doctrine stands.
408 . These considerations apply to a sentence
consisting of a single word with the verb asti
mentally supplied and not to an individual word
which is part of a sentence (and which has been
obtained by analysis).
409 . Just as it is stated by others (the Mlm'am-
sakas) that the meaningless phonemes manifest the
expressive word, in the same way, the meaningless
individual words manifest the sentence having a
particularised meaning.
We do seem to understand word-meanings before the
sentence-meaning is understood. How is that ?
410 . The cognition of the meanings of the
individual words which takes place in the middle is
only a means (to the understanding of the sentence¬
meaning) because the sentence-meaning is not
understood at the beginning.
[As illustrations of the process of understanding some¬
thing in the middle, the Vrtti takes the words bhavati and
brahmanakambala. In the first case before we understand the
meaning of the full word we may understand something from
bhava , but that is not real. In the second word we may under¬
stand something from brahmana but in the meaning of the full
word it has no reality : Tadyatha bhavatiti bhavaSabdamatrasyar -
tham brahmanakambale ca brahmanasrutimatrasyartham.']
The nature of the sentence-meaning according to anvita
bhidhanavada in now stated.
411 . Just as (according to abhihitanvaya) the
meaning of each succeeding word particularised by
II. 412
177
the meaning of the preceding word is the sentence¬
meaning, in the same way, the connected meaning,
present in the very beginning, made clear when
the meanings of the subsequent words are under¬
stood, is the sentence-meaning.
[It is a connected meaning from the very beginning.
Each succeeding word-meaning makes this connection clear.
It is in the nature of an action associated with its accessories.
The very first word of the sentence conveys this connected
meaning but not sufficiently clearly. The grammarians’ view
is that it is in the nature of intuition, without inner sequence
and indivisible.
The Vrtti makes the same idea clear as follows— Tatha
samsargasya prakrantatvat prathama eva Sabdah faftyartham upadaya
pravrttah, sa tu nityo viSifto nitya eva padantarasannidhanat prati-
pattrfii vyaktim labhate .]
412. According to some, once the need for the
accessory is accepted because of the action to be
accomplished, the accessories are again actually
mentioned in order to specify the substrata of the
power of the accessories.
[Those who hold the anvitabhidlidnavada are referred to
here. If, from the very beginning a connected meaning invol¬
ving an action and its accessories are understood, why the
accessories are again mentioned in the sentence is explained in
this verse. It is for specifying the substrata of the powers of
the accessories.
The Vrtti points out that action is a process, something
to be accomplished ( sadhya) and the accessories which help in
the accomplishment are already there ( siddha) and they exist
for the sake of the action ( pardrtham apadanat ) and they are
Se$a (secondary) in regard to the action ($e§abhdvemiigi-
krte$u sadhanefti ) and they assume the form of the action so to
speak ( kriydrupa-manupravistefviva ). This connection between
178
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
action and the accessories is understood from the very begin¬
ning and if the accessories are actually mentioned, it is in order
to make clear what the substratum of the power of the acces¬
sories is : adharapratipattyartha dravyasrutib. ]
413. As the substratum is not specified it is
not understood. In the nature of things, there is
the possibility (of a specific substratum) and the
actual mention is for excluding others.
[The Vrtti says :—An action may bring to the mind all
the possible powers which can help in its accomplishment
but not any particular substrata of these powers : kriyd sam-
bhavinah saktivisesan sarvan akfipati, naivam asya dravyavisefdpckfd
pratibandho rupalabhe. But it brings the substratum of the
power of the accessory in a general manner to the mind and if
any particular substratum is mentioned in the sentence it is
in order to exclude others : Dravyasdmdnyam tu sadhanadhara-
tvena samarthyam grhitam. Tatra visepasrutir ddhdrdntaranivrttyarthd
pratiyate, says the Vrtti. ]
414. An action with specific accessories as its
substrata and (therefore) different from other
actions, is understood from the very beginning and
its specifications ( bhedah , mentioned in the sentence)
are for the sake of the understandingof the listener.
[This is also anvitabhidhanavada. ]
415. According to others, the sentence and the
sentence-meaning, indivisible and devoid of the
sequence of the words shine from words having a
sequence.
[By anyefam the grammarians are meant here. They
include, of course, Bhartrhari himself. Another example of
Bhartrhari giving his own views as though they were those
of others. ]
II. 416-417
179.
According to Punyaraja, the purpose of the following
-verse is to state that the meaning of the real word, that is, the
sentence, is the real conditioned by the unreal.
416. That which has a form, its essence is
indefinable. That which has no form, it is the
essence of that which is definable.
[ Couched in very general terms the meaning of this
-verse is not too clear. Punyaraja understands the first half
as relating to the meaning of the individual word and the
latter half as relating to the meaning of the sentence. The
meaning of the individual word is said to have a form svarupam
.vidyateyasya) because the object meant by it can be perceived.
But it does not thereby become fit for verbal usage. That is
why it is said to be indefinable (tasyatma na nirupyate). The
meaning of the individual word, isolatedfrom the meanings of
the other words, especially the verb, is unfit for verbal usage.
It is at best a means to the understanding of the sentence¬
meaning, the essence of which is interconnection of the mean¬
ing of the individual words and which is, therefore, fit for
verbal usage and thus real.
It is a pity that the Vrtti on this verse is obscure. It has
gaps in several places. As usual, Punyaraja’s commentary seems
to be based on it. Sentences like taccdsam vedyani vyavahardtitam
in the Vrtti have obviously influenced the wording of Punyaraja’s
commentary. But one cannot ignore the strong impression
which one gets while reading the Vrtti that its analysis is deep¬
er and that it contains some points not found in Punyaraja at
all. Unfortunately due to the unsatisfactory nature of the
text, it is not possible to note down those points.]
417. Others think that the meaning (of a sen¬
tence) cannot be determined through the word. A
remembrance resembling the experience of the
object takes place through the words.
[Some think that words are not the means of understand-
180
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
ing the meaning of a sentence which is in the nature of an
interconnection ( samsarga ). According to them, this
interconnection is understood by means of an integral cogni¬
tion by the mind, ( nirvikalpakaikasamadhigamyam —Punya-
raja) and not through the meaning of individual words.
Individual words do no more than cause a remembrance
similar to the experience of objects. Thus they are too far
away from the sentence-meaning. This is the gist of Punya-
raja’s commentary.
The Vrtti comments on this and the next verse together
more on the next verse than on this one. The only point
which it mentions relating to this verse is that the idea which
we get of an object from its word is far removed from the real
nature of that object. The next verse explains this very point
by means of an example : Sarvatrasabdam arthanam svabhava -
vadharanam , sabdavrttam tvanupatad duribhavati tasmad ityeke$am
darSanam = The understanding of the nature of an object takes
place everywhere through other means than the word, what
the word brings is far removed from them, such is the view of
some. ]
418. One who gets burnt experiences the burn
through contact with fire in one way and one
experiences it in another way through the word
burn ( claha ).
[The word artha in Sanskrit denotes both the external
object and the ‘meaning’ of the word for that external object.
The big difference between the two is pointed out here. As
the Vrtti puts it : Anyatha hyagnihimasastradisannipatad dahadayo
, vast hah pratyavabhasante. Anyatha dahadibhih Sabdaih pratydyyante.
The rest of the Vrtti is unfortunately not clear.]
419. Just as the senses which have each their
own essential nature and their own field of opera¬
tion, cannot perform their function without the
body.
420. In the same way, the individual words
II. 421-423
181
though expressive of their own meaning, have no
meaning at all if they are isolatedfrom thesentence.
[Punyaraja says that the understanding of the meaning of
the individual word is an error and as such it is either
viparitakhydti or asatkliyati , two well-known interpretations of
error in Indian philosophical circles. In any case, if they
have any meaning at all, it is only as long as they are within
the sentence and not in isolation. This is what the Vrtti also
emphasises in its concluding sentence :— Tathaiva prthagarthand-
mafiipaddnam vdkyopanibandhanatdm antarenartha pratydyanasaktir na
vidyate .]
421. The meaning in the nature of an inter¬
connection is grasped when the things are connect¬
ed together. (When the word meanings are in
isolation) the essence (of the sentence-meaning)
does not become clear because it is seen to be diffe¬
rent from the word-meaning.
422. Even knowledge (or consciousness) does
not appear in its true (pure) state. It is formless
but appears as coloured by the object.
[Knowledge or Consciousness is brought in here for ana¬
logy- J ust as P ure consciousness is formless but always appears
as coloured by the form of some object or other, in the same
way, the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible and
undifferentiated but appear as the inter-connection between
words and meanings. The isolated word and word-meaning
are unfit for communication and that is why they are said to
be unreal ( asatya ).]
423. Inasmuch as even the meaning of a single
word is expressed as connected with existence or
non-existence, it is the sentence which is used (for
communication).
182
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[Only the sentence and its meaning are real because
only they are fit for communication. That is why, when a
communication is made by means of a single word, it is com¬
pleted by adding mentally the word or atleast the idea of
existence or non-existence.
The text of the Vrtti is doubtful at the beginning but be¬
comes clearer later. After having said that like existence or
positive activity, non-existence or absention from activity is
conveyed by the sentence. That is why it is the sentence with
the verb actually present in it or inferred which is used in all
communication :— Pravrttivacca nivrttisamsargo’pi vakyadharma
eva. Tasmdcchrvyamdna-kriydpadom anumiyamanakriycpadcm id
vakyam eva sarvavyavaharefu avatar ati.~\
424. No word-meaning, whether real or unreal,
is understood in communication except as connect¬
ed with some action. Therefore, it does not really
exist.
[Explaining this verse, the Vrtti says that one cannot
predicate the truth or otherwise of the meaning of a single
word: . . . kevalapadaprayoge satyatvani viparyayo va na prakhyayate.
It is only when it is completed by a verb that the listener under¬
stands it as true or untrue : kriyapadopasamhare tusatyasatyabha-
vena pratipattrfu vyavaharo vatif thate . Without connection with
some verb, the completion of the meaning can be done in one
of many possible ways, in a way that would come under any
one of the six transformations of Being = sadbhavavikdrdh. That
is much too vague : so rthah pariplavamano’pi hy asau fad bhava-
vikdraparydyendnu dhavatiti. That is why, the isolated word-mean¬
ing is beyond the scope of communication and is said to be
unreal : Tasmat kevalapadartho vyavaharatitatvan nastiti vyapa-
disyate.]
425. Even a sentence having the form of the
single word sat ( = it exists or existent) cannot be so
understood without connection with some word
expressive of action such as ‘it was’ ( tad abhut) , or
II. 42 6-427
183
it is ( tad asli ), or it was not (tan na bhul ) or it is not
( tannasti ).
[The point here is that action and accessory require each
other. So where only one is mentioned, the meaning is in¬
complete and the other is mentally supplied to complete the
meaning. Once that takes place, there is a sentence which is
fit to be used for communication.
Without some process or action being mentioned or
mentally supplied, what an isolated noun brings to the mind
is too vague and not firm says the Vrtli—Alrdpi sadhyabliidhanam
antarena pariplavamdna ivdrtho na vyavatifthate.]
42 6. The requirement (that is, the incomplete¬
ness) which is felt in the meaning expressed by the
verb which depends upon an accessory is not re¬
moved unless the thing which can be the accessoiy
is also mentioned.
42 7. It is the action which is first analysed
from the meaning (ofthe sentence) because it is the
main thing. The accessories are employed for the
sake of the action to be accomplished. As for the
action, it is the result aimed at that sets it in
motion.
[ If the action requires the accessories and if the accesso¬
ries require the action, there is equality in dependence. Why
should the dependence of the nouns expressive of the accesso¬
ries be emphasised ? ydvatdyathaiva ndmnam kriydpadam akanksam
vicchinatti tathaivdkhydtdndmapi vim sattvdbhidhdnapadendkdrm na
vicchidyate, asks the Vrtti and answers as follows —Sadhyastv
arthdtmd svaphalaprayuktah prddhdnydt sarvasya vdkyopasangrahar-
thasya pun am pravibhajyate= The process or action, set in motion
by the result to be attained is the most important element and
it is, therefore, analysed out of the sentence-meaning first.
Once that is obtained by analysis, the accessories on which
depends its coming into being, are automatically understood.
184
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
Tcna tu pravibhakte^jia ) sadhanapralabhyatvad, atmalabhasya
samarthyak$iptani sadhanani pratiyante. This is not the case with
the accessories which are all already there (siddha) and are
set in motion by the process (sadhya prqyuktefu—Na tu sadhanefu
siddhatvat sddhyaprayukte$v etat sambhavati .]
It is now stated that all this conception of process and
accessory and their mutual relation is artificial and relative
and not real.
428. It is the speaker who thinks of something
as a process and something else as its accessory and
it is he who thinks of the relation between the two.
[The point here is that there is nothing fixed about
these three things: that which is to be accomplished, that
which helps in its accomplishment and the relation between
the two. It is a matter of the speaker’s choice. As the Vrtti
puts it—Togyasaktinibandhanaya vivakfqyd Sabdapramdiwkah pra-
yoktd iabdasaktim anugacchanu api vivaksantam tainarlhani tat/id
tatha samihate. Pfa hi vustutdli sadhyatvam sxddhatvarri vd sabda-
pravrttinimittam. Kihcavyavasthitam aniyatam vidyate.]
If these were fixed, nobody would be able to change
them. But we see that the same thing is presented differently
by different speakers.
429. The action of cooking is expressed as
the object in the sentence : I do the act of cook¬
ing (pacikriydm karomi). But the actual doing (of
the act of cooking) is understood as a process
(sadhyatvena).
[The point here is that the action of cooking, taken as an
example, is presented now as a process and now as the acce¬
ssory ( sadhana) called karma= object of action, according to
the wish of the speaker. There is no pre-determined fixity in
this matter. The Vrtti also emphasises this very point : Pacikri¬
ydm karotityubhayor avisifte sddhydtmakatve paktih sadhyatvena
vivakfita siddharupena sadlyariipetia vabhidhiyate. It is not clear
II. 430-433
185
Avhat is meant by ubhayoh . The reference may be to the two
actions mentioned in paeikriyam karoti : (1) The action of cook¬
ing expressed by the noun paeikriyam and (2) the action of do¬
ing expressed by the verb karoti . The former is presented by
the noun as a thing ( siddha ) and the latter as a process
(sadhya) by the verb. Apart from presentation by words, an
action is really a process and it is so meant in karoti , : As the
Vrtti puts it : karanam tu sadhyatvenaiva vivakfitatvdd (vi ?) pra-
krtdvasthdm na jahdti .]
430. As an object lias all powers, it is present¬
ed as rendering whatever service the speakers
think of.
[An object is as the speaker sees it and wishes to present
it in words and so it is presented differently by different speakers.
The simple act of cooking can be presented differently as in
the following expressions : pakam karoti, pacati, pakasya nirvrttim
karoti. Irrespective of what it is in reality, an object follows
the intention of the speaker and appears to be as he presents
it. As the Vrtti says : Vastu-sambandham anapeksamdnah prayo -
ktur vivakfam anupatams tathaiva vyavatif (hate .]
431. Sometimes objects which are far from one
another are presented as being connected and those
which are near one another are presented as be¬
ing apart.
432. Separation of what is united and union
of what is separated; what are many are presented
as one and what is one as many.
How the same thing is presented in different ways is now
explained.
43 3. Because every object is everything (as it
has all powers) or because it has no essence at all.
This can be explained. In all this, the word, the
power of which is extremely restricted, is the basis.
t
186
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARI
[In the previous verses, the author has been speaking
about the great variety and the consequent lack of fixity in
the way in which objects are presented by words. It has been
pointed out that much depends upon the intention of the
speaker and his ability to make use of the capacity of words
to present the same thing in different ways. In this verse, two
alternative ways of looking at the matter are mentioned. In
the first way, the object is endowed with all powers, it is sarvat-
maka but the speaker, urged by his own purposes and inten¬
tions, cognises and determines some aspect of it and presents
it through words which have the capacity to express that aspect.
In the alternative way, the object has no essence of its own
(nairdtmyat ). It is as the speaker cognises it- and expresses it
through words whose expressive power is fixed. This is the
gist of what Punyaraja says.
He is only putting in his own words what the Vrtti had
already said before in what is to us to-day a more obscure lang¬
uage. It begins by saying that the sentence-meaning is very
comprehensive and includes everything that the speaker might
want to convey and has all powers. Or it might be looked
upon as having no essence at all. The Vrtti says much about
the speaker’s intelligence and intention in all this, but what it
says is not too clear].
434. The word is only an adventitious mark of
an object ( upalaksana)] it does not express the
service which it renders, it is not capable of touch¬
ing (that is, of expressing) the powers of the
object.
[The point here is that a word really does not touch the
essence of an object. It stands far from it and does no more
than somehow bring it to the mind, so that it can be talked
about. There is no real relation between the two.
The Vrtti , following, of course, the verse, also emphasises
that the word can at the most denote the object, that is, bring
it to the mind but it cannot express the powers of the object.
It is the powers which distinguish an object from others and
II. 435-437
187
enable it to render service, but the word is not capable of
denoting all that :— Sa hi vastumatrasamsparSitvad bhedakanyupa-
kdrini saktirupani na samsprSati.~\
Even the relation of expression and expressed ( vdcyavaca-
kabhava) between word and meaning cannot be maintained.
435. The relation called contact is expressed
as that which is related ( sambandhin ) by its own
word (namely, samyoga ); similarly, inherence is
also expressed as that which has inherence.
[ In the expression; bhuiale ghatah= the jar is on the floor;,
the relation of contact between the floor and the jar is under¬
stood as a relation but in the expression dravyayoh samyogah=
‘the contact between the two substances’ where the word sani-
yoga (contact) is itself used, the relation is not presented as a
relation but as a sambandhi= that which is related. In other
words, its own word does not present it in its true nature. It
presents it as the related whereas it is really a relation. The
same is true of the word samavaya which means the relation
called inherence. ]
436. Objects are presented in some capacity
or other and not in their real nature. One and
the same object is understood as the basis of some
service or other.
[Words never present an object in its true nature. They
pick on some capacity or function of it and present it in that
form. So what the word presents has no fixity. It is not real.
It is always relative. The Vrtti ends its comments by bringing
in the illustration of the same woman being daughter, sister,
wife or mother in relation to different persons. Tadyathd ekd
stri duhitdbhagini blmryd mdtetyapekfdviSefaih pravibhajyate.]
It is now stated that the sentence-meaning, being always
new, is real.
43 7. The essence of the sentence-meaning
which is in the nature of inter-connection does not
188
VAKYAPADlYAM of bhartrhari
rest anywhere. In communication ( vyavahare ) it is
the soul of the word-meanings.
[The idea here is that the sentence-meaning, like know¬
ledge or consciousness is difficult to be grasped except as
coloured by the word meanings. As it connects together the
word-meanings and makes them fit for verbal usage. It is
their soul. It exists in the meaning of each word or in all of
them together.
The Vrtti points out that the meaning of the individual
word is of a very general nature and it is only when it is
connected with the meanings of the other words that it becomes
particularised. The particularisation of the meaning is the
chief feature of the sentence-meaning and even if one accepts
division within the sentence, one has to admit that this parti¬
cularised meaning exists in the meaning of each division i Tatra
bhedadarsanam asritya kaiscid ucyate pr atipadarthain tasyatmd vyavas -
thita iti . ]
438. In reality, it does not rest in the word¬
meaning or in all of them together or anywhere
else. However its essence is differentiated on the
basis of the artificial differentiation in word mean¬
ings.
[The form of the sentence-meaning as distinct from that
of the word-meanings cannot be indicated. Its form is deter¬
mined in terms of the word-meanings. In its own pure form,
it is beyond worldly usage.
The Vrtti points out that when the individual words are
used, particularisation of meaning takes place and from this
particularisation, one infers that a power, different from the
power of individual words to convey their general meaning,
exists which is responsible for the particularisation : Tasya tu
kevalapadaprayoge yo vUe?o nirdharitah tena vi§e$enanumanena sam-
bandhat sa prthak faktih pravibhajyate. ]
439. The division of it which is made in order
II. 440-441
189
to explain it is the means of knowing it. In that
division, the parts are incomplete and require one
another. Through this means, something different
from it is defined.
440. Of the sentence which has many powers,
a division is understood (on the basis of the diffe¬
rentiation of word-meanings). The unity of the
sentence-meaning is understood even from slight
indications.
[For the understanding of unity from slight indications,
Punyaraja gives the following illustration. There is the siitra
lg yanah samprasaranam (P. 1.1.45) =The ik which comes in
place of yan is called samprasaraija. The two words ig yanah
convey a connected meaning, namely, the relation of original
and substitute (sthanyddetabhava) . It is a sentence-meaning
because it comes from two connected words. But this sentence
meaning can be conveyed by the single word in the singular
number, namely, samprasaranam . This is the slight indication
( mdtraya ).
What the Vrtti says may be briefly, indicated as follows:—
Those who uphold the unity and the eternality of the
word believe that the sentence conveys action, particularised
by time, special accessories, substance, person, aspect etc.
That One indivisible word is analysed for practical purposes
into parts, but it stands for one indivisible meaning, involving
qualifying and qualified elements. By analysing the unified
powers of the sentence, practical divisions are obtained. But
without this practical division, words like samprasarana are con¬
veying a sentence-meaning. The relevant words of the Vrtti,
though doubtful in places, are as follows— Tena vakyarthastvekah
samprasdranddiprakdraya matraparimanayd vibhagoddesam antarena
pratyayyate . Vakydrthasya hi samprasdranasamjhdvibhdgoddekna
vind sambandhini vijiiayate . ]
441. From the sentence-meaning which is of
the nature of cognition, a word meaning having or
190
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
not having something external corresponding to it
but appearing to have it is analysed. The analysis
consists in abstracting the powers capable of con¬
veying the word meanings.
[This verse says that the sentence-meaning is something
mental, not having anything corresponding to it in the external
world. As it has nothing corresponding to it in the external
world, it has not been seen and that is why it is looked upon as
something new. It is in the nature of a connection and connec¬
tion is something mental. That is why it cannot be a real
part of the sentence-meaning. Anything which appears to be
a partis unreal. As the sentence is mental, its parts, if any,
can also be only mental, but it appears to be external or it is
identified with the real external object.]
441 (a). The powers relating to the mental
objects ( pratyayarthatmanah ) are not clearly deter¬
mined. Nor are their forms obtained elsewhere
(than in the sentence-meaning).
This verse is not found in Punyaraja’s text but it is found,
in some manuscripts of the verses only and it is there in the
only manuscript of the Vrtti which shows that it is not a recent
interpolation. It is older than Punyaraja, for some reason,
the manuscripts of Punyaraja’s commentary, utilised for this
edition, do not have it. I have included it as it is authenti¬
cated by the Vrtti . As it is connected in meaning with 441 and
in order not to disturb the numbering of the following
which agrees with R and RP, I have numbered it 444(a) verse.
The Vrtti on this is not too clear. In one place, there
is a gap also. It seems to point out the difference between the
external object and the idea of it which figures in the meaning
of the individual word. The latter is only an imitation of
the former and yet that is all which we have in order to under¬
stand the sentence-meaning. Through it a division is made in
the sentence-meaning and this division is the means of under¬
standing the sentence-meaning : Tatra bahydrthavi$ayanam
II. 442
191
laktlndm abhavad anukaramatram upadayabhedah prakramyate. Ayam
xvahi bhedah pratipatterupdyah.
What is said in 441 and 441 (a) may be briefly stated as
follows, though the idea is not too clear—“The meaning of the
individual word, understood as a constituent of the sentence¬
meaning, is something mental only, but it appears to be exter¬
nal. There is, of course, the external object, but it figures in
the mind as the meaning of the individual word. Then it is
only mental and it appears to be identical with the sentence¬
meaning which is wholly mental. After the sentence-meaning
is understood, it is analysed out of it. The powers of the sen¬
tence meaning, favourable to the understanding of the word-
meanings, are analysed out of the former. These powers are
not clearly determined. According to the view that the sen¬
tence-meaning is mental and indivisible, it can have no powers
leading to division. How can they be then analysed out of it ?
If they exist anywhere, it can only be in the external object
and they are only inferred. Without looking upon the external
object and the one figuring in the mind as endowed with
powers, worldly transactions cannot take place. The latter is
identified with the former and this is what is meant by bdhyi -
krtya in 441. Because of the identification of powers, this ana¬
lysis of the mental sentence-meaning is possible. If the mental
object, identified with the external object, is unreal, then the
external object is real. Otherwise, the mental object is real
and not the external object.]
Another question is raised. When there are several phra¬
ses, each having a verb and each incomplete and requiring the
others, do they make up one sentence or should they be looked
upon as many sentences ?
442. Even when there are many verbs 9 they
constitute one sentence, if they require one an¬
other. In this way, the prohibition of loss of accent
after verbs would be meaningful.
[There is a reference here to the difference of opinion
between Panini and Katyayana. According to the former,
192
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHAR1
there can be more than one verb in a sentence, provided one
of them is the main one and the others, subordinate to it.
According to the latter, more than one verb means more than
one sentence. See M. Bha. III. p. 373, 1. 10 and p.374, 1.
23-25.]
443. According to him who holds that the
fixed definition of the sentenced that it should have
only one verb, there would be a different sentence
if there were more than one verb and, therefore,
the mention of atihah would be useless.
[According to the author of the Vdrttikas , there shouldT>e
only one verb in a sentence. More than one verb would result
in more than one sentence. So the other words in the sentence
should be non-verbs. In P. 8.1.28, a verb coming after a non¬
verb is said to lose its udatta accent. Loss of udatta accent can
take place only if the non-verb and the verb are both in the
same sentence. If the sentence can have only one verb, there
is no need to say coming after a non-verb ( atihah ) in P. 8. 1.
28, because the other words in the sentence are necessarily non¬
verbs. So the verb would come necessarily after a non-verb
or after nothing at all if it happens to be the first word in the
sentence. If there is another verb in the sentence, there cannot
be loss of accent at all. Thus the mention of atihah in P. 8.1.
28 serves no purpose according to this view. ]
According to some, even where there are many
verbs, there may or may not be difference in sentence depen¬
ding upon circumstances.
444. In sentences like mrgah pa'syata^ yati ^Look !
the deer is going 5 . Where there is more than one
verb one being connected with another which is
already connected, there cannot be unity and
difference.
[The sentence mrgahpasyata yati is understood differently
by different people. First mrgah is connected with yati and that
II. 445
195
makes one sentence, meaning c the deer goes’. Then pafyata is
connected with mrga, changed to mrgam with the meaning of
ydti transformed into an adjective. That makes the second
sentence yantam mrgam paSyata look at the deer that is going.
In each sentence there is a verb with its own accessory, agent
in the first sentence and object in the other. This is one
way of understanding this sentence.
The other way is : mrgo ydti makes one sentence and
that sentence becomes the object of the verb pasyata and as
ydti and pasyata require one another, the whole thing remains
one sentence. Thus, in the first view there is bheda and in
the other view there is abheda. In spite of this, one can hold
the view that there is no difference of opinion between the
sutrakara and the Vdrttikakdra. When the author of the varttikas
says that there should be one verb in a sentence, all that he
means is that there should be only one main verb. The pre¬
sence of other subordinate verbs will not lead to Vakyabheda =
plurality of sentences.
All that the Vrtti does here is to say that there would be
loss of accent ( nighdta) if the whole thing is looked upon as one
sentence and that there would be no nighdta if one sees two
sentences in it.]
The point now to be discussed is : when is a meaning to
be considered complete and when incomplete.
445. Where the mode of performance of the
action (denoted by the sentence is desired to be
known because of its very nature (samarthjlat ), that
sentence containing no verbal incompleteness is said
to be complete in meaning.
[The point here is that the incompleteness must come out
of the words themselves before the sentence can be considered
incomplete. When one says : ‘Devadatta cooks’, the sentence
is complete, though how and what he cooks is not mentioned.
From the word ‘cooks’ an average listener will understand a
complete meaning. But when one says ‘Devadatta cooks his’,,
one feels at once that the words themselves are incomplete.
194
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
The Vrtti gives the sentence vrihayo'vahanyantam as an exam-
pie of a complete sentence though no details are mentioned in
it. It is complete because there is no verbal incompleteness .
sabdalaksampekfayogdd iti, as Punyaraja says. ]
446. Where there is a bare statement of fact
and its implications are understood from its express¬
ive power ( sruteh ) without the use of words to
express them, then the sentence is complete.
[ In other words, the incompleteness must come from the
words themselves. Otherwise, the sentence must be considered
complete, even if the listener understands more than what the
words actually say. The words used do not require other words
for yielding a complete meaning :— parisamaptameva sabdatii-
bandhandya dkankfdyds tatrabhavdd vdkyam vijndyate. ]
Two sentences may say the same thing, and yet there
may be difference of emphasis in the two statements.
447. ‘Study while moving around’ ‘move
around while studying’. In these two sentences
what is enjoined is the same btit there is a diffe¬
rence due to difference in verbal presentation.
[The purpose of both sentences is to tell somebody to
study or pray while moving about. The first sentence presents
the study through a verb and the moving about through the
present participle and the second sentence does it vice-versa.
What is presented through a verb is the more important ele¬
ment verbally. But in reality the purpose of the speaker is
the same in both sentences, namely, to tell somebody to study
(adhi) or to pray (jap).]
448. Varieties of action, having their fruit and
involving many minor actions and infinite in
number because of different modes of performance
and different aims are expressed by the same verb.
II. 449-452
195
[ It is stated in this verse that though the verb denoting
he action may be the same, the action may differ because of
•diffeience m the mode of performance and in the results ]
449. The verb always denotes an action with¬
out any inner variation. From the mere word, all
the variations cannot be imagined.
450. In the sentences : ‘the kings will perform
the asvamedha sacrifice ‘the Brahmanas are holding
a saciificial session’, the variations are not under¬
stood because of difference in the verb.
[In 4o0, two distinct verbs are used :yaksyante and sattram
asate but it is not because of difference in the verbs that
difference in the ritual is understood but because of inherent
difference in the actions themselves ( arthasamarthydt .)
Commenting on 449, the Vrtti points out that variations
in the action conveyed by the verb are brought about by
differences in the sadhana, the accessories to action ( sadhanablie -
dena tadbhedasya caritdrthatvdt). The verb itself does not convey
the variations. Commenting on 450, the Vrtti, the text of
•which is doubtful in several places, points out a difference in
the action denoted by yaj in yaksyante and that denoted by as
in sattram as ate. ]
451. The action in regard to the seventeen
prajapatyci animals, though mentioned only once
and not repeated, becomes diversified because of
the nature of things.
[ By samarthyat, what is meant is that, as there are seven¬
teen different animals, the same action necessarily becomes
diversified, though the word denoting the action is not
repeated. ]
452. The action of eating relates to Devadatta
etc. separately. Or the sentence itself is applied,
to each agent ( pratisvatantram ) separately.
196
VAKYAPAD1YAM of bhartrhari
[ In the sentence Devadatta-T,ajiiadatta-Vipiumitrd bhojyantdm
the meaning of the sentence is the action of feeding which is
connected with Devadatta etc. separately. That is what the
first half of the verse says. The second says that alternatively,
the sentence itself is split up into three different sentences,
each having one of the three agents as the subject and the
verb bhojyatdm as the predicate. According to the second alter¬
native, one verb becomes many verbs and therefore, one sentence
becomes many sentences. As the Vrtti puts it— Pratikartr ca
vakye bhidyamane bahavah kriyasabda upaplavante. Tasmadekopanib-
andhanani bahuni vdkya.nyupa.jayante'. If a separate sentence is
made for each agent, many verbs would arise and thus many
sentences based on one sentence would come into existence.]
453. At the time of utterance of the sentences,
a separate form is not heard but at the time of the
understanding of their meaning, the form of
different (sentences) is understood.
[ In the sentence under discussion, only one verb denot¬
ing one action is heard, but at the time of understanding its
meaning, the verb or its meaning is construed with each agent
separately.
The Vrtti points out that according to some, it is in the
nature of words that they are uttered in one way and under¬
stood in another way: Sabdapravrttidharma evayam anyathoccaranam
anyathapratipattih. At the time of understanding the meaning
of a sentence, it becomes diversified when many sentences arise
out of it:— Pratipattikale tu vdkydntare$upajayamane$u pravibhaktam
rupantaram pratiyate .]
This happens in the kas Ira also.
454 . An all-embracing sentence (grahanakam
vakyam) like kartari ( krt ) (P. 3.4.67.) is enunciated
in a general manner and then it is applied sepa¬
rately to cases like pasu.
[P.3.4.67, says that a krt suffix is added to a root in the
sense of the agent of the action. This general statement is applied
II. 455-457
197
to particular cases as in P.3.2.25 according to which the krt suffix
in is added to the root hr when the preceding proximate word
( upapada ) is drti or ndtha and the agent is an animal. Thus we
get the form: drtiharih (pasuh ). If the agent is not an animal, this
suffix cannot be added to the root. The form would be drtih-
arah with the suffix an (P.3.2.1.]
455. If, once the general rule is uttered (with
some special rule) and its incompleteness is remov¬
ed, it would not be connected with the other
(special rules).
[And so the required forms cannot be derived. The idea
here is that a general rule should have some scope as a general
rule, apart from its scope when associated with some special
rule. Otherwise, some forms cannot be derived. The general
rule, must not be tied up with any particular special rule, as
that would take away its scope as a general rule as well as the
possibility of its being associated with other special rules. As the
Vrtti puts it:— Tadi tu kartari krdityekasminneva s utre paivadibhir
akdnksa vicchidyeta samanyena sadhutvam na syat. Ekena vopadhind
krte’vaccliede tatraivavaruddhatvad upddhyantarasambandho na prak-
alpetai]
456. It has the same form, it has many appli¬
cations and, therefore, it is the basis ( upanibandhana )
(of the subordinate rules); it is the source of the
rules of elaboration ( vibhagavakyanam) and it appears
to be one with them.
[A new point of view is discussed: how can action which
is something to be accomplished and has parts arranged in a
temporal sequence be looked upon as a universal and as a parti¬
cular ? The next verse tries to answer the question.]
45 7. Sometimes action renders service through
its individual aspect and sometimes it is its general
aspect which fulfils some purpose.
198
VAKYAPAD1YAM OF BHARTRHARI
[How can action which is a process ( sadhya ) and has parts
arranged in a temporal sequence be looked upon as the universal
or the particular ? It is like this: where the accessories are men¬
tioned, in prohibitions, in optional instruction, in accumulation
in expressions of excellence and praise, it is its individual aspect
which counts. Where the accessories or time and place are not
mentioned, it is the general aspect that counts.
458. Where variations are due to time or in
expressions like ustrdsika, it is the general aspect
that works and they do not affect the form of the
word.
[This stanza states where the verb denotes the general
aspect of action.]
It was stated before how many actions conveyed by the
same word are connected with different accessories conveyed
by different words. Now how many actions conveyed by
different words are connected with different accessories con¬
veyed by the same word is stated.
45 9. Where actions differ from one another in
their universals etc, (and are conveyed by different
words) and the accessories are also of the same
number but are conveyed by the same word uttered
once, the former are separately connected with the
latter.
[In ak$a bhajyantdm , bhujyantam, divyantam , the three
verbs denote three different actions unconnected with one
another and are conveyed by three different words. The word
ak$ah conveys three different accessories though it is uttered
only once by the speaker. But the hearer connects each
accessory with one of the verbs and thus gets the complete
sentence. ]
460. Different actions like breaking, eating and
playing are connected separately with the accesso-
II. 461-465
199
ries, namely, the aksaseve n though the latter are
conveyed in one utterance and simultaneously.
461. In the case of the three kinds of aksas-
conveyed by the same word, the use of the same
word is a means (of conveying them at the same
time). When they are separately conveyed, there
is sequence; the single utterance is for conveying
them at the same time and connecting them
separately.
462- There are two ways of presenting things
through words : sequence or simultaneity. The
world does not go beyond them.
463. Where words are used in a sequence,
their form varies but not when there is simultaneity.
Even when there is simultaneity (in the presentation
of the accessories) the action follows sequence.
[To say that the action follows sequence means that each
action is connected separately with the different accessories.]
464. Difference and unity are two powers
which appear 1o be different from the word. Even
where many (accessories) are conveyed at the same
time by the same word, the latter becomes diversi¬
fied (when its many meanings are construed) in
usage (with different actions).
[Though the word aksah is one word which conveys many
accessories at the same time, it becomes many when it is con¬
nected with the different verbs, each conveying a different
action.]
465. Where a complex whole with its parts in
a patent state is meant to be conveyed, there the
200
VAKYAPADlYAM OF BHARTRHARI
complex whole is strengthened by the property of
the parts.
[The word ak$dh conveys a whole consisting of three
things. The plural number in the word shows that there are
several things in that whole. These several things are con¬
nected in a certain order with the verbs. The order is the
attribute of the several things included in the whole.
The complex whole here is the first kind of whole men¬
tioned in the Vrtti which speaks about three kinds of wholes.
In this first kind of whole, there are three distinct parts : As
the FW/iputsit : tatrak$a ityavayavabhedanugata ekahsamudayah.']
Another way of looking at the same thing is now stated.
466. When the complex whole is analysed into
its parts, the meaning of the sentence is connected
with each part. Or the mention of the accessories
is split up into many because of the plural suffix in
it, results in the splitting up of the sentence.
[What is meant is that ak$a bhajyantam , bhujyantdm>
divyantam becomes ak$o bhajyatdm , bhujyatam , divyatam.']
467. Either each word aksa can be used in the
singular number or according to the original utter-
ance, each word aksa can be separated in the
plural number.
[ What is meant is that each word aksa standing for one
thing only can be used in the singular or plural number.
Thus, it is shown that the splitting up of the original utterance
ak$ah can take place in two ways.
Normally, one would use a separate word for every idea or
object which one wants to express : Pratyartham tabdanivetah ,
as it is generally put. Pratyartham is explained usually as
artham artham prati. But it can also mean arthau arthau prati or
arthan arthan prati. In the last two cases pratyartham Sabdanive -
Jah would mean for every two ideas or objects or for many
II. 468-471
201
ideas or objects, one should use a word. It means that the
-same word can express more than one idea or object. Those
“who hold this view are abhedavadinah = those who hold that
the word is the same even when it denotes many things. Accor¬
ding to them, the sentence ak$ali bkajyantdm , bhujyantdm divyan -
tdm is not to be split up on the basis of the word ak$ah under¬
stood as including more than one word ak§a each being conne¬
cted with one of the verbs because, according to this view,
there is only one word ak$a which has three meanings. That
is possible only if it has three distinct powers. In other
words, abhedavadinah believe in Saktitantra and not in Sabda-
.t antra.']
468. According to those who believe in the
identity (of the word) in the case of polysemic
sentences, it is the power of the many-powered
sentence which is split up (and not its form).
[The other view is that in the sentence in question,
the word akfah contains three separate words, all having the
vform akfa. These three separate words are mentioned in a
•condensed form but at the time of understanding the meaning,
each of them should be taken out and connected with one of
ithe verbs. This is the sabdatantra view.
469. Or it is a case of mentioning in a condens¬
ed form (through tantra) two separate words. The
inter connection between the words differs accord¬
ing to the hearer.
470. What were two separate sentences having
the same form have been used in a condensed form
by the speaker for the benefit of the hearers.
The views of the bhedavadin and the abhedavddin are now
iput differently.
471. Even if only one of the condensed senten¬
ces is meant by the speaker, the other (being of the
202
vakyapadIyam of bhartrhari
same form) comes to the mind. Without any
intention on the part of the speaker, the other comes,
to the mind as a power.
[The first half of the verse gives the view of the bhedavadin-
and the other half that of the abhedavadin. ]
Another way of putting the view of the abhedavadin is.
this.
472. Sometimes, both the powers of the word
are utilised at the same time just as fire is used
sometimes both for its heat and for its light.
It is now shown that the same thing happens in the Sdstra-
also.
473. The sentence, heard only once but having
more than one meaning, eitherthrough repetition of
the sentence or through more than one power,
presents itself as more than one ( vibhagena ) either
through lihga or through tantra.
[According to the bhedavadins it presents itself as more
than one through lihga and according to the abhedavddins it"
presents itself as more than one through tantradharma, that is,,
through its multiplicity of powers. ]
An example is now given.
474. In regard to the name Samprasdrana 5 .
through two indications, the same sutra can be
understood separately as presenting either the
phoneme or the sentence meaning as the named.
[The sutra: igyanah samprasdranam (P.1.1.45) teaches the-
name samprasdrana. What is the named ? One view is that the
phonemes i, u, r, l are the named. Another view is that the-
II. 475-478
203-
sentence-meaning, namely, the coming of ik in place of yan is
the named. There are indications for both in the sastra. ]
475. Similarly, it has been shown in the
Bhasya itself that conveying of more than one thing
by mentioning the word only once has taken place
in the satra dvirvacane aci (P. 1.1.59).
[In P.1.1.59, even though the word dvirvacane is mentioned,
only once, it has to be construed twice in slightly different
meanings by following the principle of tantra which is similar
to, but not identical with the grammatical process called ekasefa
where a word, mentioned only once, may stand for the same
word repeated. For example, in ratnau, the word rama, occurring
only once, stands for two ramas and in ramdh, it stands for three
or more ramas.~\
The following verses relate to the history of the Grammati¬
cal Tradition in India.
476. After the Sahgraha declined when it came
into the hands of Grammarians who were fond of
abridgements and had acquired only little
knowledge.
[The Saiigraha is mentioned in the Mahabhasya , I.p.6.1.12.
We are told that there the question whether the word is eternal
or only an effect is discussed as one of the main topics.
Commenting on this, Bhartrhari says in his commentary on the
Mahabhasya that there were 14 000 topics discussed in the
Sangraha: Caturdasa sahasrani vastuni asmin samgrahagranthe
(M.Bha. dipika, p. 21, 1. 4-5. B.O.R.I.Post Graduate and
Research Department Series no. 8.) ]
47 7. And when the Master Patanjali who knew
all the traditions ( ilrtha-dar'sina) had incorporated
into his Mahabhasya all the arguments and princi¬
ples.
478. It was found that those who were not
204
vakyapadIyam of bhartrhari
sufficiently equipped ( akrtabuddhlnam) could not
arrive at proper decisions while studying that work
at once bottomless because of its depth and clear
because of its lucidity.
[According to Punyaraja, Bhartrhari wants to say here
that only his Guru Vasurata could really understand the
Mahabhasya properly. ]
479. When that sacred work which was an
epitome of the Sahgraha was ruined by Baiji,
Saubhava and Haryaksa who merely followed dry
reasoning.
480. The Grammatical Tradition slipped away
from the hands of the disciples of Patanjali and in
time, the mere text of it survived in the South.
481. Then Acarya Candra and other followers
of the principles of the Bhasya obtained the true
Tradition from the mountain and elaborated it into
many branches.
[Punyaraja says that by ‘mountain’, the Trikuta is meant.
He also refers to the belief that there on that mountain the
original Grammatical Tradition, composed by Ravana and
engraved on stone, existed. Some Brahmaraksas brought it from
there and gave it to Acaryas Candra, Vasurata and they under¬
stood the true nature of the Science of Grammar from it and
imparted it to their disciples and incessantly elaborated it. In
the end it became a discipline with many branches. ]
482. After mastering those principles and
cultivating his own discipline this collection of tra¬
ditions was composed by our Teacher.
483. Here only the gist of a few of those tradi¬
tions is given. In the third Kanda , there will be
full discussion.
II. 484-485
205
484. The intellect acquires critical acumen by
familiarity with different traditions. How much
does one really understand by merely following one’s
own reasoning only ?
485. The learning of those who have not sat at
the feet of the earlier scholars but flit from one idea
to another does not attain complete definiteness.
- ooo
CHAPTER III
Section 1. On the Universal
1. Some analyse a sentence as consisting of two
kinds of words, others of four kinds and others still of
five kinds, just as a word is analysed into base, suffix
etc.
[In the Vakyapadiya, the eight topics mentioned in
Chapter I, 24-26, are dealt with, namely, the two kinds of
meanings, the two kinds of words, the two kinds of relation
and the two kinds of purpose. In Chapter I, the purposes
and other matters were considered. In Chapter II, the sen¬
tence which is to be grammatically analysed ( cinvakhyeya)
and its meaning which has a fixed character ( sthitaloksana)
were determined. In Chapter III, words and their meanings,
obtained by artificial division ( cipoddhclra ) are going to be
considered. Words are obtained by artificially analysing
sentences and a sentence may be analysed in different ways
according to one’s point of view. Strictly speaking, a sentence
is indivisible and it is such a sentence which is expressive
(vdcaka ). The cognition of individual words and their
meanings is really an illusion ( vibliramci ) and they are the
result of an artificial analysis of sentences. This artificial
analysis is a means of understanding and explaining the
indivisible sentence, just as the division of a word into stem
and suffix is a means of explaining the indivisible word.
Sentences are infinite in number and no two sentences are
alike. Their artificial parts seem to resemble one another
and these parts are abstracted from the sentence as that is
the only way of explaining the sentence. The individual
word which is abstracted from the sentence on the basis of
meaning is as unreal as the stem and suffix abstracted from
the individual word on the basis of meaning by following
2
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the method of anvaya and vyatireka (agreement and differ¬
ence) mentioned by Katyayana in his Va. 9 on P. 1.2.45—
Siddham tv anvyayavyatirekabhydm
When the sentence is divided into individual words, the
sentence-meaning is automatically so divided. The former
depends upon the latter. That is why we cannot divide a
word into so many phonemes, because these would have no
meaning. The sentence-meaning is of a fixed character
(sthitalaksana) . It is really indivisible, but we divide it
artificially and we get two kinds of meanings out of it: action
and accessory to action. That which expresses the former
is called the verb (a khydta) and that' which expresses the
latter is called noun (namari) . Thus we get two kinds of
words. In a noun, there are two parts: the root and the
suffix. Number and the like are the meaning of the suffix
and even though, formally, it is the meaning of the suffix
which is the predominant one in a noun, from the point of
view of the meaning, that which comes from the word as a
whole, namely, the individual ( dravyci ) qualified by the
universal (jati), something which is in the nature of a thing
(siddha) , is the predominant meaning, because it is this indi¬
vidual which is the substratum of number and the accessories
(sadhana) . Particles ( nipdta) , Prepositions ( upctsarga) and
Postpositions ( karmapravacanlya) come under nouns and
verbs. Some particles express some peculiarity belonging to
the thing ( siddha ), the meaning of nouns and, therefore, come
under them. It makes no difference whether a word expres¬
ses a thing ( siddha ) directly or expresses a peculiarity in it.
Some particles like svah are primarily expressive of things
(sattvapradhana) . Thus they also come under nouns. Parti¬
cles like hiruk come under verbs, because they are primarily
expressive of actions. It is not merely words ending in verbal
affixes (tin) which are verbs. Any word which is primarily
expressive of a process is a verb. That is why prepositions
(upasarga) and postpositions (karmapravacarfiya) and parti¬
cles ( nipdta) are also verbs, because they also can express
some peculiarity in a process.
III. 1.1
3
But, if one wants to emphasize their special feature,
particles and prepositions are classed separately. They do
not’ express a meaning directly, but express a peculiarity in
the meanings expressed by nouns and verbs and so they are
classed separately. Particles ( nipdta ) and prepositions
(upasarga ) differ from one another also, because the former
express a peculiarity found in things and processes whereas
the latter can express a peculiarity in processes only. Post¬
positions ( karmapravacavdya ) on the other hand express a
relation brought about by some particular action. Thus, they
also denote a peculiarity in processes and come under pre¬
positions. In this way, we get four kinds of words, according
to some.
Others consider postpositions ( karmapravacaniya ) to be
a fifth kind of word. They argue that they differ from upa-
sargas because they refer to an action that is past and not to
one that is present. The delimitation of a relation with refer¬
ence to some action or other, is their function. Relation is
brought about by action or some service (upakfira) rendered
through action. Sometimes the verb expressive of the action is
actually heard and sometimes it is not. Where it is actually
heard, the understanding of a particular relation is direct as
in matuh smarati, matuh smrtam, sarpiso jdmte. Action can
spontaneously and directly enter into relation with things,
without another action coming in the middle. Where the verb
is not used, there are two possibilities: the very nature of
the things related brings the action to the mind and, without
the help of the karmapravacaniya, we understand that the
relation must have been preceded by a particular relation of
action and accessory between two things, upagor apatyam,
vrksasya sdkhd are examples. In upagor apatyam , there is
the relation of father and offspring, it is brought about by
the act of procreation. In vrksasya sdkhd , there is the rela¬
tion of whole and part, brought about by the action of stand¬
ing and supporting ( sthitikriydnimittah ). Sometimes, the
relation has not the power of bringing any particular action
to the mind. For instance, in the sentence rdynah purusah,
the relation is that of master and servant ( svasvdmibhdva)
4
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
and it may have been due to one of many actions: mainten¬
ance, abduction, purchase and begging. (Cf. M. Bha I.
p. 463, 1. 12). From the expressioin ‘the King’s man’
(rajnah purusah) the particular action which was the cause
of the relation of sva and svamin is not understood. Some¬
times, it is the presence of the post-position which tells us
about the particular action which has brought about the
relation in question. For example, in the sentence Sdkalyasya
samhitam anu prdvarsat , there exists the relation of cause
and effect between the samhita and rain and this relation is
due to the action of reciting the samhita text. The post¬
position anu tells us that it is due to this action. (Cf. Vak.
a. II, 109-201; 204-205). The word anu is found associated
elsewhere with the action of hearing, as in anu-nisamya. But
that is not a reason for considering it as directly expressive
of the action here. Nor does it suggest action because a verb
expressive of the act of reciting is not used here at all. Nor
can anu suggest a verb here in the way in which vi suggests
the gerund vimaya in jyrddesam vi-parilikhati . In Prddesam,
there is a suffix (case-ending) expressive of an accessory to
action; therefore, vi can suggest a word expressive of action.
But in Sdkalyasya samhitam anu pnavarsat, there is a case¬
ending expressive of sesa in samhitam. Nor does anu directly
express the relation of cause and effect, because that is done
by the accusative case-ending which is specially taught
instead of other case-endings. (P. 2.3.8.). The real function
of anu is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is
brought about by the particular action called ‘recitation’
(pathanam) . This is what is called Samhandhavaccheda , the
delimitation of the relation. This is made clear in the verse
Kriyayd dyotako nayam, samhandhasya na vdcakah etc.
(Vak. a. II, 204). This is the function of anu . There is no
use of attributing to anu something which is the effect of
something else.
Nor can it be maintained that the delimitation of the
relation, referring it to a particular action, is the function
of the sentence and that anu merely expresses the idea of
posteriority. Those who maintain this rely on the principle
4
III. 1.2
5
that the meaning of the sentence is that which is understood
over and above those of the individual words. But it must
be remembered that ‘over and above’ does not mean going
against the meaning of individual words. Sentence-meaning,
even when it is an ‘extra’, must be based on those of individual
words. It really consists of the relation of the process 01
the thing primarily conveyed by a sentence with its acces¬
sories or its attributes. This delimitation of the relation can¬
not be considered to be the sentence-meaning, because it is not
based on that of any individual word. It is, therefore, better
to consider it as the meaning of the Karmapravacaniyci .
About this delimitation of the relation by the post-position,
there are two views: (1) that it is delimited in its own
form ( svampe^dvacchidyate ); (2) that it is delimited as
brought about by a particular action. According to Bhar-
trhari it means that it is delimited by reference to the parti¬
cular circumstance (nimittavisesdvacchedah) . Thus in adhi
brahmadatte pahcdldh , adhi indicates that the relation of ruler
and ruled ( svasvdmibhdva ) is due to the act of protection
which is the particular circumstance (nimittavisesa ).
Thus the abstraction of words from a sentence on the
basis of meaning is the only means of explaining a sentence.]
The nature of the abstracted meanings is now explained
2. When the meaning of a sentence is analysed
into those of individual words, two word-meanings
have been declared to be the eternal meaning of all
words, either the universal (jdti) or the particulai
( dravya ).
[Once the meanings of words are abstracted from that
of the sentence, the next question is: what is the natuie o
these meanings? According to some, the universal (jati) is
the meaning of all words. According to others, it is t e
particular ( dravya ) which is the meaning of all words. A
third view is that it is the particular as qualified by the
universal. This third view is indicated by the dual numbei
6
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
in the word paddrthau. If the third view is the correct one,
then a word would convey both the universal and the parti¬
cular at’ the same time, because it is inconceivable that a
word should convey one thing first and another thing after
a little interval. When both are conveyed, one would be
more important than the other in a particular context. The
dual number in paddrthau might be taken to mean that the
universal and the particular are equally important, but, in
particular contexts, only one of them is conveyed. A word
like gauh conveys the universal ‘cow-ness’, but, as a universal
without a substratum is impossible, the particular is also
necessarily understood. Similarly, the verb denotes the
universal aspect of action, present in the different moments
of action and causing the same cognition and the use of the
same word. The universal of the accessory (baraka) con¬
veyed by a verb plays a subordinate part in the cogni¬
tion produced by a verb. The universal of action, conveyed
by the verb, enters into relation with the universal of the
accessory conveyed by the noun through the particular
(vyakti ). In the particular inheres the universal which
enters into relation with action through the power called
accessory which also inheres in the particular. It will be
explained in the section on the Accessory (S-adhanasamud-
desa) that what is called ‘accessory’ is really a power or a
capacity. The universal of an action like cooking is manifest¬
ed by the different' moments of it like putting the pot on the
fire. Even though the universal of action is eternal, it be¬
comes a process ( sadhya ) through the particular. According
to this view, prepositions ( upasarga ) also express the uni¬
versal, because they do no more than denote a peculiarity
in the meaning of the verb which is a universal. A post¬
position is also based on the universal of a relation. Simi-
larly, words like sukla express the universals of qualities
(guna). So do proper names like Dittha. This is the view
of Vajapyayana. (See M. Bha I. p. 242, 1. 10).
According to Vyadi, the particular ( dravya ) is the mean¬
ing of all words, because it is the particular which is con¬
nected with action. What Vyadi calls dravya is often called
in. 1.2
7
Vyakti, the individual, also the correlative of universal. Thus,
according to Vyadi, the particular or the individual becomes
an integral part of the meaning of a sentence. It is to this
that Vedic injunctions refer as declared in the VarUika.
Codandsu ca tasyarambhat (Va 47 on P. 1.2.64). Even
though the universal is not directly expressed by the word,
it is also understood. In the verb also, it is the particular
which is predominant, according to Vyadi. The meaning of
a verb is the particular penetrated by action (vyapardvistam
dravyam ). Words like sukla also denote the particular.
Alternatively, one might understand by dravya what is
going to be explained in the next section: that it is Brahman,
conditioned by this or that limiting factor and that is the
meaning of every word.
Ordinarily, the word dravya is a synonym of vyakti , the
individual. As the two word-meanings in question are
declared to be those of all words ( sarvasabdanam ) they are
also attributed to the parts like base and suffix which are
abstracted from the individual word. The truth is that both
are recognised meanings of words, even though one or the
other may be emphasised in particular contexts. Whether
the meaning of a word is jciti or dravya, in either case, it is
something which is eternal ( nitya ). By nitya, it' is continuity
(pravdhanityata) which is meant, as is made clear in the
statement—
Tadapi' niiyam yasminstattvam na vihanyate
(M. Bha I, p. 7, 1. 22).
Thus, it has been shown that the universal and/or the parti¬
cular can be the meaning of a word. In this section, the
considerations which favour the view that it' is the universal
will be explained.]
Now a doubt arises: If the universal is the meaning of
every word, how can it enter into relation with action which
is the meaning of the verb in the sentence? It is only the
accessory ( sadhana ) which can be connected with action and
8 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the universal can never be the accessory. No doubt, its
substratum can be the accessory; but, after all, it is the uni¬
versal which is directly conveyed by the word. So, when
something having the universal prescribed in a Vedic injunc¬
tion is not available, we cannot use a substitute, because it
would not have the prescribed universal. Thus Vedic injunc¬
tions cannot be carried out. This difficulty is removed as
follows—
3. According to some, the universal is the means
of conveying 'power’ because of association. If the
‘acacia catechu’ etc. are powerless (i.e., not being
available, are powerless to accomplish the action in
question) a substitute having that power is taken.
[According to the view of some theorists, the universal
is the means ( upalaksana ) whereby power or capacity is
conveyed, because the universal and power reside in the
same substratum. Others, on the other hand, think that it
is the universal which is primarily conveyed by the word
and that, in some cases, it enters into direct relation with*
action, while, in other cases, it does so through the medium
of power. The word kesdmcit in the verse can also mean:
‘in the case of some words’. Those words which express the
accessories denote mainly capacity. In such words, it is the
case-endings which stand for power or capacity and as the
case-ending cannot be used by itself, the stem must neces¬
sarily be used and that expresses the universal which quali¬
fies the capacity conveyed by the case-ending. All this is
true where the thing prescribed is available. Where it is
not available, power or capacity becomes associated with the
nearest universal. The Vedas enjoin actions which must be
performed. Particular materials for the performance of these
actions are also taught. If any material is not available, the
action must still be performed with a substitute.]
The author now points out how, even according to those
who hold that’ the word primarily conveys the universal and
not capacity through the universal the use of substitutes can
be explained.
4. (In the injunction ‘khadire badhnati’) the root
‘bandh’ (to bind) denoting an action which results in
loss of independence is taught like the act of killing
(pramana) etc. Therefore, though the universal is the
primary meaning, nothing that is devoid of ‘power’ is
taken.
[Even according to those who maintain that the word
primarily conveys the universal, the use of a substitute can
be explained. In the injunction khadire badhnati, the action
denoted by the verb is that of binding the animal to the
sacrificial post, resulting in its loss of independence. That
can take place only if a post which has the power to yield
the desired result is used. Therefore, a substitute is allowed
if the original article, the khadira wood, is not available.]
The author now points out that there is an indication on
the basis of which a substitute can be allowed.
5. Even if the meaning of the root bandh is noth¬
ing more than contact (with the sacrificial post) the
very fact that killing etc. are taught as the next step
is an indication that an efficient thing is to be taken.
[Even if it is maintained that the root bandh means noth¬
ing more than contact (with the sacrificial post and not loss
of independence) the fact that killing etc. are taught as the
next step is an indication that the animal must be well tied
to the post. Therefore, something which is fit to be used
as a post must be taken. Khadira has this fitness or capa¬
city, but if it is not available, something else which has this
capacity must be substituted. Thus, on the view that a
word denotes the universal, the use of a substitute becomes
v-m. 2
16
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHAK1
justifiable in three ways: (1) on the basis of the meaning
of the word (; paddrtha ) as shown in verse 3 where it was
said that the meaning of the word, the universal, stands for
something which has the required power, (2) on the basis
of sentence-meaning ( vdkydrtha ) as shown in verse 4 where
it was said that the word must convey something which has
the capacity to help in the accomplishment of the main action
conveyed by the sentence and (3) on the basis of context
(prakaraya ) as shown in the present verse which says that
a substitute must be allowed if one takes into consideration
the other acts like killing which are taught in the same
context.
Here Helaraja mentions two further arguments in order
to justify the use of a substitute. The first one is called:
asambhavaniyaviatyagah. An injunction like khcidire badhndti
must not be understood as an asavibhavaniyama, that is, a
restrictive injunction ( niyamci ) making alternatives impos¬
sible ( asambhava ). The second argument is called niyama -
matratyciga. The injunction in question is so interpreted
that its positive aspect is retained; that is, one understands
from it that the animal should be tied to a post. One rejects
the negative or restrictive aspect of it. In other words,
one rejects the restriction that the post should necessarily
be made of khadira wood. By adopting these two argu¬
ments, one avoids going against scriptural injunction,
because one follows the positive aspect of it, eveh. if one
rejects its negative or restrictive aspect.]
6. All words first express their own universal
which is then thought of as being superimposed on the
universals of the meanings.
[When we hear a word, it is its own form which we
understand first. And we do so, no matter who utters it.
The form remains the same in all utterances. This form
is, therefore, a universal (j dti) and it is this which we under¬
stand invariably. This invariable cognition of the uni-
III. 1.7-8
11
versal of the word is what is meant by the word ‘first’
( prathamam ). See Vak I. 66. After this is understood, or
while it is being understood, the meaning which is also a
universal, is understood. The two appear to be one. The
form of the word is understood by us as having been super¬
imposed on the meaning. We take the two as one. To under¬
stand the one as being superimposed on the other implies
that we consider the two to be different. We do, but this is
only a fiction ( kalpand ) on our part, because the meaning
(the object), according to Grammar, is only an unreal mani¬
festation (vivartci) of the word. Therefore, the two are not
really different from each other. This superimposition of the
word on the meaning is the basis of convention and also of
the relation of expression and expressed ( vcicyavdcakablidva)
between the two. This universal of the word is progressively
clearly revealed by each sound of the word, just as each
moment of a movement like the lifting of the arm reveals it
fully and progressively more clearly, or just as a passage of
a text, not fully learnt by heart at the first reading is gradually
memorised by repeated reading or just as the genuineness of
a precious stone, not fully clear at the first gaze, becomes so
progressively.]
The author now says how the universal of the word,
existing in the word, can convey the universal of the object
as identical with itself.
7-8. Just as ‘redness’, residing in the quality red
is attributed to the substance ‘lac’ and then, on ac¬
count of its intimate union with the intimately united,
it is perceived in clothes etc., in the same way, on ac¬
count of the intimate connection between word and
meaning, the universal residing in the word performs
the function of universal for the universals of objects
also.
[It was declared in the previous verse that the universal
of the word is superimposed on that of the meaning and that
12
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the latter appears as one with the former. Here a doubt might
arise: the universal of the word is inherent in the word and
not in the meaning; how can it then denote the meaning
through the relation of identity? This doubt is sought to be
removed by means of an example. Redness is inherent in a
particular case of red, in what is red. It is also attributed to
the substance which is red. Due to contact with the sub¬
stance which is red, redness is attributed to another object
also like cloth when we speak of it as being red. In other
words, due to the contact of the cloth with a substance which
is red, the cloth is also said to be red. Similarly, there is the
eternal relation between the word and its meaning, a relation
which is grasped only at the time of the learning of the con¬
vention. This relation is evident from the fact that both about
the word gauh and the object gauh, we can say: ayavri gauh.
Through this relation, what belongs to the word is super¬
imposed on the meaning. The universal of the word is super¬
imposed on the universal of the meaning. The latter becomes
the expressed meaning ( vdcya ) of the former. Not only that.
The universal of the word becomes a kind of universal among
the different universals, though, according to the Vaisesikas,
there cannot be a universal of the universals. But the uni¬
versal of the word plays the part of a universal among the
universals of the meanings. It performs the two functions of
such a universal. The two functions are: persistence of the
same word ( sabdanuvrtti ) and persistence of the same cogni¬
tion (pratyaydnuvrtti) . How this happens is explained in
verses 9 and 10.
This universal of the word exists in the word considered
as a unity and not in the different phonemes, because it is this
unity which is expressive (vacalca). This unity is called
vyaktisphota and the universal, jati, inheres in it. It is called
jatisphota. Thus sphota is of two kinds. The particular rela¬
tion through which vyaktisphota expresses the meaning is fit¬
ness ( yogyatd ) which is eternal and not the work of man
(apauruseya) . When a meaning is understood from a word,
it appears as one with it. With all that, the form of the mean¬
ing is not completely obliterated. When an object is revealed
III. 1.9
13
through light, it appears as enveloped in light, but with all
that, its own form appears distinctly. Light and the word
reveal other objects by superimposing their own form on them.
This is the eternal character of words, not due to human
agency. This can happen only in the case of one who knows
a language. In the case of one who like a child does not' know
it yet, there cannot be superimposition of the word on the
meaning, because he does not know the word yet. The uni¬
versal of the object appears to him as distinct.]
How it performs the function of a universal is now
explained.
9. When one has to form the ‘ekasesa’ of words
denoting universals, the universal of words is the
universal of the universals of objects. In the formation
sabdajatayah (universals of words) the universal of
the word (is the cause of the ekasesa ) when the uni¬
versals of the words have to be expressed.
[When we apply the same word, say ‘cow’ or ‘tree’ to a
large number of objects, it is because we see some common
characteristic in ail of them called jdti or universal. When we
apply the word 'jdti to a large number of universals, the
natural conclusion would be that, in all of them, there is a
common characteristic, another universal above the original
universals. But this is impossible according to the vaisesika
principle: nihsdmanydni sdmdnydni. And yet we do apply the
word jdti to a large number of universals. How to explain this?
It is explained in this way: the universal for which the word
jdti stands does the work of such a super-universal which really
does not exist. Similarly, if each word stands for its universal,
there would be as many word-universals as there are words
and when all these universals existing in the different words
are referred to by the expression sabdajdtaya imali , what really
happens is that the universal existing in the word sabdajdti
itself does the work of such a super-universal.]
14
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
10. The universal of words, residing in words and
differing from the words themselves, includes also the
universal existing in the word sabdajati.
[The universal which exists in words and which is different
from the words themselves is so comprehensive that it includes
the universal which exists in the word sabdajati itself. When
we say: sabdajati, it does not denote a universal which is over
and above such universals as gosabdatva, asvasabdatva etc.
Because, one does not believe in a universal over a universal.
So the universal which exists in the word sabdajati itself does
the work of such a universal. The universal which exists in
the word sabdajati is in the same category as the universal
which exists in the word gauli or asvab. Atikraviya vartate
has been translated as ‘includes’, following Helaraja.]
The author now tries to show that' all words denote the
universal without resorting to the concept of ‘adhyasa’.
11. (Some) words may denote the universals of
objects, but all denote the universal, since the mean¬
ings of words are determined by the functions ( vyd-
para)' of words (i.e., they are determined by what the
words actually convey)'.
[So far, the author has established the doctrine that all
words denote the universal with the help of the grammarian’s
idea of adhyasa, the idea that the universal of the meaning
a ppears as one with that of the word, or rather that the
universal of the word is superimposed upon that of the mean¬
ing. Even without recourse to the idea of adhyasa, it is
possible to show that all words denote the universal. If one
does not accept adhyasa, the alternative is to say that words
denote the universals of the object, pure and simple. Even
then, one will have to maintain that all words do so. By ‘all’,
hat is meant is: not only words like ganh, asvah, etc., but
also words like jati. Here one has to meet the Vaisesika ob¬
jection that if the word jdti also stands for a universal, it' must
be a universal existing in other universals. And that is not
possible. If there is universal in universals, where would one
stop? But grammarians have a different point of view. Their
chief concern is to find out the nature of meanings conveyed
by words. What they find is that in all universals as conveyed
by words, there is a common point or characteristic which can
be looked upon as another universal and can be called by the
name jdti. The existence of the first universal was postulated
because a common characteristic was experienced in the indi¬
viduals. Even invisible things are assumed to exist if they
somehow produce a cognition in regard to themselves. What
to say of things conveyed by words? Grammarians go by what
the words convey. They are not really concerned with things
as they really are, but with things as conveyed by words. If
a quality is conveyed by words as a common characteristic, it
becomes a universal for them. The word syama is considered
to be expressive of a quality but Panini gives to .its meaning
the name of samanya in the compound word sastrlsyamd ac¬
cording to his sutra: upamdnani samanyavacanaih . (P. 2.1.55).
The same is the case with action. In such matters, gramma¬
rians are more anxious to follow worldly usage than the views
and conventions of other systems of thought. To them, artha
means what words convey and all words convey the universal,
because that is a matter of fact. In reality, the universal which
a word conveys may or may not exist. But the word in ques¬
tion, through its function called abhidha , does convey it. So
that is the meaning of the word.]
The author now makes clear the function called abhidhd
of words.
12. In the view that the universal is the meaning
of words, the universal or even the particular becomes
the meaning of words in the same way as (the well-
known) universals; therefore, they (the words) denote
the universal.
[The peculiar features of an object, not found in any other
object in the world, cannot be expressed by words at all. At
16 VAliYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
the time of learning the convention about words, it is with the
common characteristics of objects that we connect the words.
Thus the words become expressive of them. The universals
may really differ from one another, but' words cannot express
them. Even proper names denote universals. The name of
a person stands for that unchanging recognisable element
which persists in all the changes which he undergoes.]
The author now states that even the other view, namely,
that words denote substance ( dravya ) depends on the function
of words.
13. In the view that substance is the meaning of
words, the meaning of all words can have the characte¬
ristic of substance. As the meanings of words are sus¬
ceptible of assuming the properties of substance, the
latter is said to be the meaning of all words.
[The other view about the meaning of words is that it is
dravya which can be rendered as substance (as distinguished
from attribute) or individual (as distinguished from the uni¬
versal). This is the view of Vyadi as stated in Va. 45 on
P. 1.2.64. According to this view, all words denote dravya,
some primarily and directly, others secondarily and indirectly.
Just as, in the other view, some words denote the universal
primarily and directly, while others do so secondarily and
indirectly. According to this view, whatever may be the
reality, a thing as conveyed by words is seen to possess the
characteristics of dravya which are: the capacity of being
referred to as ‘this’ or ‘that’, a certain completeness and inde¬
pendence, the fact of having gender and number. A quality
like ‘whiteness’ may or may not in reality possess these attri¬
butes, but as presented by a word, it can have these properties
or rather these properties are attributed to it.]
So far, it has been shown that all words have the same
meaning (the universal or substance) on the basis of word-
function ( sabda-vydpdra ). The author now proceeds to show
in. i.i4
1?
that, according to the Vaisesikas also, i.e. on the basis of the
common characteristic of objects, all words denote the
universal.
14. In all universal, the fact of being a universal
consists in being found in all (the individuals which
belong to the class) while in all particulars ( visesa ),
.the universal consists in this that they distinguish (the
things in which they reside from others).
[So far it has been maintained that it is in the nature of
a word to convey the universal, whether that universal really
exists or not. A word conveys it through its function, its power
to convey meanings. But even by following the Vaisesika line
of reasoning, one can show that the universal is the meaning
of words. What is, after all, a universal? It is something
which exists in all its substrata, as a result of which all of
them produce a uniform cognition and are called by the same
name. Another characteristic of a universal is that it pervades
the whole of its substratum and not merely a part of it. A
universal like gotvci has these characteristics. But there are
many universals and it is not unreasonable to believe that
there is another universal existing in all of them and sharing
the characteristics of a universal in general. The word visesa
also denotes a common characteristic of the same kind. There
are as many visescis as there are eternal things ( nityadravya )
and they all have this common characteristic, namely, that
each one exists in one eternal thing and not in any other.
This is also thus a common property, something like a uni¬
versal. Words like ablidva also denote a universal of the same
kind.
What Helaraja wants to point out is that all the visesas
produce a uniform kind of cognition and are the cause of the
same name (visesa) being applied to them.]
The author now explains how words like ak&sa, kcila and
difc, which stand for things which are one and eternal, denote
the universal.
v-m. 3
18 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
15. Once parts are postulated on the basis of the
properties of the different objects (with which space
(akasa) is) in contact, the universal of space also is
found in these parts.
[Words like akdsa, kdla, dik, stand for that common
feature which is present in all the contingent divisions which
we make in these things. For instance, akdsa is one, but we
artificially divide it into localities according to the different
objects which exist in space. The space occupied by a jar is
dkdsa just as the space occupied by a piece of cloth is akdsa.
In regard to all these divisions, we have the cognition that they
are dkdsa and that is what the word stands for. The same
thing can be said about time, direction, soul and the relation
called samavdya. Soul is one, but it can be looked upon as
different in each person with whom it is associated. We can
say also that there are as many samavdya-s as there are pairs
of things united by samavdya; but everywhere there is
ihabuddhih: which is the connecting link.]
It is also possible to look upon these divisions of dkd-sa
as real ones and not merely as contingent ones.
16. Just as the connected (potsherds etc.) are
parts of the jar and the like which (as such) are with¬
out divisions, in the same way, the connected objects
are the parts of akasa which is really without any
division.
[In the previous verse, it was declared that words like
dkdsa denote a kind of universal on the basis of the contingent
divisions of such things as akasa. But, perhaps, one can speak
of these divisions as real and not contingent. An object like
a jar, a whole, is, in itself, partless. Its parts, the potsherds,
are its causes and connected with it by the relation of inherence
(samavdya) . Similarly, the various objects of the world
which are in contact with akasa and which delimit it are the
III. 1.17-18
19
real divisions of aktisa. They become the desa of dkasa which,
being their background, become their desa too. Ak&sa and
the objects become desa to each other.]
The author now states where the divisions (desa) are
primary and where they are secondary, as, unless they are
primary somewhere, we cannot speak of them as being
secondary elsewhere.
17-18. The idea of difference persists in the case
of objects joined together by the relation called con¬
junction ( samyoga ) whereas in the case of objects
joined together by inherence ( samciv&ya ) the percep¬
tion of difference disappears.
Therefore, the divisions consisting in objects joined
together by conjunction are secondary whereas the
divisions consisting in objects joined (to the whole)
by inherence are primary because (the wholes) so
united are not really different from the divisions.
[When we have the idea of two things being in contact,
it is based on a difference between the two things. Even
when we see the contact, we continue to see them as differ¬
ent from each other. The two things which come into con¬
tact make a kind of whole, but the two things are not essen¬
tial parts of that whole, because we continue to perceive them
as apart from the whole. But when two things are related
to each other by inherence, the position is different. When
we see a sphere, we do not see its two halves as distinct
from the sphere. They form the very body of that sphere.
They are, therefore, real parts of the whole called sphere.
The division is a primary one and not a secondary one. But
even within the field of things related by Samyoga or con¬
tact, one must make a distinction. When an all-pervasive
thing like dkasa comes into contact with things, it is an
invariable contact. The contact between the clothes and the
20
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
body is not an invariable contact. In the former case, we
do divide the all-pervasive substance on the basis of the
objects with which it is in contact].
The author now explains the universal according to the
Vijnanavadins.
19. Some consider the universal to be merely
something which figures as a common characteristic in
our mind and the particular ( dravya ) to be that which
figures as differentia.
[According to the Vijnanavadins, this attempt' to show
that words like Skasa also denote the universal is futile,
because, according to them, there is no such thing as the
universal at all. They do not believe in the reality of the
external world. They only believe in the different states
of consciousness and, in them, some things figure as common
properties while others appear as distinguishing features. A
word denotes only this thing which figures in the conscious¬
ness and this is what is called jati. In such matters, the
grammarians are governed by two principles: (1) Grammar
is common to all disciplines, (2) for Grammarians, meaning
( artha ) is just what the word conveys. The second princi¬
ple enables them to explain the universal according to the
Vijnanavadins. According to the latter, the universal is
something which occurs in the mind when a word is heard.
In other words, it is sabdcirtha and for Grammarians also,
artha means s abdartha.']
The author now points out the need for' postulating the
existence of the universal.
20. To say that things are different or that they
are identical presupposes some external basis (j^cno-
pddhih ). This diversity in objects arises only when
they are united in some way.
III. 1.21-24
21
21. Neither identity nor difference, neither exis¬
tence nor non-existence of objects is possible if they
are not linked with one another.
[The above two verses are meant' to be an answer to
one who might say that things differ from one another only
because of time, place and circumstances. If such differ¬
ences are ignored, all things would be the same. W y tnen
postulate an universal? It is pointed out here that unless
it is postulated, all vyavaliara or verbal transaction, woul e
impossible. Vyavahara depends upon some basis (uyudhi)
or other].
The author now puts forward the advaita view on this
subject, namely, that it is the powers of the One which are
the basis.
22. The ultimate view is that it is the One which
has all the powers. To postulate difference between
the objects themselves is unnecessary.
23. Therefore, substance etc. are only powers (of
the Supreme), made known by their different func¬
tions. United, they help man to reach his goal and not
separately.
24. Just as the collocation of the senses etc. is not
an entity over and above the things composing it, in
the same way, the connection between the different
powers of the Supreme is not a separate entity.
[All the previous discussion arose in connection with
the question: how do words like ak&sa denote the universal?
The answer was based upon contingent divisions of dkasa.
Contingent’ divisions are only artificial divisions which really
do not exist. But when it comes to the other things of the
world, they were assumed to be real. In verse 22, the author
states that ? according to Advaita, Brahman is the only reality.
^ VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
Everything else, that is to say, all distinctions such as the
universal, the particular and so on are unreal. They are all
the products of the powers of Brahman. The seven catego¬
ries of the Vaisesikas are only the powers of Brahman. These
powers are inferred from their effects. Though the various
objects of the world, produced by the powers of Brahman
are distinct from one another, still they join together in order
to do their work. But one cannot, because of that, maintain
that it is their connection and not the things themselves which
are effective nor that the connection which is eternal, is an
entity different from Brahman. That would go against
monism. The connection is not over and above the things con¬
nected. Just as in perception, the senses, the mind and the
object must come together and this coming together, this
collocation (sdmagn) is not an entity over and above them
so is the case here. Thus, there is no damage to monism].
Remark: Sambandhi-sambandha-samsarge’pi. Samban-
dhin =the Supreme, sambandlia =the powers of things, sam-
sarga =the connection of the powers.
The author now says how the universal which is eternal
helps the effect.
25. Nothing is produced in which its universal
does not exist. Hie universal sets the causes (of the
particular) in motion for its own manifestation.
26. The universal, after having obtained a foot¬
ing among the eternal and non-eternal causes, manifest
themselves again and again in some effects.
[The universal requires the particular or the individual
for its manifestation. It, therefore, prompts, as it were, the
causes of the particular, so that the latter may come into
existence. It becomes a kind of contributory cause in the
creation of the particular. The word used here is prayojikd.
In Vaisesika terminology, it would be a nimittakdrana. The
universal exists in the material cause of an object, whether
eternal or otherwise and makes its appearance when the parti-
23
III. 1.27-28
cular is produced. The effect is supposed to exist in the
cause in the form of the universal which is manifested in
the particular which is produced. Thus, the universal helps
in the production of the particular which is the effect].
As the universal exists even before the individual is
produced, it is eternal. How it helps is now stated.
27. The universal is the cause even of that object
which is newly produced. In order that its substratum
might be produced, it prompts the action to come to be.
[In a sentence like sa Katam Karoti (he makes a mat),
‘mat’ is the object of the action of making. In other*words,
it is a scidhcina , an accessory of the action of making. Before
it is made, it does not exist. How can it then become a
scidhcina ? To this objection, the answer is that its universal
was already present in its causes and it is that which helps
in its production. The universal aspect of it is the sadhana
and the individual ( vycikti ) aspect of it is the effect ( Kcirya ).
After all, the universal and the individual are not two totally
different things like a cow and a horse. They are indis¬
solubly mixed up. They are two aspects of the same thing
which gets two names accordingly. Why the universal is
called prciyojikd is this: Before a man makes a mat, he has
the universal of it in his mind and then proceeds to assemble
the material. But for that, he would not act. It is the
universal which prompts him].
The author now states that, according to the view that
the word denotes the universal, it is not the individual which
is the accessory of an action ( sddhana ), but the universal.
28. A universal such as brahmana-hood is the
accessory in the case of a command or a prohibition.
This universal is qualified by the one belonging to the
number of the individual.
[It is the universal which is the object of all the actions,
commands or prohibitions, which are found in the Vedas . In.
24
VAkYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHAfif
carrying them out, it is the universal which is the accessory,
that is, the means ( sddhana ). Not only that. The universal
of the number expressed by the suffix qualifies this universal] .
As the universal is never found apart from the indivi¬
dual, would it be right to maintain that the word expresses the
former only? This doubt is now answered.
29. Just as a face, reflected in water etc. is only
called as such (that is, a face without any connection
with water etc.), in the same way, a word expresses
only the universal manifested by the individuals.
[In reality, we never see the universal apart from the
individual in which it inheres. But in spite of that, a word
conveys only the universal through its expressive power
( abhidha ). We use the word mukha for the face which is
reflected in a mirror and not also for the mirror which re¬
flects it. Similarly, a word conveys by abhidha, on the basis
of convention, the pure universal and not also the individual
which manifests it'. In perception} however, the two are
mixed up. A word, on the other hand, conveys a meaning
according to convention.
See Vak. I. 100 and the Vrtti thereon].
The author now states how, if the individuals are not
conveyed by the expressive power of words, they can dis¬
tinguish the universals.
30. Just as the difference in the organ of sense,
though unperceived because of the non-perception of
the organ still leads to an awareness of the difference
in the knowledge (produced by the senses) of their
respective objects,
31. in the same way, some individuals, though
themselves unperceived, still become the cause of the
difference in the knowledge of the universals.
III. 1.32-33
25
[The individuals, though not conveyed by words, still
serve to qualify the knowledge of the universal which arises
from words, just as, in perceptual knowledge, the senses,
though not themselves perceived, still serve to distinguish one
kind of sense perception from another].
So far, the view that the word conveys the universal only
by its expressive power has been explained. There are two
other views: (1) that it conveys the individual as quali¬
fied by the universal, (2) that it conveys the individual.
The author now states that the distinction between the
universal and the individual can be explained on the basis
of the view that everything is the result of the different
powers of the One Reality.
32. Of the real and unreal elements which are
found in every object, the real element is the universal,
whereas the unreal one is the individual.
33. It is Being which, being differentiated accord¬
ing to the object in which it is present, is called the
universal. All words are based on that.
[That element in objects which is peculiar to them, which
comes and goes, is a transformation of nescience (avidyd ).
It is that which is called vyakti. It is not real, because it
is not permanent and not found in all objects. Only that is
real which is permanent and which constitutes the pervading
essence of an object. That is what the monists call the uni¬
versal (jati ). In such gold ornaments as rucaka, svastika ,
kuiidala etc., the particular shape of the ornament is the
impermanent thing. These shapes are mutually exclusive,
whereas gold is the persisting essence of all. That is real
or satya. But it has only a relative reality. Gold is fire
(iejas) which is more pervasive and, therefore, the persist¬
ing element compared to goldness. But even the reality of
tejcis is relative. If we go on seeking wider and wider reali¬
ties, we will come to Brahman which is the only Reality
V-m. 4
26
vAkyapadiyam of bhartrharj
which is everywhere and in everything. That is the highest
universal. So it is called maha-satta, the great Being. It is
this mah&satta. which is found in all objects in the form of
their universals, as ‘cowness’ in a cow, ‘horseness’ in a horse
and so on. What is called gotva is nothing but gosattd Being
as it exists in a cow. All words thus ultimately express this
great Being and it is only through the limiting factor with
which it is associated in each object that it appears as golva,
asvatva and so on].
34. That is the meaning of the stem and of the
root; it is eternal, it is the great Soul; it is the meaning
of the suffixes -tva and -tal.
[In all things, there is the comprehensive universal called
‘Being’. Even negative entities have it because they also
figure in our mind. Hence every noun-stem denotes this,
whether it is the name of a positive or negative entity. Roots
also do the same. They denote ‘Being’ as existing in the
different individual actions which depend upon the accesso¬
ries ( sadhana ) for their accomplishment. Thus, it is this
Being which is presented as finished or accomplished ( siddlia )
by nouns and as a process ( su-dhya ) by roots and there is no
third possibility. It is not merely the stem and the root'
which thus denote Being, but also the suffixes. They denote
Being as associated with such limiting factors as number,
accessory etc. Not merely according to the monists, but
according to the followers of Sankhya also, all words denote
Being which is the same as what they call ‘Mahat’ or Buddhi].
Remark: For the Sankhya view, see Vyasabhasya on
Y. Dar. II. 19.
This idea is now further explained—
35. It is this universal, (namely, Being) which
is called ‘action’ when it assumes sequence in the
details. When the form having sequence is destroyed,
it is just called substance ( sattvcwn ).
III. 1.35
27
[In all things, there is the comprehensive universal called
‘Being’. What is called ‘action’ and what is called ‘substance
(sattva) —both these are only transformations of Being
(sattd ). A verb expresses this sattd as a process, something
which has parts arranged in a sequence and which depends
upon accessories endowed with movement foi its accomp is 1
ment. Every verb expresses a process of this kind. Even
though these processes differ from one another, they are all
processes. The fact of being a process is their common fea¬
ture. This is the universal of action which is a vivaria, an
unreal manifestation of sattd or Being. This is the meaning
of all roots. When a process of this type is not understooc
from a root, when the inner sequence which is the essence
of a process is not understood, what we understand is called
sattva, substance or thing, which is also a transformation o
Being. This is also called dravya. Action is sddhya an
sattv°a is siddha, and they are the two unreal manifestations
(vivarta) of Brahman. To say that all words convey Being
is equal to saying that all words convey the universal (jott)
because Being is the greatest of all the universal and it is
identical with Brahman. Thus according to the view that
all words convey the universal (the jdtipaksa), they real y
convey Brahman. According to the other view also, namely,
that all words denote dravya, they denote the same thing,
namely, Brahman, because it is going to be explained t la
what is called dravya is also Brahman. Jdti and di avya are
only two ways of understanding Brahman. When it is
thought of as the persisting feature in everything, it is called
jdti. When it is thought of as a finished thing, it is called
dravya. Thus both the views really stand for the same view,
namely, that' all words denote Brahman.
All this has been said according to Brahmadarsana. But
Vydkarona, as a sdstra, is not particularly attached to any
system of philosophy. It is sarvapdrsada, it is common to
all schools. Therefore, points of Grammar are sometimes
sought to be explained by reference to other systems
also].
28
vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
The author now states that, according to the author of
the Nirukta also, all actions are unreal manifestations of
Being.
36. It is this universal which assumes six states
in the transformations of Being. On account of its
powers,- it appears so in a sequence.
[That all actions are only unreal manifestations of Being
(sattd) is supported by Yaska also. He quotes with appro¬
val the view of Varsyayani who said that bhava or Being
undergoes six transformations: it is born, it exists, it changes^
it increases, it decreases and it' is destroyed. A thing is first
born, then it is said to exist, what exists necessarily undergoes
change, change means growth and then decay and, finally
comes destruction. (See Ni. 1.2.9.) These so called transfor¬
mations ( vikara ) are not real. Here viktira only means
vivarta, an unreal manifestation. Followers of Agama main¬
tain that Brahman who is omnipotent has a power called
‘Nescience’ on account' of which the one Brahman is presented
as many. Because what is manifested has multiplier tv, the
power which is One, is spoken of as being many].
The author now explains how the manifestations appear
in a sequence.
37. Sequence also belongs to the very essence of
this Being. In it, Time is seen, as though divided into
forms like priority and posteriority.
[What is called Time is a power of Brahman. Sequence
is the very essence of Being and it is also the very essence of
Time. Sequence is really not different from what has sequ¬
ence. Time is not an entity quite apart from the things which
appear in a sequence. Time is just a power of Brahman,
as a result of which actions appear with sequence within
them].
in. 1.38-39 29
The author now explains how destruction is also essen¬
tially “Being”.
38. If one accepts the eclipse of objects, that is
their non-existence. When this eclipse assumes inner
sequence, one gets the cognition that the object is
perishing.
[The question now arises: how can birth and destruction
which are not positive things be transformations of Being?
The answer, as far as destruction is concerned is this: what
is called destruction is nothing more than hiding (tirobh&va ),
not being visible. When a thing exists in its causes as a
mere potentiality, it is called destruction. This condition
exists before a thing is produced and when it is destroyed.
When, due to the activity of the accessories, the process of
hiding becomes perceptible and is conveyed by a verb, in
its first stage it is expressed by the verb apaksiyate —it dec¬
lines, and, in its last stage, by the verb vinasyati—it is des¬
troyed. Thus, out of the six transformations of Being; two
relate to the process of hiding or disappearing. Hiding or
existing in the causes in the form of a potentiality is a form
of ‘Being’].
The author now points out that ‘birth’ is also a trans¬
formation of ‘Being’.
39. It is Being which, fallen from its previous
state and not having yet attained the later state, is
called ‘birth’ on the basis of the different moments
coming between the two.
[To say that something is being born amounts to this:
that it has moved from the previous condition of existing as
a mere potentiality in its causes, but has not yet reached a
condition where it can be said to exist. Birth is not the
coming into being of something which did not exist at all
before. It stands for that intermediate state between existing
30
vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
in the causes as a potentiality and existing as an actuality,
a state conceived of as a process. In the list of the six trans¬
formations of Being, each represents the coming into being
of some new feature. In that sense, each stands for birth].
The author now points out which associated things bring
about multiplicity in ‘Being’.
\
40. It is its substratum or its (fictitious) parts or
things appearing to be different from it or its own
powers which are the causes of differentiation in Being.
[The substratum causes variety or multiplicity. Just as
the same face, reflected in oil or water or mirror, appears
to vary, similarly, the same ‘Being’, manifested by a cow or
a horse, appears to be different. Or, one can say that the
universals like ‘cowness’ or ‘horseness’ etc. which are nothing
else than artificial divisions of Being, make the one appear
to be many. The whole which is one appears to have multi¬
plicity through its own parts. Sometimes multiplicity is due
to things like snace, time and the senses. We speak of things
thus: ‘this is here now’, ‘that was there them’ and so on, show¬
ing how time and space bring about difference. To one who
is suffering from jaundice, white appears to be yellow. The
ultimate truth is this: Brahman which is omnipotent appears
as many for the worldly experiencer].
After having pointed out that, according to the views
of others and of the Grammarians, the universal is the mean¬
ing of words, the author now explains its properties.
41. The universal does not depend upon any
particular shape for its manifestation in Earth etc. Nor
does it become destroyed with its substratum, though
the latter is not eternal.
[Universals like earth-ness, water-ness do not require
any particular shape or disposition of parts for their manj-
III. 1 . 42-43 51
festation. A jar appears as earth just as much as a mountain
does. But such universal as cowness (gotva) require a
particular shape for their manifestation. Secondly, a uni¬
versal like a quality exists in its substratum by the relation
of inherence (samav&ya), but if the substratum is destroyed,
the quality is also destroyed, but not the universal. A uni¬
versal depends upon a substratum only for its manifestation
and cognition and not' for its very existence].
Where would the universals, inhere when, at the Great
Dissolution, even eternal things are destroyed? To this, the
author replies as follows:
42. Others declare that the substratum of all
universals cannot be destroyed, holding tne view, that,
at the Great Dissolution, everything is not destroyed at
the same time.
[The universals require a substratum for their manifes¬
tation. But, at the time of the Great Dissolution, all effects
and transitory things which form the substrata of the uni¬
versals disappear. What happens then to the universals?
This question is answered by some by saying that such a thing
as Great Dissolution does not take place at all. So all uni¬
versals always have some substrata or other. Otheis say
that all things are not simultaneously dissolved with the same
universe and secondly, there is no end to the number of uni¬
verses. So, somewhere or other, there are always substrata
for the universals.]
Remark: The Mimamsakas do not believe in Mahapralaya.
What is the answer of those who believe in the Great
Dissolution?
43. Those who believe in Unity hold that, once
the different objects are dissolved in the ultimate cause
(Prakrti), the universals have their existence as one
with the ultimate substance.
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhari
[Those who believe in the Great Dissolution must natu¬
rally answer this question differently. They say that what
is called the Great Dissolutoin is nothing more than the
merging of everything in the root-cause, the Great Universal
(mahasamanya). The universal also merge in it which is
here called substance (dravya). This root-cause is nothing
more than the Great-Universal. According to Advaitins it
is nothing more than the cause which is found in all effects
. Vai;se5lkas believe that, in the Great Dissolution the
universal exist without any substratum. But here* the
author has stated his own view].
‘The author now makes a statement on the basis of the
view that all universal exist everywhere.
44. Universal like brahmana-hood reside in all
living beings. Once they are manifested, they produce
their effects. This is another tradition.
[Universal like brahmana-hood exist everywhere but
are manifested only through particular substrata. So’ one
cannot argue that if the universal exist everywhere, jar-ness
would exist in a cloth also and thus confusion would result
Only a jar can manifest jar-ness and not anything else. Thus
according to this view, all universal exist in the ultimate
cause like the atoms at the time of the Great Dissolution j
45. Some declare that the universal are mani¬
fested in pictures etc. But they become the cause of
the attainment of merit and demerit only when they
have living beings as substrata.
[Some go to the extent of saying that the universal of
sentient things exist in their non-sentient images. But this
is not correct. All that happens is that, due to similarity
between the original and the image, similarity of cognition
takes place. That does not prove the presence of the
universal.]
m. 1.46 33
The author now states how the omniscients acquire their
knowledge of the universals.
46. The knowledge regarding the universals of
those who are different from us proceeds from all the
senses, just as that relating to the characteristics of
precious stones and coins comes through practice in the
case of those who know them.
[All words denote universals which exist in the parti¬
culars that manifest' them. But here a doubt arises. If the
particulars manifest the universals, how is it that they do
not do so for one who does not know the language. Such a
person, after seeing a large number of cows and other ani¬
mals, does not seem to see the ‘cowness’ which exists in all
cows and does not exist in the other animals and give expres¬
sion to it by the word ‘cow’. If the individual cows do mani¬
fest ‘cow-ness’, how is it that he does not perceive it? And
if he ultimately comes to see it through others, how did the
latter know it? Such reasoning will ultimately take us back
to one who is naturally omniscient and knows all the uni¬
versals and their words and teaches others. The assumption
cf the existence of such a person or persons becomes neces¬
sary for the knowledge of such universals as ‘brahmana-hood’
which differs from such universals as ‘cow-ness’ in that the
latter can be observed by all as existing in all cows and
not existing in other animals, whereas the former cannot' be
so observed. These omniscient beings were the original
teachers of mankind and they were taught by God ( Isvara ).
As the Yogasutras say: Sa purvesdm api guruh, K&le-
ndnavaccheddt. (Y. Dar. I. 26). When, after the Great Dis¬
solution, Brahma and others are created again, it is isvara
who teaches them and they pass on the knowledge to others.
All the sdstras testify to the existence of omniscient Beings,
Isvara and the deities. They directly see the universals and
the substrata which manifest them. They differ from us in
that their senses are not restricted in their scope. They can
hear with the nose, see what is behind them and do the work
V-III. 5
24 vAkyapadiyAm of bhahtrhaki
of all the senses with the tips of their fingers. For them,
knowledge of Brahmana-hood is not merely visual, but pro¬
ceeds from their other senses also. They can see subtle uni-
versals in words. Besides Tradition, there is another proof
for the existence of omniscient beings. We do see in life
that practice increases both knowledge and power in some
individuals. Jewellers acquire great skill in detecting the
genuineness of precious stones. Whatever has degree reaches
its climax somewhere. That Being in whom knowledge and
power reach their climax is Isvara. From Him, some Yogis
get their knowledge. These Yogis are superior to us. They
can see what we cannot. They can see Brahmana-hood
directly, just as we can see ‘cow-ness’. It is they who teach
us that such and such a word denotes such and such a uni¬
versal. In doing so, they only make known what is already
there. The relation between word and meaning is eternal.]
The author now considers whether, in words like jati-
gandhatva, ‘utpalagandhatva’ etc., the abstract suffix-rua ex¬
presses the wider universal, namely, the fact of being smell
or the lower universal, namely, the fact of being the smell
of j ati flower etc.
47. The particular fact (smell) which is resorted
to in words like jatigandha and utpalaganclha , is not
conveyed in the world by the abstract suffixes, it being
(relatively more) transitory.
[It was said before that all words denote universals. Here
a question arises: in words like j atigandhatva, utpala¬
gandhatva etc., dees the suffix-tua denote the universal of
smell or the universal of a particular smell? The answer is
that the suffix expresses smell in general and not the fact of
being a particular smell, the smell of a particular flower.
That is because the former is wider and more comprehensive.
The quality of being a particular smell is relatively ‘anitya
less comprehensive. So the suffix must be taken to ex¬
press that which is relatively more permanent and more
comprehensive.]
III. 1.48-49
35
The author now point's out that some universals have no
words to express them.
48. Universals like the fact of being a ‘man-lion’
have no words of their own to express them. They are
conveyed by other words the (fictitious) parts of which
are similar (to other words in the language).
[Universals like ‘the fact of being a man-lion (nara-
simhatva ) have no words to express them. The word nara-
simha has two parts, each of which is like another word in
the language. The result is that each of these words brings
to our mind its own universal. The word nam brings the
fact' of ‘being human’ to the mind and simha brings to the
mind the fact of ‘being a lion’. But the universal ‘the fact
of being a man-lion’ is something quite different from naratva
and simhatva. It is not a mixture of the two. The word
narasirnha is really an indivisible word and to say that it has
two parts which resemble two other words in the language
is really a fiction. Because the two fictitious parts of the
word bring to our mind two other universals, the word can
cause only an error in us. The fact is that such universals
have no words of their own to express them.]
The author now states that like the stem, the suffix also
denotes the universal and that the two are coordinated.
49. In any consideration of the scope of the
universal (of a thing or of an action) the number or
the universal in it (denoted by the suffixes) is of use
because of its connection, even though it may be
separated.
[The universal exists in a thing or in an action by the
relation of inherence. The determination of its scope is based
on the consideration whether it' resides in one thing or in
more than one thing. When such a consideration is made,
the universal of the number conveyed by the suffix in the
36
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
noun or the verb plays a useful part. It does so, not because
it is directly connected, but by the relation of ekdrthasaraaveta-
samavdya = inhering in what inheres in a thing. Between
the universal of number conveyed by the suffix in a verb
and the universal of action, there is this relation through
their substratum. The universal conveyed by the stem and
the particular number reside in the same thing. Only that
which has been understood can qualify, it does not matter
whether it is understood directly or indirectly. According
to the view that all words denote the particular, the parti¬
cular number is conveyed directly by the word and not in¬
directly understood. In such expressions as gauh, ga-vau
pacati, pacatah, a thing having a particular number is under¬
stood as the main thing. Thus the meaning conveyed by the
suffix becomes the visesana and the meaning conveyed by
the stem becomes the visesya. This is also in keeping with
the well-known saying that a verb is a word which primarily
expresses an action. In the word pacati, for instance, the
action of cooking which is the meaning of the root' is the
main thing and it is qualified by the accessories etc. which
are conveyed by the suffix. In the word aupagavci, on the
other hand, the idea of progeny, conveyed by the suffix, is
the main thing and it is qualified by the meaning of the stem.
It is in reference to words like that that the saying Prakrti-
pratyayau pratyaydrtham saha brutali' applies.]
The author now points out that, sometimes, the meaning
of the suffix is not meant to be coordinated with that of the
stem.
50. Even when the powers of number, the accu¬
sative case and the like have the same verbal element
to express them, it is seen that there is secondary usage
( laksana ) when they (are not actually meant but
merely exist to) give a certain completeness to the word
or that they help in the accomplishment of the action
(which is the real meaning of the sentence).
III. 1.50
37
[Thus, speaking generally, one can say that the word
conveys the meaning of the stem as qualified by that of the
suffix. That is how the meanings of the two elements of a
word, both universals, are co-ordinated. Sometimes, things
happen differently. That is, though the suffix is used in
order to lend a certain completeness and correctness to the
word, its meaning does not play any part'. In the sentence
graham sammdrsti, the second case-affix expresses the singu¬
lar number, but it is not to be taken seriously, because more
than one vessel ( graha ) is wiped. Similarly, in the sentence
saktun juhoti, the accusative case expressed by the second
case-affix in sciktiin is not’ to be taken seriously. All that t e
sentence means is: the sacrifice is to be performed with ground
grain (saktu) . The act of performing a sacrifice is meant to
serve an invisible purpose and, therefore, that is the impor¬
tant thing. The homa is not performed in order to reduce
the flour to ashes. It is performed in order to attain an
invisible fruit, with, of course, ground grain as the material.
Somebody at this stage might argue as follows. If this is the
case, if is wrong to say that the accusative case in ‘saktun’
is not significant. One can speak of something which actual¬
ly exists as not seriously meant. For example, in graham
sammdrsti, the second case-affix does convey the singular
number which, therefore, really exists, but is not significant.
But nobody says that' the accusative case is not' significant in
K&sthdni pacanti=the fuel cooks, because it does not exist
at' all. There, the nominative case is used instead of the
usual instrumental case which, therefore, can be said to be
not meant. But this line of argument is not right. Because,
if, in the sentence saktun pacati, saktu is not the gramma¬
tical object (karma), that is, if it is not what the agent wishes
to reach most, the invisible purpose itself cannot be at'taine .
What one means by saying that the accusative case is no
significant is that the sacrifice is not performed for the sake
of ground grain. It is the latter which is made use o m
order to attain some other purpose.
Sometimes number and the accusative case sei\e the
purpose of accomplishing the action which is the meaning
38
vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
of the sentence and that is done by specifying in some way
the things which are the accessories of the action. For ex¬
ample, in the sentence, pasund yajeta =one should perform
the sacrifice by means of an animal, the singular number in
pasund is significant', because the sacrifice can be fully ac¬
complished even with one animal. Similarly, in Vrlhhi ava-
hanti =he threshes the paddy grains, the accusative case ex¬
pressed by the second case-affix is significant, because vrllii
is what the agent wishes most to reach, because it' is to be
cleaned by means of threshing. Threshing is never for its
own sake, but' for the sake of the paddy-grains. When
threshed, they become fit' to make the sacrificial cake ( puro-
ddsa). Thus, they become accessories to the sacrifice. The
grains are more important than the act of threshing. They,
when threshed, are of further use Saktu, on the other hand'
after it is thrown into the fire, is not of further use, because
it exists no more. When it' is said that threshing i s less im-
porant than the grains, it is from the point of view of rea¬
lity. As far as the language is concerned, it is threshing
which is enjoined in the sentence vrllun avahanti .]
The _ author now points out the scope of secondary power
(lalcsand) in the formation of words.
51. No finished object ( sattvabhuto’rthah) can be
expressed without a number. Therefore, the number
which is found in all expressions is not (necessarily)’
significant.
[A thing is what can be referred to by a pronoun such
as ‘this’ or ‘that’. It is always associated with some num¬
ber. It cannot be otherwise expressed in language. So the
number which a word expressive of a thing (dravya) has
should not' always be taken seriously. It is there only to
lend a certain completeness or correctness to the word].
To this general rule, some point out' an exception.
ill. 1.52-54
39
52. According to some, the singular and the plu¬
ral numbers are not significant, as they serve only to
convey the universal. But the dual number is signi¬
ficant.
[According to some, the singular and plural numbers
may not be meant to be taken seriously. They may be only
the means to convey the universal, as in the sentences:
brahmano na hantavyah=a brahmana is not' to be killed,
surd na peyd= wine is not to be drunk, vrsalair na pravesta-
vy am=sudras are not to enter. Where the singular num¬
ber is significant, the word may primarily convey che indi¬
vidual ( dravya ). The dual number, on the other hand, can
never be used for conveying the universal primarily. It al¬
ways denotes the individual primarily].
The author now says that, sometimes, even the dual
number is not significant.
53. In such a sentence as: “if these two fall ill,
this medicine should be given”, the number two belong¬
ing to the objects is not significant.
[But even the dual number is sometimes not meant to
be taken seriously, as, in the sentence: ‘if these two (dual
number) fall ill, this medicine should be given to them’.
Even if only one of them falls ill, the medicine is given].
The author now points out that the number expressed
by the stem is always significant.
54. In sentences like: “he digs to the accompani¬
ment of two (mantras)”, the number expressed by
words like ^one' etc. is to be considered as part of tne
action, because this (number) arises out of the stem
of the word.
40
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[The universal of number conveyed by the stem is al¬
ways seriously meant. In such expressions as dwbhy&m
mantrabhyam. mrdam khanati, caturbhir ddcitte, astabhir
harati, the number conveyed by the stem is significant.
Otherwise, there would be no meaning in using that parti¬
cular stem at all. That particular stem denotes a particular
number].
It is now pointed out that the singular number, conveyed
by the suffix, is also sometimes significant.
55. „ In the sentence “one should sacrifice with an
animal”, though there is a certain completeness (sams-
kdra), the number one must be considered to be as
much a part of the action to be performed as the
universal.
[It was said before that the dual number is always seri¬
ously meant. It does not come in merely to lend a certain
completeness or correctness to the word. A word which ends
in a dual-suffix denotes primarily the individual and not the
universal. But, sometimes, the singular number is also sig¬
nificant, as in the sentence: pasuna yajetci. Here the univer¬
sal conveyed by the stem, namely, that of an animal is an
important element in the action. Similarly, the singular
number conveyed by the suffix is also an important element.
The two elements are conveyed by the same word, aooear as
one in the mind and cannot be separated. The inner rela¬
tion between the different elements of the same word is
apauruseya, not made by man. The injunction to perform
the sacrifice, expressed by the sentence pasuna yajeta applies
to the singular number also, through updddna or inclusion
or implication which is different from the six authorities
sruti etc. The injunction cannot, relate to a bare animal
without any number].
Remark: See Mi. Su. 3.3.14.
The author now says that, even those who hold that the
suffix expressive of the singular number is only for the sake
III. 1.5G-57 41
of lending completeness to the word, consider it to be signi¬
ficant for other reasons.
56. The mention of second etc is an indication that
the singular number is significant. It is also an indi¬
cation that both the universal and number are found
in the same thing.
[After having declared: Agneyamajamagnistoma ala-
bheta, it is said: aindragnam dvifiyam ukthye , aindrarr
prsrtim tr&yayi soclasini. The very mention of dvitlya—
second, trtiya=i hird etc is a proof that the number one
expressed by the suffix is significant. It also proves that the
universal and number are found in the same object. Unless
the universal is found completely in one individual, it would
be impossible to sacrifice a second animal. Unless the whole
universal is found in an animal, it would not be that animal
at all. As Helaraja puts it: Yavata hi vina nopapadyate
tdvato’rthasyaitallmgam'].
57. (In the sentence ‘pasana yajeta) the animal is
taught for the first time as the means of sacrifice, not
taught elsewhere and also that it is subsidiary to the
act of sacrifice. That is why it (the singular number)
is significant.
[The reason why the singular number is significant in
the sentence pcisund yajeta is that it mentions for tne first
time that the object to be sacrificed is an animal which is,
therefore, an anga of the sacrifice. There is no other text
where the number of animals to be sacrificed is mentioned.
From this very text, we have to understand the number
also].
The author now says that the sentence graham sam-
mdrsti is a different case.
v-m. 6
42
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
58. In such sentences as “vessels dedicated to
Prajapati are nine in number”, the vessels are taught
in different numbers.
59. How can the number mentioned in connection
with what is (generally) understood as being subsi¬
diary but becomes important as far as cleaning is con¬
cerned be significant?
[This is not the case in the sentence ‘graham sammdrsti'.
Here the singular number in ‘graham’ is not significant
because there are other texts where the exact number of the
vessels (grdha) in the different ceremonies is mentioned.
In those texts, the number comes as the meaning of the
stem. Here, the main purpose of the text is to teach the
cleansing of the vessels. Thus, the vessels become, in rea¬
lity, the important thing ( ahgin ) in regard to the act of
cleaning, though, verbally, cleaning is the important thing.
It is natural that all the vessels previously mentioned should
be cleaned and not merely any one of them. Therefore, the
singular number is not significant for two reasons: (1) the
real number is taught elsewhere (2) in regard to cleaning,
the vessels become ahgin].
The author now says that the singular number becomes
significant where there is a special reason for it.
60. Neither the idea that the singular number
lends completeness to the language when number has
been taught elsewhere nor that it becomes important
is the reason for considering it as insignificant. It is
significant when an effort is made to make it so.
[Though the above two reasons have been given for
holding the singular in graham sammcirsti to be not signi¬
ficant the real reason is the one given in verse 51. It be¬
comes significant only if there is a special reason for it. There
is no such reason in this case].
III. 1.61-64
43
That' is what the author now says—
61. No distinction has been made as far as the
cleansing of vessels is concerned. They are taught (in
different numbers) and they have to be purified.
Therefore, all are taken.
[There is no indication anywhere that only one parti¬
cular vessel is to be cleaned. The singular number in
graham is no such indication as it' does not specify any
particular vessel].
The author now points out what indication there is in
'pasand yajetci.
62. As the universal is present in full in every
-substratum, one would think of resorting to more than
one animal only if the act cannot be accomplished
with one.
[In the sentence pasuna yajeta there is a special reason
for considering the singular number significant. If the uni¬
versal of the animal were to reside completely only in more
than one animal taken together, it would be necessary to
sacrifice all of them before the whole of the universal is sacri¬
ficed. That is not the case. The whole of the universal is
found in any single animal.]
63. When the act has been accomplished with one
animal, if one takes another merely because it is possi-
fcip to do so, such an act would be useless.
64. Just as it is useless to sow the seed in a woman
in whom it has already been sown, in the same way,
it would be useless to resort to another animal when
the act has been completed with one,
4< * VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[The sacrifice is complete when one animal has been sac¬
rificed. By sacrificing more than one animal, the sacrificer
is not likely to get any extra fruit. Thus, it is simpler to
say that the singular number is significant.]
Others give some other reason than simplicity for con-
sideling the singular number to be significant
65. As the act can be accomplished by that much
(that is, by one) some think that there is no reason for
by-passing the number one. In this way, the singular
would not be (openly taught as) accessory to action.
[Some argue that we come to many only after havin«*
passed one and as the sacrifice can be performed with one"
we take one and not more than one. There . ’
reason for by-passing the number one. The number one
would serve the purpose (sdvmrlhya ). Thus, due to simnli
city and because it would serve the purpose, the singJL
number is significant.]
66. The indcations in ‘second’ etc. only confirm
what has already been understood through reasoning
From them, number is not understood as an accessory
3S the universal is.
[The words dvitlya, trtiya etc. are lingas, indications of
what has already been understood through simplicity and ful¬
filment of purpose (laghava and sdmarthya). They say noth¬
ing new. The singular number in pasund does not say that
it is also a part of the accessory, because it has already been
understood through simplicity and fulfilment of purpose.
Verbally, it is not significant and still it comes in as shown
above and the work is done.]
The view expressed in verses 65 and 66 was that of ‘some’
(kecit ). It is now criticized.
III. 1.67-68
45
67. If, on the basis of agreement and difference,
number is actually understood from the text, it is right
that it should also become an accessory and not merely
be secondary to the meaning of something else.
[This is not the right way of looking at it. The real
position is that the singular number is understood only if
the suffix of the singular is present and not otherwise. If it
is thus understood, what is the reason for abandoning it?
It should also be considered a sddliana, accessory to action.
It is not there merely to give a certain completeness to the
meaning of the stem. The word pcisund expresses two ideas,
one through the stem and the other through the suffix, and
they stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each
other. To accept one and reject the other is not right.
Secondly, unless the singular number is taken as actually
taught, it would not be possible to substitute clarified butter
when, for some reason or other, one of the avadana-s is lost.
One can use another animal, because there would be no obli¬
gation to stick to one animal. But if the singular number
is openly taught one cannot resort to another animal and so
one can take clarified butter as a substitute.
68. When the full meaning of the word (includ¬
ing both the unversal and the number) is the acces¬
sory to action, the power of the word to convey both
is not affected and that is an indication that number
has also a function to perform in regard to action.
[When, both the universal and the number are equal
because both are expressed by the same word, both become
accessories. Thereby ^ the word does not lose its capacity to
express the accessory. From this we understand the func¬
tion of number. As smoke is invariably concomittant with
fire, it causes the inference of the latter. Similarly, because
the power of the word to convey the accessory is not lost,
so it becomes the cause of our understanding the function of
number. Where there is no such indication of the function
46
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
of number as for example, in graham sammarsti, there the
number is not significant.]
The author now adopts another argument and reaches
the same conclusion.
69. The unknown ( apurva ) is to be considered
important as it is to be taught; the known ( vihita ) is
to be considered secondary, as it exists for something
else.
70. As (in the sentence in question) cleansing is
to be taught and considering that the vessels are taught
elsewhere (for the first time) the number found in the
injunctive sentence is not to be rejected in (the inter¬
pretation) of the confirmatory sentence.
[The question which is being discussed here is when the
meaning expressed by the suffix, such as number, is signifi¬
cant and when it is not. So far, the question was discussed
on the basis of the nature of the meaning conveyed by the
suffix. Now, it is being discussed from the point of view of
the function of the sentence. That which is vidheya, that is
to be primarily conveyed by the sentence is the new feature
and that is the important thing. That which is already made
known elsewhere is mentioned in order to convey some¬
thing else through it. It is only restated ( anudita ). In the
sentence graham sammarsti, it is the cleaning ( sammdrga)
which is the new thing to be taught in regard to the vessels
already taught elsewhere. In that other passage, the num¬
ber of the vessels is also mentioned. That number is the
one which is meant in the sentence in question. The num¬
ber expressed by the suffix here is not to be taken seriously.
The suffix only serves the purpose of lending correctness
or completeness to the form ( sabdasamskdra ). The number
expressed by it is set aside by the number openly mentioned
by the stem in that other sentence. Before, the line of argu-
ill. 1.71-72
47
ment was that the cleaning is for the sake of the vessels
which are, therefore, more important in the sentence under
consideration. Here, the line of argument is that what is men¬
tioned in the injunctive sentence is more important than what
is mentioned in a mere re-statement ( cinuvdda ,).]
The author now points out that the case is different in
the sentence pasund yajeta.
71. There is no contradictory number for the ani¬
mal in some other injunctive sentence; therefore, it
(the animal) is understood together with its qualities
and the singular number.
[As to the sentence, pasund yajeta, it teaches sacrifice
with the animal as its accessory (guna ). The animal is
taught for the first time. Therefore, the particular number
expressed by the suffix is also significant. Together with the
animal which is specified ) it becomes an accessory of the
sacrifice. This way of looking at it is in accordance with the
view of the Mimamsakas. (See Mi. Su. III. 1.7.13-15).]
The author now says something about other qualities
besides number.
72. As an action depends upon substance ( dravya),
so does it on a quality which is taught in connection
with an action whose relation to a substance is already
settled.
[Just like number, other qualities also become accesso¬
ries to action through the process of specifying a substance.
Action requires accessories and it is a substance which can
be so. But a substance is the substratum of qualities. It
has always some quality or other. So action depends upon
qualities also. It is quality which specifies a substance which
is the real accessory to an action. In regard to action, a
substance is an inner (antaraiiga) factor, whereas quality is
48
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
an outer (bahiranga) factor. That is why substance is con¬
nected with action first and, through it, quality also is con¬
nected. This sequence is significant. Substance is the sub¬
stratum of power and power is the real accessory to action.]
73. Because of their mutual indispensibility a
particular quality is associated with a substance. Simi¬
larly, a substratum is also invariably associated with a
quality.
74. When, because of this mutual indispensibility,
a relation between the two is understood, it should not
be abandoned nor something not actually mentioned
be brought in.
[Substance and quality require each other. This mutual
requirement is called samarthya. Granting this mutual de¬
pendence, when a relation between them is understood from
the very words of the sentence, it cannot be abandoned. All
this about substance and quality is being said from the point
of view of artificial abstraction (apoddhara ). In reality the
sentence is one and its meaning is an indivisible complex
whole. Therefore, there cannot be any question of bringing
in the meaning of a word which has not been mentioned in
the sentence. As there is a mutual indispensibility between
substance and quality, if both are expressed by separate ver¬
bal elements in the same sentence, they must be connected
with each other. There is no justification to abandon this
connection and connect any of the two with something not
mentioned in the same sentence. A cognition which arises
without any hitch must be taken as authoritative. The sen¬
tence is indivisible and conveys a single particularised mean¬
ing. For the sake of convenience in explanation it is divided
artificially into parts and each part is assigned a meaning
which is a universal. In association with the meanings of
other words in the sentence, it becomes particularised. But
this way of looking as it is only for the sake of convenience.
111 . i.75-78
49
Really speaking, the meaning of the individual word conti¬
nues to be a universal and only appears to be particularised
in association with the meanings of other words. The word
expressive of the universal disappears, as soon as it has been
uttered, with its universal meaning and so with which parti¬
cular is it to be identified? The speaker cannot mean to
express both the universal and the particular at the same
time. Besides, the other words also express universals and,
so, with which particular is each universal to be identified?
Therefore the right view is that the individual sentence con¬
veys a particularised meaning. So there is no question of
bringing in an idea not openly expressed in the sentence].
It is now pointed out that, even when two relations come
out in the same sentence, there need be no ?;a/c yabheda,
splitting of the sentence, because of the two relations. One
can be the main thing and the other secondary.
75. The relation of these two with the action is
expressed by means of a verbal element (case-ending).
The close relation between the substratum and that
which exists in it is understood from the sentence.
[In the sentence gam cibhyaja suklam dandena , both the
substance and the quality stand in the relation of accessory
towards the action and this is made known by the case-end¬
ing. The words gam and suklam stand in the relation of
qualified and quality to each other and this is understood
through the sentence. Thus, the sentence conveys two re¬
lations and yet it is one. There is no splitting of the sen¬
tence. Of the two relations, one is the main one and the
other secondary to it. Thus, in one expressive movement,
the sentence conveys both, that is, it conveys a particular
substance, having a particular quality as the accessory to
action.]
1 The author now points out a difficulty.
76. In this view, when the (prescribed) substance
or quality is not available, it would be possible to have
V-m. 7
so
VakyApadiyAm of bhartrhari
a substitute for either. The relation expressed directly
by a verbal element is stronger than the one conveyed
by the sentence.
[According to this view, there would be a difficulty.
When, either the substance or the quality prescribed is not
available, there could be a substitue for either, because that
which is conveyed by a directly expressive verbal element is
stronger than what is conveyed by the sentence. Therefore
the injunction ‘One should sacrifice a white goat’ could be
carried out with a black goat or a white goat made of flour
if the prescribed substance or quality is not available ]
If the universal is the meaning of words, evervtbino
would be alright. S
77. When the view is that it is the universal or
capacity which is taught in relation to action, then
substance and quality are also understood because of
their indispensibility.
[Accordingly to the view that the universal is the mean¬
ing of words, everything would be alright, because, then the
connection of both substance and quality with action would
not be direct, that is, through the verbal element. Only th~
connection of the universal or of the capacity with action
would be so. It is the universal which is taught as the acces¬
sory to action and it has been declared that the universal
stands for that which has the requisite capacity. So it is
the connection of the universal or that of capacity which is
directly expressed by the verbal element ( sruti ). But both
must have a substratum and so a substance is also understood
and through it, a quality also.]
78. Even though universal and qualities are
equally accessories of action, it is the qualities of the
goat etc. for which there may be substitutes and not
for the universals.
III. 1.79-80
51
[Both the universal and qualities enter into relation with
action through a substance and yet, there cannot he a sub¬
stitute for the universal. Only a quality can be replaced.]
The author now says why.
79, The qualities are not as near to the substance
having capacity as the universals are. The substance
is directly connected with action. That is why there
can be alternative only for quality.
[That is because the universals are much nearer to the
substance which is actually the accessory than the qualities
which come later and are liable to change. So they are a
step removed from substance which is directly connected with
action. No quality can be connected directly with action.
As the universal is much nearer to the substance which is
connected with action, there can be no substitute for it. If it
is replaced, it would become a different accessory and so
the action itself would become different. All this is said on
the basis of the universal being the meaning of words. Accord¬
ing to the view.that substance or the individual is the mean¬
ing of words, the universal is not directly taught and so can
be replaced.]
80. Some (on the other hand) think that, because
of resemblance, there can be alternative for either:
there can be a goat which is not of the (prescribed)
colour or a sheep which is.
[The oilier view that there can be a substitute for both
the universal and quality, because both are connected with
action through substance, is not the view of the Bhasyakara.
but of others, of those who follow Vyadi.]
After this digression, the author comes back to the sub¬
ject-matter,
52
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
81. It is seen that the universal, together with the
number attached to it, is applied (to action); some¬
times, the universal alone, after discarding the num¬
ber, is applied.
82. Where the universal is subsidiary to something
else, there it is associated with the number of the
substance (individual). Where, on the other hand, it
exists on its own, it does not depend upon the number
(of the substance) .
[Before it was declared that the singular number in
graham is not significant on the basis of verbal presentation
(sabdavydpara) that is, whether something is presented by
words as the main thing or as the secondary thing. Here it
is said on the basis of the factual situation ( vastavam ), that is.
whether something is actually the main thing or the secondary
thing, that the number of the latter is significant.]
83. In the sentence ‘one should sacrifice with an
animal’ (yajeta pasuna ), the mention of animal is for
the sake of the sacrifice and the act, (the sacrifice) the
main thing, is fulfilled even with one animal.
I
[In the sentence pasuna yajeta, the sacrifice is the impor¬
tant thing. The animal is an accessory to it. As the sacrifice
can be accomplished with one animal, there is no reason for
sacrificing a second one. The universal of the animal, being
subsidiary to the sacrifice, is associated with the singular
number expressed by the suffix in pasuna. If a second ani¬
mal is sacrificed, there would be another act altogether, which
is not pi’escribed. Number should follow the main prescrip¬
tion and not vice-versa. If one were to sacrifice as many
animals as one can, the sacrifice would follow number and
not vice-versa.]
III. 1.84-8G
53
81. If one were to sacrifice with as many animals
as one can, then it would be a case of the main thing
being determined by the subsidiary things.
The author now gives an example of the principle refer¬
red to in stanza 82.
85. Where the act (of cleaning) is mentioned, the
main thing being the vessel which is cleaned, there we
disregard the particular number which is expressed.
[Where the vessel is to be cleaned, it becomes the main
thing in relation to the act itself. There, the number ex¬
pressed by its own vevbal element, the suffix, is not signifi¬
cant. If the act were the main thing the number one expres¬
sed by the suffix would be significant, because the act can
be accomplished even by cleaning one vessel. Cleaning more
than one would be useless. But that is not the case.]
The author now points out an indication of this princi¬
ple in the science of Grammar.
86. The very fact that in the sutra teaching the
retention (of a word as the main thing) the word one
is specially mentioned, even though the word sesa (left
over, retained) has a suffix expressive of a particular
number (one) is a clear indication (of the principle).
[The principle that the number expressed by the suffix
in regard to the subsidiary is significant, but not the one ex¬
pressed in regard to the main thing can be known from the
science of Grammar. In the sutra: sarupdndvi ekasesa eka-
vibhakatau”=Of many words having the same form, only one
remains when they are followed by the same case-ending
(P. 1.2.64), there is the word ekasesah. The suffix in sesnli
expresses the singular number. So does the word eka (one).
The very fact that the word eka has been put in even though
the suffix is there shows that the number expressed by the
54
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
suffix is not significant. What remains is taught and is, there¬
fore, the main thing. Hence the number mentioned in con¬
nection with it is not significant.]
An illustration of the principle from the science of Gram¬
mar is now being given.
87. In the rules teaching compound words and
suffixes, just as there is express mention (of a parti¬
cular number), in the same way, it is based on reason
also, namely, that the secondary things (parts') depend
upon something else (the whole).
[In the sutra saha supd (P. 2.1.4.) the main thing is the
compound word ( samasa ) which it teaches. It is not the
members of a compound word which are taught in that sutra.
Really speaking, a compound word like a sentence is indi¬
visible. So it has no real parts. Parts are derived by abs¬
traction. The elision of endings, shortening of final vowels,
masculine form etc. which are taught in regard to the mem¬
bers of a compound word are really for the sake of the cor¬
rectness of the whole. In the sutra in question, the singular
number is actually heard and it is justified by reasoning
also. That is why, in a compound word, a word combines
with one other word at a time and not with more than one.
Similarly, in teaching suffixes also, the particular number
mentioned is sometimes significant, as in the sutra nydpprdti-
padikat (P. 4.1.1.). According to this, the suffixes taught in
the subsequent sutras come after a single word ending in
fit or dp and after a single stem ( pratipadika ). One suffix
cannot come after many of them at the same time.]
It is now shown that there are exceptions to this principle.
88. (Sometimes) even in what is secondary, the
number (mentioned) is not accepted (that is, it is not
significant) in order that the main thing may be
accomplished. Therefore, in regard to the teaching of
111. 1.89 55
the name ‘object’ (karma), the agent is understood un¬
qualified by anything.
[It is not that, in the sastra, the number coming after
every secondary thing ( gwci ) is significant. The sutra
teaching the name karma is: kartur ipsitatamam karma— that
accessoi’y is called the object which the agent wants most to
reach (P. 1.4.49). Here the word kartuh is in the singular num¬
ber and in this sutra, the agent ( karta ) is secondary, because
the name ‘object’ is the main thing. And yet, the singular
number here is not significant. What many agents together
want to reach most is also called karma.']
This conclusion is now further strengthened.
89. When something which is possible is expressly
mentioned in order to remove other possibilities, there
the number is not significant, as its purpose has been
served by the removal of other possibilities.
[If Paiiini had only said Ipsitatamam karma=‘that which
is most desired to be reached is karma,’ and not specified by
whom, any accessory ( kdraka ) could occur to one. But as
he has added kartuh (by the agent), the other accessories
are excluded. This exclusion is the purpose of the mention
of the agent in the sutra. The singular number of the suffix
in kartuh is not significant. It has been used because, after
all, some number has to be used. Even what is desired to
be reached by more than one agent gets the name of
karma. This reasoning cannot be extended to the case of
pasuna yajeta, because that is the main injunction in regard
to the animal and so the singular number in pasuna is also
significant.]
• i
The author now explains how a single case-ending comes
after many identical forms if the singular number in P. 4.1.1.
is significant.
56
VAKYAPADIYAM of bhartrhAr!
SO, Where a case-ending comes after several
identical stems, one of the latter is meaningful and is
expressive of the whole group.
[The retention of one only of several identical forms
(ekasesa) is taught in P. 1.2.64 when the speaker wants to
use them together (sahavivaksayam ). When the meanings
of the different identical forms are mutually connected, the
meaning of the group comes into being. The different iden¬
tical forms of the group and the group as a whole are mean¬
ingful and, therefore, get the name of stem (pratipadika ).
There can, therefore, be a case-ending after the group also,
even if the singular number in P. 4.1.1. is significant. Once
there is a case-ending after the group, it will serve each indi¬
vidual form also. No separate case-ending need come after
each identical form. Thus several identical forms would be
followed by one case-ending, only one of them would remain
and the others would disappear according to P. 1.2.64.]
In this way, the main thing would be fully supported.
9r. According to the view that the number ex¬
pressed by the word denoting what is secondary is
significant, the main thing, whether it be a suffix (as
in the sutra nyappratipadikat —P. 4.1.1.) or a com¬
pound word (as in the sutra sdha supa —P. 2.1.4.) is
supported in every way.
[Even according to the view that the number expressed
by the word denoting what is secondary is significant, a suffix
can be added after a single stem or a compound stem accord¬
ing to P. 4.1.1. and a compound word can be made by uniting
one word with another or with many ) as in the case of a
dvandva or a bahuvrlhi.']
The author now begins to state a few more points about
the universal.
iii. i.92-94
57
92. Similarity consisting of absence of difference
or the powers which are the very essence of things,
these might be described as the synonyms of the
universal.
[The universal is something the existence of which is
inferred because of the similarity of the cognitions which the
individuals produce. It is never seen apart from the indivi¬
duals. Why not accept that the individuals are themselves
the cause of this similarity of cognition on account of their
resemblance? What is the use of postulating a universal?
The mutual resemblance of the individuals, not different from
the individuals themselves, is the cause of the similarity of
cognition. It is different from the expressed conventional
meaning of a word, it is a kind of power. This is just what
is called universal. After all, the universal is nothing more
than something in the individuals which causes a similarity
of cognition. On this everybody is agreed. That something
can be called resemblance, power etc. The only point on
which the different thinkers differ is: Is it something over
and above the individuals?]
The author now states that it is something over and above
the individuals.
93-94. From a man’s desire to hold a stick, one
no doubt gets the idea of a stick, but still one does not
get the idea that he actually holds it. From a man’s
desire, one does not get the knowledge which has the
form ‘he is one with a desire’. Therefore, even though
there is power, the mind has recourse to something else.
[On this point, the followers of the Vaisesika say that
it is something over and above the individuals. They reason
as follows— The universal is postulated because, the indivi¬
duals, being different from one another, cannot account for
the similarity of cognition. Resemblance and power are not
over and above the individuals. Therefore on® has to postu-
V-III. 8
58
vakyapadiyam of bhartrhari
late the universal which is over and above them. These
universal have particular abodes, - namely, the individuals
having a particular disposition of parts. . A cow, having a
particular disposition of parts is the substratum of cow-ness.
The samething can be said of horse-ness. If a particular
arrangement of parts determines the substratum of each
universal, why not attribute similarity of cognition also to
this very arrangement? Why postulate the universal, apart
from the disposition of parts? The reason is that particular
effects have particular causes. When we get about some¬
body the cognition that he is the holder of a stick ( dandl ),
the cause of it is his connection with the stick. The cause
of this connection is the desire of the person in question to
take a stick. We cannot say that this desire is the cause
of our cognition that he is the holder of a stick. Similarly,
we have to postulate a special cause for the similarity of
cognition which we have when we look at different indivi¬
duals belonging to the same class. Thus resemblance and
the particular disposition of their parts can account for cer¬
tain things, but not for this. This can be explained only by
the universal, which is over and above the individuals.]
Otherwise
95. In the end, the indeterminate nature (of things)
or power would remain and all verbal usage would
become difficult.
[If we do not accept direct and immediate causes for
effects, but try to explain them by remote causes, it would
take us back to the root cause of everything, whether it be
primordial matter ( pradhana ) or anything else. It would
be something indefinable. It would, then, become impossi¬
ble to make statements of cause and effect. To explain
verbal usage, universals have to be accepted.]
* * o
The author now states that, according to the Sankhya
and the Advaita, the universal is not something over and
above the individuals.
III. 1.96-98
59
96. When, abandoning all distinctions, the essence
of the individuals is perceived as one, then a single
conception comes into existence.
[We trace back the whole universe to one cause if we
find some common feature in everything. That which does
not exist in any way cannot come to be. Thus cause and
effect are really the same thing. Everything is like every¬
thing else and yet not so. As one and the same thing
becomes many, the common point is the universal and the
difference is the distinguishing feature. The most compre¬
hensive common feature would be the great universal
(mahasamanya ) and the less comprehensive ones would be
the intermediary universals (avantarasamanya) . The factors
that determine the parts are also transformations of the one.
Everything is a transformation ( parinama or vivarta). Thus
there is no absolute difference between cause and effect,
dharma and dharmin, sdmdnya and uisesa.]
As the siitra teaching retention of one only of many iden¬
tical forms has been declared to be impossible if the universal
is the meaning of words, the author now brings it within the
sphere of the idea of collection.
97. When, that which has diversity is looked upon
as one then from the many is born the conception of
a ‘collection’.
[When both diversity and unity figure in the cognition,
then the object is what is called a collection. Unity is super¬
imposed on what is diversity. The cognition of collection
arises from the many, to which unity is subordinate. In the
cognition of the universal, diversity does not figure. Unity
or identity is the predominant factor.]
The author now defines the scope of resemblance.
98. When the difference between the different
individuals is kept down and the two (unity and diver-
60
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
sitv) are understood together (sakrtpravrttau) there
is the idea of collection, and when they are understood
in turn, there is the idea of resemblance.
[Resemblance, collection and the universal are allied
things, but there is difference between them. In the
cognition of resemblance, both difference and identity figure.
In the cognition of the universal, only identity figures. In the
cognition of collection, unity mixed up with diversity figures.
The two appear at the same time. In the cognition of resem¬
blance, on the other hand, first difference figures and then
resemblance.]
The author now explains the Bauddha view in regard to
the universal.
99. Just as a cognition which is dissimilar appears
to be uniform, similarly, an object also appears to he
the same even though it is different.
[According to the Bauddhas, the cognition of Univer¬
sal is an error. All cognitions are different from one another.
There is no such thing as identity of cognition, but, due to an
eternal vdsana, cognitions appear to be identical and on that
basis, the concept of universal in cognition arises. Objects are
also essentially different from one another, but due to the
same vascina, they appear to be identical and this unreal iden¬
tity is called the universal.]
The author now considers whether there is any external
basis for this cognition of identity.
100. Nor are there words exoressive of the
difference between objects which look like one another
nor is the difference itself perceived.
101. Because of the difficulty in perceiving the
difference in our cognitions, words and objects, we
perceive them to be identical.
III. 1.102-103
ei
[Things are essentially different from one another.
There is nothing in common between them. But we are not
able to see this difference. As our words can only express
what we see, they also do not express this difference. They
express a certain identity which we see on account of re¬
semblance. Thus, our cognitions of things (prakhya) and
our expression of them by means of words ( updkhyd ) pio-
ceed on the basis of an unreal identity based on resemblance.
The meanings of words are based on convention and con¬
vention cannot rest on the own nature of things ( svalaksana ).
Cognitions really differ from one another, because their
Qj^jgcts are different. Words also differ from one anothei,
even when they are perceived as identical. Objects of the
same class also differ from one another, but we notice only
the point in which they differ from things of another class.
The subtle differences which exist in precious stones, pearls,
corals etc. can be seen only by experts and not by every¬
body.]
Those who accept universals, however, declare—
102. There are universals in all cognitions as in
objects and they prove the existence of universals i’i
objects—such is the view of those who believe in con¬
nection. ( samsarga ).
[Those who believe in universals believe that there are
universals of cognitions also. It is the existence of universals
in our cognitions which prove the existence of universals in
the objects of these cognitions. This is one view of those who
maintain that objects are connected with difference and
identity ( samsargadarsana) ].
The following is another view current in the same
circles.
103. The universal which exists in the object
serves the cognitions also. Cognition is not determin¬
ed, like the object, by something which is external.
62
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
wll .[ USt , a ff S the ° bject is 2 iven a form by the universal
which is different from it, in the same way, one cannot say
that cognition also is given a form by the universal which
different from it. Cognition never becomes an object If
one seems to perceive a universal in the cognitions, it is only
due to the universal in the objects. Therefore, cognitions are
endowed with a form ( sdkdrdh ), self-illuminating (svapra-
Kcisali) and devoid of universal (nihsamanyah ).]
How is cognition not determined by something external?
104. Just as light is not illuminated by another
light, in the same way, the form of cognition is not
determined by another cognition.
[A light which illuminates an object does not require
another light to illuminate it. It is self-luminous. If the
light is not self-luminous, it would not be able to illuminate
the object either. The Vaisesikas also accept that the uni¬
versal in the object serves cognition also, but they do not
believe in the self-luminousness of cognition. But the gram¬
marians do not follow them in this respect.]
The author now points out the difference between the
knowledge of an object and the knowledge of a knowledge.
105. The knowledge “this is a knowledge of the
jar is different from the knowledge “this is a jar”.
The knowledge “this is a jar” refers to an external
object.
[Here a doubt arises: We can have two cognitions taking
the forms ‘this is a jar’ and ‘this is a knowledge of the jar.’
In the former, the jar is the thing known. In the latter, how¬
ever, the knowledge of the jar is not the thing known, be¬
cause no knowledge can become the thing known. Know¬
ledge illuminates something else and is self-luminous, but
never the thing illuminated. This argument is not valid,
because knowledge is not self-luminous. It has to be illumi-
nated by another knowledge. Nor need this lead to regres-
sus ad infinitum
The above doubt is answered as follows— The knowledge
This is a knowledge of the jar’ is different from the know¬
ledge “this is a jar”, because the former is not produced
directly by an external object. The jar which seems to
figure in it has no reference to an external object. In other
words, no object, different from external object, figures in it.
Knowledge itself does not figure as an object.]
106. As the form of the knowledge is not cognised
as an object, its form as distinct from that of the object
is not grasped.
[Wny not accept that in the knowledge This is a know¬
ledge of the jar’, just as the form of the external object figures,
in the same way, the form of the knowledge itself, mixed up
with the former, also figures? If that is so, it would mean
that knowledge also becomes the object of knowledge. But
this position is not valid. The external object figures in this
knowledge, but not the knowledge itself, as the illuminator
of the external object and as distinct from it. Therefore,
what is regarded as the knowledge of a knowledge is really
the knowledge of the external object that figures in that
knowledge. A cognition having the form of another cogni¬
tion figuring in it as its object does not arise. There can be
no cognition which does not have an external object figuring
in it. So ? in the cognition gliatam aliavi janami, it is the
jar which figures on the object, not the knowledge of it.
Thus, it has been shown that the word conveys the
universal which is capable of accomplishing worldly usage
relating to visible and invisible things.]
64
VAKYAPADIyAM OF BHARTRHARi
Section 2
ON SUBSTANCE
Following Vyadi, the author now states that substance,
which is the thing qualified, is the meaning of words, by first
of all giving its synonyms.
1. The Self, the thing-in-itself, Being, the Body
(Primordial matter), the Elements, these are synonyms
of the word Substance and it has been declared to be
eternal.
[According to Vajapyayana, the universal is the meaning
of every word and it figures in the mind as the attribute
(visesana) of substance which is also understood from the
word by implication. According to Vyadi } substance is the
meaning of every word and it figures in the mind as the thing
qualified ( visesya ). It is this which plays the chief part in
purposive action and it is that, therefore, which prompts one
to act. The word primarily conveys that. The universal is
not conveyed by the expressive power ( abhidha ) of words,
but it specifies or determines the substance conveyed by it.
Substance is of two kinds: real and expressional (paramar-
thika and samvyavaharika) . It is the second which, accord¬
ing to Vyadi, is the meaning of all words or rather all things
can be presented by words as substance. Here, in this chap¬
ter, we are concerned with the first kind of substance. It is
called by different names in different systems. The monists
call it atma, the Self. The same Self appears as different
things through different limiting factors (upadlii) which are
the immediate meanings of the different words. According
to the Bauddhas, the thing-in-itself ( svalaksana ) is the real
substance. Followers of sattadvaita consider that substance
is nothing more than the Being which is the own essence of
a thing ( svo bhdvah ). When inner sequence is not meant to
be conveyed Being ( satta ) becomes a thing ( sattvci ) and
this, differentiated by different limiting factors, in substance.
III. 2.1-2
65
For others, the body or primordial matter ( prakrti ) is sub¬
stance. For the Carvakas, the four elements, air, fire, water
and earth, are the substance. They call it the reality (iatlva).
When these elements combine, the body, the sense and the
object result. These words are synonyms of the word
dravya, because they denote the ultimate substance, which
words like jar ( ghata ) cannot do. They can be applied to
anything as in the statement: eko’ yam dtmd udakain nama
(M. Bha. I. 1.1.). Here the word atma is used for water
kept in a particular vessel. Other words denote substance
through akrti. These, on the other hand, denote substance
directly. Patanjali has declared in one place thcit while
shape (akrti) constantly changes, substance remains the
same. Thus, it is eternal. What the Bhasyakara means by
eternal is the fact of something not giving up its essence
even while forms are changing and, in this sense, dravyci is
eternal even according to the Carvakas.]
After having stated what substance is according to other
systems, the author now shows the comprehensive nature of
it according to Grammar.
2. Through the unreal forms, it is the ultimate
Reality which is cognised. By the words which directly
express the unreal limiting factors, it is really the ulti¬
mate which is expressed.
[Words are, by their very nature, incapable of express¬
ing the ultimate reality directly. So they are seen actually
to express it thorgh various limiting factors. These latter are
impermanent. They come and go. It is they which fulfil the
practical needs of people. Words, therefore, express the
forms which are cognisable. They are applied to things as
they are cognised and they are cognised through their forms.
A formless thing cannot be conceived by the mind. Even
though words directly express these forms, they also denote
the ultimate through these forms.]
v-m. 9
66 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRIIARI
The author now shows how, if the words go beyond the
limiting factors, the latter can be so considered at ,all.
3. It is like the house of Devadatta being recognis¬
ed (or differentiated from other houses) by means of
an impermanent feature of it and yet the word ‘house’
denoting only the bare house.
[Even though a crow sitting on Devadatta’s house may
help one in recognising it or distinguishing it from others,
yet when one speaks about Devadatta’s house, the crow is
not included in it. It was just a temporary mark which
served a particular purpose. When it flies away, one can
still recognise the house with the help of some more perma¬
nent feature like a dais ( vedika ) or white lotus ( pundarika)
(See M. Bha on P. 1.1.26.), observed when the crow was still
there. In the same way } the past passive suffix ta is disting¬
uished from any other ta‘ by the ‘k’ which is attached to
it at the beginning. But that disappears in actual usage.
Then, it is distinguished from any other ‘ta,’ by something
more permanent like the accessory to action and the tense
which it expresses. In the same way, words, while first ex¬
pressing a mere impermanent limiting factor, can point to
a permanent reality.]
As the crow is quite different from the house, it is
natural that the house should not include it. The author,
therefore, gives a better illustration.
4. (Or) it is like gold etc. which even though
differentiated by different impermanent forms, remains
in its pure form, the expressed meaning of words like
rucaka and so on.
[Gold is one, but is differentiated by different forms such
as ‘rucaka’ (the name of an ornament). These forms, how¬
ever, come and go, but the gold persists. The different prac¬
tical purposes are not served by the perishable forms. There-
III. 2.5
67
fore, words like ruccika do not express these forms but go
beyond them and designate the permanent reality, that is,
gold. Similarly, words express the ultimate reality by going
beyond the plurality which is not ultimate. The imperma¬
nent forms are not the real expressed meanings of words.
As they are not real, they cannot fulfil practical purposes.
That is why they are not the expressed meaning of words.
There is no harm in taking the view that words primarily
denote the ultimate reality as visesya and the impermanent
forms as visesaya. All that is emphasised here is that the
impermanent forms or the limiting factors are not the real
meaning of words.]
The author now explains how, if every word ultimately
points to the ultimate reality, confusion does not result in
usage.
5. Just as the capacity of the eye etc. is limited by
the tube etc., so is the capacity of words to convey all
meanings restricted by the particular forms which they
bring to the mind.
[There would be no confusion because each word points
to the substance Brahman through a particular form which
that word and that word alone can bring to the mind. The
word jar (ghata ), for instance, points to Brahman through the
form of a jar. Just as one who looks through a tube sees only
as much of reality as is visible through the hole of the tube,
similarly, through each word, one can see only a particular
form, limited by nescience and this form points to reality.
Covers and impediments only restrict the power of the
senses. They do not, in any way, affect reality. Similarly,
nescience only restricts or limits the jivci-s, does not affect
ultimate reality. It is not merely such things as tubes which
restrict our vision. Attention concentrated on one thing takes
it away from others. The particular beauty of a thing
attracts our attention towards it and takes it away from
others.]
63
VAK YAP ADI YAH OF; BHARTRHARI
The author now says something about words like sanni-
vesa (=form, shape) which seem to denote attribute ( dhar -
ma) only and not substance.
6. As for the word which conveys such (imperma¬
nent) forms, since these are essentially one with it (the
Substance), it also conveys the eternal,
[Another name for the limiting factors ( upddhi ) is
clharma (attribute). Words like sannivesa mean form ? shape,
diposition of parts. It means that they denote someth, ng
which is essentially dliarma. How can they ultimately denote
the substance? If they do not, the view that all words
denote the dravya’ falls to the ground. This difficulty is
removed as follows:— Really, these limiting factors are not
different from the substance. If they were different, they
would be nothing at all. They exist as one with the ulti¬
mate, the apeidhimat. To be one with it is their essence.
They are not the essence of the ultimate. The limiting factors
are so when they are merged in the ultimate. The moment
they are detached from the ultimate, they would cease to be
limiting factors. They would acquire a kind of indepen¬
dence and themselves become upddhimat .]
7. The tradition which has come down from the
ciders is that there is no difference between the real
and the unreal. The real, when not properly under¬
stood, is called the unreal.
[It might be said that, if, what is an attribute (dliarma)
now may, in other circumstances, become the dharmin
and thus become real and eternal, the principle that the
form is unreal and the substance real would break down.
To meet this objection, it is pointed out that in monism, the
real and the unreal are not two totally different things,
because, if they were, monism itself would be undermined.
There is only one ultimate reality, which, due to nescience^
appears in many forms to different experiencers. The one
III. 2.8-10
69
stands for knowledge and the many for nescience. When
the one manifests itself as many, it is prapanca, which is
wonderful as long as one does not probe too much into it.]
The author now states that it is Brahman which appears
as differentiated.
8 The undifferentiated Reality appears to be
differentiated. There is really no distinction of time
within it and yet such a distinction is cognised.
[Thus, it is Brahman which manifests itself now as this
and now as something else. Therefore, all words ultimately
denote that. The Reality which is devoid of all differentiation
appears to have it on account of nescience. Through the
powers called Dik (Space) and K<11 n (Time), this one Reality
presents itself as having spatial and temporal sequence.]
The author now explains how the non-existent appears
to have existence.
9. Just as the attributes of the object cannot
belong to cognition at all and yet that which is not
identical with ii appears as one with it.
[According to the Vijnanavadins, the external world
does not exist and yet objects appear in our mind as being
external. Consciousness appears to have various forms which
appear as external. In other words, the unreal appears in
the real.]
10. In the same way, the forms of the transforma¬
tions do not at all belong to the Reality and yet that
which is not at all identical with it appears as one
with it.
70
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[Another illustration of the same would be this: Pri¬
mordial matter, according to the Sankhyas, contains within
itself, the germs of all later transformations and yet, it is free
in its own nature, of all these transformations. It consists of
a balance or equilibrium of the gunas and is, therefore, quite
different from that state where there is disturbance of the
equilibrium. But, in actual life, it can be cognised only
through its transformations which have not the same reality.
Thus Reality is manifested through the unreal. This principle
is accepted by the Buddhists as well as the Sankhyas.]
The author now states how we know that the forms are
unreal and what is different from them is real.
That is real which persists till the end. when
ail the forms disappear. It is eternal, it is expressed
by the word and it is not different from the ultimate
word-principle.
[It is stated in the M. Bha: “That is also eternal which
does not lose its identity (Tad api hi nityevm yasmhnstattvavi
na vihmiyate (M. Bha on Va I, paspasdhnika ). The forms of
the different ornaments vary and are impermanent, but the
gold persists in all of them. Similarly, Brahman is eternal
and real. The eternality of the universal and other things is
only relative. Compared to the different individual cows,
cow-ness is eternal. Compared to cow-ness, horse-ness etc.,
earthness ( prihivitva ) is eternal. Compared to that, the fact
of being just a thing is eternal, an idea which can be con¬
veyed by the pronoun ‘tat’. But, right through these more and
more comprehensive and yet only relatively permanent things
persists consciousness and, therefore, that is the real truth.
And this consciousness is nothing more than pasyanti or
para vdk, or sabdabrahman. Brahmtm is not different from
Pabda. Brahman is the vacya of all words which are its
vdcalca-s. Vacaka and vacya are not different from each
other. From the way Helaraja explains the Karika, his text
probably was: tacchabdatattvanna bhidyate .]
III. 2.12-13
71
The author now shows how the Reality is absolutely
different from all appearances.
12. It does not exist nor does it not exist; it is not
one nor is it different; it is not connected nor is it
separated; it is not transformed nor is it not so.
[The Reality is beyond all transformations. It cannot,
therefore, be identical with them. It is beyond all assertions.
One cannot say that it exists nor that it does not exist. Nor
can one say that it is one, because the Reality which is free
from all limiting factors is without 'any inner differentiation
and, therefore, it does not appear as one. Nor does difference
add any peculiarity to it, because there is nothing different
from it and whatever is different from it has no reality. Nor
can connection or separation be its limiting factor because
that presupposes the existence of something different from it
and that cannot be proved. It cannot undergo any real trans¬
formation, because one does not accept such a thing; one
accepts appearance instead ( vivarta ). And yet the whole
wonderful universe is manifested, so that there is some kind
of change. Thus it is not possible to make any positive asser¬
tion about the Reality.]
The author now says that everything is identical with it.
13. It does not exist and it does; it is one and it
is many; it is connected and it is separated; it is trans¬
formed and it is not.
[And yet it is Brahman which appears as everything else.
It appears as positive entities and as negative entities. It
appears as one and as many (as one in the case of universals
and as many in the case of the individuals. It appears as
associated with other things and as separated from them. It
appears as transformed and as not transformed.]
The author now says that, as everything is Brahman ,
even contradictory usages are resolved in it.
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BIIARTRHARI
12
14. That one Reality is seen as the word, the
meaning and their relation. It is the seen, the seeing
the see-er and the fruit of the seeing.
[The expression, the expressed and their relation are one
in the ultimate reality. In it, the power of the expression
(vacaka, sruti&akti) and that of the expressed (vdcya,
arthasakti) are united. In the manifested state, it appears
as two branches, the word and the meaning (sruti and ariha).
Manifestation as knowledge ( jhana ) and the known (jheya)
separately is nescience. This has been explained in the
Brahmukdnda. It is the same reality which evolves as the
see-er and the seen. What is called the seen, or the objective
world figures in the consciousness. Its very essence is, there¬
fore, consciousness. If it were not so, it could not be illumi¬
nated. It has also been declared that the see-er, the indi¬
vidual soul, limited by nescience, the transmigrator, is really
Brahman, because, being conscious, cannot be really different
from the ultimate reality. The mention of the two accessories
(karaka) namely, the agent and the object ( kartd and karma,
i.e. the see-er and the seen) is meant to include the other
accessories also. Thus the whole of the objective world
(siddha) is included. The word darsana refers to the main
action and includes all other actions and so the whole of the
world of processes ( sadhya ) is included. The manifestation
called action is determined by the power called Time and
the manifestation called concrete object or embodied object
(murtti) is determined by the power called Space (Dik).
Thus, the whole universe, consisting of things and processes
(murttivivarta and kriydvivarta ) is set forth. The word
prayojana in the verse stands for the fruit of all actions. Thus,
all the three things, sadhya, sddhana and phala are included
and it has been shown that the whole of it is a vivarta of
Brahman. This has already been explained in Vak. I. 4.
The ‘seen’ and the ‘seeing’ are separately mentioned because
usage consists of prakhyd, i.e., cognition or ‘seeing’ and
uvakhyd, i.e., giving expression to cognition by means of
words involving sabda, ariha and sambandha which together
Hi. 2.15-16
73
stand for the ‘seen’. All this, of course, is in the state of
nescience. In reality, all this differentiation does not exist.]
The author now shows that when all the appearances
disappear, something unchangeable does remain.
15. Just as, when forms disappear, it is the gold
which is the truth ( satya) in the ear-ring etc., in the
same way, when transformations (like earth etc.) dis¬
appear, the primordial substance is the only thing which
is real.
[That which persists when all the forms disappear has
been declared to be real. But somebody might ask whether
something does persist at all. In answer, it is said that when
forms such as ear-ring (kundala) disappear, the gold remains.
Similarly, when forms such as earth disappear, primordial
substance, that is, Brahman , remains. For this, the authority
is the written tradition (agama). It would not be right to
say that all this universe proceeds from something which is
non-existent and inexpressible. Non-existence cannot pro¬
duce existence. Nothing can come out of hare’s horn.
Consciousness persists in everything. Therefore, everything
originally came out of it.]
The author now concludes by saying that all words ex¬
press that.
16. The primordial substance is the expressed
meaning of all words. The words themselves are not
different from it. Though not different from one
another, there is a relation between them as though
they were different from one another.
[Thus, what is called substance ( dravya ) is really Brah-
man, the only persisting reality. It is that which is expressed
by all words. All usage is based on differences brought about
by limiting factors. It is based on nescience. All words
V-III. 10
74
VAKVAPADIYAM OF EHARTHHAHI
therefore, express Brahman, differentiated on the basis of
limiting factors. Even words like atmd, brahman, tattva ex¬
press that primordial substance through some limiting factor
or other. Because that which is beyond all limiting factor
(nirupadhi) is also beyond the range of words. In compari¬
son with words like ghata, words like atmci are much nearer
to the ultimate reality. In fact, words themselves are not
different from the ultimate Reality, in the world, one talks
as if they were different from one another.]
The author now gives an illustration to show that the
manifestations are unreal and only unity is real.
17-18. Just as, in a dream, the one mind appears
in contradictory forms, as the self and the non-self,
friend and foe, the speaker and the spoken and the
purpose, in the same way, while the ultimate reality
is unborn, eternal and devoid of inner sequence, we
see it as having birth and other contradictory attributes.
[One should not wonder that all the plurality which we
see before us is being denied and the unity which one does
not see is being advocated. Because that kind of thing is
happening all the time. The world which we see in our
dreams is contradicted in the wakeful state. Similarly, the
world which we see in the wakeful state does not persist in
the turiya (the state beyond deep sleep). So that may also
be looked upon as unreal. That which persists in all sfates
is the only thing which is real. Consciousness is the only
thing which so persists. The different states come and go
and they, like pleasure and pain, do not affect the real nature
of consciousness. The variety which one sees in a dream is
confined to a particular experiencer. This experiencer, the
transmigrator, being essentially consciousness, is Brahman .
He creates things out of himself, without any other material
and enjoys them. It is this idea which is conveyed in the
following verse, quoted in the Vrtti on Vak. I. 127.
III. 2.17-18
75
Pravibhajydtmandtmdnam srstva bhdvdn prthagvidhan.
Sarvesvcirah sarvamayah svapne bhcktd jiravartate.
The word bhoktd refers to the creation of the individual self.
As it is ultimately Brahman , it has the power to create. It
does not require any external material for the purpose. As
there is no real difference between the creator and the
creation, it is said to be vaikalpika . The creation which takes
place in the wakeful state depends upon external material
and it is a creation which is common to all experiencers. The
dream creation is impermanent, whereas the one in the wake¬
ful state is relatively permanent. Both are unreal, because
both are manifestations of nescience. In dream a further veil
on consciousness, namely sleep, also takes place. On account
of that, the average man looks upon the dream-creation only
as unreal. But to those who know the truth, the whole
universe, that of dream and that of the wakeful state, is un¬
real. Only the persisting consciousness is real, without
sequence and eternal. But to nescience, it appears to have
sequence. Therefore, it is the eternal sakti of Brahman
which manifests the unreal world, the perceiver and the
perceived and creates this world dream. It is the function
of philosophers to remove this universe which is charming as
long as we do not reflect.]
76
V AKY AP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARI
Section 3
ON RELATION
• Unless there is a relation between the word
its meaning, any word would convey any meaning and
does not happen. So the relation between the two is
being explained —
and
that
now
1. From words which are uttered, the intention
of the speaker, an external object and the form of the
word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed.
[When words are uttered, three things are understood:
(1) their own form; (2) an object which is a means to fulfil
a certain purpose; (3) the intention of the speaker. The rela¬
tion between these three things is fixed, that is, not made by
man] ■ Of these, the first is closest to the word ( antaranga ).
That is why it is understood in any case. Between the own
form of a word and its meaning, there Ts the relation of the
expression and the thing expressed (vacyavdcakabhdvaj .
Between the speaker’s intention and the word, the^e is the
relation of cause and effect ( kdryakdranabhava) ' As the
science of grammar is common to all systems (sarvaparsada),
the latter relation is also spoken of, in order to meet the view
of those who hold that the meaning^ of a word is only what
figures in the mind of the speaker.In that view, the relation
between the intention and the word would naturally be that
of cause and effect, because the intention would evoke parti¬
cular words and not others. Whatever be the relation, there
is superimposition of the word on the meaning ( adhyasa ).
By ‘word’, it is chiefly the sentence whicn is kept in mind,
because, according to grammarians, the individual word is
only an abstraction (cipoddhara ).]
The author now says that the own form of a word is a
meaning in a primary sense.
III. 3.2
77
2. There is sometimes knowledge and sometimes
doubt in regard to the meaning and the intention of
the speaker. No mistake is possible about the forms
of the words which are perceived.
[The word gciuh and the object of which it is the name,
both appear to us in the form ayam gauh. That means that
a word conveys an object (a meaning) and conveys its own
form in the process. This process of conveying a meaning as
one with itself is called expression ( abliidhana) . That is how
the convention is understood. The very purpose of conven¬
tion is worldly usage and therefore, it has to follow worldly
usage. In worldly usage, the word and the meaning are
identified. The senses are only a means to cognition and do
not become part of it The sense of vision, for instance, does
not become part of our perception of an object. Certain
things like signs enter into the cognition which they cause,
but remain apart from it. For instance, the sign ‘smoke’
causes the inference of fire but remains apart. The word is
also a means of cognition like the senses and signs, but there
is this difference that the object whose cognition it causes
appears as one with it.
f _
One might here object to the last statement by saying,
rather sarcastically, that the letters of the alphabet are not
found reflected in the object. In other words, we do not see
any identity between word and meaning. But this objection
derives from an imperfect understanding of fundamental doc¬
trines. That word is said to be expressive (vacaka) which is
the function called ‘vdk’ of the power of consciousness. This
function is called verbal expression (sabdana) . Even in
silent recitation, it is so called. In its first stage, it is un¬
differentiated into word and meaning. It remains in the state
of the supreme word. Afterwards, it enters into the region
of the mind, and the breath (pranavrtti) and becomes dif¬
ferentiated, into the expressed and the expression ( vdcya and
vdcaka) . In this state which is called the ‘middle one’
(madhyama) , the expressive word (vdcaka), without aban-
78
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
doning the state of the supreme word which consists in un¬
differentiated consciousness, refers to form and meaning
closely bound up and standing in apposition to each other in
the form gaur ayam arthah. There is~ said to be super¬
imposition of one over the other (adhydsa) . There is dif¬
ferentiation between the expression and the expressed and
yet the two are identified. In the next stage, the word, while
still not giving up its basis in the previous stages, becomes
audible through articulation in the mouth. The word, being
thus a manifestation of the supreme word, retains its
characteristic of identity between word and meaning
(sdbdana) even after the two have been differentiated. In
one single operation, a complex meaning involving a qualifier
and something qualified ( visescina and visesya) is conveyed
as one with the words which express it. For example, in the
sentence suklah pato’yam = this white cloth, the cloth as
qualified by the colour white, is conveyed as one single thing.
The white colour is not understood as something quite distinct.
Similarly, in ghafo’yam — this jar, the object jar is under¬
stood as qualified by the word jar, its visesana. This process
of understanding the word and meaning as one is called
sabdanc^~ ‘Sometimes, the meaning of the word is the form
of the word itself as in agnim antodattam adhisva — ‘recite
agni\ with the udatta accent on the last syllable’. Where the
meaning is an external object, the w-ord and the meaning
appear as one. They are not cognised separately. The word
conveys both its own form and the meaning by its expressive
power ( abhidhd ). Three things communicate themselves
while communicating other things: Cognition, the word and
the lamp; Thus, the word conveys its own form and its
meaning as the expressed sense. It is not that its form merely
becomes the object of the sense of hearing. Its form and its
meaning become the contents of the same cognition. They
are in apposition to each other ( samanadhikarana ). The form
as the expressed sense is different from the same thing as
expressive of the meaning. In the latter capacity, the word
is active (hartrbhuwihn uparudhri), it is consciousness
(paramarsa), it is the supreme word (para vale), it is light
III. 3.3
79
(pvakdsa) and, therefore, it is different from tlie word as the
expressed sense (vcicya) , as the thing one is conscious of
(paramrsyamana ). When the hearer hears the words of
others, he understands their meaning as identical with tnem
and infers the meaning of the speaker also as identical with
the words. Thus, there is superimposition, not only between
the word and the meaning as understood by the hearer, but
also as expressed by the speaker. "So, from a word like gliata,
we understand three things all mixed up: the word, the
meaning and the intention of the speaker. That is why the
question gaurityatra kali sabdali, has been asked in ihe
Malidblidsya in order to isolate the word from this complex
cognition. Even the cognition of a new-born child is mixed
up with the word. Thus, whether the relation is looked upon
as fitness or causality, superimposition ( adhydsa ) is involved
in both.
Thus, due to the function called sabdana , which is the
very life of what is called illumination ( prakdsa ), both the
word and the moaning become the contents of this cognition
and both are in apposition to each other and identity is super¬
imposed on them ( abhedddhydsa ). In 4 Pasyanti , where
there is no differentiation, the question of differentiation does
not arise at all. v The word remains the very life of meaning
even in the stage of verbal usage (vyavahdra) and that is
why the whole universe is said to be a manifestation (i rivarta)
of the word.
H The form of the word is its first expressed sense because
it is part of the process ( antaranga ), it is unavoidable (ahoya)
and it is distinctive (asddharana ). Here there is no depen¬
dence on convention. It may be looked upon as a universal
or otherwise, as explained in the Brahmakdndci.']
The author now says what the indication is of the existence
of the fixed ( samavasthita ) relation between -'word and
meaning.
3. That this word is expressive of that meaning,
that this meaning is the expressed meaning of that
*
§0
VAKYAPAi)IYAM OF BHARTRHARI
word, such a relation between word and meaning is
understood from the genitive suffix. That is why they
are understood as identical.
[That the relation between the word and the meaning is a
natural one and not a mere matter of convention is inferred
by us in the following way. We use such expressions as:
This word is expressive of that meaning; that meaning is the
expressed sense of this word. Here the use of the ‘of’
(sasthi vibliukti) can be explained only on the assumption
that there is a natural relation between the word and the
meaning. We never connect two such totally unconnected
thmgs as the jar and the cloth by means of the genitive suffix.
Because of this natural connection it is that we identify the
two in such expressions as ayam gauh where the word gauh
and its meaning are identified.]
4. There is no verbal element (besides the geni¬
tive suffix) which denotes this relation in its essential
property. Being extremely dependent, its own form is
never cognised.
[There is no word which directly denotes relation.
Ordinarily we observe things and their properties and use
appropriate words to define or describe them. We cannot do
that in the case of relation, because we cannot observe it
objectively (idamtaya svarupanavadharandt ). Qualities like
‘white’ reside in some substance or other and yet words like
sukla sometimes express the whiteness in isolation. There is
no word which can express this relation in isolation because
it is always dependent on something ( nityaparatantra ). It is
nothing more than a certain mutual requirement of two things
(sambandhinoh parasparaunmukhyasvabhdvah ). It is a mere
attribute ( dharma ). It has, therefore, no word of its own
to express it. It has to be inferred from its effect ( kdryailcaga-
myall ).]
in. o.5-7
81
5. Where there is service rendered, there an attri¬
bute (that is, relation) is understood. It is the power
of powers, it is the attribute of attributes.
[Where one thing renders service to another, one can
infer a relation between the two. Two unrelated things can¬
not render service to each other. Relation is not the same as
power or capacity, because it is the former which regulates
the production of a particular effect by power or capacity.
Power resides in a particular thing and it is relation which
regulates it. That qualities reside in substances is regulated
by relation.]
The author now says why relation is being spoken of,
considering that others have already spoken about relations
such as conjunction and inherence.
6. Conjunction and inherence are called relations
because they have the attribute thereof. They have
definite conditions the purpose of which is to render
service.
[Conjunction and inherence do possess the chief
characteristic of relation, namely, dependence. The applica¬
tion of the word relation to them is really a case of secondary
usage. Primarily, it is not they which constitute relation.
When they themselves are conditioned by other things, the
latter become dependent (paratantra ) and they become
svatanlra and as dependence is the chief characteristic of
relation, they cease to be so. They can have their own updclhi
which render them service. When the relation between them
and their upadhi is regulated by a relation, how can they
be identified with something which is purely dependance?]
The limiting factor of conjunction is now being stated.
7. There is only one particular state in which
the conjunction of one thing with another takes place
and that is indicated by the effect.
v-m. li
&2 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
[When the juxtaposition of parts results in their contact,
the whole is produced. Thus, in order to explain the produc¬
tion of the whole, contact is taken to be the non-inherent
cause. The fact of being confined to substances and connec¬
tion with Being as a quality, this is the limiting factor
(upddhi) of conjunction. It is relation which determines the
service which it renders. That is why conjunction is not the
same thing as relation. The latter can exist in substance,
quality, action, universal etc., but conjunction is confined to
substances. Conjunction has the effect of producing a posi¬
tive concrete thing whereas relation only brings two things
together.]
The difference between relation and inherence is now
being pointed out.
8-11. It has been traditionally handed down from
the elders that Relation is beyond the characteristics
of all things (padartha ), that it is made known by
everything ( sarvalaksana ) and that it favours that
power called inherence ( samavdya ) by virtue of which
the production of things (previously non-existent is
restricted to a particular (cause) by which the effect
is never separated from such a cause, there being no
difference (from conjunction) in the matter of juxta¬
position, by which the essence of something is cognised
as that of something else, by which neither distinction
nor identity of something is perceived, which renders
assistance to other powers, which is beyond identity
and difference and which is established differently from
other things.
[According to Satkaryavada, the effect already exists in
the cause. Hence, it is the cause which becomes the effect.
So particular effects can be found in particular causes only.
According to the ' cisatkaryavada’ also, a particular effect like
cloth can exist only in the threads and so on. Thus, the effect
III. 3.8-11
83
is intimately associated with its cause, it is not separated from
it even though they are different from each other. This is
due to inherence ( savtavdya ) and this is where it differs
from samyoga, though the two resemble each other in one
respect, namely, that they bring two things together. It is
due to inherence that cause and effect; part and whole, the
universal and the particular, the quality and substance,
though different from each other, appear to be the same.
They only appear to be the same, because there is difference
between the two in each pair. It is because of this that
thinkers hold different views on this matter. Some think
that the parts and the whole are the same while others think
that they are not. What all this means is that the fact of
being found together, of being intimately united (ayutasiddhi )
is the limiting factor of inherence. It causes the cognition
of a particular substratum (ihapratyaya ) between things
which are intimately united ( ayutasiddha ) and not between
others. It is Relation which determines this characteristic of
inherence. Inherence does not appear to be different from
the two things which are united by it, just as the two things
themselves do not appear to be different from each other.
All of them appear to be mixed up ( sammurchitarupatvend -
vabhdsdt) . Inherence is inferred to exist from its effect,
namely, the cognition of a particular substratum (ihapratyaya ).
Inherence is here called a power. As it renders service to
things, it cannot be put in the same category as them. As it
is a power, one cannot say whether it is identical with that
of which it is the power or not. It is not a thing (paddrtha),
it has to be put in a different category. That is why it is
said to be something which is established differently (anya-
thaiva vyavasthitdm) . Inherence renders service to the
powers called sddhana by making them reside in their
substrata. It is such an inherence which is helped by Rela¬
tion which (1) is not a thing because it lacks that indepen¬
dence which exists in all things, (2) is made known by
everything which needs help, and not by fixed things as
inherence is, (3) confines inherence to things which are inti¬
mately united, (4) gives to inherence the name of relation
84,
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
because of the common characteristic called dependence.
Relation which does all these things must necessarily be
different from the p adartha-s. That is why, in this sdstra, it
is not merely conjunction and inherence which are relations.]
The author now explains this point further.
12. Others accept relation everywhere as a separate
category. But that cannot explain the relation between
word and meaning.
[The Vaisesikas have put conjunction among the quali¬
ties, that is, it comes under one of their categories. They
have made inherence into a separate category, even though
it is a kind of power and, therefore, resides in something else.
Tiie fixed relation between word and meaning which finds
expression in such statements as: ‘this is the meaning of this
word' cannot come under inherence. Therefore, there is in¬
completeness in the Vaisesika conception of the categories.]
13. Through inherence, words convey their
substratum and their universal. Through inherence in
the same thing, they convey the qualities which exist
in their substratum.
[Words like kha, dkdsa, gagana convey their meaning
through the relation called inherence, because they are words
and all words are qualities residing in dkdsa by inherence.
All words convey the particular universal existing in them
through inherence. As for the special qualities like mahattva
which exist in dkdsa, words convey them through inherence
in the same thing ( ekdrthasamavaya ), because both words
and these special qualities exist in the same thing, namely,
dkdsa, by inherence.]
14. The universals ‘substance-ness and Being and
conjunction are linked to their own and other substrata.
So are qualities like duality etc.
III. 3.15-16
83
[A word like drcivyatva conveys substanceness, the lower
universal and Joeing, the higher universal through the 1 ela¬
tion of inherence in the same thing. They exist in dkasa ,
the substratum of the word drcivyatva as well as in earth etc.
Thus the universals of words exist in their own substratum
as well as elsewhere through inherence.]
15. Some objects are in conjunction with the
substratum of their words, some, on the other hand,
inhere in them; others still inhere in the things which
inhere in those which are in conjunction.
[Scibda, being a quality, inheres in dkdsa which is, there¬
fore, its substratum. Objects like chariot, jar etc., are con¬
nected with dkdsa by the relation of conjunction. These ob¬
jects are conveyed by their words through saviavetascimyoga,
conjunction with the intimately united. The qualities and
movements inhering in objects like a jar are conveyed by
their words through svdsrayasamyuktasamavdya } inherence in
what is in conjunction with one’s own substratum ( svdsra -
yena akdsena samyukto yo ghatah tatra rupasya samavdya-
sambadhena vrltili) . The quality of being colour (juputva)
which exists in the colour which exists in the jar is conveyed
by the word rupatva by means of svdsrayasainyaktcisaviaveta-
gamavdya , inherence in what is inherent in what is in con¬
junction with one’s substratum.]
16. A word conveys an all-pervasive object which
is in contact with what is in contact with its substratum.
But no other relation is seen for inherence.
[Space, Time and Soul are all-pervasive. They cannot,
therefore, come into any new and direct contact with dkdsa
which is also all-pervasive. They are conveyed by their words
(. Dik, kdla, dtmd ) by the relation of sv&srayasamyiikta-
samyoga in the following way: Earth etc. are in contact with
dkdsa . Space, Time and Soul are in contact with earth etc.
The qualities which inhere in all-pervasive objects are con-
86
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
veyed by their words by svdsrayasamyuktasamavdya. The
universal which inheres in these qualities is conveyed by
svdsrayasamyuktasaviavetasamavdya. Thus, how substance,
quality, action and universal are conveyed by words has been
shown. The word visesa conveys the particularity (visesa)
inherent in atoms by samyuktasamavaya. It conveys the
particularity inherent in akdsa by inherence in the same
thing. It conveys the particularity inherent in Dik, kdla and
atmd by svdsrayasamyuktasamavaya. Thus the way in which
words convey five out of the six categories accepted by the
Vaisesikas has been explained. Nothing has been said about
inherence, also one of their categories. It is not a substance
and so cannot be related to anything by conjunction. Nor can
there be another inherence. Nor can one argue as follows: —
‘‘The word samavaya, being a word, inheres in dkdsa. Jar
etc. are in conjunction with akdsa which is all-pervasive.
Inherence exists in jar etc. Therefore, the word sam,avd.ya
conveys its meaning by svdsrayasamyuktasambandha , relation
with what is in conjunction with one’s own substratum”.
Inherence can exist in jar etc. only by inherence and there
cannot be a second inherence.]
17. As there is no special relation, there would he
no fixity (in the conveying of meaning by words).
Therefore, relation (consisting of conjunction or
inherence) is not applicable to words and meanings.
[If it is maintained that there is no special relation by
which the word samavaya conveys its meaning, that would
be impossible. There must be some relation. Otherwise, the
word would become meaningless. If the word samavaya
conveys that category without any special relation, any word
would convey any meaning, because the absence of a special
relation is not a bar to the conveying of a meaning. Saviban-
dhasyavisistatvdt may also mean: because the relation is the
same as in other cases. That is, if the word akdsa conveys
its substratum (ether) through inherence, the word ghata. also
should convey ether through inherence, because it is also a
iii. 3.18
87
word and, therefore, a quality of tiktisa. The word gluita
would also mean pata, because conjunction with the substra¬
tum aktisa exists in the case of pata also. Thus, there would
be both narrowness and excessive width (avyapli and ati-
vytipti ) in the relation between word and meaning. There¬
fore, the attempt to explain the way in which words convey
their meaning by having recourse to conjunction and
inherence is a failure.]
The author now hints at a possible justification of the
Vaisesika view on the basis of mere logic (praudh ivada ).
18. Just as the Self, while it is connected (with
everything) has the relation of ownership in regard to
certain things only through adrsta, in the same way,
elsewhere also the same thing holds good even though
the relation is the same.
[Just as the all-pervasive Soul which is in contact with
everything feels a sense of ownership only in regard to the
body, in the same way, even though all words, being words,
inhere in tiktisa , each one through adrsta , means some parti¬
cular thing only. Thus there is no excessive width. One
might argue thus from the Vaisesika point of view, but it is
not right. Even though the Self is all-pervasive and, there¬
fore, in contact with everything, yet everything does not
belong to the Self nor does the same thing belong to all the
selves, because what belongs to which self is regulated by
adrsta. In the same way, all things are not expressed by all
words. Which word expresses which thing is regulated by
usage and convention. 'The relation between word and mean¬
ing is fitness ( yogyatti ). There is, therefore, no use of think¬
ing about conjunction and inherence in connection with word
and meaning.]
The author really holds that inherence is not the ex¬
pressed meaning of any word.
88
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARl
19. Neither the speaker nor the hearer can reach
through words that juxtaposition (prcipti) called
inherence which is beyond the attributes which things
expressed have.
[All things like a cow which are expressed by words are
characterised by some properties and are mixed up with
them. These two things are their limiting factor. But for
them, they could not be expressed by words. Inherence has
no quality or universal as its limiting factor, according to
the Vaisesikas. Thus, it is beyond the range of what is cha¬
racteristic of all that is expressible ( vdcya ). The capacity
to be referred to by a pronoun as ‘this’ or ‘that’ is the sign
that something can be expressed by words. This is also
absent in the case of inherence. It cannot be understood
even from the word samavaya by the speaker or by the
hearer. There is no word which can touch its essence. The
word samavaya is not such a one, because it is also used to
denote an assembly of men. It is only among the Vaisesikas
that it is used to denote this category].
Now the Naiyayika indulges in some casuistry.
20. If what is said to be inexpressible is expressed
as inexpressible, it would thereby become expressible.
[The Naiyayika points out that to say that inherence is
inexpressible ( avacya) is a contradiction in terms because
it comes within the range of the expression ‘inexpressible’
( avacya ) ].
21. If it is said to be not capable of being expressed
even by the word 'inexpressible’ the condition that is
meant to be conveyed would not be understood.
[If it is maintained that it is not expressed even by
the word ‘inexpressible’, then what is intended to be con¬
veyed by all this is not understood, namely, that inherence
does not come within the range of words].
III. 3.22-23
89
22. If what is meant is that it is inexpressible in
some aspect or other or in all aspects, even then those
words would not deny that particular condition.
[If what is meant is that ‘inherence’ is not expressible
in its nature as dependence ( pdratantrya ) it is as good as
saying that it is not expressible at all. There cannot be a
negation of an attribute ( dharma ) without there being a
negation of that which has the attribute (dharmin) . There¬
fore, even if only its dependence aspect is declared to be in¬
expressible, it itself becomes inexpressible. Even to deny
any particular aspect of a thing, it has to become the object
of verbal knowledge and if it becomes the object of verbal
knowledge, it has become ‘vacya\ How can it then be said
to be avacya’?~\
The author now answers the casuistry employed by the
Naiyayika by giving an example.
23. When knowledge in the form of doubt has
assumed the form of sesa (meant for something else),
it cannot become the object of another doubt without
losing its original form.
[When the particular form of a thing like a post is not
perceived, a doubt arises: is this a post or a human being?
This cognition in the form of a doubt is chiefly concerned
with finding out the true nature of the object which figures
in it. Just at that time, another doubt, doubting this very
doubt, cannot arise. The first doubt is concerned with find¬
ing out the nature of the object. Just at that time, it can¬
not become the object of another doubt. If it does, it would
lose its former condition of being a doubt. As a doubt, it
was visayin and as the object of another doubt, it would
become visaya and one and the same thing cannot become
visaya and visctyin at the same time.]
The author now gives another example. t
v-m. 12
90 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARl
24. When, in a decisive cognition, decision as such
takes place, then the cognition retains its characteristic.
[When a decisive cognition is engaged in clearly deter¬
mining the nature of the object, it cannot become the object
of another cognition. If it did, it would lose its proper nature
and become the ‘object’ of another cognition. To be en¬
gaged in determining the nature of the external object is
the nature of cognition. When it is so engaged, it cannot
be the ‘known’ (j neya ). In the same way, the nature of a
word is to convey a meaning, to bring the object within its
range; to say abdut something that it is ‘avacya’ which is
a word and to say at the same time that the thing is inex¬
pressible is a contradiction in terms.]
25. The sentence ‘all that I am saying is wrong’
is not literally meant. If what it says is wrong, the
point in question would not be conveyed.
[When one says: ‘all that I am saying is wrong’, the
incorrectness should not be applied to that very sentence.
Otherwise, the incorrectness of what the person had been
saying before — the point which is sought to be conveyed
— would not be conveyed. On the other hand, if that sen¬
tence is held to be expressive even though it is incorrect,
the same could be said of the previous sentences and that
would mean that what was meant to be conveyed would
not be conveyed.]
26. What is expressive cannot at the same time
be the expressed. What conveys something else can¬
not at the same time be conveyed by something else.
[What is engaged in conveying something else cannot
turn back and become the object of the expressive activity
of something else. What is acting as the agent cannot at
that very moment become the object. What is expressive
III. 3.27
91
cannot at that very moment be the expressed. The follow¬
ing syllogism expresses the idea well.
Yat pratipadakam na tat pratipddyam ,
Yalhd sainsayajnanam nirnayajndnam vd
pratipadakam r.dbhidlidnam,
ato naitat pratipddyam.
“What conveys something else cannot itself be conveyed
by something else.
As, for example, a doubt or a decisive cognition.
The word conveys something else,
And so it cannot itself be conveyed
(by something else).]
27. The statement: “a mere assertion does not
prove the point” does not apply to that statement .itself.
Similarly, the property (incorrectness) is not under¬
stood as applicable to this sentence.
[It is true that incorrectness cannot be attributed to the
meaning of the sentence sarvayi mithyd bravimi without its
giving up its expressivity (vdcakatva) and becoming the
expressed ( vdicya ). But incorrectness may be attributed to
it in another way. After all, it is also one of the sentences
uttered by the person in question and if all that the person
says is wrong, this sentence would also be wrong. To meet
this objection, another illustration is given. Sddhyanirdesah
pratijnd sddhandngam na bhiavati is a statement of the
Bauddhas which means: “A statement of the thing to be
proved is what is called assertion and it cannot become part
of the proof.” This does not apply to this very statement.
Otherwise, it cannot convey what is intended to be convey- .
ed. Therefore, the statement that assertion is not part of
the proof does not apply to this assertion. It applies to
others. In the same way, the incorrectness mentioned in the
sentence; c sarvam mithyd bravimi’ does not apply to that-
92
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
sentence itself. All this reasoning applies to the word avcicya
as applied to samavciya.’]
28. Since one function has not another function,
therefore one should not point out anywhere contradic¬
tion or regressus ad infinitum.
[‘Anywhere’ means not only in the matter of being the
expressed meaning, but also in regard to relation. Or it
might be understood as relating to what was said in verses 25
and 27.]
The author now proceeds to explain relation as accepted
in his own circle.
29. Just as the senses have an eternal fitness to
perceive their objects, in the same way, the relation of
words with their meanings is an eternal fitness in regard
to them.
[Because we understand a meaning as soon as we hear
words, a natural capacity in the words to convey the mean¬
ing must be presumed. This natural capacity is made known
through convention ( sanketa ). This capacity is as natural
as that of the eye to perceive form and colour. This capa¬
city has to be understood by us on the basis of the meaning
which we understand from words. As words and their
meanings are understood as one, there is a kind of mutual
superimposition ( adhycisa ): the word is understood as the
meaning and the meaning is understood as the word. Adhycisa
or superimposition is the main relation between word and
meaning. The senses are causes (karaUa) in the process
of the production of the cognition of objects. The word,
on the other hand, makes known (jnapaka) the meaning.
Being so, it must itself be known before it can cause the
meaning to be known. The resemblance between the senses
and the word is that their power or fitness is natural, not
due to human effort.]
III. 3.30-31
93
The author now points out that the meaning is not relat¬
ed to the corrupt form of a word.
30. The corrupt form, according to some, is expres¬
sive only through the inference (of its correct form).
Even if its expressivity is equal (to that of the correct
form) the sdstra makes a restriction in regard to usage
keeping merit and demerit in view.
[This capacity belongs to the correct forms of words
and not to their corrupt forms. People who know do not
understand the meaning directly from the corrupt forms of
words which have, therefore, no connection with meaning.
They are not expressive (vdcaka). They cause us to infer
the correct words from which the meaning is understood.
But corrupt forms of words have become current and igno¬
rant people understand meanings directly from them. But
merit comes only from the use of the correct forms. The
correct form of a word is only one while its corruptions may
be many. Just as Brahman is One and stands for vidyd
and the multiplicity of the world for avidya, in the same
way, the correct word stands for vidyd and its corruptions
for avidya.]
31. The relation which the word relation expresses
is this capacity (fitness) and it is through that that the
word ycgyatd itself conveys the meaning of fitness.
This capacity is made known through convention just
as the relationship between parent and child.
[It was pointed out before that if inherence (samavdya)
is postulated as the relation between word and meaning,
there would be difficulty of having to postulate another in¬
herence for the word samavdya itself. This difficulty would
not arise if fitness is accepted as the relation between word
and meaning. The word e saii'ibav.dha would denote the re¬
lation consisting of fitness through its fitness to do so. Simi-
94
V AK Y AP AD IY AM OF BHARTRHARI
larly, tliG woid samavaya would. dGnote inherence through
its fitness. Even the word yogyata would denote its mean¬
ing thiough its fitness. This eternal fitness of words is made
known through usage or convention, the uninterrupted prac¬
tice of elders (vrcldhavyavaharaparampard) . Mere conven¬
tion cannot give words that fitness if they did not already
have it before, just as usage can only make known the rela¬
tion of parent and child if it was already there. The sages
also do no more than make known which word means what
on the basis of this eternal fitness.]
The relation of cause and effect is now being stated.
32. The word is the cause of the meaning which is
indeed produced by it. Similarly, it is from the mean¬
ing which is in the mind of the speaker) that the word
(arises and) is heard (by the listener).
[Of the meaning which figures in the mind of the liste¬
ner, the word is the cause. That meaning presents the thing
as something external. The meaning which was in the mind
of the speaker before he spoke is the cause of the word
which he subsequently utters and which the listener hears.
Thus the word and the meaning are causes of each other.
They are conceived and perceived as mixed up, as identi¬
fied with each other by both speaker and hearer. The
meaning which the speaker intends to convey is already unit¬
ed with the word. It appears as inner speech. Even the
cognition of animals is mixed with this eternal word (and-
disabdabhdvand) . The word which the hearer hears is
mixed up with the form of the meaning and the meaning
which he ultimately understands from it is mixed up with
the form of the word. What is called verbal usage ( vyava-
lidira) is the exchange of ideas between the speaker and
the hearer. What the word does is to transfer to the hearer
the meaning which w'as in the speaker’s mind and which
was already mixed up with the word.]
If the meaning of the word is mental, how does one say:
‘he eats rice’?
III. 3.53-34
G5
33. The ideas of meal etc. which one considers to
be impossible on the view that the meaning of a word
is mental becomes possible when, after one mental
meaning is understood, another one comes into
existence.
[According to the Viyhanavddins, the external world does
not exist. Both action and its accessories are mental. There¬
fore, the relation of accessory ( sadliana ) and action ( sadhya )
is also mental. On this view, the ideas of meal, eater and
their relation which, at first seemed impossible, become pos¬
sible. When? When, after the idea of cooked rice has arisen
in the mind, another one, that of its being eaten, also arises
in the mind. The meaning of one word in a sentence is neces-
sarily incomplete. It becomes complete only when the
meanings of other words are also understood. According to
those Buddhists who accept the external world, the meaning
of words is something mental.]
It is now stated that the meaning of a word has eter-
nality in the sense of continuity.
34(a.b.) Even in impermanent tilings, there is
eternality in the form of being the expressed meaning
of woi’ds.
[From words, one understands always a meaning in
which the form of something or other figures. That thing
may or may not exist outside the mind but as the meanig
expressed by a word, it is eternal. This eternality is
continuity.]
It is now stated that it has eternality in the sense of
unchangeability also (kutasthanityata ).
34(c.d.) What is called impermanence is nothing
more than the power which is not different from the
eternal reality.
96
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHAR1
[It is tile power of Brahman, the ultimate reality, which
causes things to appear as non-existent in the past or in the
future. This power is not different from the Ultimate Rea¬
lity. What is called impermanence or non-existence is only
an appearance. Every word denotes this ultimate Reality
through some limiting factor ( wpadhi ) or other, as explain¬
ed in the section on Substance. As every word ultimately
denotes Brahman who is unchangeable ( khtastho.nitya .),
therefore, the relation between word and meaning is also
unchangeable.]
It is now stated that, according to some, even meaning¬
less words produce results.
35. (Even meaningless) words have an influence
over objects leading to visible or invisible results. How
is that possible unless there was a (natural) relation
(between these words and the results)?
[Some people maintain that another proof that there is
a nauual xelation between word and meaning is that words
uttered by Sabaras, even though meaningless, cure cases of
poisoning. Similarly, magical syllables (bijdksara) known in
the different sects (though meaningless) produce invisible
results. All this shows that between words and things there
is a natural relation.]
But this is not right.
36. One does not invariably see such influence on
objects conveyed by words. Nor is such a relation
meant here.
[The meaning understood from words like ghata does not
produce the same result as the above mentioned words but
that does not mean that there is no natural relation between
words like ghata and their meanings.]
III. 3.37-38
9?
37. The fact of particular words being the cause
of the understanding of particular meanings can be
explained only if there is a relation between the two.
So it is presumed that there is such a relation.
[It is better to look at the whole thing as Grammarians
do. In order to explain the fact that we understand a parti¬
cular meaning from a particular word, we assume that there
is a relation between them, a kind of fitness similar to
what the senses have in regard to their objects. It is not
that we infer the existence of such a relation on the basis
of some visible or invisible result which words might pro¬
duce. Such a result may be produced merely by the sequ¬
ence of the phonemes of the words through the influence of
a great personality. It is not due to their capacity to convey
meanings.]
It is now stated that the relation cannot be mere
convention.
38. Whether the expressed meaning of words is
eternal or transitory, no human being can establish a
relation (between words and meanings) with the help
of words whose relation with their meanings has not
yet been established.
[According to the view that the meaning of a word like
the universal is eternal, nobody can establish a relation
between word and meaning for the first time. According
to the view that the things denoted by words are imperma¬
nent and that words are also impermanent, the position
would be the same. The person who would like to establish
a relation between particular words and particular meanings
cannot, of course, see all things with his own eyes. Even if
he sees them through their universals, many universals may
exist in the same thing and it would be difficult to choose
between them. Nor can inference be of much help because
the thing inferred can only be understood as mixed up with
V-I1I. 13
98
VAKYAP ADI YAM OF BHAHTRHARX
words and, therefore, it cannot be of much use in first esta¬
blishing a relation between the two. By a process of elimi¬
nation, he has to rely on words to do the job. He would have
to determine things through words and then establish the re¬
lation. But the words used for determining things also de¬
pend upon convention ( sanketa ) and, therefore, other such
words would have to be brought in and thus there would be
regressus ad infinitum . Nor can the nature of things be de¬
termined with the help of words the convention of which has
not been established. Thus one has ultimately to depend on
words which have a natural and eternal capacity to denote
their meanings.]
The eternality of the relation between
ing is now explained in another way.
word and mean-
39. In verbal usage, there is another Being, a
secondary one, which presents the real nature of things
in all circumstances.
[When words convey objects the things so conveyed
have a Being distinct from their external Being. It consists
in their figuring in the mind. Such a Being is called aupa-
carifci’, to distinguish it from Being outside the mind, in the
external world. Through this Being, things are presented as
past or as yet to come. That is how words like past (atlra)
and future ( anagata ) also convey a meaning. When words
present things as standing in the relation of visesana and
visesya, it is this Being in which they participate. Things in
the world exist in a mixed-up state, not visesana separately
and visesya separately, but words present them separately.
This separation participates in this Being. The objects de¬
noted by words are conceived in the mind and the mind can
conceive objects which have no external Being and words
convey them as they are conceived by the mind. That is
why words like alatacakra and sasavisana have a meaning.
They convey something conceived by the mind but having
no external being. Thus words are never without a relation,
with their meanings. Till something figures in the mind, its
i
III. 3.40-41
99
existence or Being is a matter of faith only. In verbal usage,
it is this secondary Being which plays the main part. Things
come to be because of this Being. They do not assume their
proper form till they are mixed up with words. When all
usage can be explained in terms of this Being, if one still wants
to think of some other kind of Being, consisting of fulfilling
practical purposes ( arthakriydkarana ), let one do so. But
such a Being cannot enter into verbal usage. It is another
matter if such a Being is also reflected in this one. That is
what is now going to be shown by means of an example.]
Now follows the example.
40-41. Just as crystal etc., in association with
objects of different colours, seem to become one with
them on account of their power (of assuming different
forms) in the same way, the word, taking its stand at
first on this secondary Being, becomes related to various
properties, contradictory and non-contradictory.
[The external object has its fixed form, it cannot co¬
exist with both existence and non-existence and, therefore, if
that is the meaning of the word, it cannot enter into relation
at the same time with the meaning of the words c asti’ and
nasti. Therefore, the meanings of words have this secondary
Being. The meaning of a word is capable of entering into
association with the meanings of all other words. It is like
the crystal, or glass or the sky. It is sometimes associated
with the meaning of ‘asti’ and sometimes with that of nasti.
An object like crystal is very clear and when in contact with,
say, a blue object, does not give up its own clarity, but ap¬
pears to be blue. Similaily, this secondary Being, when link¬
ed with such ideas as negation, becomes coloured by it, with¬
out giving up its own form. It appears to be identical with
negation. The clarity of crystal consists in its being able
to assume various forms and colours. That is its power. The
power of this secondary Being also consists in its being able
to assume the forms of all particulars. The word ( sabda ) is
so called because the object is reflected in it (artliah sabdyate
100
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
iti krtvd ). The word has its footing in this secondary Being
in the beginning (purvam ), that is, when the meaning of
the individual word is understood. At the time of the
understanding of the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of
the individual word which has its basis in this secon¬
dary Being, enters into relation with opposites and non¬
opposites. Positive objects are the non-opposites. They
are favourable to this secondary Being, just as jasmine
flowers are to crystal. That is why this Being assumes the
form of these non-opposites in their presence. External Being
is not opposed to it. In fact, it is very near to it. The oppo¬
sites are the negative entities. Being negative in nature, they
affect the nature of this secondary Being, just as a japci Rower
which is red affects the colour of crystal. It is due to this
secondary Being that external objects which are combinations
of substance and quality are presented by words separately
as substance and quality.]
Association with opposites is now being shown.
42. Similarly, negation relates to the objects of
negation, resorted to through secondary usage, in order
that negation may be possible.
[It is only on the view that the object which figures in
the mind is capable of assuming different forms that such ex¬
pressions as non-brahmin ( abrdhmana ) can be explained, that
the use of the negative particle in them can be accounted for.
If words denote things which have an external Being, how
can we say abrdhmana? In the person to whom the word is
applied, there is no brahmana-hood in reality. The word
brdhmana cannot, therefore, be applied to him. But if it is
applied, the negative particle cannot be joined to it. But on
the view that the meaning of words has a secondary Being,
which is common to positive and negative objects, the ex¬
pression abrdhmana can be explained. The word brdhmana
would denote the quality of being a brahmin attributed, say,
to a Ksattriya on the basis of resemblance. This attribution
is thus the object which is going to be negatived. It has come
in through wpacara, secondary usage, which supplies the thing
III. 3.43-44
101
to be negatived, without which there cannot be negation. So
what happens in cibrahvicfliti is this — The negative paiticle
denies real brahmanahood attributed to somebody either
through mistake or resemblance.]
See M. Bha on P. 2.2.6 and the Pradfpa' thereon. The
difficulty which arises if words denote things having external
reality only is now pointed out.
%
43. Birth means attaining one’s own form, what
already exists attains what is to be attained. If it
(already) exists, why should it be born and if it does
not, how can it be born.
Remarks, saita labhyam ca labhyate is a doubtful text.
sattd should probably be labdha. labhyate may be an error
for labhasca .
[If words denote things having external Being, expres¬
sions like ahkuro jay ate would be impossible. Jay ate stands,
for birth. Birth means the assumption of its form by some-
[hing. There is the thing which assumes its form, the form
which it assumes and the act of assumption itself. All the
three exist. That is why one cannot speak about a thing
being born, as in ahkuro jay ate. That which already exists
cannot be born. If it does not exist who is the agent denoted
by the suffix of the verb expressive of the act of being bom?
If it already exists, how can it be born? The meaning of
the root also becomes impossible.]
Another illustration of the same difficulty is given.
44. If the goer exists and if there is a destination,
the going can take place. If the one who is born is
like the go-er, he cannot be born at all. If he is not,
there cannot be birth at all.
[The act of going is like that of being born. Only that
which already exists can go, provided that there is a e -t
nation as distinct from that which goes. Bui if one \\ io ta ves
102
\’AKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI ,
birth already exists like the one who goes, he cannot be born
at all. Secondly, as birth means ‘attaining one’s self’, there
is no object as distinct from the agent as in the case of going.
These are the difficulties if words are taken as denoting things
having external Being.]
It is now stated that the difficulties are removed on the
basis of secondary Being.
45-46. By conceiving it as agent in order that the
name (sprout) may be given to it, by further conceiving
it as the object and by postulating the action (of being
born) based on it there results the secondary Being.
The suffixes ‘la’ etc. (the verbal suffixes) can be applied
to it. But there is no primary Being here because it
would conflict with the idea of birth.
[The secondary ‘Being’ is capable of assuming all forms.
What already exists in its finished form cannot be said to be
born, nor what is totally non-existent. About something
which neither is nor is not, which participates in the former
and later condition and is about to attain a Being, one can
say that it is being born. When one says that ‘the sprout
comes out’, what one means is that when the causes are about
to produce their effect, what is yet to be is thought of as
being already there and to that we give the name of sprout
and it is presented as the agent of the action of being born.
There is further secondary usage when the agent becomes the
object of the action of attaining one’s form which is the mean¬
ing of being born. The agent which thus becomes the object
through secondary usage is said to be born, that is, it is the
agent of a process the parts of which are arranged in a sequ¬
ence. Explained in this way, the expression ankuro j ayate
is seen to rest in secondary Being. The agent, the object
and the action are all the result of upacdra: There is kartr-
kalpana, karmakalpand and kriyakalpand .]
It is now pointed out that the expression ‘asti’ which
expresses the state coming after being born, is also based on
secondary Being.
III. 3.47-43
103
47. One says about a thing that it exists when it
'maintains itself’. As the object (of the action of main¬
taining) is included in the meaning of the root, the
latter is not a transitive one.
[Similarly, the expression ankuro‘sti’ can be explained
only on the basis of this secondary Being. When one
says: ahkuro‘sti’ £ the sprout exists’, what is meant is that
the sprout maintains itself. In this meaning of the root
‘as’, the agent and the object of the action are the
same. The agent itself becomes the object (karma) in the
explanation of the meaning of the root itself. That is why
the root ‘ as’ is said to be intransitive.]
.48. Before connection with existence, how can there
be primary Being ? What does not exist cannot be the
the agent of 'to exist’. But there is secondary usage as
before.
[The verb ‘to exist’ denotes existence conceived as a pro¬
cess, the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. In this
state, there cannot be an agent in a finished form. Nor can
there be the action of existence if there is no connection with
the agent of that action. Nor does one see any other acces¬
sory here. Being itself cannot really become both accessory
and action. The accessory has to be something that is com¬
pleted, accomplished ( sicldha ). What is in the process of
being ‘ sattci’ (existence) cannot be something that is complet¬
ed. What has already assumed existence cannot be a process
(sadhya). Therefore, what has attained its form (born) is
conceived mentally as having existence, the parts of which
are arranged in a sequence. The first part of it is the agent,
the latter part is a process, the object is included in the action
based on both. Thus, as in the case of birth, the expression
'it exists’ is based on an agent which has only secondary Being.
Thus the expressions asti, ndsti and jdyate have been ex¬
plained on the basis of secondary Being. These stand for
three cut of the six transformations of Being (sad bhavavi -
i04 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
kcirah ). The other three are included in them. What is call¬
ed growth or increase of parts is included in birth.
What is called change or the appearance of new pro¬
perties is also included in birth. What is called decay
(apaksiyate) is included in destruction (nasti ). As all actions
come under the six transformations of Being, they have all
to be explained on the basis of secondary Being.]
It is now stated that this secondary Being is all-pervasive.
49-51. No meaning of a word can go beyond this
secondary Being which is not opposed to things which
are opposed to one another, which is resorted to by
different words in order to present difference and
opposition, which has no temporal distinction but exists
in things belonging to different times, which is the
cause of the use of all words. It has been shown as
something different from primary Being in the Bhdsya.
[Things which are opposed to one another have no oppo¬
sition in this secondary Being. It is on the basis of this that
words present difference where there is no difference in rea¬
lity. For example, words present the jar and its blueness
as two separate things, whereas in reality, the two exist as
one concrete thing. Words like past and future present things
which are opposed to and different from what words like
vartaraava denote. This secondary Being presents as sepa¬
rate what is really united, but only to unite it again. It ex¬
tends to all things, present, past and future. It is the cause
of the use of all words, because we first conceive things in
our mind and then give expression to them in words. What
has not yet been mentally conceived cannot be expressed.
Even what is actually present cannot be expressed unless it
has been conceived by the mind. To conceive of things as
related to one another by the relation of action and accessory
is also a case of seconadry Being, because it is the work
of the mind. When we utter a sentence consisting of nouns
and verbs and expressive of an action which is being done,
In. 3.52
105
the action is not there yet and nothing can, therefore, be an
accessory in realtion to it. Therefore, the meanings of the
verbs and nouns in that sentence have an existence only in
the mind. Thus, all words move in the realm of this secon¬
dary Being. What is called non-existence is also something
which can be conceived by the mind. No word is separated
from its meaning understood as something moving in this
secondary Being*. This is accepted by the Bhdsyakdra when
he says: na sattdm padartho vyabhicarati (M. Bha on
P. 5.2.94). The past and the future have no outside reality,
but they have this Being. When we use the word ‘asti ’ in
regard to a thing, what we are doing is to say that it has
outside reality in addition to having secondary Being. Even
external Being becomes capable of being expressed by words
only when it is grasped by the mind. Past and future Being
have an existence only in the mind.]
See Kaiyyata’s Pradlpa on the Bhasya sentence “ na
sattdm jiadartho vyabhicarati”, on P. 5.2.94. What is stated in
detail on £ upacdrasatta 9 in this section of Helaraja’s commen¬
tary is stated there briefly.
It is now shown that all words positive or negative are in
the same position.
52. Verbal communication relates only to a part
of an aspect of reality or to the determination by means
of an external factor or to a reversal of reality or to an
absence of it.
[No word expresses reality faithfully. Words like ‘past’
and ‘future’ also express things which do not exist and so do
not express reality faithfully. Thus words expressive of posi¬
tive and negative entities are all in the same position. No
word can express the full reality. All words express only
a part of it, because everything in this world is only a part
or an aspect of the Ultimate Reality. In fact, no word can
fully express even that part. A word like gliata cannot express
even that part of reality fully. It just expresses a part of
v-m. 14
106
VAKYAPADIYAM o£ BHARTHHAKI
that part, namely, the universal in it. Anything else which that
thing may possess requires another word to express it. If
it is red in colour, the word rakta has to be used to express it.
A thing can be expressed in words only through some such
property as the universal which exists in it. A thing as such
cannot be expressed at all. The One Brahman is presented
by words as many on the basis of different limiting factors or
they present what is within us as external to us. They are
responsible for viparitakhyati. According to the Siinyavadins,
there is no external reality at all. The different forms which
occur in our consciousness cannot have reality. They are
mere dreams and it is these unreal forms which words present.
In other words, they present what does not exist ( abhava ).
As words can present only one of these four distortions of
reality, as stated by (1) grammarians (2) samsargadarsana
(3) Vijnanavadins (4) Siinyavadins, there cannot be an eter¬
nal relation between words and the actual reality.]
53. Just as, through a defect in our senses, objects
produce cognitions in which something is superimposed,
as it were, such is the nature of cognitions producd by
words.
[In this matter of presenting reality in a mutilated form,
words are like defective senses. With a defective eye, one
sees two moons instead of one; with jaundice, one sees the
conch as yellow. Objects produce cognitions in which a form
different from what they actually have figures. Words also
produce a cognition in which a non-existing form figures.]
54. Words are based on cognitions which do not
reveal the full reality and so present things in another
form, not determined by their real form.
[Effects correspond to their causes. The cause of words
is our cognitions of things (nirupanapratyaya) . Cognitions
are in the nature of mental constructs (vikalpa) which never
III. 3.55-56
107
perceive things in all their aspects. How they present only
a part of reality was mentioned before (verse 52). Due to
the relation of causality, the cognition which arises from a
word is a vikalpa. Our determinate cognitions are based on
words and vice versa. Therefore, due to a certain incapacity
born of avidya, our determinate cognitions are not capable
of seeing things as they are. They see them in an unreal
form according to all thinkers and words convey these un¬
real forms. All words do this, words which convey positive
things like ghata and those which convey negative things
like ‘past’, ‘future’ ( atlta , andgata.) ]
55. The child and the scholar, when they are both
at the worldly level, see things and communicate them.
Therefore, they are in the same position as far as cogni¬
tions and words are concerned.
[It might be said that those whose vision is not blurred
and who, therefore, see the full reality express it through
words and we learn words from them. Why should not words
then express the full reality? The answer is: What is called
social intercourse means exchange of ideas. Therefore, even
those whose vision is not blurred are not different from ordi¬
nary people at that level. They also observe objects and give
expression to what they see. In other words, their words
also express their determinate cognitions and, therefore,
present only a part of reality.]
As cognition always relates to limited objects, in what
its purity consists is now stated.
58. Purity of knowledge consists in its embracing
all objects and not having (sense-contact as its) basis.
When no form of objects figures in it, purity, some say,
reaches a still higher stage.
[When sages go beyond the worldly level, there comes
•<a certain purity in their cognitions. Purity is of two kinds,
108
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
initial and final. The knowledge of the omniscient which
embraces all objects and which does not arise through sense-
contact has initial purity. Dependence on the senses is itself
an impurity. In its finished form, it is free from the appear¬
ance of the forms of objects or of any differentiation, it is
pure Consciousness like the sea without the slightest ripple
on its surface. It is the supreme Brahman.]
57. When knowledge exhibits the forms of external
objects, it is a kind of disturbance, a kind of impurity
consisting in its being mixed up with them as a result
of contact.
[When pure consciousness comes into contact with
objects and gets mixed up with them, a certain impurity
results, a certain proneness towards outside objects, just as
pure water is tainted when it comes into contact with dust.
When this impurity goes away, the consciousness is restored
to its original purity.]
58. Just as knowledge becomes impure through
being coloured by the object, in the same way, an object
falls form its real form when it is expressed through
some limiting factor.
[The object also is susceptible to impurity. A thing can
be spoken of only through some characteristic of it, some
limiting factor such as the universal. This is a limitation of
the object and so it constitutes a kind of impurity of the
object.]
59. The object, the word and the cognition being
thus distorted, existence and non-existence thus enter
into verbal or worldly usage in an identical manner.
[The impurity of the object consists in its being coloured
by the universal and the like, that of the word in not being
III. 3.60-61
109
able to express the whole object, but only as coloured by
some limiting factor or other and that of cognition in being
coloured by the external object. Thus any positive entity,
when expressed by words or cognised by the mind, appears
in the form of some limiting factor. In this respect, it is like
a negative entity, which cannot be cognised as such. It can
be cognised only as the negation of something. In other
words, its nature is determined by something extraneous to
itself. It can never be cognised in its own real form. Even
though an error is a defect of the perceiver, the fact remains
that, in an error, three things, the word, the object and the
cognition appear in an erroneous form.]
60. Just as the non-existence of a thing is cognised
on the basis of its existence, similarly the existence of
a thing is conceived on the basis of its non-existence.
[Non-existence, unless related to some positive entity,
cannot enter into usage. Positive entities also exist only
during the middle stage, between previous non-existence and
later destruction. Even eternal things are as good as non¬
existent till they are manifested. Being thus mutually de¬
pendent, they are similar in their position in worldly usage.
All this has been said on the assumption that positive and
negative entities are two different things.]
61. It is not non-existence that is transformed into
existence nor existence which becomes non-existence.
Existence and non-existence are two appearances
( vikalpita ) and are not different from the one Self.
[According to dualists, existence comes into being after
having destroyed non-existence and non-existence comes into
being after having suppressed existence. This position is
untenable, because existence and non-existence can merge
into each other. If they were totally different from each other,
one cannot be cognised in terms of the other. The fact is
that the Self, the only Reality, manifests itself now as bhdva
110
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
and now as abhava which are thus two limiting factors of
one reality. This only reality is in the nature of light and
always remains so. When, through nescience, it manifests
itself as the external object, is associated with the present
time and has causal efficiency, it is said to be a positive entity
( bhavci ). When it is associated with past and future time,
it is in the form of a residual trace only and then it is said
to be a negative entity ( abhava ). But it is not absolute non-
being because it is remembered if it is associated with past time
and imagined if it is associated with future time. In this condi¬
tion, it is not perceptible to the senses. There is no non-exis¬
tence which has not even got the form of residual trace
(samskdra) and is devoid of all powers. Things are either
present and can be perceived by the senses or they are past
or yet to come and are, therefore, remembered or imagined.
That is why things are said to be traiyyaclhvikdh, that is,
belonging to three paths, the present, past and future. Thus
absolute non-existence does not exist.]
The untenability of the relation of causality is now stated.
62. Non-existence being intangible, cause cannot
bring it about. Nor can cause do anything to what is
already tangible.
[It might be said: why look upon existence and non¬
existence as mere mental constructs? Why not look upon
them as two different effects, due to different causes? The
reason is that the relation of causality itself in untenable.
Causes are supposed to act in such a manner that effects come
into being. How can causes act keeping in view something
which does not exist yet? It is true that it exists in the form
of the universal, but the universal, being eternal, cannot be an
effect. Nor would it do to say that the universal and the
particular are identical and as the particular is not eternal,
it can be an effect Because how can the causes work keep¬
ing the particular in view? Moreover, if the causes work for
the coming into being of the non-existent effect, why should
the latter come from one particular cause rather than another.
HI. 3.63-64
111
Why should oil, for instance, come from sesame-seeds and
not from sand, considering that it was non-existent in regard
to both? Nor can one argue that the power of causes to pro¬
duce effects is limited. We see that when something is there,
something else is produced and not otherwise. Well, it is
only a matter of our understanding such a connection be¬
tween two things. There is really speaking no such connec¬
tion. Satkdryavdda is also not tenable. If the effect is already
there, the cause cannot be said to produce it. The idea that the
already existing effect is merely manifested by the cause is
also not tenable. The manifested effect is either different
from the cause or it is not. If it is different, it either existed
or did not exist before manifestation. If it did not, then
there can be birth of what did not exist and that is not possi¬
ble. And so on. The net result of this argument is that
causality as understood by others is not possible and that
it is based on the notion of existence and non-existence as
two distinct things.]
63. Therefore, everythng is either existence or non¬
existence. There is no other state which proceeds from
the one Reality.
[The fact is that they are not two distinct things. They
are only two unreal appearances of one ultimate Reality
( vivartd ). due to nescience. As this does not appear as it
is, the whole of the phenomenal world is a kind of non-exis¬
tence, a'paramdvthci.']
64. Those who believe in a positive reality do not
accept non-existence and those who believe in non¬
existence only do not accept any positive entity.
[The sages hold the view that birth and death are
nothing more than the manifestation and the hiding of the
real. What is called non-existence is not something distinct
from existence. It is nothing more than the previous and
later conditions of existence. The previous non-existence of
112 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHAHTHHARI
a jar is clay and its later non-existence is potsherds (fea-
pala). The Sunyavadins consider non-existence alone to be
the truth. But even they have to admit existence at the
worldly level. Thus through ‘samvrti’ or hiding of reality
at the worldly level, everything can be explained.]
How the distinction between existence and non-existence
arises, is now explained.
65. While all this visible world is naturally one,
there is an extraordinary order in this multiplicity.
[All this variety is really pervaded by a certain unity,
namely, Brahman. But due to nescience, this unity appears
as multiplicity. It is this very unity which appears as exis¬
tence and non-existence; but, of course, this distinction is
unreal.]
66. Just as four states are postulated in what is
intangible (nirupdkhya), in the same way is this two¬
fold division into existence and non-existence postulated.
[Ix non-existence which is intangible can have such
artificial divisions as previous non-existence, non-existence
after destruction, absolute non-existence and mutual non-
existence, the ultimate Reality also can have artificial
distinctions. What is called existence is the fact of being
cognisable to the external senses and fulfilling some purpose
or other. What is called non-existence is the fact of being
imperceptible and not fulfilling some purpose.]
It is now stated that neither existence nor non-existence
has separate Being.
67. Non-existence can rationally be neither opposed
nor non-opposed (to existence) can be neither existent
nor non-existent, neither have sequence nor not have it.
[As non-existence in intangible, there cannot be opposi¬
tion between it and existence. Non-existence neither helps
III. 3.G8-71
113
nor hinders existence. One cannot predicate existence about
it, because what exists cannot be non-existent and what has
already attained its form cannot get anything further. Nor
can it have a separate form because, in that way, there would
be no difference between it and existence. Sequence is an
attribute of existent entities and, therefore, non-existence
cannot have it. Nor can there be absence of sequence, that
is, simultaneity, because that depends upon something ex¬
ternal.]
68. Existence which is opposed or otherwise,
existent or non-existent, sequenceful or sequenceless,
does not, therefore, exist.
69. There cannot be any division within non¬
existence on the basis of the three divisions of time
and, if that is not possible, there cannot be triple time
for existence either.
70. Abandoning one’s own essence due to something
external is not possible, nor is it possible to maintain
that one’s own essence depends upon oneself or some¬
thing external.
71. There is contradiction in identity (between
existence and non-existence) and if they are different,
they cannot render service (to each other). If both
are abandoned, all usage would cease.
[Verses 67-71 are intended to show on the basis of logic,
that really speaking it is not possible to show the validity of
existence or non-existence. They are no more than appearance
and disappearance or hiding of something unreal. The ulti¬
mate Reality is eternal and is not affected by its appearance
and disappearance as unreal forms of something which is
eternal and quite free from these unreal forms.]
The truth is now stated.
V-III. 15
114 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARi
72. Those who know the final portion of the Vedas
have declared that entity alone to be real which is
differentiated into the see-er, the seen and the seeing.
If the text is: ‘va avikalpitam’, the translation should be:
in which there is no real differentiation into’.
[Knowers of Brahman have declared that the world
consisting of the perceiver and the perceived, brought about
through differentiation is not real. What is real is beyond
all differentiation, beyond the range of words and mind, with
no beginning and no end. The final portion of the Vedas,
consisting of Rk, Yajus, and Savian, is the TJpanisad where
the essential truth is propounded. Those who know this
portion have declared that monism is the truth and not dualism
suggested by the performance of actions. Differentiation is
due to avidya which is neither identical with nor different
from the ultimate reality.]
It is now stated that words move about in the world of
unreal differentiation.
73. Inasmuch as words express the universal or the
particular as differentiated, they move about in the
world of unreal differences.
[Words express the unreal which appears in our cogni¬
tion and do not touch the undiffei’entiated reality but move
about in the world of differentiation. Words express even
universals as distinct from other universals. That is, even
when they express universals which stand for unity, they are
still associated with differentiation. Similarly, a visesa (par¬
ticularity) is dfferent from other vsesas, as expressed by
words.]
The author now says somethng about non-existence as
understood by the Vaisesikas.
74. When non-existence is brought about, existence
cannot be destroyed nor can existence be brought when
III. 3.75-77
115
non-existence is destroyed (if non-existence is also a
separate category).
[So far, all reasoning has been going on on the basis of the
view that non-existence is something intangible. But, for the
Vaisesikas , it is a separate category. That means that it is
something tangible. If that is so and it is different from
‘bliava’, how can bliava be destroyed when abhdvci is pro¬
duced and how can bliava be produced when abhdva is
destroyed?]
75. The existence of sdbaleya does not prevent that
of bdhuleya, nor does the non-existence of sdbaleya
bring about the existence of bdhuleya .
[Just as the existence of sdbaleya does not prevent that
of bdhuleya and vice-versa, in the same way, if abhdva is also
a separate category, its existence or non-existence would not
bring about the non-existence or existence of bhdva.~\
76. Such considerations would arise if non¬
existence were a positive entity and in regard to its own
non-existence, the whole question would arise again.
77. Therefore, being a non-entity, it is beyond the
scope of verbal communication and variation within it
does not deserve to be explained.
[If we proceed on the Buddhist assumption that what is
called non-existence is only the disappearance of a positive
entity, and, therefore, something intangible, all these con¬
siderations would not arise at all. The objection that when
non-existence is destroyed, why should a positive entity come
to be, would not be raised. If the object comes into existence
when its previous non-existence is removed, it is because of
its nature to come to be. Therefore, non-existence is some¬
thing intangible and does not deserve to be classed into a
116
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
separate category. It is intangible and it cannot be thought of
in the same way as bhavci .]
The untenability of causality, already stated, is now
repeated and vivartavcida, the final doctrine, is expounded.
78. There is no such thing as the cause working
towards something which has not even a word to express
it. Even when the cause is present, there is the absence
of the effect (before it is born).
[As the effect does not exist before it comes into existence,
it has no word to express it. The cause, therefore, cannot
work towards it. A cause operates in relation to an effect
which is fit to be born and which is something positive. So
unless the effect exists already, the cause cannot work towards
it. Causes do not work towards something which is nothing.
That which does not exist cannot be an aim and if it already
exists, there is no need for a cause. If, by what is called the
cause working towards the effect, it is the agent’s plan which
is meant, that is also not possible. An insentient cause can
work still less towards the effect. So what is called causality
is nothing more than something appearing to come into
existence only when something else is present.]
79. ‘What is its previous condition’ is a question
which relates to something which exists. Both the ideas
of ‘previous’ and condition are inapplicable to some¬
thing which does not exist.
[No one can say that because, before its production, there
is its previous condition, therefore, it is not right to say that
there is no word to express it. Because, one can legitimately
ask ‘what is this previous condition’ only in regard to some¬
thing which exists. Neither the idea of previous nor that of
condition applies to something which is nothing. Something
which is devoid of form or shape cannot be said to be previous’
either spatially or temporally. The idea of condition pre-
III. 3.80-82
117
supposes one who is in that condition and no such thing is
visible. Thus, both according to asatkdryavdda and satkdrya -
vdda, there cannot be a previous condition of the effect.]
80. After destruction, one cannot say about a thing
that it exists or does not exist, because of the absence
of any ground for doing so. It is beyond the range of
words:
[After destruction, one cannot say of a thing whether it
exists or not. The Sankhyas affirm that it does exist, but that
is not right. The fact of being cognised is the basis of such
statements and that cannot happen with something which has
been destroyed. Therefore, before it is produced and after it
is destroyed, one cannot speak about a thing at all.]
It is now siated that it is only in the middle stage that
it is visible.
81. It is indeed a wonderful activity by virtue of
which the indivisible and sequenceless essence of pre¬
viously non-existent things manifests itself.
[Causality has already been shown to be unsound. So
the effect, previously non-existent, suddenly appears under
certain conditions, that is, when something else is present. It
only appears to be an effect, but it is not so. People, blinded
by nescience, imagine it in many ways. It is only a vivarta.
When the one, without ceasing to be one, assumes different
unreal forms, there is vivarta.]
Helaraja here quotes the definition of vivarta found in
the vrtti on Vak. I. 1.
82. All worldly usage is carried out with objects
created by mental construction as with primary objects.
[After having seen the object during the middle stage,
one imagines a previous and a posterior stage for it and thus
118
VAKVAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
it becomes endowed with sequence and then one postulates a
relation of causality and talks about blidva and abhdva. This
is worldly usage which is the result of nescience.]
83. Those who believe in the Eternal (Brahman)
look upon this as the power of the only Reality. They
declare sequence to be the same as the objects and not
as something apart from them.
[In reality, the plurality which is visible is not the truth.
Only monism is the truth. It is seen as plurality by those
whose eyes are dimmed by nescience. The one sequenceless
Brahman appears as many and as possessing sequence because
of the power called svdtantrya. These two powers, that by
which the one appears as many and the sequenceless appears
as having sequence are not really different from Brahman.
Nothing besides Brahman can shine and that which shines
cannot be different from Brahman. Sequence appears as
conditioned by objects which are identical with Brahman. So
sequence is really not different from what has sequence.]
84. In reality, simultaneity is not different from
sequence just as non-existence is not different from
existence.
[The opposite of sequence is simultaneity and that is also
a mere appearance. The One Reality cannot be cognised as
such by ordinary people. It manifests itself as having spatial
and temporal sequence. When two or more things appear
together, they seem to have simultaneity. But squence and
simultaneity are not different from the things themselves. It
has been said before that abhdva is not different from bhdva
and that it is not anything positive. Simultaneity is only
absence of sequence. Association in time with something else
is not different from that which so associates.]
85. People of the world speak about time within
time. But one cannot bring about a distinction by
merely speaking about it.
lit 3.86-88
119
[By speaking about time which exists to-day and time
which will exist tomorrow, some people make a distinction
within time. They speak of time as ddhdra or as adlieya. But
Time is One. Similarly, sequence and simultaneity do not
differ from each other nor from the things which are
sequential or simultaneous.]
86. Even if non-existence is imagined to be a
substratum, nothing can really exist in it. Nobody can
be prevented from imagining totally non-existent things.
[When we say salvor abhdve sukham the use of the loca¬
tive case seems to imply that non-existence can be a substra¬
tum. .But that is not right. It is a mere fiction. There is
nothing which one cannot imagine.]
87. Therefore, the one eternal Reality, consisting of
existence and non-existence, shines through its different
powers, in many forms when conveyed by words.
[The substance of this section can be stated as follows —
Ihe ultimate Reality is beyond all differentiation. It is
endowed with all powers. Words express this Reality, accord¬
ing to occasion, either as a positive entity or as a negation
and as having this or that limiting factor. Those words which
express negative things are similar to words expressive of
positive things as far as their relation to their meanings are
concerned. This ultimate Reality is one, because there is no
differentiation within it. It is eternal, because there is no
such thing as abhdva, non-existence.]
88. Verbal communication in the world is done
with meanings of words fashioned by the mind and in
the science of grammar, it is the meanings adopted in
the world on the basis of which the work (of explaining
the forms) is done.
120
VAKYAPAdIYAM of feHARTRHARi
[Therefore, in everyday life, it is the norm for words to
express the limited reality and it has been so stated in this
sastra. Therefore, all the different views of the tarkxkas are
out of place. Ordinary people do not follow the conclusions
which may have been reached by different thinkers. In the
matter of using words in accordance with our cognitions, both
the scholar and the child are equal. On that basis, they pro¬
ceed to exchange views. Ordinary people understand things
in a superficial manner and use words accordingly. This sastra
is an attempt to explain words as used by ordinary people.
In this attempt, one should take the help of the ordinary
man’s view of the world. From the indivisible sentence¬
meaning, by a process of abstraction, one derives the root
expressive of action, the nouns expressive of things, the suffix
which conveys its own meaning for the sake of explaining the
forms. 'The notions of action, substance, quality and so on
used by the science of grammar, are worldly notions. In
worldly usages, all words whether expressive of positive or
negative things, are in the same position. Therefore, the
meanings of words have continuity. Thus the relation between
word and meaning is eternal.]
III. 4,1-2
121
Section 4
FURTHER STATEMENT ON SUBSTANCE
1-2. Some meanings of words which exist in the
sentence looked upon as interconnection ( samsargaru -
pat sambhutah) which are isolated by a process of
abstraction (scimvidrupad apoddhrtdh ) which are
separated from the meaning of a sentence like the
meanings of the stem and the suffix (from that of a
word), which are the basis of the correctness of words
and which are inferred from indications in the Science
of Grammar, will now be explained according to
Tradition.
[The previous section ended with the remark that, in the
Science of Grammar, meanings of words, agreeing with
worldly usage, are isolated for the purpose of explaining
the formation of words. The sentence is indivisible and so
is its meaning. For the purpose of conveniently explaining
the forms of the language both are artificially divided. These
divisions become the means of the derivation of the forms
of the language. For the purpose of this division, the mean¬
ing of the sentence is looked upon as connection (samsarga ).
In that way, the meanings of the individual words whose
connection the sentence-meaning is, can be separated. They
exist only if the sentence-meaning is looked upon as a com¬
bination. If they do not exist at all or if they are like bits
of iron, they cannot combine and there cannot be any ques¬
tion of analysis. Of course, the sentence and its meaning
are indivisible. So there are no word-meanings. There
cannot be any question of their previous separate existence.
The hearer does not understand the meaning of the whole
sentence all at once. He understands it little by little, part
by part and then joins the parts together. The taste of
‘sharbat’ ( pdnaka ) is really an indivisible whole, but those
Y-IIL 16
122
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
who drink it can, if they make an effort, taste each ingra-
dient separately and assess the part played by it in making
up the taste of the whole. As the indivisible sentence—mean¬
ing cannot be understood in a flash all at once, the unreal
woi d-meanings are abstracted in the middle as mere means to
an end. Once the sentence-meaning is understood, they dis-
appear. This artificial division is done with a purpose. It
is to facilitate the teaching of forms, so that each form may
be made in its own meaning. These meanings are not
taught in the sdstra, they are not ‘vidheya’. They are natu¬
ral and they are made use of to teach forms. This is the
meaning of the M. Bha. statement: svdbhdvikam ity alia.
Kuta etat. avthanadesanat—* It is declared that it is natural.
Why so? Because meaning has not been taught.” (M.Bha. I,
p. 363, 1.8). The mention of meaning in a grammatical siitra
is only by the way. It is only a means to an end. The
artificial division of a sentence is like the division of a word
like a noun or a verb into parts and assigning a meaning to
each, though a word is really indivisible. These artificial
meanings are indications of the correctness of the word. That
is why they are analysed. They are of two kinds: (1) those
which are known in the world, (2) those which are known
in particular sdstras. These latter are defined by gramma¬
rians in their own way. These definitions are inferred from
Panini’s practice. For example, from the siitra which tea¬
ches ‘ekasesa’ (P. 1.2.64) we gather that the individual or
the particular ( dravya ) can be the meaning of a word and
that it means something which is to be differentiated
(bhedya). From the vdrttika — “yasya gunasya hi bluwdd
dravye sabdanivesali etc.” (Va. 5 on P. 5.1.119), we under¬
stand that guna is something which rests on something else.
Even the universal (jdti) can be said to be guna when it
is expressed by an abstract suffix (bhdvapratyaya). Words
like sukla in suklah patali’ denote an object having white
as its quality. That what is called time is essentially action
is known from the fact that Panini has used such words as
‘bhuta’, ‘vartamdne’, ‘bhavisyati’ as expressive of the limit¬
ing factor of the meaning of the root which is action. That
III. 4.3
123
number is something which enables us to count difference
is made clear in the sutra-jatyakhyam ekasmin’ etc.
(P. 1.2.57). The Vaisesika conception of number is that it
is a quality which inheres in a substance. We gather that
samstydna, prasava and sthiti constitute the nature of the
genders from the expressions ‘ striyam\ *pumsi and ‘napum-
saklie’ which are found in connection with the explanation
of the forms of words. Gender cannot mean sex because
such things as a ‘khatva’ cannot have sex in the ordinary
sense of the term. That it is power or capacity ( sakti )
which is the real accessory ( sadhana ) and not substance can
be gathered from these indications: (1) from the fact that
an accessory can sometimes be sesa (2) from the fact that
the object can sometimes become agent — changes which
substance, being uniform, cannot undergo — (3) from the fact
that an ‘avyayibhava’ compound has been taught in the sense
of a case-ending. The concepts of ‘pui'usa’ and ‘upagraha*
have been taken from previous grammarians. Space and
action are well-known in the world. Action has been de¬
fined as a process the parts of which are arranged in a tem¬
poral sequence. One and the same word can convey many
of the things mentioned above, but one of them as the main
thing and the others as subordinate to it. Thus, the verb
denotes action, time, accessory, number, person and aspect.
The noun denotes substance, gender, number, accessories,
action and time. All these things have been explained ac¬
cording to the tradition of the grammarians.]
As quality etc. depend upon substance, the latter is first
defined.
3. That in reference to which a pronoun can be
used is substance, presented as something to be
differentiated.
[Pronouns can do one of two things. Some merely de¬
note things in general, like K sarva \ Others denote particular
things like ‘ anyatara It is the former which are used to
refer to substance. In fact, that is just the characteristic
124 VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
of substance, namely, that it can be referred to by a pro¬
noun (sarvandmapratyavamarsayogyatvam ). Pronouns re¬
fer to things in general either as present or as past. When
the element of present or past is discarded, what remains is
just the thing in general and that is substance. It is present¬
ed as something to be qualified by such limiting factors as
the universal. What is meant by ‘presented’ is that what is
being defined is not external reality, but reality as presented
by words. Thus, even a universal, when presented as some¬
thing to be qualified, becomes substance. This conception
of substance is quite different from that of other schools. In
this way, anything can be presented by words as substance,
as something to be differentiated. This is true of the other
conception also, namely, that of Vajapyayana who held that
all words denote the universal i.e. something which is the
cause of the same cognition arising and the same word being
applied to something. Such a universal exists in action
also. That is why we cognise every step in the pro¬
cess of cooking as cooking. If only the last stage in
the process, that is, the softening of the substance
cooked, were the meaning of the root ‘to cook’ (pac ),
then the other stages would have to be understood
through inference or implication and would not be the
actions of the cook. If the activity of the agent is not ex¬
pressed by the root, but is understood by inference or impli¬
cation, then there would be no connection between the mean¬
ing of the suffix, namely, the agent and his activity which
would not be expressed by the root but only understood by
implication. If the root ‘pac’ denotes only the softening of
the material (viklitti ), then the material can only be kcirta
or kcmnakarta , but never the object. In other words, we
would never be able to say — devadattcih odanam pacati.
Secondly the softening is only the last stage or moment. So
it cannot be the action at all. Action is a process of which
the parts are arranged in a sequence. The action of cooking
is in the same position. Such moments as putting the vessel
on the fire must be part of that process, because at these
jnoments also ..we get-the idea of cooking. So there is such
in. 4.3
125
a thing as the universal of cooking inhering in every moment
of the process. This is true of all actions. Even though
every verb denotes the universal aspect of action, the acces¬
sories become connected with the individual aspect which
is something to be accomplished ( sddhya ) and only sddhya
can be connected with ‘ sadhana ' (the means).
Just as it has been shown that action is a universal, it
can also be shown that it is a substance. Even according
to the view that the verb denotes action primarily, it must
denote substance, that is, the accessory secondarily. Other¬
wise, in regard to what would action be the primary mean¬
ing? Would it not be simpler to say that the verb denotes
primarily the accessory in activity? Even according to the
other view, the accessory comes in secondarily. Otherwise,
the expression ‘devadattah pacali where the word expressive
of action and the word expressive of accessory are in appo¬
sition to each other, would be inexplicable. Action, the
meaning of the verb, can be referred to by a pronoun, charac¬
teristic of substance. In the expression c sadhu joacati’ we
see that the meaning of the verb is modified or differentiated
by the word ‘sadhu’. Similarly, the verb ‘dsyate’ can be
qualified by the word ‘sukham’ and so its meaning becomes
‘bhedya’, a characteristic of substance, as stated in the verse
under consideration.
The Mimamsakas argue that the verb expresses ‘bring¬
ing about’ ( bhdvand ) and that substance is understood by
implication only and is not the expressed meaning of the
verb. This is wrong. It is the root which expresses blid-
vand. The suffix denotes the accessory. Thus the former
expresses the sddhya and the latter the ‘ sadhana’ and that
is how the two are correlated. If ‘ sadhana’ is understood
only by implication, there would be no relation between
-the two]..
_ ^ Now the definition of quality (gfitna), based on indica-
. tions found in the sastra, is being given.
126
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
Section 5
ON QUALITY (GUNA)
1. Whatever rests on something else ( samsargi)
differentiates it ( bhedaka) and is understood in that
function ( savydpara ), is, being dependent, called
quality’ in the sastra.
[Quality is said to rest on its substratum, because the
forms of the two are mixed up, as it were. That is why it
distinguishes its substratum from other substrata. The
force of the repetition of the relative pronoun (yad yad) is
that anything, even a universal, can become a quality, if it
is understood as something which distinguishes the substra¬
tum. This is the implication of the M.Bhd. on Vci 21 on P. 2.1.1.
This definition of guna follows worldly notions. Va 5 on
P. 5.1.119 also stands for the worldly notion of guna. That
varttika says something about the meaning of the suffixes
‘ tva’ and ‘taV when added to stems. If the stem stands for
something to be distinguished (visesya), these suffixes ex¬
press the distinguishing quality (visesana ). When a stem
like ‘go’ stands for the individual characterised by class or
universal, the suffix added to it stands for the class or uni¬
versal. When the stem stands for the class only, then the
suffix stands for the form of the word itself. That the form
of the word also is the expressed sense of the word has al¬
ready been explained. It can also be looked upon as a qua¬
lity which qualifies the meaning of the stem. It is super¬
imposed on it, it is identified with it. When a stem like
‘sukla’ stands for the individual qualified by the quality
‘white’ the suffix ‘tva’ added to it stands for the quality. If
the stem stands for the quality the suffix denotes the uni¬
versal inhering in it. If it stands for the universal, the suffix
stands for the form of the word as before. Even when the
suffix ‘tva’ is applied to a proper name like ‘Dittha’, it de¬
notes the universal, that element which persists in the indi¬
vidual named, through all the changes which he undergoes.
III. 5.1
127
In words like rdjapurusatva, pdcakatva, aupagavatva, the suf¬
fix denotes relation. The word rajapurusa’ denotes a person
qualified by a relation with the king and the suffix denotes
that relation. In ‘ hastitva 9 and kumbhakaratva’ the suffix
denotes classes, relation being the basis of the formation of
the stem itself. From all this, it is clear that in P. 5.1.119,
the word l bhdva’ stands for something which qualifies some¬
thing else, due to which a thing appears as what it is (b7ia-
vaty asmdt tenakdrena clravyam iti ). This conception of
quality ( guna ) has been adopted by the Science of Gram¬
mar. Sometimes, however, rules have been framed on the
basis of other notions of quality. For example, P. 4.1.44.
.Mere the word ‘gunavacana’ means a word expressive of sub¬
stance to which an attribute is subordinate and the feminine
suffix comes after such a word. The word guna’ in this stitra
cannot mean what is defined in the present verse because
then the feminine suffix would have to be added even to a
word expressive of the universal. It stands for the Vaisesika
notion of guna, mentioned in the verse “sattve nivisate” etc.
given in the M.Bhd. under P. 4.1.44. This definition would
not include the universal. The other verse given in M.Bhd.
under P. 4.1.44, namely, ‘upaity anyaj jahdty anyad ’ etc. also
gives the Vaisesika definition of guna. According to some,
these two verses are not meant to define ‘guna’ but to say
what kind of word ‘gunavacana’ is. M.Bhd. on P. 1.4.1. denies
the name 'gunavacana' to a compound word, a word ending
in a primary or secondary suffix, a pronoun, an indeclinable,
a proper name and a word expressive of universal. It is a
word which denotes a thing qualified by an attribute. After
such a word, the suffix ‘syan’ can come according to P. 5.1.124.
Thus, this siitra is also based on the Vaisesika conception of
guna, though not in a consistent manner.
In P. 5.2.94 and P. 8.1.12, a word which denotes a thing
to which a quality is subordinate, is gunavacana. For exam¬
ple, the word ‘sukla’ which means not ‘white’ but ‘that which
is white’. Or the word ‘patu’ which does not mean cleverness,
but one who is clever. A word which denotes quality only is
not ‘ gunavacana’. For example, ‘kdrsnyam’. In P. 5.2.47 the
128
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
word guna stands for an equal part. The meaning of the
word ‘guna’ in P. 2.2.11 has to be clarified. The vdrttikas
tatsthais ca gunaili and c na tu tadvisesanaih’, given under
P. 2.2.8 must be taken together with P. 2.2.11. In the last
siitra, the compounding of a word ending in the genitive case
affix with a word expressive of guna is prohibited. There
the word guna is used in the Vaisesika sense. So we cannot
have a compound word for kdkasya karsnyam’. This prohi¬
bition is set aside in some cases. Words express guna in two
ways. Sometimes they present it as quite separate from
the thing in which it exists as in candanasya gandhah \ We
cannot say ‘candancim gandluth’ because the word ‘gandhah’
denotes smell itself and not smell as existing in sandal wood.
When we say ‘suklah patah’ the word ‘sukla’ denotes ‘white’
as an attribute of cloth. It means something that is white
and not whiteness itself. ‘Gandhah’ is what is called ‘tatstha
guna’ that is, guna which is presented as something separate
from its substratum. A word ending in the sixth case affix
can be compounded with such a word. That is why we can
say: candanagandhah . A word which presents a quality
sometimes as separate and sometimes as one with its sub¬
stratum cannot be compounded. We can say ‘patasya suklah’
and ‘suklah patah \ In the former expression ‘white’ is pre¬
sented as something separate; in the latter, it is presented
as existing in the cloth. Therefore, we cannot have the com¬
pound word patasukla. So the word ‘guna’ in P. 2.2.11 means,
not a word which means a thing to which a quality is
subordinate, but a word which presents a quality as some¬
thing separate and independent, though elsewhere it might
be dependent. In Va. 1. on P. 2.2.7 and in P. 5.3.58, the
word guna has the Vaisesika sense. In P. 6.2.155, it has the
meaning given to it in the present verse. From all this it
follows that the meaning of the word guna varies in the
sdstra and that the meaning given to it in the present verse
is the special grammarian’s meaning.]
Here certain doubts arise. Why is it that only quality
admits of degree and not the thing itself? How is it that
when degree is expressed in regard to quality, degree in
III. 5. 2-5
129
regard to the thing is also understood? How can one say
that everywhere some quality is present which brings about
difference of degree in the thing, considering that qualities
cannot have qualities, universals cannot have universals and
actions can have no qualities? How can excellence in one
thing bring about excellence in something else? An attempt is
made in the following verses to remove some of these doubts.
2. Whatever distinguishing quality is adopted to
determine a thing which is otherwise indeterminable,
any excellence caused by it is expressed (by the
suffix).
[A thing cannot be determined except with the help of
its quality. If a thing cannot even be determined in its own
form, there cannot be any degree in it except through some
quality or other. Through it, a thing can be distinguished
from other things. Only that quality can distinguish which
is actually mentioned, and not those which are understood.
There are too many of the latter and one would not know
which one to take. Degree comes as a kind of excellence of
the meaning of the stem and only that which is expressed can
be the meaning of the stem and degree in it is expressed by
the suffix. In this verse, the word guna stands for the notion
defined in the previous verse. Even a stick can be a quality,
because it can distinguish one with it from one who does
not have it.]
It is now stated that just as difference in degree in a
thing cannot exist except through a quality, in the same way,
when a word presents an attribute as apart from the thing
in which it exists, as something independent, difference in
degree in it can be expressed only through another quality.
3. Without a distinguishing quality, that which is
(presented as) the main thing cannot admit of degree
nor come within the range of words.
V-m. 17
i30. VAKYAPADI^AM Otf BHARTHHARI
[That quality through which it comes within the range
of words is the very one through which difference of degree
is also expressed. The universal becomes the cause of some¬
thing being expressed by words, but not of difference of
degree in it, because it exists everywhere in the same degree.
It does not admit of difference in degree. It exists from the
very time when a thing comes into existence. So some other
quality co-existing in a thing with the universal, becomes
the cause of difference of degree in it. Similarly, when a
word presents a quality as the main thing, difference in
degree in it can be expressed only through another quality,
as in ‘suklataram rupam 9 where it is some such quality as
‘brightness’ ( bhdsuratva ), or purity ( vaimalya ) through
which degree is expressed. If brightness is presented as
something independent, that is, as a thing, it would require
another quality to express degree in it, as in bhasuratara .
The idea has already been set forth in Vak. 1.64.]
It is now declared that ‘brightness’ is actually conveyed
by the word ‘sukla’.
4. All the attributes present in the (main) thing
do not serve to distinguish it. They are conveyed by
special words expressive of some distinguishing mark.
[It cannot be said that ‘brightness’ through which degree
is expressed is not directly conveyed by the word * sukla ’.
The fact is that there is no one word which can express all
the distinguishing qualities which exist in a thing. Each word
expresses only one of them. Difference of degree can be
expressed only through an attribute actually expressed by
the word. ‘Brightness’ is actually expressed by the word
‘sukla’. This word cannot be applied to any object which
is not bright. If we say ‘suklatara’, it is because there is a
greater degree of brightness. Therefore, one must assume
that ‘brightness’ is actually conveyed by the word ‘sukla’.]
The very attribute which brings an object within the
range of words can also be the cause of the expression of
degree.
III. 5. 5-7
131
5. If a special attribute is useful only for making
a thing namable, then difference of degree would re¬
main without a cause to make it known, as there would
be no restriction (as to which other attribute should
do it).
[One cannot argue that, even though a thing may come
within the range of words through some attribute, the latter
cannot serve to express degree also. If it serves only to
bring the object within the range of words, then we would
see difference of degree being expressed through some other
attribute such as weight. But that is not what happens. We
understand difference of degree through the first attribute
itself as in ' suklatarci\ Therefore, we must conclude that the
very attribute which gives something a name serves also* to
express degree in it.]
It is now explained how expressions like nikrstatarah
;prakrstatarah 5 are possible.
6. Everything can differ in degree from everything
else (of the same kind) either on the basis of an attri¬
bute of inferiority or of superiority.
[When there is excellence of that which is the cause of
something coming within the range of words, there is excel¬
lence of the thing itself. When the cause is of an inferior
nature, the degree relates to inferiority and when it is of a
suerior nature, it relates to sueriority. Thus within the same
kind, there can be difference of degree.]
Expressions like ‘gotarc i’ are now being explained.
7. If the object does not require a basis ( nimitta)
for the expression of degree, its mention, when degree
is to be expressed, would be useless.
[In the expression gotara, difference in degree cannot be
due to the universal and there is no word expressive of any
132
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
quality. Difference in degree is, however, understood. Why
then insist that in i suklatara 3 it is understood through a
quality? The fact is that it cannot be understood from the
object itself. And if the attribute also is not the basis of
the cognition of degree, there would be no point in mention¬
ing it. But it is actually mentioned in suklatara . The reason
is that the attribute is the basis of the difference in degree.
In suklatara the attribute is brightness. In c gotara y , it would
be some such attribute as superiority in carrying loads or in
giving milk.]
8. Therefore, quality, performing its function
( savyapara ) and based on its own difference in degree,
involves the object ( dravya ) also in such difference
and distinguishes it from others.
[The object, in itself, does not admit of any degree.
Therefore, quality, by expressing quality within itself, serves
to distinguish its substratum from others.]
It is now stated how difference of degree in one thing
results in difference of degree in another.
9. Just as the formless object is expressed through
the form of another (its quality), in the same way,
being itself devoid of difference in degree, it acquires
it through such a difference in its quality.
[An object, in isolation from its attributes, cannot come
within the range of speech. When qualified by an attribute
it can be expressed in words. It is also difficult to distinguish
a thing from its attribute. Therefore, excellence of the attri¬
bute results in the excellence of the object. It is not confined
to its own excellence, isolated from the object, nor to that
of the object, isolated from its attribute.]
III. 6. 1-3
133
Section 6
ON POSITION (DIRECTION)
1. The words Direction (dik), Means ( sadhanam)
Action ( kriya ) and Time (Kola), (if taken) as expres¬
sive of things, would not refer to their nature as poweis
of things.
[Words like Direction (Dik) convey a meaning which is
an attribute of things having an independent character. They
do not express independent things. The four words Direction,
Means, Action and Time stand for power, capacity and not
for independent entities. They are dependent on something
else. The Vaisesikas look upon Dik as an independent entity,
a dravya. That is not right. It is something to be inferred
from its effect, from the service which it renders to positive
entities. Words which express an accomplished thing cannot
convey it directly. Its definition must be made on the basis
of indications in the sdstra as in P. 5.3.27.]
The definition of Direction (Dik), based on inference,
is as follows:
2-3. Direction is that power which is the cause
of the opposition of the limit ( avadhi) and the limited
( pratipddya) of the cognition of straight without the
help of anything else, of the manifestation of the minor
universals of action and which is divided through its
contingents.
[We make statements like this: ‘This is to the east of
that’, ‘this is to the west of that’. Here, ‘that’ is the start¬
ing point and ‘this’ is what is determined by it One has
to exolain such expressions. It is the notion of Direction
(dik)'which explains them. Universals etc. which exist in
objects cannot explain them. As we have to infer its nature
from its effects and as, in linguistic expressions, it always
134
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
appears as an attribute of something else and not as some¬
thing independent, we conclude that it is a power. The same
is true of Time and Inherence. When we say ‘this bamboo
is straight’, we are giving expression to a cognition which
does not involve the notion of limit ( avadhi ) and limited
(avadhimat) and does not depend on something else. It is
caused by the notion of Direction. The idea of something
being bent can also be explained by the same notion only.
It is this very notion which manifests universals like
bhramanatva’ and ' utksepanatva’ which exist in particular
actions like ‘turning’ and ‘raising’. This Direction is one, but
due to particular associations it is looked upon as ten in
number. That particular region which is in contact with the
sun daily at the beginning of the day is called the East. The
West, the North and the South are similarly named. The
intermediate regions are called by their respective names
because of the association of the Sun with the regions looked
after by the Guardians. A particular association with the Sun
is the auxiliary cause which brings about the apparent divi¬
sion of what is One.]
4. The notion of ‘ first ’ and ‘ next ’ in regard to
concrete limited objects is based on regional distinction.
The notion of earlier and later, consisting of sequence,
arises on account of time.
[Form (■ murti ) means measurement of things which are
limited in extent. Things having form are here referred to
as concrete and limited (murta ). The all-pervasive entities
such as space ( dkdsa) has no prior-posterior distinction. It
is about limited objects that we use such expression as ‘first’
and ‘next’ on the basis of their contact with the first or the
next region. Priority or posteriority of a region is based on
Direction. The notion of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ amounts to
sequence which is an effect of the Time-Power of Brahman.
Thus Direction and Time are two distinct things.]
It is now pointed out that immaterial things can also have
artificial distinctions of priority and posteriority.
ill. 6 . 5
135
5. Direction becomes the basis ( apadhi ) for the
contacts and separations of Space with its divisions and
of parts of other objects with them.
[Even all-pervasive entities can have artificial divisions
such as ‘first’ and ‘next’ or ‘farther’ and ‘nearer’. It has al¬
ready been pointed out that space can have artificial divisions
on the basis of objects which are in contact with it. This
contact takes place in a particular region ( desa ). That region
is an artificial division of space. There is contact between
such regions and parts of the objects which are on them.
These objects are also described as ‘first’ or ‘next’ and ‘farther’
or ‘nearer’ on the basis of such a description of the divisions
of space. Direction becomes the basis for the contact between
objects.]
Remarks . The words Akdsa, Dik and Desa occur in the
V dkyapadiya. It is, therefore, necessary to try to understand
the three notions for which they stand. In Vaisesika, Akdsa
and Dik come under the category of Substance. The former
is defined as that Substance which is the substratum of the
quality called sound. It is an all-pervading substance and is
the medium for the propagation of sound. It is usually
translated as ‘ether’. It fills the whole of Space and is, there¬
fore, different from it. In the Upanisads, however, Akdsa
often means Space itself and not a substance which fills space.
In the Vdkyapadiya Akdsa is looked upon as One without
any real division of its own. In this sense, it is equal to space.
That is why it is in contact with all the objects of the world
to which it provides room or accommodation. Helaraja
actually says that akdsa is so called because it provides room
(avakdisa) to everything: avakdsaddndddhi taddkdsam. (Vak.
III. Ja. 15). Even though One, it can be looked upon as many
in terms of the various objects of the world which occupy
space. The space occupied by each object is a part or a
a portion of the one Space. Each of these parts or portions
is a region (desa) within Space. Moreover, these regions
have a position in the scheme of things. We can say of a
particular region that it is to the right of an object or to the
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF BHARTRHARI
left of- it. There is something which is the cause of such
notions as right and left and that is called Dik (Direction).
According to the Vakyapadiya, it is not a separate entity.
It is only a power or capacity of what is real. To say,
t erefore, that Bhartrhari does not make any distinction
between Akasa and Dik would not be correct. Akasa is Space
and Dik is position or Direction. In this translation, I have
used the word Direction for Dik.
6. Regions are regulated through Direction and
nothing regulates ‘Direction. Powers of objects are
postulated on the basis of the service which they
render.
natule a region is to he the substratum of things.
Whatever distinction of priority or posteriority there is among
regions cannot arise out of their own nature. That depends
upon some other factor and that is called Dik. Thus, we
postulate the existence of Dik because of the service which
it renders. Being a power it rests on something else
(panitantra). That being so, there cannot be another power
to regulate it. If another power is postulated, Direction (Dik)
would cease to be ‘power’, because it would become ‘saktimal’,
the one having power. The quality of being prior, posterior
etc. is inherent in Dik. Contact with the Sun only manifests
it.]
7. What is called the East is something imposed
on objects. That due to which the notion of priority
arises is Direction. Otherwise, it would be a mere
name.
[What is called East is an attribute imposed on objects.
It is because of Direction that things are talked of as being
in the cast or as being ‘prior’. If it is not so regarded, it would
be a mere name, there being no independent entity like that.
So it should be looked upon as a power, postulated on the
basis of its effects.]
in. 6. 8-9 137
It is now shown that expressions like prior and posterior
cannot be based on one’s own body.
8. The Directions would not be fixed if they were
based on one’s body. What is behind when one faces
west would be in front when one faces the other way.
[It has been said so far that Dik has to be postulated in
order to explain the notions of the prior, posterior, etc. But
cannot they be explained in relation to one’s own body? What
is in front of one’s body would be ‘prior’ (p urva) and what
is behind would be posterior (p ascdt). We also use such
expressions as luistadaksina and luistavama (M. Bha. I. p. 118,
1. 23.) to designate what is on our right or on our left, showing
that our own body can be the basis of the expression. This
view is not correct, because there would be no fixity in our
notions of piirva, para etc., because one would be constantly
changing the position which one faces. Therefore, it is better
to accept the view that notions of priority and posteriority
are based on Dik which has come down from time immemorial.]
9. The determination of the regions is not based
on the notion of Directions ( diksu ). One does refer to
as ‘piirva’ what has been long known as apara.
[It has been stated that the notions of East, West etc.
are based on Dik (Direction). Here a difficulty arises. Some¬
times we apply the term ‘piirva’ to what from the point of
view of Dik, is ‘pdscdtya’. When we face west, the region in
front of us is in the west but we use the expression ‘purva
for it. When one goes from the South ( Daksinapatha) to the
Eastern country, one is said to go to ‘purva’, but he is really
going north ( uitara). Thus, it is clear that we sometimes use
the expressions purva, para etc. without meaning Dik by
them. In other words, the notions of ‘purva’ (in front) and
pascdt (behind) are not based on Dik. The remark of the
M. Bha. on ‘purvasmin dese vasati’ confirms this. The M. Bha.
is trying to explain why the suffix ‘ asldli’ cannot come after
V-II1. 18
VAK YAP ADI YAM OF 13HARTRHARI
the word ‘purva’ in ‘parvasviin dese vasali \ Tlie reason is
that the suffix in question is taught after words like purva
when they directly express desa (region) whereas, in the
expression in question, the word ‘purva' is only an adjective
qualifying the word ‘desa’ which is the word expressive of
region. The word ‘purva’ is not a ‘diksabda’ expressive of
‘desa’ as required by the sutra P. 5.3.27. Those who maintain
that the word here specifies the particular direction ( digvi -
sesdvaccheda) where the region is, are wrong. The conclusion
is that in applying the words purva etc. to Dik, there is no
upadhi or underlying notion, because they are rudhi words,
that is, words based on immemorial usage. In applying the
words to desa (regions), dik (direction) is the underlying
notion.]
It is now shown that this conclusion is supported by the
M. Bha.
10. It is because the words ( daksina and uttara )
have not the same meaning when they are in the mas¬
culine gender that they cannot take the masculine form
(pumvadbhdva) . In this sense (of dik), the masculine
gendei ( prasavah ) is never expressed by the words.
[That is why there cannot be assumption of the mascu¬
line form by the words daksind and uttara when the suffix
‘atasuc’ (P. 5.3.28) is added to them. These two words have
a masculine form also, but with a difference in meaning. When
they are masculine, they express ‘vyavastlid’ and not dik.
Unless the meaning is absolutely the same whether the word
be masculine or feminine, there cannot be assumption of the
masculine form (pumvadbhdv a). If it is held that even when
these words express Direction (dik), the idea of vyavastlid
(limit, mutual requirement, starting-point) is present, there
would still be difference between ‘diksabda’ and desasabda .]
11. Words like purva are invariably used in the
sense of Direction (Dik). It is like the word sasti (in
III. 6. 12
139
the word sastika ) which denotes time when duration
of life is measured.
[The words East (Purva), etc., are applied to the direction
(Dik ) irrespective of any other implication. But when they
are applied to the Regions or to the divisions of Time, they
are based on ‘vyavastha’ (mutual requirement). When applied
to Directions, these words are really proper names. The notion
of limit or mutual requirement may be there in a completely
hidden form. In the expression ‘purvo gliatah’ the word
‘ghata’, conveys its own meaning and the word ‘purva’ pro¬
vokes the question: in relation to what? Thus there is a clear
difference between purva, etc. as applied to Direction and as
applied to the Regions and the Divisions of Time. Because
of resemblance, they appear to be the same. But they cannot
be the same. What is based on mere immemorial usage cannot
be the same as something based on a cause. In the case of
Regions and Time, the words only look like diksabda but are
really not so. Such words are used in a fixed meaning. It
is like the word sasti in sastika. Though a numeral, it denotes
time here without the help of any other word, by mere usage.
Similarly, purva, etc., denote Directions (Dik) by long usage,
even though they may denote vyavastha elsewhere. That is
why they are not ‘bhdsitapuviska ’.]
12. (It is on account of Direction that) division
based on light and shade is possible in mountains etc.
Such a division is not possible in things which do not
have that attribute.
[Another effect of what is called Dik is that things like
mountains seem to be illuminated by the light of the sun on
one side and to be covered with darkness on another. Without
Dik this division of parts would not be possible. It serves as
an indication for the inference of Dik.)
140
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
13. It is through Dik that division is made in the
indivisible atom. That indeed has been declared to be
the first power for effecting all division.
[Division of parts in limited material objects is due to
Direction (Dik ). Even in atoms which are supposed to be
indivisible, one can imagine four sides, a top and a bottom on
the basis of Dik. Other atoms can come into contact with
these six parts and produce such things as binaries etc. It
is because of this division into parts from the very beginning,
that it continues in all the later products. So division of all
material objects into parts in ihe first service which Dik ren¬
ders. Some explain this and the previous verse as follows : —
‘In all divisible objects, division into parts is due to light
and shade. In all indivisible objects like the atom, division
is imaginarv and it is brought about by Dik." What they mean
is this: Where there is some basis for the division of parts
such as light and shade as in the case of divisible objects, that
is the basis of the division. Where there is none as in the
case of indivisible objects like atoms, there it is Dik which is
the cause of such division. But all this is wrong. It is due to
Dik that division in any object is possible, not merely in the
indivisible atom.]
14. Objects are (in themselves) without regions,
divisions, sequence and contingencies. Variation in
their power takes place because of difference in their
associations.
[Why not assume that things have a special disposition
of parts in their own nature? Why bring in Dik to explain
this? The answer is: Things like * dkdsa which are all-
pervasive have no divisions at all. Material wholes have no
divisions which are part of their own nature. In both cases,
parts are artificially made. If they have no parts, there can¬
not be any question of sequence of these parts. Because
of difference in their associations, they seem to have varia-
III. 6. 15-16
141
tion of power and so appear to have divisions and sequence.
In the same way, when divisions in them are brought about
by Diky we describe them as prior and posterior.]
It is now explained how visible material wholes are really
partless.
15. Indivisibility is the same in an atom and in a
jar. What is called their division is only a power and
so is their dimension.
[One might here ask: ‘One does see objects like jars,
associated with different regions, having visible parts and
magnitude. How can they be looked upon as indivisible? The
answer is this: A jar and an atom are alike in that neither
has any parts in its own nature. Divisions having sequence
are imagined in them on the basis of the power called Dik.
These parts are not different from the wholes. Because of
the relation of inherence ( samavdya )) between the whole and
the parts, they do not appear to be different from one another.
If objects had parts in their own nature their unity would
be destroyed. Division based on association with an exter¬
nal thing is not real division. Otherwise, even the atom would
become divisible. Nor can one say that division is real
because it is caused by dimension. Dimension is a power
and it is the cause of the cognition of the ‘smallness’ or
‘bigness’ of things.]
16. That by which a division is made is also sus¬
ceptible of division. And a division which has no end
has been said to be improper.
Remark. The last iicida of this verse, printed c ato
yuktataram viduh' should really read as e ato’ yuktataram
viduh. There is elision of the initial ‘a’ of ‘ayuktataram’.
[No division artificially made through an external factor
is part of the nature of a thing. An artificially made part
142
VAKYAPADIYAM OF BHARTRHARI
can also be artificially divided into further parts, until one
reaches the atom. Even there, one can imagine parts on the
basis of Dik. Unless Dik itself has parts, it cannot cause parts
in other things. Divisions in Dik are based on association
with the Sun. Association with the Sun is based on differences
in the regions of Mount Meru and that also on something
else. There would be no end to this process. Division which
does not come to an end is unacceptable. Thus things are
indivisible in themselves and they are divided on the basis
of limiting external factors. All divisions have, therefore,
only a relative reality.]
17. Because its effects can be seen everywhere, it
is said to be all-pervasive. Its all-pervasiveness consists
just in this. It is otherwise with corporeal things.
[The effects of Dik, previously explained are found
everywhere. That is why it is said to be all-pervasive. The
all pervasiveness of immaterial things consists just in their
producing effects everywhere, whereas that of material
corporeal things consists in their occupying extensive space
with their parts.']
18. The assumption of the existence of Direction
(Dik) and Time (Kola) is as established as that of
Consciousness. Who indeed would order otherwise
that which is the very nature of living beings?
[Even a thing which exists is as good as non-existent if
it is not cognised, because it cannot fulfil any purpose.
Consciousness is, therefore, accepted by all disputants. The
self is of the nature of consciousness. Similarly, Direction
and Time are based on our cognitions. As explained before,
things have neither difference nor identity, neither existence
nor non-existence. They appear in many colours on account
of beginningless avidyd. All experiences take place in time
and direction. Otherwise they would not lead to any pur-
III. 6. 19-20 143
poseful activity. It is the nature of beings (pralcrtim
prdnindm ) to have experiences in dik and fcala.]
19. There would be confusion of activities if this
nature were not accepted. Therefore, even while
abandoning these things, one has again recourse to them.
[If this conception of Dik and Kdla is not accepted, if this
assumption of Dik and Kdla which has become our nature
is abandoned, there would be confusion in regard to the
observance of Vedic injunctions. Even though the Universe
is without sequence spatially and temporally, still even one
who knows the truth must act on the basis of the assump¬
tion of Dik and Kdla. Even he can cognise things only as
having sequence.]
It is now stated that Dik performs a function parallel to
that of Kdla.
20. From that Power, distinctions such as East etc.
arise on the basis of association with other things.
Thus differentiated, Dik brings about differentiation in
the cognition of things.
[Just as Time, the power of Brahman, exercising the
functions of permission and prevention, brings about tempo¬
ral sequence, in the same way Dik is also the cause of the
notion of spatial sequence among objects, due to association
with other things. By ‘other things’, contacts with the sun
are meant. Dik brings about cognitions of objects as quali¬
fied by itself. It is then that Dik which is One, appears to
be many.]
The result of the notion of Dik in grammar is now set
forth.
144 VAKYAPADIYAM OP BHARTRHARI
21. When the idea of limit (starting point) is to
be expressed it is the ablative of position which is used.
When some other idea (as that of part and whole) is
to be expressed, it is the genitive case which is seen as
in: ‘the upper part of this’ (purvam asya ).
€
[Certain operations in grammar are based on the notion
of Dik. In the world, there is the idea of limit: ‘this is on
the east of that’ and so on. There one uses the ablative case.
Where some other idea such as that of part and whole is to
be expressed, the genitive case is used according to P. 2.2.1.]
It is now explained why the notion of prior and posterior
is not based on one’s own body.
22. Where there is no confusion in regard to the
limit, there cannot be any mistake in the use of the ex¬
pressions prior (or east) etc. Nor does an indication
like the expression 'this is straight’ become false.
[Where there is fixity in regard to the starting point,
there is no confusion in the meaning of words like prior,
eastern etc. Notions of prior etc. if based on Dik (Direction)
are fixed. What is prior to (to the east of) something cannot
be posterior to (or to the west of) the same thing. Also,
such an expression as ‘the base of this bamboo is straight’ is
a clear indication of the notion of Dik and is not liable to
confusion. It does not depend on any notion of starting-
point. If it did, there might be occasion for confusion. If
one has to have a starting point, it is better to take contacts
of the Sun as such.]
It is now stated that Dik is something internal,
23. It is an internal function ( dharma ) which ap¬
pears to be external. Or rather, according to this mode
of thought, there is neither internal nor external.
III. 6. 24-25
145
[According to those who hold that it is an internal
function, me universe is maniiested witmn me consciousness
liseu, tnougn on account ot an eternal metaphysical limita¬
tion, it appears to be external to it. Dik is in the same posi¬
tion. It is something which exists within. There is noiiimg
corresponding to it outside. In fact, notions of internal ana
external are relative. In reality, there is neither the one
nor the other. Notions such as prior and posterior proceed
from aviclya. There is no such thing as Dik as an external
entity.]
It is now stated that it is really useless to discuss whether
Dik is one or many.
24. Knowing that the notion of unity and plura¬
lity in regard to these powers are speculative and have
no relation to the thing itself, one must not take them
to be real.
[The powers of Dik are primarily one but appear to be
many due to association. Or they are primarily many, being
eternal and inferred from their many effects. Both these
views are only speculations and have no relation to the thing
itself. One must not take them to be real.]
25. In regard to objects whose reality is beyond
speculations, the world follows the usages based upon
conventions.
[Things in the world are quite different from what the
different thinkers ( tirthika ) speculate them to be. They
obviously cannot have the contradictory characteristics which
thinkers attribute to them. Therefore, one has to follow the
usages based on convention. Even thinkers have to do it.
This applies to the ten Directions (Dik) current in the world.]
V-11I. 19
146 VAKYAPADIYAM OP BHARTRHARI
26. There is no unity and no multiplicity and with¬
out unity there cannot be multiplicity. In reality, there
is no difference between the two.
[If things are mutually dependent, the disproving of one
would disprove the other. Thus neither multiplicity nor unity
of Dik would stand examination. Worldly usage is based
upon what appears to the mind. In reality, both multiplicity
and unity are unreal.]
It is now stated that unity and multiplicity cannot be
predicated of Power.
27. There is not the same difference between the
powers as between objects having power. Nor is
there any worldly unity in their nature.
[Objects having power can be cognised as something
distinct. But powers which can only appear as resting and
dependent upon their substrata, do not appear as distinct
from one an